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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STACEY GROVE,
SUPREME COURT NO. 43537
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

· ct~RK'S RECORD·

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County bf Nez Perce

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

Counsel for Respondent

Counsel for Appellant

Mr. Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010·

Ms. Sara B. Thomas
State Appellate PD
PO Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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User: BDAVENPORT

Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

9/7/2012

NCPC

KATHY

New Case Filed-Post Conviction Relief

Carl B. Kerrick

ATTR

TERESA

Plaintiff: Grove, Stacey Lewis Attorney Retained
Dennis Benjamin

Carl 8. Kerrick

PETN

TERESA

Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA

Affidavit of Stevie Grove in Support of Verified
Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA

Affidavit of Lori Stamper in Support of Verified
Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Carl 8. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA

Affidavit of Carol Grove in Support Verified
Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA·

· Affidavit of Lyn·ette Walton ·in Support Verified
Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA

Affidavit of Deborah Grove in Support V~rified
Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA

·· Affidavit of J~ck Grove in SupportVerified·Petition Carl B. Kerrick
for pest Conviction Relief

ORDR

TERESA

. Order for Telephonic Scheduling Conference

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

TERESA

Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling
Conference 10/11/2012 10:45 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

9/19/2012

MISC

TERESA

B~~ue·~t for Juqicial Notice

Carl B. Kerrick

10/1/2012

AFFD

TERESA

Affidavit of Karen Stamper in Support of Verified
fcir
Post Conviction Relief
·
Petition
' . . .
·-. ., . .
Affidavit .qf ,Craig Stamper in Support of Verified
Petition for Post Conviction Relief
.

Carl B. Kerrick

9/13/2012

Judge

~

;

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA

MOTN

TERESA

M.9~ion
to ·_bra.~iare
Petitioner a Needy Person
. .. ,- ' . ,
..

Carl B. Kerrick

10/5/2012

MOTN

TERESA

rvtotion:fo~ Summary Disposition and Dismissal
a,nd.fo.SeJ
fqr Hearing.
·
..' '.:, .

Carl B. Kerrick

10/10/2012

MISC

TERESA

Objecti9n ,to ~tate's Motion for Summary, ..
Disposition ana. Motion for a More Definite'
Statement . . .
,

Carl B. Kerrick

10/11/2012

HRSC

TERESA

Sch~d{j1ed •. (Hearing: 12118/2012 11 :00
AM) TELEPHONIC Motion for Summary
Dispositioh . . . . '
.
.

_

"•

;

H~~~ng

Carl B. Kerrick

I

10/12/2012

10/15/2012

11/28/2012

TERESA

He~ring 'r~s~ltfor Telephonic Scheduling
Carl B. Kerrick
Conference·scheduled on 10/11/2012 10:45 AM:
Heari~ He1d"'--in chambers no court reporter
pre;;;ent, : .

TERESA

,Noti9e ~f Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

ORDR

TERESA

Order Granting Request for Judicial Notice

Carl B. Kerrick

ORDR

TERESA

Order· Grahting Motion to Declare Petitioner a
.Nee~y Perso.o ..

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

TERESA

Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA

Affidavit of Eric·Fredericksen

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA

Affi~avit of Diane Walker

HRHD

:T•

Carl B. Kerrick

2
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User: BDAVENPORT

Case: CV-2012-:-0001798- Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff -vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

12/10/2012

AFFD

TERESA

-Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin

Carl B. Kerrick

12/13/2012

AFFD

TERESA

Affidavit of Jonathan L. Arden MD

Carl B. Kerrick

12/18/2012

MISC

TERESA

Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
_Disposition---State

Carl B. Kerrick

ATTR

TERESA

Defendant: State of Idaho Attorney Retained
Nance Ceccarelli

Carl B. Kerrick

DCHH

TERESA

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
Carl B. Kerrick
12/18/2012 11:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estir:n~ted:
less. than
100
pages
"
.. " ,...
.
.

HRSC

TERESA

Hearing Scheduled - (Telephonic Status Conference -02/12/2013 11: 15 AM)

MINE

TERESA -

~

-Minute Entry
. Hearing zype: t\llotion for Summary
- ·rnspositfon1Dismissal
Hearing date: 12/18/20t2

Carl B. Kerrick
Carl B. Kerrick

,

1.

·nn'.u~: J):()tam
-- " Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape_N_umber: _CRTRM 1
Dennis· Benjamin

Nance: Ceccarelli
ORDR

TERESA

Order for Telephonic Status Conference

Carl B. Kerrick

STIP

TERESA

Sti~ulat~d Motion for Permission to Conduct
9iscovery' - i _ -

Carl B. Kerrick

ORDR

TERESA

Order Granting Stipulated Motion for Permission
to Conduct Discovery

Carl B. Kerrick

12/26/2012

MOTN

TERESA

1/2/2013

ORDR

TERESA

PETN

TERESA

Ex·
Motion to Authorize Payment of Costs
(FILED- UNDE_R SEAL)
.
':" ..
::.. ·
.
.
.
Document sealed
:·:.. :·''
Order Granting Ex Part~ Motion to Authorize
Payrryent of Costs (FILED UNDER SEAL)
Document sealed
Yerifieq Petition for Post Conviction

Aoi
e.r,:de~
Reli,~f -: .- i ·.

1/9/2013

NOTC

TERESA

Notice _of,Ta!<il'!Q Deposition

1/10/2013

MISC

TERESA

Amended Notice of Taking Deposition--petitioner Carl B. Kerrick
($~tt Ch~pman)

2/6/2013

MISC

TERESA

Answer arid Amended Motion for Summary
Di~position and Dismissal and to set for hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

2/11/2013

MOTN

TERESA

Petitione(s Renewed Motion for Summary
Disposition

Carl B. Kerrick

12/19/2012

P~rt~

Carl B. Kerrick

'

: .. --

.

Carl B. Kerrick

Carl B. Kerrick

.,

Carl B. Kerrick
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User: BDAVENPORT

Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

2/12/2013

DCHH

TERESA

MINE

TERESA

ORDR

TERESA .••

HRSC

TERESA

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument04130/2013
?1?0 ~M) __ •

MOTN

TERESA

ORDR

TERESA

3/15/2013

BRFD

JANET

Carl B. Kerrick
2nd Ex Parte Motion to Authorize Payment of
Costs-FILED UNDER SEAL
Document sealed
Order Granting 2nd· Ex Parte Motion to Authorize Carl B. Kerrick
Payment of Costs---FILED UNDER SEAL:
Document sealed
P~titi<;>h'¢rirBriefFiledin Response to Stat~·s
Carl B. Kerrick
Mo'tion)or'Suniinary Disposition and in Support of
Petiticinerr's Motion

3/20/2013

MOTN

TERESA

2/19/2013

Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference
scheduled on 02/12/2013 11:15 AM: District
CourtHearing Held
· Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
.
Numberof Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Carl B. Kerrick

Carl B. Kerrick

Minute Entry
Hearing type: tele status conf
Hearing date: 2/12/2013
Time: 11:17 am
Courtroom:
Cqurt reporter: Nancy Towler
" . ,·.:.)MmutesCierk: TERESA · · • ·
Tape Number:. CRTRM 1
Dennis B~njamin/Oebra Whipple
·•· ·. Nance Ceccarelli
· Order Sc;heduling Briefs and Argument

Carl B. Kerrick
Carl B. Kerrick

Ex

Parle Motion to Authorize Payment of
Carl B. Kerrick
3rd'
Cdsts~FILED
UNDER
SEAL
_,,. ;; ·,_, ~
'· -, ..·,:,; :, -.
Document sealed
Orqer: $ranting Ex Parte Motion to Authorize
Carl B. Kerrick
Paymentof..Costs-:--FILED.UNDER SEAL
Document sealed
.R.eply ·arief in· Support of State's Motion for
Carl B. Kerrick
$ummary Dispoi;ition and Response to
Petitioner's Briefin Support of Petitioner's Motion
for ~u111ma:ry (jispositiop .

..

'

3/22/2013

ORDR

TERESA

4/1/2013

MISC

TERESA

4/12/2013

AFFD

TERESA

Affiqqvit e>f.ArJd,re11V Parnes

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

TERESA

Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petitioner's
Motion for Summary Disposition

Carl B. Kerrick

AFFD

TERESA

2nd Affidavitof Dennis Benjamin

Carl B. Kerrick

.

:' (
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User: BDAVENPORT

Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho,- Defendant·
Date

Code

User

4/30/2013

MINE

TERESA

ADVS

TERESA

Hearing result for Oral Argument scheduled on
04/30/2013 01:30 PM: Case Taken Under
Advisement.

5/3/2013

AFFD

TERESA

Affidavit of;Stacey-Grove in Opposition to State's Carl B. Kerrick
Motion for Summary Disposition

5/8/2013

MOTN

TERESA

Motion to Strike---State

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

TERESA

o'bjecti6n to State's Motion to Strike--Petitioner

Carl B. Kerrick

7/11/2013

OPOR

TERESA

Opinion & Order on Motions for Summary
.Disposition· .

Carl B. Kerrick

8/9/2013

MOTN

TERESA

Motion for Reconsideration---Petitioner

Carl B. Kerrick

MISC

TERESA

,. -. Memor.andum in Support of Motion for. ..
Recansideration---Petitioner

Carl. B. Kerrick

9/3/2013

MISC

TERESA

9/5/2013

NOTC

Judge
Minute Entry
Hearing type:· Oral Argument
Hearing date: 4/30/2013
Time: 1:30 pm
Courtroom:
• ~ourt reporter: Nancy Towler
Mfnutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Dennis Benjamin
·Nance CeccarelH

...

10/9/2013

10/28/2013

/

.·-,:.

·:·-.·,'

·

.......

'

'

·.

Carl B. Kerrick

Carl B. Kerrick

·,

P~t[tionei$"Reply-_Memorandum in Support of

Carl B. Kerrick

TERESA

Nqtice pf; J"elephonic Hearing---Petitioner

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

TERESA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 1012212013 11 :oo
AM): PetitiOnar's )Jlotion for Reconsideration

Carl B. Kerrick

CONT

TERESA

Cpntinue~((Hearing 10/28/2013 10:00 AM)
Petitioner's f"!'lotion for Reconsideration

Carl B. Kerrick

TERESA

.Al'Jle.nded.
Notice Of Hearing
... .

Carl B. Kerrick

Mo~~n. tor::~,corisideration

'

MISC

BDAVENPORT Updated Authority ih Support of Motion for
Reconsideration

MINE

TERESA

Minute;Entry . ·
Hearing type; Motion to Reconsider
Hearing_ date; 1012a12013
Time: 10:62 am
·
courtroom:.
Cqurtr,porter: N~ncy i;-o~ler ..
M(r,.1Jte.s Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Dennis Benjall'iin · .
Nan.ce ·Ceccarelli ·

Carl B. Kerrick

ADVS

TERESA

fi"earing resultfor Hearing scheduled on
1'0/28/2015 1-0:00 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement .Petiti.oner's Motion for
R,econsideration

Carl B. Kerrick

-

•

:-• :"~

;

'

~- ----------- - -

Carl B. Kerrick
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Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

10/28/2013

DCHH

TERESA

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Carl B. Kerrick

11/21/2013

OPOR

TERESA

Opinion &. Order on Petitioner's Motion for
R.econsideration---DENI ED

Carl B. Kerrick

11/27/2013

MOTN

TERESA

· Petitioner's Motion for Permission for lnterlocutroy Carl B. Kerrick
Appeal

MISC

TERESA

Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Carl B. Kerrick
Permission for Interlocutory Appeal

12/3/2013

MOTN

TERESA·

12/4/2013

HRSC

TERESA

Motion Objecting to Petitioner's Motion for
:permission for Interlocutory Appeal
Hearing'Scheduled (Hearing 12/19/2013 10:45

Carl B. Kerrick
Carl B. Kerrick

. Al\,1) l;EJ...EP,HONIC OBJECTlQN T.0
. PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION
· FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL:·
TERESA.
12/19/2013

1/21/2014

3/14/2014
4/8/2014

4/14/2014

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

ADVS

TERESA. • . ·.

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
12/19/2013 10:45 AM: Case Taken Under
Advisement TELEPHONIC OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION
FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

MINE

TERESA

Minute Entry
Carl B. Kerrick
Hearing type: Mtri ~ermission Interlocutory Appeal
Hearing date:· 12/19/2013
·
Time:. 10:51 am
Courtroom,
Gou.rt reporter:
MiriJJtes·c1erk: TERESA
Tape Number:

ORDR

TERESA

0~~-e.(c:irariting _fVlot_ion f9r Perrpiss1on: for;'
Iriterlocutory Appe~I ·· . .

ORDR

DIANE.

Moti.on Requesting:Court to
Accept Appeal By Permission

o'rdi{o~~yiog

Carl B. Kerrick

STAT

DEANNA

Case·s.tatus
Changed: closed
. ·.•.
... _.;.

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

CHJG

SHELLIE

Change Assigned Judge (batch process). •.:

ORDR

TERESA

Ad;,,inistrativeOrderAssigning Judge-GASKILL Jay P. Gaskill DJ

ORDR

TERESA

Order for Telephonic Status Conference

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

HRSC

TERESA

He.aring Scl'leduled (Tefephonic St~tus
Gori.fer¢n~~ 04/29/2014 02:15 PM) · ·,

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

MOTN

JANET

S~ggesti~~:forVoluntary Disql,Jalificationi I• .•
Alternate.M9tiqn for Disqualification With Cause;
Sec;ond Alternative Motion for Disqualification
Without ·Cause

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of pounsel in Support of Disqualificau"on Jay P. Gaskill DJ

'

'''r··:

.

,.

,

.

....

•'

'

Carl B. Kerrick

Carl B. Kerrick

\•

6
•
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Second Judicial.-Oi~trict
Court - Nez. Perce County.,;.:.'.
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.,

~
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Case: CV-2012-'0001798 C·urrent Judge: Carl B. Kerrick'··
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

4/29/2014

ORDR

TERESA

· Order of Voluntary Disqualification for
Cause---GASKILL .

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

4/30/2014

ORAJ

TERESA

· Order Assigning Judge-CARL KERRICK
SENIOR JUDGE

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

CHJG

TERESA·

HRHD

TERESA

ORDR

TERESA

Order for Telephonic Status Conference

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

TERESA.

ti~ariog Scheduled (Status Conference
05/15/20.1410:45 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

BDAVENPORT

Misce.llaheous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Carl B. Kerrick
File Or ·Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
_Oepbi.e .M ~rove ReGeipt number: 0.0075€;)0
Dated: '5/2/2014 Amount: $3.00 (Ci:lsti) ' ' '

HRHD

JANET

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 05/15/2014 10:45 AM: Hearing Held

Carl B. Kerrick

HRSC

JANET

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 10/24/2014 09:00
AM) Evidentiary Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

CONT

JANET

Gontin4ed (Hearing 10/31/2014 OQ:00 AM)
Ev1dentiary, Hearing .
. . .
.

Carl B. Kerrick

MINE

JANET

fv.linute.~n.trY,.

Carl B. Kerrick

5/1/2014

5/2/2014

5/15/2014

5/16/2014

Carl B. Kerrick

Change A~signed Judge
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference
scheduled. on 04/29/2014 02:15 PM: Hearing
. Held...;~IN CHAMBERS NO COURT REPORTER
PRESENT

.

.

. ·.

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

li~~fin_g-;ty,pe: .Status Conference
Hearing date: 5/15/~014

ririie:: ro:45 ·am·

Co1Jrtrqom: ...:
Court. report~r: .Linda Carlton
Min1,1tesC.lerlr JANET
T~pe Number: 1
Party: Sta~y Grove, Att9rney: Denr:iis. Benjamin
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Nance Ceccarelli
:

5/19/2014

ORDR

JANET

'.·:,i·1'·

.Notice· Of Hearirig .

JANET

•

·:

'

·,'

'

•

: ·:~~ ·~

~.:

"'

• '

k

Carl B. Kerrick

••

Carl B. Kerrick

Ord,~~-~signing Judge
'

\

<

•

~- ••

. - ,.. •

•''

8/26/2014

PETN

TERESA

Petition for Appointment of Special Prosecutor

Carl B. Kerrick

8/29/2014

ORDR

TERESA

Or,der to'.f ~ppointnient of $pecial PrO$ecutor
,,

Carl B. Kerrick

9/29/2014

STIP

TRISH

Stipulation
to vacate hearing
and reset
' '.. :..... ~ . '.. : ~:. .. . .
. .
. :

Carl B. Kerrick

10/14/2014

11/26/2014

'

'

.,

'

'

.

ATTR

TERESA

Defendant:: State of ldah.o Attorney Retained
J.~ssi.ca M_ L,orell9

Carl B. Kerrick

NOTC

TERESA

Nqtice pf tle~ring

Carl B. Kerrick

CONT

TERESA

Continued (Hearing 03/24/2015 09:00 AM)
Evidentiary Hearing--2 days

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

TERESA

Motion forPermission to Conduct
Discovery-,~Petitioner

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

TERESA

J;x.PartE;! -fy1otic.>ri to Authorize Payment of Costs

Carl B. Kerrick

•,.

Document sealed

7

'«-"'---"'---
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User: BDAVENPORT

Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County
.' ··: ;.: . .:_ .. ·:' . -\1,

.

'.

.- '. i

. . .

~

; ,,

Case: cv-2012:0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
''

':.:

Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

12/5/2014

ORDR

TERESA

12/11/2014

ORDR

TERESA

3/4/2015

HRSC

TERESA

Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Authorize
Carl B. Kerrick
Payment of Costs-filed under seal
Document sealed
Order Granting Motion for Permission to Conduct Carl B. Kerrick
Discovery .
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status
Conference 03/13/2015 09:30 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

TERESA

Notice Of Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

3/9/2015

NOTC

JANET

Notice of State's Potential Trial Witnesses

Carl B. Kerrick

3/10/2015

MOTN

JANET

Motion for Order to Transport Petitioner to
-...Hfllarifl~L ·

Carl B. Kerrick

MOTN

JANET

3/11/2015

MOTN

JANET

3/12/2015

ORDR

BDAVENPORT . Ord.er to Transport Petitioner to Hearing

Ex-Parfe. Motiqn .to Authorize Payment of Costs
FILED UNDER SEAL
Document sealed
.· Motion for Discovery Pursuant to ICRP , , .
26(b)(4)(A)
:.·.

3/13/2015

HRHD

JANET

HRSC

JANET

'•'.

... ••

>

:,

:-;.,

:-.1:("

Carl B. Kerrick

Carl B. Kerrick
Carl B. Kerrick

Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference
scheduled on 03/13/2015 09:30 AM: Hearing
Held

Carl B. Kerrick

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 03/24/2015 09:00

Carl B. Kerrick

AM). Evidentiary Hearing-2 days
MINE

JENNY

3/23/2015

ORDR

TERESA

3/24/2015

MINE

TERESA

Minute Entry
Hearing type:Telephonic Status Conference
Hearing date: 3/13/2015
Tir:ne;-~:~3.am, ..
Cou~roonj: . ·
Gourt reporter:
Minuteir Clerk:' JENNY
Tape-Number: CTRM#2
D.ENN1$. BENJAMIN & DEBRA WHIPPLE
JESSICA
LARELLO & KEN JURGENSON
··.·, .•.-

Carl B. Kerrick

Order Gra_ri~ng ,Request for Petiti.oner to Wear
·
'··
Hearin!f--ORANTED

Carl B. Kerrick

IVlin.ute Entry.

Carl B. Kerrick

·. s;iynian::9l6tftiiig at Evidentiary ·
.

.

Hea.r_irig type:. Evidentiary Hearing

.
·

Hearing date: 3/24/2015
lime: 9:,03- am ·· · ·
CQL,lrtrqom:.
..
Court rep9rter: Nancy. Towler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Dennis l3enjamin & Debra Whipple
Jessica l.iorello arid Ken Jurgeson
... ,·

·-·

8

,.
Date: 11/4/2015

Second Judicial
Oist.rictCourt- Nez Perce County
...........

Time: 11 :36 AM

User: BDAVENPORT

. ROA Report · ·
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Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, i;>efendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

3/24/2015

DCHH

TERESA

Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on·
03/24/2015 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held---MARCH 24 & 25, 2015
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Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
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Document sealed
,.
. .
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Fees and Costs--filed under seal
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Exper;is·es:of. Coµnsei..-fi!ed under seal
Document sealed
Affida~it in Support of l;:x Parte Motion to
9arl B. Kerrie!<
Authorize'Payr'nent Of Expenses of Counsel:..-filed
under seal· .· .
Document se~led
Order Granting Ex
Motion to Authorize
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seal
··
Document sealed ·
: - :. "
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TERESA

4/16/2015
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TERESA

Memorandum in Oppos1t1on to Motion for
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Carl B. Kerrick

4/24/2015
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Petitioner;s Closing Argument

Carl B. Kerrick

5/8/2015
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Carl B. Kerrick

5/14/2015
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TERESA

Respondent's Post Evidentiar:y Mearing Glosing
Arg_ument
(original}
· ,,· .
· '' · ,., ·
.
.

Carl B. Kerrick

Petitiori~~s Rebuttal 'to Respondent's Closing
Argi.lmen~-

Carl B. Kerrick

~

5/15/2015
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Carl B. Kerrick
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5/18/2015

MISC

TERESA

Request for Oral Closing Argument and
Argumenfon 2nd Motion for
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Carl B. Kerrick

5/20/2015

HRSC

TERESA

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 05/29/2015
10:00 AM)

Carl B. Kerrick

TERESA

NoUce Of.Hearing

Carl B. Kerrick

Judge

5/29/2015

MINE

TERESA

8/25/2015

FFCL

TERESA

Firtdings.Of Fact And co·nclusions Of Law'and
Order; Order Denying Motion -to Reci5nsider

Carl B. Kerrick
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TERESA

Final,Judgment--all claims contained within the
Petition for Post Conviction relief are hereby
DISMISSED
.

Carl 8. Kerrick

CDIS
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Ciyil Qispg~ition enteredfor: State of Id.aha,
p~_feb~~n( Grove, ·Stacey Lewis, Subject. Filing
d~t~; .8/25/201_ 5

Carl B. Kerrick

STAT
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.

Carl 8. Kerrick
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-Hearing type: oral argument
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Dennis Benjamin, ISB #4199
Deborah Whipple, ISB #4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

Ft LED
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Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CV12-01798
CASE NO. - - - -

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

~~~~s:f..A,;f--E:QF-IIJAII~,~~~~~--:-------J-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Respondent.

)
)

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS:
1. Petitioner, Stacey Grove, is currently incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Institution
in Orofino, Idaho.
2. Mr. Grove is serving a sentence imposed by the District Court of the Second Judicial
District, State ofldaho, County of Nez Perce, the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, presiding.
3. The Nez Perce County District Court Number for that case is CR-2007-768.
4. Mr. Grove was charged with the first-degree murder of

Martin (hereafter

"
5. Mr. Grove was represented at trial by attorney Scott Chapman (hereafter "defense
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counsel").
6. The state was represented by the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney, Daniel
Spickler (hereafter "prosecutor").
7. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
7.1 A true and correct copy of the Clerk's Record in the criminal case is attached
as Exhibit A.
7.2 A true and correct copy of the transcripts of the proceedings in
the criminal case is attached as Exhibit B.
7.3 A copy of the exhibits introduced at trial aTe attached hereto as ExhibitC.
8. The district court sentenced Mr. Grove to a life sentence with 22 years fixed.

9. Mr. Grove appealed froth the Judgment and sentence.
10. Attorneys Diane Walker and Eric Fredericksen (hereafter "appellate counsel")
represented Mr. Grove on appeal.
11. On March 25, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction
and the sentence. State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 259 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied
(September 12, 2011).
11.1. A copy of the opinion is attached as Exhibit D.
12. The Supreme Court denied Mr. Grove's Petition for Review on September 12, 2011.
13. The remittitur issued that same day.
14. With respect to this conviction, Mr. Grove has not filed any other petitions for
post-conviction relief.
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Petitioner was Denied the Right to Confront
Witnesses Against Him in Violation of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article, 1, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution (LC.§ 19-4901(a)(l)).

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action.
15. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-14 above .
.16. Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses was violated when state witnesses testified at
'

.

.

. .

trial about neuropathology tests and examination results when those witnesses neither performed
nor had personal knowledge of the neuropathology testing and examination, and when the
neuropathologist who did perform the tests and examinations was not a witness at the trial.
16.1. ·A farther confrontation clause violation occurred when the autopsyreport
was admitted into evidence at trial.
17. Dr. Marco Ross is a forensic pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 892, In. 20.
18. Dr. Ross performed the autopsy of

while he was employed at the Spokane

County Medical Examiner's Office. Exhibit B, pg. 893, In. 23.
19. Dr. Ross testified at Mr. Grove's trial. Exhibit B, pg. 892-988.
20. Dr. Ross's autopsy report was introduced as State's Exhibit 11 at the trial. Exhibit C
(State's Exhibit 11); Exhibit B, pg. 902, In. 5.
20.1. Defense counsel did not object to the introduction of the autopsy report. Id
21. Dr. Ross testified that there have been occasions where the Medical Examiner's
Office would send tissue samples to outside experts for examination and interpretation. Exhibit
B, pg. 900, In. 21-24.
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22. In this case, Kyler's brain was sent to Dr. R. Ross Reichard, a forensic
neuropathologist at the University ofNew Mexico for examination. Exhibit B, pg. 901, In. 5-7;
pg. 928, In. 18-20.
23. The results of the examination were included in the autopsy report which was
admitted as Exhibit 11 at trial. Exhibit B, pg. 901, In. 1-2.
24. At trial, Dr. Ross was permitted to testify to Dr. Reichard's findings. Exhibit B, pg.
928, In. 21 - pg. 930, In. 23.
24.1. Dr. Ross testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were bilateral subdural
hemorrhages in the brain. Exhibit B, pg. 928, In. 21-23.
24.2. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were bilateral
subarachiioicfhemoirliages in tlie brain. Exhibit B; pg. 929, lii. 1.;2.
24.3. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported that the brain was swollen.

Id.
24.4. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there was a laceration in
the corpus callosum. Id, In. 3.
24.5. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there was a hypo-ischemic
injury to the brain. Id, In. 5-6.
24.6. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were vascular axonal
injuries to the brain. Id, ln. 10.
24.7. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were autolytic
changes in the brain. Id, ln. 11.
24.8. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported that the subdural
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hemorrhage and the subachnoid hemorrhages were "acute." Exhibit B, pg. 930,

In. 3-4.
24.9. Dr. Ross testified that the significance of a tear in the corpus callosum
reported by Dr. Reichard is that it is indicative of a high degree of force which
would render the victim unconscious or nearly unconscious at the time of impact.

Id., ln. 21-23.
24.10. Dr. Ross also testified that the swelling reported by Dr. Reichard indicated
that the fatal injury occurred sometime immediately before death or within a day
or two prior to death. Id., In. 6-9.
24.11. Dr. Ross testified that the degree of hemorrhage in the brain and the tear in
ffie corpuschlfoslitn reported by Dr. Reichard would be mcons1steni with a full
from a kitchen counter onto a linoleum floor. Exhibit B, pg. 936, ln. 3-7.
24.12. Dr. Ross testified that the degree of hemorrhage in the brain and the tear in
the corpus callosum reported by Dr. Reichard would be consistent with a very
significant blunt force impact or impacts to the head that would be in excess of
what would be expected from a fall to the floor. Id., ln. 12-17.
24.13. Dr. Ross testified that the widespread vascular axonal swelling reported by
Dr. Reichard was indicative of injury to the axons which could occur as a result of
blunt force trauma tearing the axons. Exhibit B, pg. 941, In. 13-18.
24.14. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard noted in his report that there were
axonal injury changes occurring in the vicinity of the corpus callosum which
would be consistent with a shearing injury, in Dr. Ross's opinion. Exhibit B, pg.
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942, In. 14-23.
24.15. Dr. Ross also testified that it was not surprising for Dr. Reichard to report
axonal injury given that he also reported a laceration or tear in the corpus
callosum. Id., at 18~23.
24.16. Dr. Ross repeated his testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear
in the corpus callosum shows there was "a very significant force" applied,
something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of stories or so," or a
"motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, ln.
5-12.
24.17. Dr. Ross also testified that the brain injuries reported by Dr. Reichard did
not result from a. singleimpact. Exhibit B, pg. 947, hi. 20.
24.18. Dr. Ross also repeated his testimony that the head injuries reported by Dr.
Reichard would have caused immediate or near immediate unconsciousness or
near unconsciousness to
24.19. Dr. Ross testified that

Exhibit B, pg. 948, ln. 23 - pg. 949, ln. 4.
could not have been engaged in certain

activities previously described by the state's witness Lisa Nash with the injuries
reported by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 949, In. 5 - pg. 95, ln. 15.
24.20. On redirect examination of Dr. Ross, the prosecutor stated that "in the
report from New Mexico that the doctor there talked about the loss of clear
distinction between gray-white junction and generalized gray discoloration."
- Exhibit B, pg. 984, ln. 23 - pg. 985, ln. 2.
24.21. Dr. Ross explained that finding to show that "brain death has occurred, but
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there's still ongoing cardiac activity." Id, pg. 985, In. 3-5.
24.22. The prosecutor asked Dr. Ross, "Is there anything in your autopsy report or
in the report from Dr. Reichard that would be inconsistent with those injuries
occurring approximately 48 hours prior to cardiac death?" Id, pg. 987, In. 4-7.
24.23. Dr. Ross answered, "No." Id, In. 8.
24.24. Dr. Ross relied upon Dr. Reichard's report in his opinions that the cause of
death was brain swelling and cerebral hemorrhage due to blunt force impact to the
head, that the manner of death was homicide, and that the fatal injuries could have
been inflicted approximately 48 hours prior to cardiac death. Id, pg. 987, In. 9 pg. 988, In. 8.
5. Dt. Reichard was never called to testify at tnal.
26. Dr. Ross admitted that he did not do anything with the brain other than to remove it,
examine its surface and have it sent to Dr. Reichard's laboratory. Exhibit B, pg. 951, In. 23 - pg.
952, In. 7.
27. Dr. Ross admitted he did not prepare the brain tissue slides or inspect the brain
internally. Exhibit B, pg. 952, In. 10-12.
28. Dr. Ross admitted he did not observe the corpus callosum laceration. Exhibit B, pg.
956, In. 10-15.
29. Dr. Ross admitted that he did not observe the global hypo-ischemic brain injury.
Exhibit B, pg. 956, In. 18 - pg. 957, In. 7.
30. Dr. Ross admitted he did not examine any of the original slides or recuts of the brain
tissue. Exhibit B, pg. 959, In. 10-15.
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31. Dr. Ross testified that he did not recall whether he had seen any photographs taken of
the brain by Dr. Reichard. Id, In. 23-25.
32. The introduction of Dr. Reichard's report and Dr. Ross's testimony about Dr.
· ·Rei chard's examination'of the brain and ·his interpretation of the meaning of those findings
violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
33. Dr. Ross also testified about hemorrhages which he did not observe but were
reported "by the surgeon who did the transplant surgery," in the retroperitoneal areas and the
psoas muscles. Exhibit B, pg. 938, ln. 20-23.

34. That surgeon did not testify at trial.
35. That testimony from Dr. Ross also violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses.

36. The testimonyofDr.DonaldChln, which referred to the autopsy report, which 1n
turn contained Dr. Reichard's observations, findings and conclusions, violated Mr. Grove's right
to confront witnesses.
36.1. Dr. Chin testified that based "on what I've read on this autopsy report is the
most brutal case ... I've ever seen." Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 5-6.

37. The testimony of Dr. Jay Hunter which referred to Dr. Reichard's observations,
findings and conclusions violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses.

37.1. While Dr. Hunter admitted that he is "not a pathologist," he testified that,
''this child on autopsy, had . . . a fair amount of subarachnoid hemorrhage" that
"should have produce[d] immediate symptoms," such as "unconsciousness,"
given the degree of injury described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 874, ln. 24 pg. 875, In. 22.
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37.2. Dr. Hunter also testified that the defense version of the events on the
evening prior to Kyler's hospitalization would be "virtually impossible" given the
injuries described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 876, ln. 11-20.

373. Dr. Hunter repeated that testimony during the state's redirect examination.
Exhibit B, pg. 886, ln. 18-24.
38. The testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper which referred to Dr. Reichard's observations,
fmdings and conclusions violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses.

38.1. Dr. Harper testified that she had the autopsy report from Dr. Ross, which
contains the observations, findings and conclusions of Dr. Reichard, and which
was introduced at trial as State's Exhibit 11. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, ln. 19-20.

-s-:---2. Dr.Harper used thatreport, an::i:ong other llimgs,to reach heroprmon as to
the cause of death, i.e., the brain injury. Exhibit B, pg. 1032, In. 3-10.
38.3. Dr. Harper also testified that based upon the injuries described by Dr.
Reichard,

"would have been unconscious or semi-conscious." Exhibit B,

pg. 1033, ln. 17-18.
38.4. Dr. Harper also testified that in her experience, the extent of the brain injury
described by Dr. Reichard was unusually severe. Exhibit B, pg. 1034, ln. 2-21.
38.5. Doctor Harper also testified that the defense version of the events on the
evening prior to Kyler's hospitalization would be "not consistent" given the
injuries described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 1036, ln. 7-20; pg. 1037, ln.
20-24;
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39. Trial counsel did not object to any of this testimony.
40. The failure to object was not a strategic decision on the part of trial counsel.
41. These violations of Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses were not harmless error.
42. The Ccnitt of Appeals did not permit McGrove to raise this issue for the first time on
appeal. State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483,259 P.3d 623 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied.

B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with witnesses against him."
The Supreme Court has held "that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and
state prosecutions." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,406 (1965). Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution similarly guarantees a criminal defendant the right to "appear and defend in person."
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held
that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial are admissible only where declarant is
unavailable and where defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S.
at 59. Here, the statements of Dr. Reichard and others were introduced at trial without a showing
of unavailability or a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
Further, the testimony was undoubtedly testimonial in nature. The determination of
whether evidence is testimonial requires the court to consider the purpose behind the
Confrontation Clause. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143, 176 P.3d 911,915 (2007). The
Supreme Court noted in Crawford, supra, that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused." Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143, 176 P.3d at 915,
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quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
The Hooper Court analyzed the guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in determining what constitutes testimonial statements: First, the Court looked to Webster's
dictionary definition·of"testimony" from 182-8; i.e., 'Ta] solemn declaration or affirmation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Next, the Court
listed three formulations of"core" testimonial statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;"

. and (3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an obJective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford,
541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). Dr. Reichard's report and its incorporation into
Dr. Ross's autopsy report clearly fits within the definition of "core" testimonial statements. See,

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, -U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2716-17 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,310 (2009).
The unconstitutional admission of the evidence cannot be found to be harmless. Here, the
Court of Appeals in the direct appeal noted the importance of Dr. Reichard's evidence to the
state's case:
Initially, we clarify that the crux of this issue affects the central disputed question
in this case-when the injuries which ultimately caused K.M.'s death occurred and
whether it was likely that K.M. would have lost consciousness and/or shown
severe symptoms immediately after the injuries were inflicted. In other words, did
the injuries occur on the morning that K.M. lost consciousness-and was alone

11 - VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

21

,•
C

•-.C: • -

·,.

,.

o•• _____ • __ ,•_•, - · - - - - - - - -

"J

1

!

'---

:

/.::'::-.

with Grove-or several days prior, when it was undisputed that the injuries could
not have been inflicted by Grove because he was not alone with K.M. In this
regard, important to the state's theory of the case that Grove caused the fatal
injuries on the morning of July 10 was the conclusion of Dr. Reichard, based on
his microscopic examination ofK.M.'s brain, that K.M. had suffered a laceration
of the corpus callosum, which would have likely caused immediate loss of
· ·· consciousness, thereby implicating Grove as the cause of K.M. 's injuries during
the 36-45 minute period of time during which he was alone with K.M. Grove
points out that both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper recited Dr. Reichard's observations
in this regard, as gleaned from the autopsy report, as neither was present during
the autopsy nor conducted their own microscopic analysis, and relied on these
observations in forming their respective opinions that K.M.'s injuries had been
inflicted on July 10.
By contrast, Grove's ~xpert, Dr. Arden, testified that he did not agree with Dr.
Reichard that a laceration was present and that the anomaly was the result of
handling of the brain after death. He also offered his opinion, after examination of
the microscopic slides, that K.M.'s injuries had been inflicted at least three days
prior to death (thus absolving Grove of having caused them) and that they would
not have necessarily resulted in immediate loss of consciousness.
State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483,490, 259 P.3d 629, 636 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied (Sept. 12,
2011). In light of the central importance of the evidence from Dr. Reichard, the state cannot
meet the burden of proving its unconstitutional admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)("[W]e hold ... that before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

Petitioner was Denied a Fair Trial and Due
Process of Law in Violation of Idaho Constitution
Art I,§ 13 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution by the Multiple
Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct (J.C.§ 19-

4901(a)(l)).
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action.
43. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-42 above.
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44. The prosecutor committed misconduct outside the presence of the Court during trial.
44 .1. During the trial, but prior to the Court going on the record, the prosecutor
projected family photos of

onto the court room screen while the jury entered

the courtroom. - --44.2. The family photos would then be interchanged with the autopsy
photographs.
44.3. Affidavits of witnesses to this misconduct are being filed in support of this
Petition.
44.4. The prosecutor's actions exposed the jury to evidence outside the presence
of the Court, invoking sympathy for

and his biological family and arousing

passion and prejudice against Mr. Grove.
44.5. Defense counsel did not draw this behavior to the attention of the Court, ask
that the prosecutor be ordered to desist or move for a mistrial.
45. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the state's case-in-chief.
45.1. The prosecutor called

Bandel, the sister of

as a witness.

Exhibit B, pg. 823, In. 25 - pg. 824, ln. l.
45.2. Defense counsel objected noting that

was a child and arguing that

the prosecutor's purpose in calling her was "obviously ... just to impassion or
inflame the jury" and he expected

to testify that when she last saw her

brother "he was lying on his mother's bed, and she gave him a hug and kiss and he
said good bye." Exhibit B, pg. 821, In. 24 "'pg. 822, ln. 8.
45.3. In response, the prosecutor told the Court that his purpose in calling
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was to elicit evidence regarding the "condition of

Martin on the morning of

July 10th," and argued that he only had Lisa Nash and

to provide evidence

on that topic. Exhibit B, pg. 822, ln. 17-23. He stated, "I'm entitled to ask her
what she recalls that morning, what she recalls of the physical condition of her
brother the last time she saw him." Exhibit B, pg. 823, In. 1-3.
45.4. The Court overruled defense counsel's objection "based on the argument
made by Mr. Spickler on behalf of the State." Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 8-9.
45.5. Mr. Spickler then elicited testimony from
strong little girl," that she said "bye" to

that she was a "[p]retty .

before she left that morning, gave

him a kiss and a hug and that she never saw her "brother again after that." Exhibit
, pg. 825;IiL2'2; pg. 826, In. 15-f8; pg. 827, lii.16- ·.
45.6. That testimony, elicited by the prosecutor from

went beyond what

the prosecutor told the Court he would elicit and it had the effect of inflaming the
passions and prejudices of the jury and encouraging the jury to convict Mr. Grove
for reasons other than the relevant evidence.
45.7. Defense counsel failed to object that the prosecutor's actual questioning of
went beyond what he had represented to the Court and was inadmissible.
45.8. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash
trailer approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg.
996, ln. 19 - pg. 997, ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6).
45.9. The photos were inflammatory because they included a large display of
sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash.
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45.10. These photographs were inadmissible under IRE 403 as the danger of
unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value.
46. The prosecutor committed misconduct in his cross-examination of Mr. Grove where
the prosecutor characterized Mr. Grove's sworn testimony as-the "story you told, which is "the story you need the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make.
sense." Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11.
47. In his cross-examination of Dr. Jonathan Arden, the prosecutor suggested by a
question that Dr. Arden was "on a special mission here, which is to provide such evidence as you
might that would support the defense's case[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1321, ln. 18-20.
48. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the cross-examination of Mr. Grove.

48. r.-Tlie prosecutor cross-exammed .l\,tr. Grove about the fact that Mr. Grove
was behind on child support to his biological son, a fact both irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial. Exhibit B, pg. 1115, ln. 21-24.
48.2. During the cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor asked Mr.
Grove when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription "was a
result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12.
48.3. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical
situation has arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today" and did
not mention Mr. Grove or the nature of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg.
1067; ln. 3-5.
49. The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing and rebuttal argument.
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49.1. The prosecutor misstated the defense position regarding preexisting head
injury, saying that the defense was that there was "some long-term brain injury."
Exhibit B, pg. 1419, In. 6-10.
· 4~.2. The prosecutor called Dr. Arden's-testimony-about the· absence of a tear-in
the corpus callosum "a bit of smoke and mirrors to get you confused." Id, pg.
1426, In. 16-18.
49.3. The prosecutor suggested without supporting evidence that Dr. Arden's
"financial position" leads him to decide what cases he can take. Id, pg. 1429, In.
8-9.
49.4. The prosecutor testified that a "colleague" said that Dr. Arden's answers
· during cross-exammat10n were slippery as an ice cube and the prosecutor opined
that the doctor "was stretching things." Id, pg. 1430, ln. 4-8; pg. 1461, In. 11.
49 .5. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[c]are takers
kill little babies all the time." Id, pg. 1460, In. 5-6.
49.6. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[p]arents kill
babies all the time." Id, In. 6-7.
49. 7. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "there are
literally thousands of [similar] incidents in any given span of time[.]" Id., In. 8-

10.
49.8. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that he believed
that "our local paper has probably shown ... probably six more of these cases
since - since this one started." Id, In. 11-14.
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49.9. The prosecutor misstated for a second time Dr. Arden's testimony about
head injuries. Id., pg. 1462, In. 18-19.
49.10. The prosecutor argued that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking
· · .-_- -- KyI-er's body apart piece ·by piece[~}" Id; pg.· 1464, In. 24-25.
49 .11. The prosecutor implied that he had evidence not presented at trial that Mr.
Exhibit B, pg. 1430, In. 15-21.

Grove had previously been "violent with

49.12. The prosecutor argued that '-'we don't want to let a murderer go free." Id,
pg. 1466, In. 9.
49 .13. The prosecutor told the jury that he did not call

s biological father as

a witness "because my medical experts unanimously, to no exception, said he
could not have done 1t." id, pg. 1477, In. 18-

.

49.14. The prosecutor argued without supporting evidence that the
emotional breakdown of Mr. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a
different kind of "emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that
morning that resulted in these injuries[.]" Id, pg. 1458, In. 16-18.
50. Defense counsel did not object to any of the misconduct alleged in paragraphs 47-49.
51. The failure to object was not a strategic decision on defense counsel's part.
52. Had defense objected, the objections would have been sustained.
53. In addition, the Court would have given curative instructions to the jury.
54. Further, defense motions would have alerted the prosecutor that his misconduct
· would be challenged, which would have prevented some or all of the subsequent misconduct.
55. Had a motion for a mistrial been made based upon the totality ofprosecutorial
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misconduct, the motion would have been granted.
56. This prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless error.
57. The unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct could not have been raised on appeal.

State·-v: Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226,245 P.3d 961, 978'{2010).

B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
The due process clauses of Art. 1, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and the Fourteenth
Amendment ensure, at a minimum, "that criminal trials shall be fundamentally fair."

Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19,576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Further, "[i]t is the
duty ofa prosecuting attorney to see that the accused has a fair and impartial trial." State v.
Spencer, 74 Idaho 173,183,258 P.2d 1147, 1153 (1953) (emphasis added) (finding that the
prosecutor's misconduct warranted a. iiew trial). In this case, as demonstrated above, the
prosecutor grossly violated his duty to ensure fairness at every stage. of the trial proceedings.
He exposed the jury to extra-judicial evidence. He appealed to the emotions, passions
and prejudices of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics. And he elicited inadmissible
evidence both in direct and cross-examination of witness.
Further, his closing and rebuttal arguments are replete with misconduct. "Closing
argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal
case .... [t]o enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence." State

v. Phillips, 144 Ida.ho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
Therefore, "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the prejudices of
the jury." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution arid Defense Functions § 3-5.8 (3d.
ed.1993). The prosecutor is charged with the dual task of ensuring that the government's case is
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presented "earnestly and vigorously, using every legitimate means to bring about a conviction,
but also to see that justice is done and that every criminal defendant is accorded a fair trial."
State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,449, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ct. App.1991). Therefore, it is
-improper for a prosecutor to appeal to-the emotions, passion or prejudice of the jury through the
use of inflammatory tactics. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588. Here, however, the
prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, misstated the evidence, used
_inflammatory language in reference to defense witnesses, argued evidence not presented at trial,
and misrepresented the state's burden of proof. This was clear and repeated misconduct.
The effect of the prosecutor's misconduct requires the granting of the petition. "The
cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself
might oe harmless, but when aggregated show the absence of afatt tnhl m conttaventrnn of the
defendant's right to due process." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct.
App.2008). Thus, it is the cumulative effect of the misconduct engaged in here that should be
considered. Id Considering all the misconduct, it is clear that the state cannot meet its burden of
proving its misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Chapman v.
California, supra.

TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION:

Petitioner was Denied Due Process and the Right
to Jury Trial in Violation of Idaho Constitution
Art. I, §§ 7 and 13 and the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution
(J.C.§ 19-4901(a)(l).

A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action.
58.- Petitionerre-alleges paragraphs 1-57 above.
59. Petitioner was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and
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jury trial when jurors repeatedly slept during the presentation of evidence.
59.1. Affidavits of individuals who witnessed jurors sleeping during trial
testimony are being filed in support of this Petition.
· ·5 9·.2: ·The witness's affidavits are confirmed by the trial -transcript which show the Court was required to take several unplanned recesses because jurors repeatedly
fell asleep during the presentation of the evidence. Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 - pg.
922, ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg. 1351, ln. 19-25.
60. Sleeping jurors cannot independently evaluate the evidence and function as the
constitution requires.
61. This issue could not have been raised on appeal under State v. Perry, supra, because
defense counsel did not obJect to the sleepmgJllfdrs or make a motion forrr.ustnaL
62. This error was not harmless.

B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
A juror's inattentiveness, by sleeping during witness testimony, may constitute
misconduct. State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686,689,214 P.3d 672, 675 (Ct. App. 2009). See e.g.,

State v. Majid, 914 N.E.2d 1113, 1115 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (Numerous instances of jurors'
sleeping during murder trial, including during eyewitness testimony, violated defendant's right to
due process and constituted plain error). "[A] juror who sleeps through much of the trial
testimony cannot be expected to perform his duties." Id, citing United States v. Smith, 550 F.2d
277,285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 434 U.S. 841 (1977); United

States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333,335 (3rd Cir. 1972).
"Due process mandates that the defendant is entitled to have a jury hear and evaluate the
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evidence," id., and the jurors in this case were instructed by the Court "to decide the facts from

· , all the evidence in the case." Exhibit B, pg; 1399, -In. 24-25 (emphasis added). The repeated
instances of sleeping by one or more jurors, especially given they were sleeping during the
. - critical medical testimony-of Drs. ·Ross and Arden, denied Mr. Grove his state and federal
constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner was Denied the Effective Assistance of
Counsel on Appeal in Violation of Idaho
Constitution Art I, § 13 and the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution (J.C.§ 19-4901(a)(I)).
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action.
63. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1- 62 above.
64. Alternative argument: If the Court determmes that the prosecutortiil nusconduct
issue raised in the Second Cause of Action could have been raised on direct appeal, Petitioner
alleges that it was therefore deficient performance for appellate counsel to fail to raise that issue.
64.1. Had appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal, the conviction would have
been reversed by the appellate court.
65. Alternative argument: If the Court determines that the juror misconduct issue raised
in the Third Cause of Action could have been raised on direct appeal, Petitioner alleges that it
was therefore deficient performance for appellate counsel to fail to raise that issue.
65 .1. Had. appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal, the conviction would have
been reversed by the appellate court.

B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
:

A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the
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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth .Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v. ·

California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance
of that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC.§ 19-852.

In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance

was deficient in that 1t fellbeloW standards of :reasonable professional performance;

and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Stricklandv. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id.
An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth in

Strickland. See e.g., Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007).
· Petitioner draws the Court's attention to the fact that Mintun holds that it cannot be
ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise claims of fundamental error for the first
time on appeal. Id. (Petitioner disagrees and believes the Mintun bright-line rule is contrary to

Strickland and should be overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court.) Right or wrong, the rule is
based in part upon a concern that the record on appeal might not be "complete enough to allow appellate examination of all the factors that must be considered on such a claim." Id. Thus, the
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Court of Appeals decided to leave such issues "for presentation in a post-conviction proceeding,
where an adequate record could be developed." Id. Moreover, "the allowance of this type of
claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is ordinarily not necessary to protect a
defendant's rights because the defendant can bring th"e- same-claim· of impropriety in the trial ·
proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for failing to object to the
alleged error in the trial court." Mintun, 144 Idaho at 662, 168 P.3d at 46.

In this case, Mr. Grove has raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct and the deprivation
of the right to jury trial, which were not objected to below. Mr. Grove does not believe appellate
counsel could have raised those issues on direct appeal under State v. Perry, supra, as was the
case with his confrontation clause claim. Thus, he can raise all those issues in this Petition, both
as direct claims and as aspects oflhe ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim alleged below.
See e.g., DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603-604, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009) (deprivation
of the right to testify raised as direct constitutional violation) with Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho
469, 476, 224 P.3d 536, 543 (Ct. App. 2009) (deprivation of the right to testify raised as an
aspect of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim). If the Court disagrees and holds that
Claims Two or Three could have been raised on appeal and thus cannot be raised now, it should
then grant relief due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as the rationale behind the
Mintun rule would no longer be applicable. In either case, trial counsel's failure to make proper
objections at trial to the errors above are all incorporated into the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim alleged below.
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

Petitioner was Denied the Effective Assistance of
Counsel at Trial in Violation ofIda/to
Constitution Art. I, § 13 and the Sixtlt and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution (J.C.§ 19-490J(a)(J)).

· A. Facts ·Pertaining to Cause of Action.

66. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-65 above.
67. Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to present an adequate
analysis to support his pretrial motion to allow the admission of alternate perpetrator evidence.
67 .1. The failure to present an adequate analysis resulted in the District Court
denying admission of that evidence - evidence which was crucial to the defense
and the lack of which was prejudicial.
68. Defense counsel rendered deficient performance m failing to move for a mistrial or
for the summoning of a new jury pool after a potential juror made statements in voir dire that
polluted the entire jury pool.
68 .1. The potential juror stated in front of all the potential jurors that he worked

in the funeral business and he knew the police officer witnesses Greene and Petrie
well, both from their work investigating cases that came through the funeral
home, and through their work for his wife who was the city manager, and that they
are very credible. Exhibit B, pg. 155, ln. 13-14.
68.2. He also stated he had worked in the funeral business for a long time and
seen "these situations" before and did not have a lot of empathy except for the
victims. Id., pg. 155, ln. 21 - pg. 156, ln. 2.
68.3. The failure to object and move for a cautionary instruction or for the
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summoning of a new jury pool prejudiced Petitioner.
69. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to challenge for cause or
peremptorily challenge Juror #5 (Loetscher) after voir dire revealed that he worked at St.
Joseph's Hospital and knew of "just about everyone on the [state's witness list] . : . particularly
the ER doctors that was listed there." Exhibit B, pg. 144, In. 14-19.
69.1. Juror #5 became the presiding juror. Exhibit B, pg. 1471, ln. 19-22.
70. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to assert Petitioner's state and
.

.

.

federal constitutional rights to confrontation (Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13, United States Const.·
Amendments 6 and 14) and by failing to make proper evidentiary objections.
70.1. During trial, state's witnesses, i.e., Nash, Chin, Harper, Hunter and Ross,
repeatedly testified to the contents of the autopsy report which contained
information from Dr. Reichard.
70.2. Dr. Reichard's information was the state's only basis of proof for the nature
of head and alleged brain injuries, the only basis for testimony as to the timing of
the head and alleged brain injuries, and the only basis for the state's claim that
had suffered a tear to the corpus callosum and axonal shearing.
70.3. However, the state did not present the testimony of Dr. Reichard in
violation of the state and federal constitutional rights of confrontation.
70.4. Petitioner was prejudiced because had counsel objected on confrontation
grounds, the state would have had no testimony as to any head or alleged brain
injuries and the timing of those injuries and thus, could not have obtained a
conviction.
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70.5. In response to the defense motion for acquittal or in the alternative a
new trial, the state argued that Dr. Reichard was the one person who
actually examined the brain and therefore was a more credible witness
than Dr. Arden. Exhibit B, pg. 1486, ln. 6-15.
70.6. Prosecutor Spickler said in discounting Dr. Arden's testimony,
" ... [Dr. Arden] was trying to contradict the findings of an expert in New
Mexico who actually had the brain and actually took a look at the brain in toto, as
opposed to one or more slides." Exhibit B, pg. 1486, ln. 8-12.
70.7. Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Chin
which referred to Dr. Reichard's report.
70.8. Defense counsel failed to obJect to the teshin6n.y from Dr. Hunter
which referred to and relied upon Dr. Reichard's report.
70.9. Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Harper
which referred to and relied upon Dr. Reichard's report.
70.10. The testimony ofDrs. Chin, Hunter, Harper and Ross which
related the findings of Dr. Reichard, were inadmissible under IRE 703 as
well as the confrontation clause.
71. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to hearsay testimony
from Lisa Nash regarding the autopsy report contents.
71.1. At trial, Lisa Nash testified that she was told that

had blood in his

brain that could not be removed. She did not identify who told her this and the
testimony was admitted without limitation including for the truth of the matter
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asserted. Exhibit B, p. 755, ln. 16-25.
71.2. Defense counsel did not object on hearsay grounds. Had counsel objected,
the objection would have been granted.
71.3. The failure to object prejudiced Petitioner because, as noted above, had
counsel asserted Petitioner's constitutional confrontation rights, the state would
have had no proof of cause of death other than Ms. Nash's hearsay testimony.
Without that testimony, Petitioner would not have been convicted.
72. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the testimony of Steve
Stocking, a paramedic, that Petitioner was too calm in his opinion when the paramedics arrived
in response to the 911 call. Exhibit B, pg. 838, ln. 22.
72.1. Mr. Stocking was not a psychologist or psychiatrist an:dhad no
qualifications as an expert on the appropriate reactions in a crisis.
72.2. His opinion regarding Petitioner was not relevant (IRE 401 and 402) and
did not fall within the scope of admissible opinion testimony by a lay witness
(IRE 701) because it involved specialized knowledge of the appropriate reaction
of people in crisis.
73. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Chin's testimony that there was "no way we would have missed any of the[] injuries" described
in the autopsy report. Exhibit B, pg. 851, In. 5-6.
73.1. Defense counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Chin on this claim even
·though, according to Dr. Ross, some of the injuries in autopsy were old enough
that they did exist when he saw

specifically, Dr. Ross testified that the
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injury to the left thigh and the injuries on the back were older. Exhibit B, pg. 978,
ln. 23 -pg. 979, ln.17; pg. 987, In. 9-20.
74. Defense counsel's perfonnance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Chin's testimony that what he·t1read irrthi;sautopsy report is·-the-most brutal case" he had ever

.-

- ·--- - --

seen. Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 6-7.
74 .1. This testimony was not relevant under IRE 401 and 402.
74.2. This evidence was unfairly prejudicial under IRE 403.
75. Defense counsel's perfonnance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's testimony that subarachonoid hemorrhage has to have immediate symptoms. Exhibit B,
pg. 874, ln. 24 - pg. 875, ln. 22.
75. I. l liete was msuffic1ent foundation for thattestimony as Dr. Hunter admitted
that he is not a pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 874, ln. 24-25.
76. Defense counsel's perfonnance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's testimony that

was either "ejected from an automobile" or "was beaten very

severely." Exhibit B, pg. 871, In. 12-14.
76.1. There was insufficient foundation for Dr. Hunter to give this opinion.
77. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's testimony that a short fall "is rarely, rarely likely to produce any kind of significant head
injury or bleeding" and then failed to impeach that testimony. Exhibit B, pg. 888, In. 16-20.
77 .1. This evidence was inadmissible because there was no foundation for
· his opinion;
77.2. Dr. Hunter's opinion could have been impeached with medical research
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published in peer-reviewed medical journals.
77.3. That an affidavit with medical journal articles documenting the possibility
of serious head injury from short falls will ?e filed in support of this Petition.

78. Defense-counsel's petforma:nce-was1ieficient"because-he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's opinion, stated without any qualification as an expert, that

had sure signs of

shaken baby syndrome. Exhibit B, pg. 869, In. 4-16.
79. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Ross' s testimony that, although he did not see certain hemorrhages in the psoas and
retroperitoneal areas, he was told about them by the transplant surgeon. Exhibit B, pg. 93 8, ln.
20-23.

9.1. That testrmony is inadmissible hearsay and v10lates the confrontation.
clause.

80. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the
foundation for Dr. Ross's testimony regarding the head and alleged brain injuries because Dr.
Ross also testified that he had never viewed any of the slides or recuts himself. Exhibit B, pg.
959, In. 10-15.
81. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Ross's testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear in the corpus callosum shows there
was "a very significant force" applied, something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of
stories or so," or a "motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945,
ln. 5-12.
81.1. That testimony violates the confrontation clause.
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81.2. That testimony is not admissible under IRE 703.
81.3. There was no foundation for Dr. Ross's opinion about the amount of force.
82. Counsel rendered deficient performance in regard to the testimony of Dr. Deborah
Harper..
82.1. Counsel failed to object or move to strike when Dr. Harper vouched for the
abilities of state's witness Dr. Ross. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, ln. 12-14. ("Dr. Ross,
I'm sorry to say, is no longer our- in our Medical Examiner's Office, because he
is a super clinician.")
82.2. Counsel failed to object to irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony
regarding the estimated force needed to inflict the injuries, comparing it to the
force of being hit by a car, or being dragged behind a horse, or having a horse step
on Kyler's abdomen, or being hit by a baseball bat, even though there was no
foundation showing she could accurately make such estimates of force. Exhibit

B, pg. 1034, In. 7-21.
83. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the admission of
photographs taken a month after Kyler's death, which included many sympathy cards sent to the
family.
83.1. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash
trailer approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg.
996, In. 19 - pg. 997, ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6).
83.2. The photos were inflammatory because they included a large display of
sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash.
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84.3. If counsel had objected, the photographs would have been excluded under
IRE 403 as the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value.
84. Counsel rendered deficient performance in not moving to exclude any reference by
any witness to the brain autopsy because no valid chain of custody for the brain was. presented. 84.1. The state failed to present any evidence that the brain examined at the
pathology laboratory in New Mexico was

s brain.

85. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move to strike the
prosecutor's comments after his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination
was sustained. ExhibitB, pg. 1113, ln. 12-13.
85 .1. In his cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor characterized Mr.
Grove's sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is "the stmy you need tire
jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make
sense." Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11.
85.2. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, but counsel did not ask that the
comments be stricken or that the jury be instructed to disregard the comments. Id
86. Defense counsel's performance was deficient when he failed to object to the
prosecutor asking Mr. Grove when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription
"was a result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12.
86.1. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical
situation has arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today" and did
not mention Mr. Grove or the nature of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg.
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1067, ln. 3-5.
87. Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor
attempting to impeach Dr. Arden with alleged "gross mismanagement" when he was the Medical
- -fac-amineFin the District of Columbia. Exhibit B, pg. 1382, ln. 6 - pg. 1388, ln.·-12. -·---,
87 .1. These allegations of administrative errors and allegations of sexual
harassment were irrelevant under IRE 401 and 402 because they did not
impeach Dr. Arden's medical testimony.
87.2. The allegations' unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value
and were inadmissible under IRE 403.
87 .3. The allegations were not admissible under IRE 404, nor did the state
give ariy notice of its intentto use tire evidence to the ex.tent itelairns the
evidence was admissible under IRE 404(b).
88. Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to attempt to rehabilitate Dr.
Arden on re-direct examination.
89. It was deficient performance for defense counsel to fail to introduce photographs of
taken at St. Joseph's Hospital soon after he arrived in an ambulance.
89.1. The photographs show no redness or bruising and therefore are inconsistent
with the state's theory that Mr. Grove had just brutally beaten
89.2. The photographs will be filed with the Court under separate cover.
90. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial

.after many jurors-fell.asleep.during the testimony. See e.g., Exhibit B, pg...921, ln. 16 - pg. 922-,- ·: ---· - -~
ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg. 1351, ln. 19-25.
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91. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he introduced evidence in the
direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son
Alex. Exhibit B, pg. 1074, ln. 1-24.

9 LL_, This evidence_could_have been kept out by filing a motion in limine
as it is both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence.
92. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the
prosecutor questioning Mr. Grove about the fact he was behind on child support. Exhibit B, pg.
1115, ln. 21-24
92.1. This evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine as it is
both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence.

93. Defense counsel's performance v,ras deficient because he failed to question
paramedic David Chenalt about Lisa Nash's reaction to Kyler's injury.
93.1. Mr. Chenalt could have testified that Ms. Nash's behavior was "the most
bizarre reaction we've ever seen for especially a kid call." See Grand Jury Tr. p.
214, ln. 5 - pg. 217, ln. 15.
93 .2. The fact that defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to elicit evidence from
a paramedic that Mr. Grove's affect was "too calm," while failing to bring out
evidence from a paramedic that Lisa Nash's affect was ''the most bizarre reaction
we've ever seen" demonstrates the absence of a strategy regarding this type of
evidence.

_9JJ . The Grand Jury Transcript is not attached hereto lls_it is a confidential
document.
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93.4. Mr. Grove asks the Court to take judicial notice of the Grand Jury
Transcript pursuant to IRE 201(d).
94. Defense counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient because he
. failed to argue that-the state had failed to carry its-burden of proof because Dr._Reichard did not.. . _·- ,. ______ _
testify and the other doctors had no foundation for their opinions of when the injury happened.
95. Defense counsel's performance during the state's closing and rebuttal arguments was
deficient because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the prosecutor.
96. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial
after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments.
97. The cumulative effect of defense counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr.

-- Greve;
B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court should not look to
each example of deficient performance and determine whether it was prejudicial. Instead, the
Court should consider all the deficient performance and then determine whether the cumulative
effect was prejudicial. See, Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P.2d 910, 917 (Ct. App.
1996) and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App.1994). As the Ninth
Circuit has explained, "Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to see whether
their cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. They are, in
other words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of ineffective _
assistance of trial counsel." Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (91h Cir. 2003). __
As set forth above, there is a reasonable probability of a different result had defense
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counsel's performance not been.deficient. Crucial state's evidence would have been excluded,
exculpatory defense evidence would have been presented, and egregious prosecutorial
misconduct would have been prevented or resulted in a mistrial, or a mistrial would have been
..... granted due to. jut.or misconduct.. Accordingly, this Court should grant the Petition.
0

PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner Requests tlie Following Relief:
A. That the judgment be vacated and a new trial be granted; and/or
B. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted this

5<ft\ day of September, 2012.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

~~{

Deborah Whipple
Attorneys for Stacey Grove
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VERIFICATION OF PETITION

t
1:

t
li

I, Stacey Grove, being duly sworn under oath, state:

t:

I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and that the
matters and allegations set forth are true and correct to e best of my owledge and belief.

!
I
I

t

i
I
t

I

~------- -·~---------------------------------------------1
II

II
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~7

j,_,-...

I CERTIFY that on September_ 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be:
mailed
faxed

-/

c_.../ hand delivered

to: Daniel L. Spickler, Nez Perce County Prosecuting A.ttorney, 1221 F)Street, Lewiston, ID
/\
\
·
1
83501
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
Deborah Whipple
ISBA# 4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.

CV 1 2 - 0 1 7 9 8

AFFIBA¥1'.f OF STEVIE GaOVE IN
SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Stevie Grove, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says:
1. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v.

Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho.
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg
Lind; and James Yates.
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July
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22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008.
4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony.
5. During the trial, I witnessed prosecuting attorney Spickler repeatedly adjust his
projector as the jurors were entering the courtroom prior to presentation of evidence so as to
project alternating images of photographs of

during his lifetime and autopsy photos.

This ends my affidavit.

j
1).vi,g_,, ·

\1) 'i
.r

.· ·

l

-

/lltiJ:L--:

'-Stevie Grove
SUBSCRIBED ~ SWORN TO
before me this __:i_ day of ~ttgu5t, 2012.

\\);\· ~~~~~
Notary Public for the State of Idaho
Residing at: i,._ <e. ._p 'j ~ <} l..l"'My commission expires: >-).:~ ~ {)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
-- '/ /,.1,..,.._

I CERTIFY that on September
foregoing document to be:

L

2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the

mailed
,,.

t--·_,,

~~

hand delivered
faxed

to:

Daniel Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Dennis Benjamin

-

1SBA#4199

Deborah Whipple

.,,_

:z..J

2D1Z SEP 7 Prl 'f l O

ISBA#4355

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZPERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_____

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
_)
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AFFIDAVIT OF LORI STAMPER IN
SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Lori Stamper, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says:
1. That I was present on July 29, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden in

the criminal trial proceedings in State v. Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the
Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho.
2. That during the testimony, I observed a juror in the back row sleeping.

3. That juror was either Michael Keller or Kendall Loetscher.
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This ends my affidavit.

~~-~-~te
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
before me this
day of September, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- I-:,..__

I CERTIFY that on September
foregoing document to be:

7 ,2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the

mailed
~livered
faxed

to:

Daniel Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

----·-
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA#4199
Deborah Whipple
ISBA# 4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,

)

CV12-01798

)

Petitioner,

)
)

VS.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Respondent.

CASE NO. - - - -

A:FFIDAVIT.OF CAROL GROVE IN
SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

)

Carol Grove, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says:
1. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v.

Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho.
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg
Lind; and James Yates.
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July.
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22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008.
4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony.
This ends my affidavit.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on September
foregoing document to be:

"{~
--l-, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the_

mailed
l , . ~ d delivered
faxed
to:

Daniel Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.Q. Box: 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA#4199
Deborah Whipple

~::/~iNJAMIN,
P.O. Box 2772
303 w. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
'VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.

CV1 2 - 0 17 9 8

AFFIDAVIT OFLYNETTE
WALTON IN SUPPORT OF
VERIFIED PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Lynette Walton, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says:
I. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v.

Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho.
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg
Lind; and James Yates.
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July
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22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008.
4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony.
This ends my affidavit.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
/A,I CERTIFY that on September _ , 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:

1

mailed

~elivered
faxed
to:

Daniel Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267

~

L

83.50.
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
Deborah Whipple
ISBA#4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

CASE NcC

V1 2 - 0 1 7 9 8
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STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED
PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Deborah Grove, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says:
1. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v.

Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho.
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg
Lind; and James Yates.
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July.
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. 22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008.

-4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony.
5. During the trial, I witnessed prosecuting attorney Spickler repeatedly adjust his
projector as the jurors were entering the courtroom prior to presentation of evidence so as to
project alternating images of photographs of

during his lifetime and autopsy photos.

This ends my affidavit.

Dibw.A_~.

Deborah Grove

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO

~~~<-L.I .)..,,,.

before me this _L_ day ofA.ugl:l:st, 2012.

s~+Q_~-Ji

Notary Public for the State ofldaho
Residing at: L ..._u.) ~
My commission expires: S -:}~ -\).

~.J- °"'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1
I CERTIFY that on September _ , 2012,
6-_

I caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoing document to be:
mailed
~vered
faxed
to:

Daniel Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
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(208) 343-1000
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
J
)
)
)
)

CASENO.

CV12-01798

AFFIDAVIT OF .U...CK GROVEJN

SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Jack Grove, being duly sworn and.upon oath hereby says:
1. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v.

Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho.
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg
Lind; and James Yates.
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July
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22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008.
4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony.
This ends my affidavit.

/

.C::

~--1--~--

_:1__----="'------',IL"'--""'-"-~

j c k Grove

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
before me this~ day o f ~ , 2012.

~-\tinbLr
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
-7/...v-

I CERTIFY that on September_
I , 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:
mailed
~ d delivered
faxed
to:

Daniel Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
\i;Lewiston, ID ?35~l 'J
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
STACEY GROVE,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
CASE NO. CR12-01798
)
vs.
)
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
)
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Thursday, the 11th day of October, 2012, at the hour
of 10:45 A.M. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Courthouse,
Lewiston, Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Scheduling Conference in the aboveentitled matter with THE COURT initiating the call.
DATED this

/

7,-

day of September, 2012.

CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE was:
~ a n d delivered via court basket, or

_ _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2012, to:
Dennis Benjamin
P 0Box2772
Boise ID 83701

f3 ~ay of September,

-tn/4. t..i.J_

Nez Perce County Prosecutor
P OBox 1267
Lewiston ID 83501

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

2
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA#4199
Deborah Whipple
ISBA#4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

)
)
)
)

Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 201 (d), to take judicial notice
of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record in the case of State v.

Stacey Grove, Nez Perce County Case No. CR-2007-0000768, including the documents listed in
the Register of Actions attached hereto as Exhibit A.
Dated this

·J

r

day of September, 2012.

~:E.~-Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Stacey Grove

1 • REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on September / :J.. , 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:

6,_

mailed
hand delivered
faxed

to:

Daniel Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

b.eM,\A~

~c-:_~

Dennis Benjamin

l

2 • REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
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01/03/2012 Order for Telephonic status Conference
0312012 Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Conference 01/23/2012 08:45
AM)
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference scheduled on
1/23/2012 08:45 AM: Hearing Vacated

02/02/2012 Or r for Telephonic Status Conference
02/02/20 12 Hearin Scheduled (Telephonic Status Conference 02/16/2012 09:00
AM)
Hearing resu

r Telephonic Status Conference scheduled on

0211612012 02/16/2012 09: AM: Hearing Held
02/16/2012 Order for Telephoni Status Conference
0211612012 Hearing Scheduled {Te
AM)

0311312012 Hearing result for Telephonic tatus Conference scheduled
03/13/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing eld
04/03/2012 Notice Of Service - def Nash
06/28/2012 Child Support Order Transmittal Form
08/08/2012 Stipulation to Continue Trial
08/08/2012 Notice Of Taking The Deposition of Steven
08/13/2012 Order to Vacate Trial Setting
0811312012 Hearing r~sult for Pretrial Confere
AM: Heanng Vacated
eduled on 08/27/201

0811312012 Hear~ng result for Jury Trial
Hearing Vacated
08/13/2012 Order For Telep hon·

.

cheduling Conference

d (Telephonic ScheduUng Conference O

0811312012 Hearing Sched
09:00AM)

sultfor Telephonic Scheduling Conference schedule
0911412012 Hearin
09/1 012 09:00 AM: Hearing Held
i:ler Setting Trial & Pre-trial Conference
Hearing Scheduled {Pretrial Conference 02/15/2013 10:00 AM)

2012 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/25/2013 09:00 AM)

State of Idaho vs. Stacey Lewis Grove
No hearings scheduled

Case: CR-2007-0000768
•Ch
. Violation
, arges: Date

District

!3·

Judge: Carl
Kerrick

Charge

Amounl23 450.73
due:
'
Citation

07/10/2006 118-4001-1 Murder I

Arresting Officer: Lewiston
City,, LPD

Closed pending clerk action

Disposition
Finding: Guilty
Disposition
date: 01/28/2009
Fines/fees: $97 .50
Det Penitentiary: 22
years

Register
of
Date
'actions:

01/26/2007 New Case Filed-Felony
01/26/2007 Prosecutor Assigned Daniel L Spickler
01/26/2007 Indictment
tps://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=NEZ_PERCE&county=Ne...
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0112612007 Warrant lss~ed -Arrest Bond amount: 100000.00 Defendant: Grove,
Stacey Lewis
01/26/2007 Notice Of Appearance
01/26/2007 Request For Discovery-defendant
01/26/2007 Defendant Grove, Stacey Lewis Attorney Retained Scott M Chapman
01/26/2007 Exhibits to Deanna for appeal process.
01/29/2007 Warrant Returned Defendant Grove, Stacey Lewis
01/29/2007 Case Status Changed: Activate (previously inactive)
01/29/2007 Notification Of Rights-felony
· 01/29/2007Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 01/29/2007 04:00 PM)
01/29/2007 Request and Order to Photograph-Tribune
01/29/2007 Request to Broadcast
01/29/2007 Order To Broadcast-KLEW
0112912007 Hearing result for Arraignment held on 01/29/2007 04:00 PM: Hearing
Held
01/29/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 02/01/2007 02:00 PM)
01/29/2007 Notice Of Hearing
01/31/2007 Requestto Broadcast--KLEW
01/31/2007 Order to Broadcast--granted--KLEW
0210112007 Hearing result for Arraignment held on 02/01/2007 02:00 PM: Arraignment
/ First Appearance
02/01/2007 Appear & Plead Not Guilty- NG (118-4001-1 Murder I)
0210112007 Minute Entry Hearing type: Arraignment Hearing date: 2/1/2007 lime:
2:14 pm Court reporter: Nanc}! Towler Audio tape number: DC# 3834
02/01/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/18/2007 09:00 AM)
02/01/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Final Pretrial 06/04/200710:00 AM)
02/01/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Motions 05/11/2007 09:00 AM)
02/02/2007 Order Setting Jury Trial & Scheduling Procedings
0210212007 Motion for Preparation of Grand Jury Transcript and Disclosure of Votedef
02/02/2007 Order Granting Motion
02/06/2007 Notice of Intent not to Seek the Death Penalty--state
02/06/2007 Response To Request For Discovery-plaintiff
02/08/2007 Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 50000.00)
02/08/2007 Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 50000.00)
02/13/2007 1st Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state
02/15/2007 Transcript Filed---Grand Jury Proceedings January 22, 23, 25 & 26, 2007
03/07/2007 2nd Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state
03/21/2007 Request For Discovery-plaintiff
04/12/2007 3rd Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state
04/16/2007 Order Setting Jury Trial and Scheduling Proceedings
04/17/2007 Continued (Jury Trial 12/03/2007 09:00 AM)
04/17/2007 Continued (Final Pretrial 11/16/2007 09:00 AM)
04/17/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 06/18/2007 09:00 AM)
04/17/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 07/13/2007 09:00 AM)
04/17/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 10/26/2007 09:00 AM)
05/11/2007 Stipulation to Continue Briefing Schedules
05/14/2007 Waiver Of Speedy Trial
05/15/2007 Order ContinuinA BriefinA Schedules
:tps://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.dc?roaDetail=yes&schema=NEZ_PERCE&county=Ne...
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05/18/2007 Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Polygraph Results-state
0511812007 M?tion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Lisa Nash's Character and/or
pnor acts--state
0511812007 Moti~n to Allow Witnesses to Review the Transcript of Their Grand Jury
Testimony--state
.
05/18/2007 Pretrial Motions--def
05/25/2007 Motion for Continuance of Pretrial Motion Hearing--state
05/25/2007 Order for Continuance of Pretrial Motion Hearing
0512512007 Ord~r Allowing Witnesses to Review the Transcript of Their Grand Jury
-· -Testimony
05/25/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 07/23/2007 09:00 AM)
06/27/2007 4th Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state
06/27/2007 Supplemental Request for Discovery--state
0711312007 Hea~ng result for Status Conference held on 07/13/2007 09:00 AM:
Hearing Held
07/13/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 09/07/2007 09:00 AM)
07/13/2007 Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Motion Hearing
08/14/2007 Motion to Extend Briefing Schedule and Reset Pretrial Hearing-def
08/14/2007 Affidavit of Scott Chapman--clef
08/15/2007 Amended Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Motion Hearing
08/15/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 10/09/2007 11 :00 AM)
09/24/2007 Response To Request For Discovery-defendant
09/24/2007 Brief Support Defendanfs Pretrial Motions--def

10/02/2007 Supulatlon and Mofionfor Continuance of Fina1 Pretrial0onfe1e11ce
10/03/2007 Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Pretrial Motions
10/09/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 10/12/2007 02:00 PM)
10/09/2007 Order for Continuance of Final Pretrial Conference
1010912007 Minute Entry Hearing type: Pretrial Motions Hearing date: 10/9/2007 Time:
11 :20 am Court reporter: Towler Audio tape number: 3948
10/09/2007 Continued (Final Pretrial 11/20/2007 11 :00 AM)
1011212007 Minute Entry Hearing type: Pretrial Motions Hearing date: 10/12/2007
Time: 2:00 pm Court reporter: Towler Audio tape number: 3953
1011212007 Hearing resultfor Pretrial Motions held on 10/12/2007 02:00 PM: Hearing
Held
10/25/2007 Continued (Status Conference 11/02/2007 10:30 AM)
10/25/2007 Notice Of Hearing
10/25/2007 Opinion & Order on Pretrial Motions
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
10/30/2007 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: LAND ECK WESTBERG JUDGE & GRAHAM
Receipt number: 0304771 Dated: 10/30/2007 Amount: $19.00 (Check)
11/01/2007 Motion to Vacate--clef
11/01/2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion
11/01/2007 Motion

to Vacate-def

to Reconsider--def

11/01/2007 Motion to Compel---def
11/01/2007 Motion to Allow for Juror Questionnaire-def
11/02/2007 Notice of Hearing--def
1110212007 Hearing result for Status Conference held on 11/02/2007 10:30 AM:
Hearing Held IN CHAMBERS
1110212007 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing on Motions 11/07/2007 04:00 PM)
Defendant's Motion to Vacate Trial Setting
tps://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema= NEZ_PERCE&county= Ne...
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1110712007 Hearing result for Hea, ... l::J on Motions held on 11/07/2007 04:00 PM:
Motion Granted Defendant's Motion to Vacate Trial Setting

Minute Entry Hearing type: Defendant's Motion to Continue Trial Hearing

11/07/2007 date: 11/7/2007 Time: 4:01 pm Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape
number: DC# 3938
11/15/2007 Affidavit Of Service--UNSERVED Dr..Noelle Westrum
11/15/2007 Affidavit Of Service--SERVED Valley Medical Center, Carmen Stolte PA
11/15/2007 Affidavit Of Service--SERVED Valley Medical Center, Dr. Gregory Schultz
1111512007 Affidavit Of Service--SERVED Valley Medical Center, keeper of the
records Donna Ernsdorff

1111512007 AffidavitOfService--SERVED StJoseph Medical Center, Sabrina Tschirgi
records keeper
1111512007 Affidavit Of Service---SERVED Idaho Dept of Health & Welfare, Gaylene
Strandbakke records keeper

.

1111612007 Hearing ScheduJed (Hearing ~n Motions 12/10/2007 09:00 AM)
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider
11/16/2007 Motion to Quash Subpoena
1112012007 Hearing result for Final Pretrial held on 11/20/2007 11 :00 AM: Hearing
H~
.
1112012007 Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 12/03/2007 09:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated

·

11/20/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/21/2008 09:00 AM}
11/20/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 03/21/2008 09:00 AM)
1112012007 ~earing S~edu~ed (Hearing 02/15/2008 09:00 AM} conference to finalize
Juror questionnaire

1112012007 1leari~g Se~edul~d (Hearii,g 94197/2008 09;00 AM) eempletion ofjmor
quest1onna1re by Jury panel

1112012007 Hearing ~?hedule? (~earing 04/09/2008 09:00 AM) Vair dire in open
court/ind1v1dual vo1r dire

· 1112012007 H_earing Sche~uled (Hearing 04/10/2008 09:00 AM) individual voir
d1re~ury selection

.

11/20/2007 Order Setting Jury Trial & Scheduling Proceedings
11/26/2007 Affidavit Of Service
11/26/2007 Affidavit Of Service
11/26/2007 Affidavit Of Service
11/26/2007 Affidavit of Service
11/26/2007 Affidavit Of Service
1211012007 Hearing result for Hearing on Motions held on 12/10/2007 09:00 AM:
Hearing Held Defendant's Motion to Reconsider

Opinion & Order on Defendant's Pretrial Motion for Discovery of
Documents--ldaho Dep Health and Welfare, Family and Children's
01/04/2008 Services' Motion to Quash Subpoean--DENIED. Motion to Review
Records-GRANTED, all records shall remain under seal and not be
disseminated to the public consistent with the foregoing opinion

0211512008 Hearing result for ~ea.ring held o~ 02/~5/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held
conference to finalize Juror questionnaire

.

02/15/2008 Hearing Scheduled {Hearing 03/07/2008 09:00 AM) motion to reconsider
0310712008 He~ring resultfo~ Hearing held on 03/07/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held
motion to reconsider

0310712008 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Nancy Towler Number of
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pgs
03/14/2008 Continued {Pretrial Conference 03/27/2008 09:00 AM}
03/14/2008 Notice Of Hearing
03/21/2008 Opinion & Order on Defs Motion for Reconsideration
nt:1./?t::/?nnA 1 ot ~, ,nn Ro.onnnc,o. Tn R<>l"IIIO.C,t i=nr niC>J"nuon,.rlofonrlont
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03/26/2008 2nd Supp Response To Request For Discovery-defendant
03/27/2008 Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of an Alternate Perpetrator---state

0312712008 Heari~g result for Final Pretrial held on_ 03/27/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing
Held (m Chambers)
· ·
·
0312712008 Conti~ued ~Heari~g 04/16/2008 09:00 AM) completion of juror
quest1onna1re by Jury panel
0410212008 Conti~ued (Hearing 04/17/2008 09:00 AM) individual voirdire~ury
selection
0410212008 Continu~d. (Heari~g ~4/18/2008 09:00 AM) Voir dire in open
court/indlVldual voir dire

0410312008 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 04/08/2008 11 :OO AM) Mtn to Quash
Subpoena Dr. Schultz
04/03/2008 Motion for Order to Shorten Time for Hearing
04/03/2008 Notice of Hearing re: Motion for Order to Shorten Time for Hearing
04/03/2008 Motion to Quash Subpoena
04/03/2008 Affidavit of Gregory P. Schultz in Support Motion to Quash Subpoena
04/03/2008 Notice of Hearing re: Motion to Quash Subpoena
04/04/2008 Acceptance of Service--Bryan Cridlebaugh
04/04/2008 Acceptance of Service--Donnie Stamper
04/07/2008 Order Shortening Time for Hearing
0410812008 Hearing result for Hearing held on 04/08/2008 11 :00 AM: Case Taken
Under Advisement Mtn to Quash Subpoena Dr. Schultz
0410812008 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Number of Transcript Pages
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pgs
04 '08'200S Minute Entry Hearing typ~: Hearing on Motions Hearing date: 4/8/2008
1
'
Time: 11 :11 am Court reporter: Towler Audio ta.pa number: 4047 ·
04/08/2008 3rd Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--def
04/10/2008 Amended Order setting jury trial and scheduling
0411012008 Conti~ued ~Heari~g 07/16/2008 09:00 A~) _completion of juror
questionnaire by Jury panel
·
0411012008 Conti~ued (Hearing 07/17/2008 09:00 AM) individual voir dire~ury
selection
0411012008 Continu~d. (Hearin_g ~7/18/2008 09:00 AM) Voirdire in open
court/individual vo1r dire
04/10/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/21/2008 09:00 AM)
04/10/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Final Pretrial 06/27/2008 10:00 AM)
04/10/2008 Affidavit Of Service---Andrea Williams 4-4-08
04/16/2008 Affidavit Of Service Andrea Williams 4-11

~oa

04/18/2008 5th Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state
04/18/2008 Motion for Release of Evidence-state
04/21/2008 Order for Release of Evidence
04/22/2008 Acceptance of Service Julie Grove
04/22/2008 Acceptance of Service Brandon Krueger
04/23/2008 Acceptance of Service DONNIE STAMPER
04/23/2008 Acceptance of Service BRYAN CRIDLEBAUGH
04/23/2008 Acceptance of Service RONNIE STAMPER
04/23/2008 Acceptance of Service LORI STAMPER
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service- CRYSTAL HANSON
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service~-JOSEPHINE LIGHT
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JON PETRIE
tps-j/www.idcourts.us/reposit.ory/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=NEZ_PERCE&county=Ne...
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04r~o/2008 Affidavit Of Service-G,

)ORY SCHULlZ MD

04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--R. TODD PARKEY MD
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service-CRAIG N. AMBROSEN MD
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--CRAIG BURNS
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service-DAVID CHENAULT
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--MIKE SCHMIDT
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service-STEVE STOCKING
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--TODD MARTIN
04/25/2008 AffidavitOf Service--JESSE JACOBS 04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--COURTNEY JACOBS
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JONI DRAKE
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JONI DRAKE
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JESSE JACOBS
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--COURTNEY JACOBS
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--TODD MARTIN
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service-CRAIG BURNS
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--BRIAN FREI RN
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--DONALD CHIN MD
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--LISA BOMLEY
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--CRYSTAL HANSON
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JON PETRIE
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--BRIAN BIRDSELL
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JOSEPHINE LIGHT
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--DAVID CHENAULT
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--MIKE SCHMIDT
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--STEVE STOCKING
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--GREGORY SCHU.LlZ MD
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--R TODD AMBROSEN MD
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--SHARI SUMMERS RN
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--CORY BLAIR
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--LISA BOMLEY
06/26/2008 6th Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state
0612712008 Hearing result for Final Pretrial held on 06/27/200810:00 AM: Hearing
Held (in Chambers)
0612712008 He~ri~g Scheduled (Hearing 07/08/2008 01:30 PM) pick names go over
exh1b1ts
·
06/30/2008 Rule 16(c) Supplemental Response~ Request for Discovery--Defendant
07/07/2008 4th Supp Response To Request For Discovery-defendant

0710812008 H.earing result for Heari~g. he!d on 07/08/2008 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held
pick names go over exh1b1ts (m Chambers)
07/10/2008 State's Requested Instructions
07/10/2008 Affidavit Of Service Jonathan Ockwell
07/14/2008 Supp Motion in Limine
0711612008 Hearing_ resul~ for Hearin~ hel~ on 0~/16/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held
completion of Juror questionnaire by Jury panel
07/16/2008 Stipulation for Authentication of Evidence at Trial
. 0771612008 Minute EntryHearing type: Jury Trial Hearing date:. 7/1E>/2PQ8. Tirne: 9:00
am Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape number: 4096-4114
n~ /-to /rtnn.o

Hearing result for Hearing held on 07/17/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held

tps://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetaH=yes&schema=NEZ_PERCE&county=Ne...
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0711812008 He.ari~g ~esultfor Hearing. h_eld on ~7/1.8/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held
Vair dire m open court/ind1v1dual vo1r dire
07/18/2008 Order for Ahthentication of Evidence atTrial
07/18/2008 Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast Photograph (KLEW)
07/21/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/22/2008 09:00 AM)
07/21/2008 Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast Photograph (Tribune)
07/22/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/23/2008 09:00 AM)
07/22/2008 Affidavit Of Service Marsha Bums
07/22/2008 Affidavit-Of Service Lisa Nash -· -

.' -, · ·- . -- - -

07/23/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/24/2008 09:00 AM)
07/24/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/25/2008 09:·oo AM)
07/25/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/28/2008 09:00 AM)
07/25/2008 Motion to exclude testimony of Jason Eldred and Becy Overall
0712512008 Response to Motion to exclude testimony of Jason Eldred and Rebecca
Overall
07/25/2008 Defs Proposed Jury Instructions
07/28/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/29/2008 09:00 AM)
07/29/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/30/2008 09:00 AM)
0713012008 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter:Nancy Towler Number of
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: trial 1275
07/30/2008 Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/30/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held
07/30/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 07/31/200811 :00 AM)
OZL30L20D8 , lmy Verdict

07/30/2008 Found Guilty After Trial
07/30/2008 Instructions Submitted to the Jury
07/30/2008 Estimated Reporter's Transcript Costs
0713112008 Hear!ng result for Status Conference held on 07/31/2008 11 :00 AM:
Hearing Vacated
08/06/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 10/22/2008 09:00 AM)
08/06/2008 Presentence Investigation Ordered DUE 10-1-08
08/06/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 08/21/2008 11 :00 AM) re: PSI
08/07/2008 PSI Order

08/12/2008 Motion for Acquital or, in the Alternative, a New Trial--def
Hearing result for Hearing held on 08/21/2008 11 :00 AM: District Court
08/21/2008 Hearing Held Court Reporter: Nancy Towler Number of Transcript Pages
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
0812112008 Minute Entry Hearing type: PSI Hearing date: 8/21/2008 lime: 11 :OO am
Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape number: DC#4123
0812712008 Miscellaneous Payment: Miscellaneous Fees Paid by: Justine Foster
Receipt number: 0320188 Dated: 8/27/2008 Amount $2.00 (Cash)
09/23/2008 Order for Telephonic Status Conference
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Conference 09/29/2008 10:30
09/23/2008 AM)
.
: · ·
0912912008 Hearing result f~r Teleph~nic Status Conference held on 09/29/2008
10:30 AM: Heanng Held (m Chambers)
09/29/2008 Continued (Sentencing 11/24/2008 09:00 AM)
09/29/2008 Notice Of Hearing
10/29/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing on Motions 11/10/2008 11 :00 AM)
1012sJ2ooa Notice bf Hearing
PSI received-copies delivered by messenger to prosecutor and Scott
1n~n/?nnA ..-.L_____
. ,
.
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1110512008 Hearing result for Sentencing held on /24/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated
;.•- ,;;, ;_:.:.
11/05/2008 Continued (Hearing on Motions 11/24/~008 09:00 AM)
11/06/2008 Hearing Order

,-:.: · ·

11/21/2008 Brief in Support of Defendant's Pretrial Motions
Minute Entry Hearing type: Defs Motion for Aquittal or New Trial Hearing
11/24/2008 date: 11/24/2008 Time: 8:58 am Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape
number: CRTRM 1
1112412008 Hearing result for Heari~g on Motions held on 11/24/2008 09:00 AM:
_
Case Taken Under Advisement . __ -,,-." __ ____ __
1211612008 Opinion & Order ON Defendant's Mo.tion for. Acquittal or, in the
Alternativea New Trial--DENIED
12/29/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 01/28/2009 09:00 AM)
12/29/2008 Notice Of Hearing
01/26/2009 Sentencing Exhibits--def
01/27/2009 Request to Broadcast--Lewiston Mo-ming Tribune
01/27/2009 Request to Broadcast---APPROVED Lewiston Morning Tribune
01/28/2009 Request and Order to Broadcast--APPRClYED-KLEW
0112812009 Minute Entry Hearing type: SentencingHearing date: 1/28/2009 Time:
9:03 am Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape number: CRTRM 1
01/28/2009 Commitment
01/28/2009 Motion to Withdraw and Appoint Public Defender
01/28/2009 Affidavit of Scott Chapman
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 01/28/2009 09:00 AM: District Court
----~0~172=81=2=0=09~·Rearing Held Court Reporter: Nancy I owler Number of I ranscnpt Pages
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
01/28/2009 Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action
0112812009 Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4001-1 Murder I) Confinement terms:
Penitentiary determinate: 22 years to lire
01/28/2009 Surety Bond Converted/ Exonerated (Amount 50,000.00}
01/28/2009 Surety Bond Converted/ Exonerated (Amount 50,000.00}
01/28/2009 Commitment
01/28/2009 Motion to Withdraw and Appoint Public Defender
01/28/2009 Affidavit of Scott Chapman
01/28/2009 Order for Bond Release
01/28/2009 Confidential Order
01/28/2009 Judgment of Conviction
01/28/2009 Presentence Investigation Sealed In File
01/28/2009 Order for Withdrawal
01/29/2009 Order Appointing Public Defender
01/30/2009 Notice of Conviction
Order For Restitution And Judgment STATE OF IDAHO MEDICAID
02/04/2009 $17,730.34 INST #766812
.
02/04/2009 Order For Restitution And JudgmenfCRIME VICTIMS FUND $622.89
INST-#766813
0210412009 Order for Fine Pursuant to §19-5307 LISA M. NASH $2,500.00 INST
#766811
·
0210412009 Order for Fine Pursuant to § 19-5307 TODD D. MARTIN $2,500.00 INST
#766810
- 02/13/2009 Appealed To The Supreme Court- -02/13/2009 Notice Of Appeal
tps://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema= NEZ_PERCE&cou nfy=Ne•..
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02/24/2009
02/26/2009
. 02/26/2009
03/09/2009

.I

'-

--

I - '--

____ :_-J

t.

Motion to Appoint SAF..., and Affidavit of Counsel
Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender
Defendant: Grove, Stacey Lewis Attorney Retained Molly J. Huskey
Supreme Court Receipt - Clerk's Certificate filed at the SC

0310912009 Supreme Court Receipt - Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript due at
SC by June 12, 2009
03/31/2009 Amended Notice of Appeal
04/13/2009
04/30/2009
05/28/2009
05/29/2009
07/20/2009

Supreme Court Receipt - Amended _t'.J(?tice pf Appeal filed at the SC
Order Granting Court Reporter's Motion for Extension of Time
Motion for Release Pending Appeal~ef -Order
Supreme Court Receipt - Court Reporter's Motion for Extension of Time

Supreme Court Receipt - Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripbt - The
07/24/2009 Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transript must be filed at the SC by October
2,2009
0712412009 Supreme ?ourt Receipt- Order Granting q~urt Reporter's Second Motion
for Extension of Time
.: :·
'_
07/24/2009 Affidavit of Janet Kough

07/27/2009
08/19/2009
09/28/2009
11/02/2009
11/04/2009
11/04/2009
11/05/2009
11/23/2009

Order Rescinding Instrument Number 771384 INST #771860
Notice Of Service of Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript
Supreme Court Receipt - Appeal Record filed at the SC
Supreme Court Reeipt - Motion to Augment - Due Dates Suspended
Supreme Court Receipt - Briefing Due Dates Suspended
Order Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule
Supreme Court Receipt- Document filed a.t'the SC
Supreme Court Receipt - Briefing Resumed

1112312009 Supreme Court Receipt - Order to Withdraw Order to Augment Record
with Requested Transcripts and Reset Briefing Schedule
01/26/2010 Supreme Court Receipt- Due Dates Suspended
0210212010 S~preme Court Receipt - Order to Augment the Record and Reset the
Briefing Schedule
02/02/2010 Supreme Court Receipt - Briefing due dates are Suspended
02/09/201 O Affidavit of DeAnna P. Grimm
03/22/201 O Order re: Appellanfs Brief
03/26/201 O Order re: Appellant's Brief
Supreme Court Receipt - Order re: Appellanfs Brief, due on or before
05/20/2010 June 11, 201 O - no furrther extensions of time to file appellanfs brief shall
be granted
10/06/2010 Supreme Court Receipt - Motion to Suspend - All Due Dates Suspended
10/07/2010 Supreme Court Receipt- Objection to Motion to Suspend filed
11/19/2010 Supreme Court Receipt-Appellant Reply Brief filed at the SC
03/11/2011 Supreme Court Receipt - Additional Authorities filed at the SC

•••-•

03/28/2011 Supreme Court Receipt - Opinion - Grove's conviction of first degree
felony murder, by aggravated battery of a child under twelve years old, is
affirmed.
Supreme
Court Receipt - Brief in Support of Petition for Review filed at the
0512612011
SC
05/26/2011 Supreme Court Receipt- Document filed at the SC
09/20/2011 Remittitur
·--••••••••-••
'u0·-·-····•
-- -•••••••••-• -Miscellaneoi.JsPaymentForMaki11g· Cop}rotAnYFile--OrRecora ByTller ----~ - 10/06/2011 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Danny Radakovich Receipt number: 0016855
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Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying ;The Same Additional Fee For
10/07/2011 Certificate And Seal Paid by: Danny Radakovich Receipt number:
0016866 Dated: 10(1/2011 Amount: $4.00 (Check)

Perfection Tire of Lewiston LLC vs. Stacey Lewis Grove
Ried: 10/24/2002 i· Subtype: Small Claims Judge: Michael
,:: . . ·
Griffin
Defendants: Grove, Stacey Lewis
:fl ·p ·,: ··i ·
Magistrate

Pia in tiffs: Perfection Tire of Lewiston LLC·
--·-- --·- -·· - ,r\:. '

In
Favor
Of

~~~~ment g:~osition ~~~~osition Partfes

'Disposition: Date

Grove, Stacey Lewis
(Defendant), Perfection Tire Plaintjff
.. of Lewiston LLC (Plaintiff)
,,'Judgment amount: 289.42

Comment:

r· .

./ "f;··:·

: Register of Date
,actions:

.

10/24/2002 New Case Filed
1012412002 Filing: H • Small Cla s Paid by: Perfection Tire (plaintiff) Receipt
number: 0215195 Da d: 10/24/2002 Amount $35.00 (Check)
10/24/2002 Claim And Complaint
10/24/2002 Summons Filed

1211912002 Hearing r~sult for Hearing held on 12/1
With Hearing
.
12/19/2002 Judgment-$289.42 Default
12/19/2002 Case Status Changed: closed
1212612002 Perfection Tire, Plaintiff vs Stace G
Order Or Decree Entered
Ex~~~tibri Paid by. erfection Tire
0512112003 Miscellaneous Payment: Writs
Receipt number: 0225035 D ed: 05/21/2003 Amoun $2.00 (Check)
05/21/2003 Application For Continuou
05/21/2003 Writ Issued
08/14/2003 Satisfaction Of Judg ent
08/14/2003 Writ Returned-Sa · fled

it Bureau of Lewiston-C"rkston Inc vs. Stacey Lewis Gr

.

, Case:CV-2002-0002056

Subtype: Other Claims

e

Judge:

reg K.
Ka

Defend

Pl

leisch

Status:

C

d
lose

06/26/2003

ts:Grove, Stacey Lewis

ntiffs:.credit Bureau of Lewiston-Clarkston Inc

Judgment Disposition Disposition Parties
Type
Date
Type

In
Favor

Of

Grove, Stacey Lewis
-·~ ..... ,_,. ___,,_-=_ __

--:06726/2-003 ~;~~::a1----------------;:_~fe8::0~c~~::u:~~u~:P-laintiff~------·-··---·--- - - - ----:
. . {Plaintiff)
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Ff.LED
Dennis Benjamin

zm OCT

ISBA# 4199
Deborah Whipple

ISBA# 4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772

1 RM ID 13

At~Ji]!_,g. w.~., ~
~~~GOw~T
DEPUTY

303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343~ 1000
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV12-01798

- - - - - " . - - ~ - ~ ~ - ~ ~ - - - - - - - -}------f':A:F1c1:'"i"FtlD1:;1,,t\:A.._e-¥l;lJ+T:f-'=OnFYKi""-·,',1.:1\R~tEo11,~~NHS~T1cil1""'..Mn.FPE.8tRA-----

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED

)
)

PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

______________))

Respondent.

Karen Stamper, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says:
1. That I was present during the testimony of state's witness Dr. Marco Ross in State v,

Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho.
2. That during the testimony, I observed jurors sleeping.
3. That I observed the third juror in the back row sleeping.
4. That I observed a juror in the .front row sleeping.

1 - AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN STAMPER IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CON\llCIIDN.RELIEF

····----·· - - ~ - - -..
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5. That I observed the prosecuting attorney showing photographs of the autopsy of
Martin on the overhead screen prior to the commencement of court.

6. That while the prosecutor was showing the autopsy photographs, I observed Juror
Number 4 talking with a bailiff within sight of the screen.
7. That on July 29, 2008, during the lunch recess from the trial, I was at the Taco Time
in Lewiston, Idaho, with three other people.
8. That during that time, my companions and I were discussing the trial.

1

9. That during the discussion, my son noticed a juror sitting directly behind us in a
place where he could clearly hear our conversation.
10. That we immediately stopped our conversation.
11. That thejmm did nut infonn us oflris presence, leave our vidnity, nor speak: to ms~
This ends my affidavit.

•

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
,,,,,,,mm111111,l
1_
~,-.. ~\NA HJ,. , . ,.,;
2
before me this lP day of September, 2012 ..~$:,;~~ •••••••••• b~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on September}i:, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:

1(_ mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Daniel Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

3 - AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN STAMPER IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-

~-==~--
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
Deborah Whipple
!SBA# 4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
.

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV12-0l 798

AFl?UM. VfT OF CRAIG STAMPER
IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED
PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

)

Craig Stamper, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says:
I. That I was present during the trial proceedings in State v. Grove, No. CR-20070000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho.
2. That during the testimony, I twice observed a juror in the back row sleeping.
3. That this sleeping juror leaned back to rest his head on the wall as he slept.
4. That I observed the prosecutor showing slides of the autopsy of

of Martin on

the screen as the jurors were entering the courtroom prior to the official commencement of

1 - AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG STAMPER IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
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court.
This ends my affidavit

~\\\\\111111111,,,,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
cll.t. day of September, 2012.

before me this
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on September]:&, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:
_(;,_ mailed
hand delivered
faxed

to:

Daniel Spickler
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

3 - AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG STAMPER IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
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DANIELL. SPICKLER
Prosecuting Attorney

~12 OCT S PJ111 2 58

NANCE CECCARELLI
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County, Idaho
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 799-3073
ISBN 7787

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY L. GROVE,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2012-0001798
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR
HEARING

)
)
Respondent,

)

COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney of record,
NANCE CECCARELLI, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Nez Perce County, Idaho, and moves
this Court for Summary Disposition and Dismissal of Petitioner's Application for PostConviction Relief as it presents no genuine issue of material fact, raises issues decided in other
appeals, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and, the Respondent is entitled
to judgment as a matter oflaw pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4906(c).
Further, that this matter be set for hearing at a time convenient for the Court.

r_~l

DATED this I/)

.

day of October, 20121

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

~•·-=-__:.____ :=-=•::-M0Ti0N-F01FSBMMAR:-Y-f>fSPt'}S~i'I6N----AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR
HEARING
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR
HEARING was
(1) _ _ hand delivered, or _
(2) _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or
(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or
(4)

~ ' postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United

States Mail.
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Dennis Benjamin
Deborah Whipple
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP
P .0. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

DATED this

6-~ day of October, 2012.

- - - ---- -~- -MOrf0N--FtHl~B'M:MAAY-fl1SP08TI-<:>N
AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR
HEARING
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA#4199
Deborah Whipple
ISBA #4355
NEVIN. BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-_1000

D[PUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798
OBJECTION TO STATE'S MOTION

FOifSUIVfMARY DISPOSITION AM)
MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE
STATEMENT
(Oral Argument Requested)

Petitioner, Stacey Grove, objects to the State's Motion fof Summary Disposition and

Di~missal because it fails to adequately set forth the basis for the motion. Petitioner also moves,
·pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(e), for a more definite statement before he is required to interpose a
.responsive pleading.

Post-conviction relief proceedings are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,

Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995), and Rule 7(b)(l) requires that
"[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which ... shall state with
particularity the grounds therefor[.]" See Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319> 322,900 P.2d
I•

OBJECTION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND
_MQ.TIONEORAMOREDERJNIIB -STATE:MENTL--·=·-~===...:....~------------------~

ORJGlf~AL
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795, 798 (1995) (applying rule to post-conviction proceedings). The Comt of Appeals wrote in

.A{artinezv. State, 126Idaho 813,818, 892P.2d488, 493 (Ct. App.1995):
It is clear that in summary judgment proceedings the nonmovant is required to
respond only to alleged grounds for smnmary judgment asserted by the moving·
party. The nonmovant need not address any aspect of the nonmovant's case that
has not been challenged by the opposing party, s motion.... In Mason [v. Tucker
and Associates, 125 Idaho 429,871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994)], we emphasized
the necessity of notice of the grounds for a motion in order to afford the
nonmovant an opportunity to address the issues raised and present evidence and
legal argument· directed to those issues.

See also, DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009) (Rule 7(b)(!)
requires grounds be stated with "reasonable particularity"), citing Patton v. Patton,. 88 Idaho 288,
292,399 P.2d 262, 264-65 (1965).
Rule 12(e) gives the Court authority to order a more definite st~tement in cases \vhere a

pleading "is so vague and ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading[.]"
Here, the state's motion consists of a single desultory paragraph consisting of nothing
more than timeworn boilerplate allegations which are not linked to particular claims in the
Petition and do not provide notice to the Court or Petitioner of an actual reason to grant the state
relief. The motion fails to even mention any of the claims raised in the thirty~five page long
Petition and it fails to address any of Petitioner's arguments made in support of those claims.
See Verified Petition, p. 10-12 (argument regarding confrontation clause claim); p. 18~19
(argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct claim); p. 20-21 (argument regarding juror

misconduct claim); p. 20-23 (argument regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claim); and p. 34-35 (argument regarding the~ineffective assistance of trial

cou.nsefciaiirif It also

2•
OBJECTION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND
- - - - ~ ·MB'I'i0N-FeR~:_M6R.EbEFINriE~TA:TEMEN f . -
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fails to mention any of the eight affidavits filed in support of the Petition. Mr. Grove is not ~tble
to respond to the state's motion because there are no actual arguments advanced in support or its

request.
Therefore, the Court pursuant to I.C.R. 12(e) should order the state to file a motion
compliant with Rule 7{b)(l) before Mr. Grove should be expected to respond.
Oral argument is requested.
Respectfully submitted this

/0-('-,.day of October, 2012.

Attorneys for Stacey Grove

···---

3•

---------··-

....__________________
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on October
docwnent to be:

I~ 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Kmailed
hand de]ivered
)( faxed to (208) 799-3080

~
to:

emailed to nancececcarelli@co.nezperce.id.us

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

D

jlAA~~ ~ . . , ~ - -

Dennis Benjamin

~

OBJECTION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND
MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDIC"'......:- ,w,
1

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT
_STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

THE COURT, having considered Petitioner's Motion, pursuant to I.R.E. 20l(d), to take
judicial notice of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record in the
case of State v. Stacey Grove, Nez Perce County Case No. CR-2007-0000768, including the
·documents listed in the Register of Actions attached as Exhibit A to this Order, and the State
stipulating to the granting thereof, HEREBY TAKES JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE ABOVE
MENTIONED MATERIALS.
Dated this /S't7-day of October, 2012.

Carl B. Kerrick
District Judge

91
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

12

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DECLARE PETITIONER A
NEEDY PERSON

THE COURT, lut:ving considered Petitioner's Motion, pursuant to IC §§ l 9-851 (c) and
19-852, to declare that he is a "needy person" for purposes of obtaining necessary services and
facilities of representation in this case, finds he is a needy person and eligible for such services at
county expense. Counsel for Petitioner shall direct any specific requests for services to this
Court for prior approval. Any specific request may be made on an ex parte basis with the
moving papers and orders to be sealed.
Dated this

JS ")t.day of October, 2012.

(1

~--JJ~tJ...J.!::.L=========::--0
Carl B. Kerrick
District Judge
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Dennis Benjamin

ISBA# 4199

lJ1Z OCT 15 p~ 3 311

Deborah Whipple

ISBA#4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W_ Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

'~-\~

DEPUTY

,

__

,,~

·

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE OIS1RICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE~
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
} __ )
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798
----
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PETIT101\'ER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

-

)
)

Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks the Court to grant summary disposition in his favor and
grant the relief requested in his Petition. There is good cause to grant the motion because the

Respondent has not answered the Petition and the allegations therein, even construed most

favorably to the state, establish that the Petitioner is entitled to relief as a matter of law.
This Motion is made pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c). It is supported by the affidavits

already filed herein as well as the allegations and arguments made in the Petition. See Verified
Petition, p. 1O~ 12 (argument regarding confrontation clause claim); p. 18-19 (argument regarding
prosecutorial misconduct claim); p. 20-21 (argument regardingjurOT misconduct claim); p. 20-23

1 • PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY D-1SJ~QSITION_______~--- ______ ··-·--·-----------------------~---
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(argument regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim); and p. 34-35 (argllmcnt
regarding the i:ueffective assistance of trial counsel claim).
~
. Respectfully submitted this
day of October, 2012.

t5'"'

Ue·~g- ¥ ,_.g_
Deborah Whipple

~1:~Dennis Benjamin

Attorneys for Stacey Grove
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on October ~ 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be:

xmailed
hand delivered

\<: emailed to nancececcarelli@co.nezperce.id.us
to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

________ 3_ • PETITIONER:S_MOIIQN_F_O_R__SJJMMARY_J)JSPOSITION
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Dennis Benjamin, ISB #4199
Deborah Whipple, ISB #4355

2012 t-lDU 28 PPl 1 1-13

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P .0. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

PATTY 0. WEEr:S

. CL~~OURT
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE.DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE SECOND mDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
)

STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs ..

-·· - . . -···- STATE OF IDAIIO,

.. ~--

Respondent.

)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

)
}

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC

---~~---· ___J) _ ____ JffiEDERICKSEN ____ ·-------------~

____________ _

)
)

Eric Fredericksen, being duly sworn and upon oa~ hereby says:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho.

2. That I represented the Petitioner herein, Stacey Grove, during the appeal in Slate v.

Stacey Grove, Supreme Court Docket No. 36211 (Nez Perce County District Court Number CR2007-768).
3. Attorney Diane Walker was my co-counsel in the appeal.
4. That I have read the post-conviction petitio.Q. filed in this case.
5. That I did not raise the prosecutorial misconduct issue raised in the Second Cause of
Action on direct appeal because trial counsel did not ·object to the alleged instances of

l - AFFIDAVIT OE.ERIC FREDRRTCK.,:,S.c...EN~-------------~~------
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misconduct and thus did not preserve the issue for appeal or the record was not sufficient to raise
the issue on appeal.
6~ Fmther~ the issue could not have been raised under the fundamental en-or doctrine
under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P .3d 414 (2009) and State v.- Perry, 150 Idaho 209,

245 P.3d 961 (2010).
7 ..

The juror misconduct issue raised in the Third Cause of Actio11 could not have been

raised on ditect appeal because trial counsel did not draw the misconduct to the Court's attention
or ask the Court to take any action about it, and there was no definitive evidence in the record
. thatjuxors had been sleeping during trial testimony.
8. Further, the issue could not have been raised under the fundamental ·e1ror doctrine
under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P .3d 414 (2009) &nd State v. Perry, 150 Idaho, 209,
245 P.3d 961 (2010).
9. That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an emaiLex.change
between me and trial counsel.

This ends my affidavit.

Eric Frederickse7'

No
Public for the State r Idaho
Residing at: ~ba_,~-+\'D)=-----.-----,-My commission expires: ctfz"Z../'20\1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that onNovembeJ-1-: 2012, I caused a true arid correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:
JS)mailed

hand delivered
faxed
to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Eric Fredericksen

__ ·::·::.. · · ··-·-· ·

··. ~-~:.. -~----~·-~_:-. -~. · .. .. a:·•. . ,-..•. e:

From:

Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:

page 5
...:;;:-~ .

i :-:. .:···~_-- ~: .~ .. - .

Scott Chapman [Scott@rbcox:.com}
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 9:37 AM
Eric Fredericksen
Diane Walker
RE: State v. Grove

As best as I can recall it was not discussed. Please do not hesitate to contact me regarding any questions you mlg!it
have and good luck.
_ _ _.........,,....,..._,_~-~ .

. .' .

-=--

-------.~---.-------

From: Eric ·Fredericksen [maUto:efrederlcksen@sagd.st.ate.jd .us]
Sent: Tuesday, Aprll 06, 2010 8:26 AM
To: Scott Olapman
·
Cc: DTane Walker
Subject: State V. Grove

Scotti
I am working on Stacey's direct appeal 1md have a quick question for you. One of the issues I will be raising is whether
the district court committed fundamental error by allowing Dr. Ross to testify as to the Dr. Reichard' s report based vpon
his autopsy of the brain (Confrontation clause violation- Melendez-Diaz v. Mass, 129 S.Ct. 2527). Based upon your
cro5s-examinatlon of Dr. Ross, It appears as though the Issue was likely addressed at some point in the case, but I can't
find- anything "In the pretrialrulings~ -t know there-was---a-bunch·of·in-chamben.-discussions thatwenrnot·recorded, cari·- --- - -------- -you tell me if Dr. Reichard's report was adclressed in any of those unrecorded hearings.
Diane Walker is co-counsel on appeal, so I cc'ed her to this e-mail.

Thanks, feel free to reply to this e-mail or call Diane or me at your convenience!:
Eric D. Frederlckeen
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
36.47 Lake Harbor·Lane
Boise, ID B3703
(208) 334-2712
Fax: 334-2985
DO NOT read, copy or disseminate thls communication unless you are the intended addressee. This e-mail
communication contains confidential and/or privileged information intended only for the addressee. Unless
otherwise Indicated, the information contained in this email message is information protected by the atlomey~client
and/or attorney work product p~iveleges. If you have received this communication in error, please call us
immediately at (208) 334-2712 and ask to speak to the sender of the communici;ition. Also, please e-mail the
sender and notify the sender immedlately that you have received the communication In error.
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Dennis Benjamin., ISB #4199
Deborah Whipple, ISB #4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
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~DEPUTY

. ·

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,

)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

vs.
-------··-··

-------

...

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

)

-------------------~·-- ....----------

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT OF DIANE WALKER
)
--------- .. -----·-----------.. ----·------- -- --- - - - - · -------------- -···-··)
)
)

· - --· " -

Diane Walker, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho.
2. That I represented the Petitioner herein, Stacey Grove, during the appeal in State v.

Stacey Grove, Supreme Court Docket No. 36211 (Nez Perce County District Court Number CR2007-768).

3. Attorney Eric Fredericksen was my co-counsel in the appeal.
4. That I have read the post-conviction petition filed in tins case.
5. That I did not raise the prosecutorial misconduct issue raised in the Second Cause of

Action on direct appeal because trial counsel did not object to the alleged instances of

1 - AFFIDAVI1 OF DIANE WALKER
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misconduct and thus did not preserve the issue for appeal or the record was not sufficient to raise
the issue on appeal.

6. Further, the issue could not have been raised under the :fundamental error doctrine
under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P .3d 414 (2009) and State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
245 P.3d 961 (2010).
7. The juror misconduct issue raised

m. the Third Cause of Action could not ha-ve been

raised on direct appeal because trial counsel did not draw the misconduct to the Court's r.ttention

or ask the Co'urt to take any action about it, and there was no definitive evidence in the record
that jurors had been sleeping during trial testimony.
8. Further, the issue could not have been raised under the furi,damental error doctrine
·----·

-·---··~·-·

- - - · . .~ .··-.-..

-

- - - ----- - - - -

--~

-------- -

-- --

------ -

--

-

--

-- ---- -- - -

- -- - - -

.

-------·----------

-·

under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P .3d 414 (2009) and State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
245 P .3ci 961 (2010).

1bis ends my affidavit.

{J:-.,WJL.
DianeW
alker

--

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
this 'Z~day

Notary blic for the State ofldaho
Residing at: B,o,~ ,'I.~

My commission expire~: 9

h'7.I \7
~,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE
I CERTIFY that on November,.2-°+; 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:

K mailed.
hand delivered
faxed

to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

-------~----·" -,-.

,-

-----~--- --- -- -- ---····------·-· .. - . .

- ---- -------- - ..

·.

-
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Dennis Benjamin, ISB #4199
Deborah Whipple, ISB #4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

Ff LED
@ll DEC. 10 R:l'I .9 5~

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS BENJAMIN

r-------------·--

Respondent.

)
)

Dennis Benjamin, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says:

1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho.
2. That I, along with co-counsel Deborah Whipple, represent the Petitioner herein.
3. That the petition alleges at Paragraph 77 that defense counsel's performance was
deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's testimony that a short fall "is rarely, rarely
likely to produce any kind of significant head injury or bleeding" and then failed to impeach that
testimony.
3 .1. That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a medical j oumal article wherein the
author, John Plunkett, M.D., a forensic pathologist, documented 18 cases of fatal

1 - AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS BENJAMIN
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I

head injuries where an infant had fallen 3 meters or less. "The author concludes
that an infant or child may suffer a fatal head injury from a fall of less than three
meters (10 feet). The injury may be associated with a lucid interval and bilateral
retinal hemorrhages." ExhibitA, pg. I.
3 .2. In this case, there was testimony that

had both bilateral retinal hemorrhages

and a possible lucid interval.
3 .3. This study was readily available to defense counsel at the time of the trial.
4. That the petition alleges at Paragraph 89 that it was deficient performance for defense
counsel to fail to introduce photographs of

taken at St. Joseph's Hospital soon after he

arrived in an ambulance.

4.1. True ana correct copies of ffiose pfi.otograpfis are attach.ea hereto as Exli:i.6it
B-1 to B-6, filed under seal.
4.2. The absence of serious bruising in the photographs rebuts the state's theory
that Mr. Grove beat

causing massive internal injuries just prior to

s

admission to St. Joseph's.
This ends my affidavit.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on December[)__, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:
~mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

~~
DennisBeajamin
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Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-Distance Falls
John Plunkett, M.D.

Pbysici!ll'ls cw.agree oc se~l issue:i n:gwdms bead injury i.n i.1::a!ants 8.Dd c:bildren, including I.he potct1tial
lethality of a $hor:l-dut11nce fall, fl \ueid interYsi.l in an ul-

Many physiciWlS believe that a simple fall cannot cause serious injury or death (1-9). th& a
lucid interval does not exist i.n an ultimately faw

timawy fataf head i.njwy, :and me s:pec:ificiry of reriDal
bc:morrli.agc for infilctcd 1:rfWma. There is scant objective
evidence to resolve mac quesLiollS, and more intbrmation u Deeded. n&e objecrive of this study was to determine ~he:ther then: llffl witne~sed or inves\ig::!ted f-4w
sbon-<iisaancc r.ans chat were concluded to be accidental.
The 11uch01" rcv;ewed me January 1, 1988 dmnlgh June
30. 1999 Ul'lired States Conmmer Product Safety Com·

pedi!l.tric: head injury (7-13) •.and that. retinal hemorrhage is highly suggestive if not diagnostic: for
inflicted trauma CT,12.14-2.l). HoweveT. several
have qw:.<;tionc:d these condus.ioru; or meed c:aution when interpreting head i.njury in a child .
.
~15.22-:2~) .. Tb.is con~versy eX\StS because mo~t
· - --~-mission ciambasc-fm·b.cad mjwy :1ssoc:i:ut:d.with-ihe-use---1nfmt~anJU!")e~-.occur-1t1 the home--(29..30),-and-if______ ---··-of playground cquiprne11t. The auchor obtained and re-there is history of a fall, it i~ u.~u.ally not wia,esscd
v~ed the
SOUtCC data (hospital and c:magc.ucy
or is seen only by tile caretaker. Objective data ue
m..-dic::1 servi~ record:. lew e:..l'\force,_menr. repo,u; and
needed to resolve chis dispute. It would be helpful
coroner or a,edica.1 exB.llllN:r records) tor all btalities in·
.
volving II r.n.
·
if
the~ were a database of (al.al falls mac were
The re:-ul~ revealed 18 fall-re~ head injuey fatzili·
witnessed or wbe.rcin medical and law enforce·
ties in the da~b:lsc:. The youngest c:bild wt1.11 12 monthS
mept invc:stig&tion unequivocally coo.eluded that
old.. \he oldest 13 years. The falli. were from 0.6 to 3 me.the death wa.s a.n accident.
.,
ten (2-10 feet). A ~ witDC5Scd 12 of lbc 18.
y1... U · ed
Co
n.-..1
Safe
md 12 Nt.d a 1ye;,;1 intet'Val. FoUY" of the dx -:hlld.rel1 i.n
~e
rut
States
n.sumer .inuuuct
ty
whom fundllSCOlric e,:amiu:stion was doc:umcnccd in I.be
Commission (CPSC) National lnjury Tnfonnaticm
medical rccmd bad bila\C!'81 retinal bcmor:ma~. The :iuClearinghouse uses four computerized data sources
thor concludes mat an ,nfant or child may s.uffer a fatal
(31). The National Electronic Tnjmy Sur,eillance
he~ injury from a fall of less than 3 meters (10 feet).
System (NEISS) file collects c:unent injury dara asThe injury m:iy be associated with ll ]lla.d interval af\d
sociated with 15,000 categories of consumer prodbilateral rctioal bemotrl\9te.
KeyWords:Ou,dabuse :fie.\dinjury--4..ucidin~lw:t.s from 101 U.S. h.ospital ~ .dcpaa-. ·
Retinal tiemnnttage-Subduml hem.tstomA.
met1t.", including 9 pediatric hospiws. 'Jae file is a. ·
probability sample and is used w estimalc the number and types of consumer prodw:t-n:\ated injuries
each year (32). Th£ Death Cati6catc (DC)· file i~ a
demographic summary created by infonnation provided to the CPSC by selected U.S. State Health
Dq)a:nments. The Injury/Pocential Injury Incident
(IR) file contains summaries, indcJted by consumer

P?~

-----MaauscripU"ecei:ved April 10 2000: revised s ~

product, of reports {O the CPSC m>m consumers.
medical examiners and coroners (Medical Examiner and Corot1er Alen Project (ME.CAP]). and
newspaper ::w::counts of product-relawi incidents
discovered by Joe.al or n:gional CPSC !iUff 03).
The In-Depth Invei,tigations (Al) file contains summaries of investigations perfonned by CPSC ,;i.aff
based oc reportS received frum ll1t NE!SS. DC, 9c
IR files (34). The Al file..,; provide details abou[

u,

2000: ~ S=ptember 24. 2000,
f'rvm 1.1K ~ of h!.bOlogy 1111d Medi~ fduia11lin1,
llcsin.111. ~ O:sw:r. I J7S !'l"1t1iA2er RNd. Haslia;s MN
55033. U.S.A.; E.mai.l! ~a.keujli're&in.:unwie11l.1:t1"'·

the focident from victim and witness intcrViews,
accident rcconstru~cion. and review of la-.i~.
. .

J
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,,.• n-p-lT
106
L"\ '

·,.J

2

J. PLUNKEtT

ment. b.ealtb care facility, and coroner or. medical
ex;miner records (if a death occwred).

METHODS
l reviewed the CPSC. OC. ~ and Al files for s.11
head and neck injllries involving playground cq~plUCM recorded by the CPSC from January 1. 1988
through Jone 30. 1999. There are 323 cnrrics iA !he
playground equipment Ill file.. 262 ia the Al file, 47
in d:ac DC file. and mote than 75,000 in the NEISS
lile. All deaths in the NEISS file geneuced an IR or
Al file. lf Che file indicated dm a dUih had occured from a fall. I obtained and reviewed each
original source rcccnd from law enforcement, hospiws, emergency medical services (EMS), aad
caroaer or medical examiocr offices except for one
autopsy report. However. I discussed the autopi:y
fiodlngs with the pathologist in this case.

-· .

be the highest point of rhe arc. Twc~ve of the 18
falls were witnes~ by a n o ~ or were
videotaped: 12 of the children bad a lucid in,crval
(5 minuteS-48 hours): and 4 of tbc 6 in whom funduscopic cx.aro.ination was pcri'ormed. had bilateral
retinal hemorrhage (Table 1).
-- -· .. --. -· ·· .

Casel
This 12-month-old was seated on. a porch swing
between her mother and ~ when the chain on
her mother's side broke and all three fell sideways
and backwvds 1.5 to 1.8 meters (5-6 fed) onto
dccoristivc: nxks in' from o( die porch. The mother
fdl first. then the child. 1ben ·her father. It is n.0t:
known if her father bnded on top of her or if she
suuck only the ground. She was unconscious im-

mediately. EMS wu called; sbc ~as
local hospiul: and

W&S

ictal and bad

ween to

a

~

RESULTS
posturing in [he emergency raom. She was intu__
. -·'-·._ . ._.. ---'llierc-m:~11.-4 -dcaths~ilrlhe" etcafifiglJoU$e data- ___ M._~ypg:,.:e.Qma&e~and ~-~~~tb 1J'1!DDi10l,
basc., 18 of wl)ich were due lO head injuty from a
A computed tomography (CT) sc:an indicated a
fall. The following deaths were excluded from this
subgal~ helmtoma at lb~ vcr\CX of the .skull. a
.
.
con:muaut.cd fracmre of the vault, parafakmc s\lbstudy: those that 11Nolved equipment mat broke or
d 1 hcmorrh
d . 11
·ew buacbno"d
1
collapsed, striking a person on lhe head or nee\t
ura.
age, an · ng: t pan
su
(41); those in which a person became enwigled in
b~morrhagc. There wss _also acute cerebral edema
the equipment and suffocafed or was Slr&D8led (4 S).
MUI ~ffacc:ment of the_ nght frontal ham and. comthose that involved equipmellt or incidents other
press1on of me b~al cisterns. She bad a ~opultban playgrowid (6 (includin.l a 13
fail
monaey arrest wbilc ~ CT scan wu being done
from a homemade Fems wheel ·and a 3-merc:r fall
and could not be resusc,tat.ed.
ftom a cyclone fence .dj-=ent to a playground)); .
and faJlll in. which the death was ca-used exclusively
Casel
A l 4"mouth.-old was oa a backyard ""sec-saw"
by nec\t (carotid vessel. ahway. or cervical spinal
conl) injury (4). .
and was being held in place by bis gnmdmotllca'.
The gtUdmodler said that she was diso:x:t.ed for a
The rans were from horizontal ladders (4),
moment and he fell backward, Striking me grassswinls (7), stationary platfomu (3), a ladder attacbed t0 a slide. a ..see-saw", a slide, and a retaincovered ground 0.6 meters (22.S inches) below the
plastic seat. He was conscious but crying, a.ad she
inc walL 'ThirtecD occurred ~ a school. or public
playground. and ftve occurred. a.t borne. The dalaclllrled him into the house. Within 10 to 15 minuies
he became lethargic and limp, vomited, and was
bu: is ®' limited \0 infants :md children, but a
taken to the local hos'piw by 'EMS pasonai:L He
13-ycar-old wu the oldest fatality (range, 12
moatbs-13 years; mean. 5.2 years; meclian. 4.S
was unco&lSCious but purposefully moving all extremilics when evaloaicd, and results of
yiws). Tbe distance of me fall defined as lbe c:liscopic examination were nomaal. A er scan indi·
UIDC:e of rbe closes, body part Crom- the ground Al
. cated an occi.p&tal subpleaJ hemacoma.. leh-J1ided
lhe ·begin11ing of the fall, could be determined from
cerebral edeJna wirb compl&ee obliteration of the
CPSC c,r law enforcement reconsa-w:ticm and acNal
left ln,ntal hom, and small p11ncwe hemorrhages
mca.,;11remem: \ft 10 cases and wu 0.6 tO 3.0 me~
in ll\e left frol,Ul.1 lobe. Then: wu no fracture or
(mean. 1.3
0.77; median. 0.9). Tbc disUtnCC
subdural 'hematom:a. He war. trca1c:cl wilh mUAnilul:
could llOI be accurately decerminc:cl in lhc seven fahis level of consciO\Uncss rapidly improved; and he
tallcies involving SWU\QS and one of the falls fron, a.
was exNbated. However. approxima1ely 7 boun
honzoiliil liddei. aad may have been ft0tt1 as little
after
admiuion he began to have difficulty breathas 0.6 meters to as much as 2.4 meters. The maximvm beigbc for a fall from a swing was assumed ta
ing, bor.b pupils suddenly dil.dted, and

~-c---~---,--·-
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CPSCHo.

Age
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TABLE 1, S11mm11ry al.,.~,.
lucid
lnleMI

f'

Falllrom·

DlllancaM/F

Wlln•n•d

DC.110801~

12 nfal

F

Swing

1.s-1.11&.o-e.o

No

No

NIR
I

Al 11110208H8C3081

... fflO$

M

S81•U\V

~.612.0

No

IR Fl103111A

17111C1S

F

Swlog

U-1.8/$,H.O

No

10-15
minutes
No.

Nd'
I

Al 1121001HCC2283

20mOI

,

Platform

1.113.5

No

$-10
minutes

Subdu111I

!A1llnal

hemorlfllge

i

H/A
I

i

Bllaltrll

h1montiage
YG9 +IHF

No
Yes +l~F
Y11

hlulllayered
I

+IHF

I

!

•

DC 1312080161
DC 845101&513

23 fflOI
28mo1

f

Plelform

M

Swing
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I. PWNKEIT

tubatcd. A second CT scan demon.-.trated propssion of tbe left hemispheric edema despite medical
management, and he was re.moved from life support 22 hour$ after admission.
·
-- --

·-·--:.

--. --

Cases
A 23-monrh-old was playing on a plascic gym set
in the garage .at her .home with her older brother.
She had climbed the atlached ladder to the top rail
. __ ____ _ aJ:)_Q!'C_tl!e.plalfom1 and was svaddling·tbe raH. w,th
be:r feel 0. 70 ·mcCCtS (28 ·- inches) ~ - the floor.

---

Case 3

She lost her balance and fell bcadfim onto a 1-c:m
C'"-iuch) thick _piece of plush caq,el .rc.mnanl covering the coocretc ftocr. ·S~ muc~ the carpel JirsL
with her out:sttetched hands, then with the righc
front side of bet forehead. followed by her ri:ht
an estima.ted height of 1.S to 1.8 meum (S-6 feet)
shoulder. Her grandmother bad been watching the
when the snap came loose. The child fell from the
children play and videoiaped the fall She cried
swing on its downstrcke, striking her back and
after the faJI but was alert and talldng. Her grandhe.ad on the gta$Sy surface. She was immediately
mothe1' wal'kcd/ca.rried her tntO the kitchen, where
unconscious and apneic but fhcn start~ 10 breathe
her modlc:r gave bee a baby analecsic wilb some
spontaneously. EMS look hr:r to • pcdi.aic hospiwater, which she dra4k. However. approximately S
w. A er scan indicared a luge left-sided sub- minutes lalCT she vomited and became sniporous.
dural hematoma. wiui extension to the inu:.rhemiEMS personnel airlifted her ro a tcniary-carc uni9pberic fissure anteriorly and throughout tbe lel\gtb
v~nit:y hospit:sl. A CT fcan i~all:d II large tightof the fa..lx. The hfflU&loma ...,,$ surgically cvacus!ded subdural b~maroma ~~th e ~ t 0£ ~
--- ,----··atea;out-mc·~oped-a:Wign&m~CCfet,tal-edcm;a-c~_n_gbJJ~~ycnUlClc and ffl"l\i;nal S U ~ ~ benu··-·· _····-~·--··
and died the following day A postmonem exam,.
atlon.. (The soft tissue windows for the scan co.:>\d
narion indicated symmcui~al contusions on the
nol be located and. were ~vailablc for review.)
buttock and m.idline posteriot thorax. consisrenc
bcmatom.a was unmedia~ly evacua1.ed. She tcwilh impact against Jiat sw:face; & small. residual
maincd c:oma~se ~to~bvely._ develOFd ce,-e..
~ edema wadi hcrrunuoa., and was ~oved f~m
\eft-,i.ded subduTal tlemat.oma.; cerebnl edem:i.
with anoxic encephalopathy~ and unc:al and ceresupport 36 hours after the fal~. Bala.tend rcllnlll
be1lar tonsillar herniation. There were no cortical
hcm.om:age. not ~ ~~ was docuconmsions.
merited 1n a fundU5Col,ac CJCaminaUOD pcd'ormed 24
hours after admission. A postmonem ex.aminatioo
confirmed the right frontal scalp impact injury.
·Cue4
There was a $mall residual right &11bdunl hemalOma. :a. right parietal Jobe contusion (secondary to
A 2Q-m.onth-old was with other family members
die surgi~ inf.B.l'Ventiun). 1$· ccrcbral edema with
for a reunion at a public park. She was on me platcerebellar tonsillar hemiaoo11.
form ponion of a jungle aym when she fell from
the side and stIUc:k her heed. oa one or the support
Ca.tt 6
posts. The pllltfonn W8$ 1.7 meters (67 jneb=)
above me ground and 1.1 meters (42 inches) above
A 26-month-old was .on a playground swing
the top of the support pom thal. iche itruck.. Only her
being pushed by a 13.ycar-old cousin when b.e fell
backward 0.9 w 1.8 meti:rs (3-6 feet), stxilwig bis
falher saw d1e ac;tOal fall. alrhough there wue a
number of othCT' people in the immedia~ area. She
head on hard-packed soil. Tbc 13-ye.ar-old •nd sevmu odler children saw lhc ran. We was immediwas initially conscious and talking. but wil:bin 5 to
ately unconscious and was tabn a, a Jocal cmcrJO minutes becMne comatose. She was taken to a
gcacy room, then 1raoderred 10 a pediatric hospital.
nearby hos~ilal. men transferred u, a tertiary-can:
A CT~ indicated acute ceiebr.lJ edema and a
facility. A CT scan indicared a tight occipital s,\cun
small ~~ut:ll bemamma adjacent 10 the antcnQr
fractan: with approximately .4-mm. of gcpression.
·inwhemifpb.eric f:ilx~ A !uac.tuscopic examination.
and subuachnoid and subdural hcmoabagc along
petfonned 4 hours after admission indicated
the tentorium and posterior falx. 'Funduscopic e:ilsive
bilalcral retinal bcmonilace. vitreau.11 hemoramiftation indicated extemive bilateral retinal and
rhage: in lhc lefl 1:yc:. ud papWedemL He bad a
prerednal hemormage. She died 2 days later belillbsequent cardiupu\mOl'lary arrest and could not
cause of uncona-ollable increased inuac:ranial pTe5•
be resuscitated. A po.,;tmonetn cx.armnaoon c:c,nsure. A limited posononem e~amination indic~ted
1111 iffll)BCt ~iabplcal hcmaloma uvCT"lying the fr;acnnncd the retinal hcmon:ha:e and 1ndicatcd a 'ripl
parietal scalp impact i.njury bul no c~~rracmrc in the mid occiput.
'This 17-month-old bad been placed in 8,. baby
c:an:ier-type swing auacbed to an overhead a:ee
limb al a daycare provider's home. A restrahwlg
bar held i.n pl.ace by a snap w.u across her waisL
She was being pushed by the daycare provider to
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FATA.L HEAD INJURIES wrrH SHORT-DISTANCE FALLS

wre. a ..film'' of bilateral iubdural bcmorrb.a.ge,
~bral edema widl herniation. and focal hemorrhage in the right posr.erior midbrain a.nd pons::· ..
Case7

This 3-year-old with a hist.QI)' of TAR (thron:i.bocytopenia-absew:it radius) syndTomc was playing
with otb::r children on playground equipment at his
school when be stepped through an opening in a
pbufo.rm. He fell 0.9 meb9'S (3 fecr) ·,o the hardpacked ground. striking his face. A teacher wi(ncssed rbe incident. He was initial}y conM:jous and

- able co walk. However, approximately 10 minutes
later be had projectile vomiting and became comatose, was taken to a local hospitlll, ..nd ~ub~que:nUy lra4Sferrcd co a pediatric hospital. A CT

ease,
A 4-yaar-old fell appro,dmatcly 2.1 me1CtS (1
feet) fcom a·playground slide at a state part. landing 01'I the din ground on his bunock., rhen falling to
his left side, saiking bis bead. TheR was no loss of
conscioust1C$ll, but hjs family rook_ him. tQ ;,,J«;al
emergency facility, where an cvaluati.oa was nornual.. However, he began vomitin& and complained
of left neck and head pain approximately 3 hours
later. He was taken to a second hospital. where a
CT scan indicated a large left parietal epida.&Jal
hemaLOma with a midline shift. He was D"SUI.Sferred
to a pediatric hospital and the hemfl[()ma was evacuated. but he developed malignant cerebral edema
with righl occipital ud left parietal infatcT.$ and
was removed ti-om the rcspira.lor 10 days later. A
posuuonem· uamin:stian indicated a small residual
epidur:il bcmacoma. mv\ced cerebral edema. bilat·
en.l cerebellar tonsillM and unca1 'herniation, and

& smaU subdaral bcmatoma and difcercbnl edema with uncal-bemiation, isccording to the admission history and physical cxamina. tion. (The original CT report and semi could not be
hypoxic ence.ph:a.lopr&thy. There ~as no identifiable
located and were unavailable for Rvicw.) ffis
skull fracture.
platelet count was 24,000/mm', and he was treated
--~--- _ empirical].Yc-with~~let u.msiusions. althuugll _he __Case_ 10 . . . ___ __ _ __ _ ___ . __ _ _
bad no evidence for an expanding extra-axial mass.
A 5-ycw:-uld :W-.aS appate.ndy walldng ~ the
Resuscitation was di$COntinucd in the ccncrgcncy
horizontal ladder of a "monlccy bar," put of an in-

scan indicated
~

room.
Case 8
This 3-year-old was at a city park wilh an adult
neighbor and four other cbildrcll. ag5 6 to 10. She
wu sranding on me lhird step of a slide \adder 0.6
mcn:rs (22 iaebes) 11bove the pound when she fell
forward onto compact din, striking her head. The
other children but not the ad'i:.ah saw lhc ran. She
wu crying but did not appear co be seriou,ly io•
jured. &lld. die neighbor piek£d her up and brought
her to her parents' home. Approxima.c.ely 15 minutes later she began to vomil, ud her mother called
EMS. She was taken tO a local emergency room,
rbeA lnnSfcaed to a pediatric hospiial. She waas ini•
tially lethargic but respoadec1 to byperventilation
and fflU\nilol; she began lo open her eyes with
sdmuladon _and co $pontaneouly move all ucicmi-

dcs and was CXNbated. However, sbc c:lcvclopccl
malipanl cerebral edema on the 5eeond hospital
day and was rciruub&lCd and hyperventilated but
died Ebe following day, A postmortem =llfflin.lion
indicated 3. subpleal bema1oma at rbe vertex of the
slcuJJ IWIOCialcd with a complex fracture involving
the left frontal bone and bilateral remporal bona.
1bae were small epidural and subdur&l hemacomas
{not idendfiablc on the CT~sc:an). bil:aLcral ..cont.racoup.. COIUU$iom: of tbe Inferior: '"ri'a.ccs of lhc:
tionlal aad temporal-lobes. and ma.rbd c:erebml
edema with uncal herniation.

tcrconnccnnt system of homemade pl&.yground
equipment in his Croat y3rd. when his mother
looked out one of the windows and saw bim laying
face down on rhe gt'O'md and not moving. The bor~
izonr.al ladder was l.1 metefS (7 feet) above compacted dirt. £MS were called. be wa:s ween to a
local hospir.al. amd then ttansfened to a pediauic:
hu$piw, A CT scan indicated a right posterior renipocal line~ fractun: with a small underlying
epidural hematorDA, a. 5-mm thiclc acute s u ~
hematom:s 1t1ong lbe right temporal U1d parietal
lobes, and marked rich1-..qded edema with a 10-mni
midline shifL He was hypervenulated and trcalCd
widl mannirol. but lhe hematoma continued lO enlarge and -was S1J11ically evacuated. However. be
dc:velupcd unconlrOUable ~bn1. edema 1111d was
removed from life support 10 days after du: raan.

Cascll
A 6-yeu-ald was on a playground swlng al a pri•
vate lodge wKh his 14-year-ald sister. His- sillter
beud a "thump," wncd around, and saw bim on
the grass-covered packed eann l:leneath the swing.
-The· act\Jal fall was not witnessed. The seat of -lbc:
swing was 0.6 mecers (l feet) above du: lfOU"d.
and the fall db,umc:c could have been nam as high
as 2.4 meters (8 feet). He was im,ti.ally conscious
cd ta1kiftc but widun 10 minuLeS became com;nase :md was taken to a lgcsl cmergenc;y room.
lbcn transferred to_ a tertiary-care hospital. A' CT
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sc:ui indicated a large left frontopilrietal ,ubdurw
hema[Om11 with cxtensioa into !he anterioT inter•
hemi~heric fissure :.nd a signific:mt midline shift
with obliteration of the left lar.er:il venuiclc:. Then:
------~ no retinal hemorrhag~. He was tratcd :ig-

gressivcfy -Wlth dcxamcthasone aria"

bypervenora- -

tion. but there was no surgical interYention. He died
the following day.
Case 12
This 6-yetir•old was at school nnd was sitting on
the top eT"OKSbar of a ..monkey bm-" a:pl)tOxim.ctcly 3
meW"S (10 feet) above compacted clay soil when an
unreJa(C(f noncan:takcr adult saw hun fall from dlc
crossbar to the gmund. Re ·,anded ftat on his back
and initially appeared to have the wind knocked nut
of him but wu conscious and alert. He W11S taken to
r.bc $chool DW1ic who applied an ice pack: to a con-

msioa on the bade of his head. He rested for apprcx.im:ately 30 minuces in the nwsc's office and
wu \,ejn; e$CC>ned back to cws when he suddenly

colblpsed. EMS was called. and he was b'an$ported
-'----~,o-a-ped;acncilospitat He-was-comuo~~on-admis"sion. tbc fundi cauld not be visualized, and a head
CT $CaJl wu ina:rpreted as normal. However. a CT
.scan pcrfDffl'led the following morning approx.ima1ely 20 hours after the fall indicated diffuse ccrebial edema with effacement of the basilar cistc:rns
and fourth ventricle. 1bcre was no idcutifiable subdun! hemorrhage or calvarial fnu:ture. He developed transtent.orial herniation and died 48 hours
dt=- the fall.

· Cuell
l'bis 6-yea:r-old was pla)'in£ on a school playground wida a Sib grade stUdcrn/frlend. She was
band-cr.,er-baod traversing the awsbar of a "monkey bu'~ 2.4 meters (7 feet 10 inches) above the
,round. with her feet approximately 1 meLer (40
incbes) above the
She attempted u, slide
dDWI\ the pole wben she reached the end of the
c:rossbar but lost Im- grie and slid quickly to the
ground.
1be compaclcd dut first with hcT
feet. tben her bunDc'k and 'back. md finally her
bead. The friend infoi:med lbe scbool principal of
me incident, but dle child seemed tine and cbere
was no intcnre:J)tion. She \Vent to a telativc's home
for after-111:hool ~ __ approximately 30 minutct
after che fall. waccbed TV for a wiille~ cbcn com;plained of • headache and laid down for a nap.
When het parents anived· at the home la1e:r lbat
evemn1. 6 boun a!re:r. tbe incident. they discovered
tbat she was mcohcrcn1 and ..droo!in,." .EMS tranSporied her t0 a reniary-care medlcil center. A CT
scan indicated a right parieto-occipital skull frao.

sunacc.

5llikina

tute, subdund and subaracbnoid hcmorrhaa:e. and a.
rigbl ccrebraJ hemisphere i.afan..'1.. The infarct included the posterior ccn:bral u:rritocy and was
thought most consi~lCJ'lt with thrombosu or dissection of <Ii righ1 carond artery chat had a persistent

fctaf'ongin 01 ilie pos1irfoi cerebral artay. She
Temained comatose and was zcmovcd from the
respirator 6 clays after admission. A postmortem
examination indicated superficial abrasions and
contusions over lbe scal)ula. a prominent ri~l parietotcmporal iubgaleal hcmalama, and a rigbt parietal sl-ull fractuTe. She had a SO-ml subdunl
hcmatotmt and cerebral edema wilh global hypoxic
or isc:he.mic injury ("'respir.tor brain'"). but 1he
carotid vessels were nom,al.

Case 14
A 7-year-old was on the playground during
school hours playing on the horizontal ladder of a
"'monkey bar" when he slipped and fdl 1.2 to 2..4
meu:rs (4-8 feet). According to one wimcss, he
smJclc his forehead on the ban: of the vertical lad·
-- -der;~cc:cmling--to-anodlcz-eyewilness--he-slr\lck-t:bc~~-,-------, ~--_--- ----rubber pad covering of tbe asphalt grou.ad.. Tilere
arc conflicting sior.ies as to whether be had an butial Joss of consciomness. However, be walked
back to lhe school. and EMS was called because -Of
me lJistory of the fall lie was taken to a local hospita!, where evaluation indicated a Glasgow coma
score of IS and a normal er scan except for an OC•
cipit:Jl S\lbgaleal bemamma. He was Jccpt ovem.\ght
for observation because of tbe possible loss of consciousness bot was released the following day. He
was doing homework at. bomc 2 days after lhe: fall
when bis l(Uldmotber noticed that be was siumblin& and had sl\UJ'Cd q,eecb. and she took him
back to the hosphal. A second CT scan indicated a
left carotid artery occlusion and \d.l tempoRl and
parietal lobe infarcts. The. infarctS and subsequent
edema pro~sscd: be had bramstan bemiadon;
and be was JCmOYed from life support 3 days lacer
(S days after the initial fall). A postmorrem. exam;.
nation indicated iscbemic iAwcls of the left parietal, tcmponl. and ocdpical lobes. acate ces"ebral
edema widl herniation. and duombosis of lbe left
-venebral anery. Occlusion of lhe carotid 111ay.
suspected premortc:m. could not be confirmed.

CuflS -This S-ynT-o)d was at a public playground near
her home with sevenal frieads ·her ap. She was
h:lngin; by her bands from the .borizaatal laddff of
a "'rnonlccy bar" with her feet approximately 1. I
mcms (3.S feel) above dx pound when she attempted a, swing &om !he bars to a nean,y 0.9-
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merer (34-inch) retaining wall. Sbe landed on the
top of the wall but then lost her balance and tell to
the grollnd., either to a hard-packed surface (one
witness) or to a 5.1-ctn fl-inch) thielc: resilient robber mat_ (a. second wiU'leSS), striking her back and
head. She initially cried
complained of
headache but continued playing, then later went
horne. Her D10tbcr said tlm she seemed nonnal and
went 10 bed at her usual lime. However, when her
mOlhcr· aied to awaken her at approxi.m.ately 8:30
die following morning (12 holll'S an=r the fall) she
complained of a headache and went back u, sleep.
She awoke at 11 a.m. and complained of a severe
beadacbe then became unresponsive and had a
scizuJ;C. EMS took bcr to a nearby hospital. but she
died in the emergency room. A posun.onem cxamination indicated a rigl\t temporoparietaJ subdural
hem.AtOma, extending to the base·of the brain in the
mi4dle and pos.terior fossac. with flaucning of the
EYri ~ n:m-owt11g of the sulci. (The presence or
absence of herniation is not described in the au-

and
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· lost her balance and fell 0.9 tol.8 meteis ~ feel)
to the asphalt surface, sailing her posterior thoru
and occipital scalp. She: was immediately uncon- ·
sciou.s and was taken to a tertiary-care hospital
emergency room, where she was pronounced dead.
A poi.tmonein·exa.auo.s.ti.0.11 indicated .an occipital
impact injury usociated with an extensive comminuted occipital fr.taure ex.tcndinl inio both mid·
·dlc cranial fossa and "contra-coup" conmsions of
both inferior frontal and temporal lobes.
Case 18

This 13-year-old was at a public playground wilh
a friend. She was sianding on the seat of a swing
with her friend £ealed between her le;s wben she
10.~t ber grip and fell badcwards 0.6 to 1.8 meters
(2~ feet), sui'king either a concrete retaining wall
adjacent to the playground or a resiliettt S.1-em (2
inch) thick .-ubber mat covering the ground. She
was hnmediately unconscious and was given emergeucy first aid by a. phy5ician who was oeai'by
u,psy report.) Theic was no calvarial fracture, and
when the fllll occWTed. She was taken lo • nearby
·----- ----tbere-wu-no-·id.enu6.able ·mjury··in-the-"SuJp-e>t~-- ·11ospital-anct was-pu,posef-ully--.oYing=-all ~Rmi- ----- - -----·-galca.
ties and bad reactive pupils when initially evaluated. A CT scan indicued .iAtcrbcmispbaic su1,.
Casel6
d.ural tiemormace and ge11eralizcd cerebral edema.
A 10-year-old was swinging on a swing at b,i.s
wbich ptOl:[CSSed rapidly to· brain deach. A postscho~l'.s playground during recess when the seal demortem examination indicalCCl a linear nondetached from the chain and he fell 0.9 to l.S meter.
prcssed midJinc occipital skull fracmrc.. subdunl
(3-5 fect) to the asplua.lc sutface, striking tbe back of
hemoirhagc cncnding ta the occiput, contusion of
bis bud. The other SlUdenlS b11t not the three adult
the left cuebell:sc '1emispbere. bifroatal '"coacrapl:ayground supcivisorS saw h.im fall. He remained
coup"' eontUsions, aad ccn:bnl edema.
conscious although groggy and w~ curled to the
school nurse's office, '"'hen: an ice pack was placed
D1SC1JSS10N
oo an occipital contaaion. He suddenly lost consciousness approximately JO minurcs luer. and
General
Tnvmatic .brain lJljury (T.81) is c:msed by atan:e
EMS toOt bim lo a local ~ - He had dtecr£·
bra1c posturing when initially evaluated. Fundusresulting in either srnin (dcformuioa/unit length)
copic e:uminauon indicated exte11sivc bilateral conor st:reM (force/original cross-sectional area) of the
ftueot. and Sldlat~, posterior a.nd peripheral
scalp. skull. and brain. (35-37). The acent of injwy
prerctinaJ and iubhyaloid bcmorl'hage, A CT scan
depends not only on the level and duracian of fon:c
showed a larce acute rigbl ftontoparieta\ subdural
but also on the specific mechanical and geomeaic
propeme3 of d\e cranial system Llftder Joadi111
bcmatoma with 1ranstcntorial bcmiauon. The
(38-40). Ditferent parts of the slcull and brain~
bcmacoma was suq:ically removed, bllt be develdisdact biophysical characteristics. and calaalalin&
oped maligaanc cerebral edema and died IS days law.
A -posanonem examination iDdicatcd a right paricial
defonnarion and saeu is complu. However. an applied foice causes the skllll a.od brain to ~ and
subaracbnoid AV malformati~ contlpous with a
sm.D.U amount of n:ndm.1 subdural hemorrhage. _and -acceleration. the time n:qu.insd 10 rach .peat accel,c:;erebnll edema wilh moxie encephalopathy and bet'•
enition. and lhc dWlllion of acceleration may be
measured at specific locadons (36.41). i'bcsc Jr:ir,c.
niarlon. Tbcre w..s no calvarial fracture,
matic parameters do not caUM. the actual brain
damage but ~ useful far analyzillg TBf because
Case 17
they iln: easy tu qusntify. Research m 1·a1 astq
A 12-ycar-old wu u, ll public plilyground with a
J1h)'$1cal niodels and animal expenments his ihowo
£istcr and anodler friend and was standinc on the
that a force resulting in af\l'Ulm: acceteratiOD proseat of a switlg wbca lhc swing began to twist. She
"• J Forrvic Med l'fldtot. 11tL Z2, No. I,
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ducts primarily diff°u$e brain damage. whcrcu a
force causing exclusivd.y tranislational ~leratio11
produce, only fcx:al baia dmn:1ge (36). A fall from
a eountertop or table is often considered to·bc exc:lusive.ly translational and therefore assumed incapable of produ~ing serious injury (3. 7-9). However,
sudden impact deceleratiott musr have an angular
vector wJless the force is applied only lhrough the
center of mass (COM). and deformation of the
,s.kull during impact nuur be ac:companied by a volumc change (cavitation) in the subdunl "space..
taDgendal to the applied fon:e (41). 1ne ugula.r
and deformation factors produce 1CDailc sttains on

ing surface is usually less than S millisca>ods
(39.59-ol). Experimentally. impaa duration longer
than S milliseconds will not: cause a subdutal
bematoma unless the level of angular acccleracion
is above 1.75 x tOS rad/s1 {61).· A,body in motion
wi£ti
angular ac::ccletation of 1.75 X lo' radls'has a tangential acceleration of 17.500 m/s2 ll 0.1
meters (the distance from the midneck. axis of rotation to the midbrain COM in lhe Duhaime model).
A buma.n cannoc produce this level of acceler.nion
by impulse rsh~..) loading (62).
AA injury resulcitlg in a subdural hematoma in an
infant may be causcd by an accidenml fall

the surface veins and mechanical distonions a£ the

(43,44,64). A recent report documented the findings
in seven children seen iJI a pediaa-ic hospiw emergenc:y room after an accldeoral fall of 0.6. IO l .S

brain during impact and may e-a.use a subdural
bematoma without deep white matter injury or even

an

unconsdousnes, (42-44).

mclQ'S who bad subdural hcmoabage, no loss of

that a fall from less lhan 3
meters (10 feet) is ntdy if ever fll.lal, espccil.lly if
the distanee is less than 1.5 meters (S feet) (l-6,8,9). The few studies concluding that a shortdis.~nce fall may be fatal (22-24.26,27) haw • n

con.sciousness, &lid no symptoms (44). The cbarac=isli.:s of the hemorrhage, especially extension
imo the posterior i.ruethcmispberic fissure, have
been U$cd to suggest if not connnn that the injury
was nonaecidcntal (9.62.65-68), Tbc hemorrhage

Many authors

State

· · .·· · · - - cri.licl&d bediuse ftfcrall was not w1messed orwu
Ren only by fhe caretaker. However. isolated repons of observed fatal falls and biomcclwucal
analysis using experimental animali,i,. adult human

voluntec:rs. and models indicate the potential for scrious bead injury o,: death from u little as a 0.6meter (2-COOL) Call (4&-S2). There an: limited
c.x.perimentaJ studies on infan.ts (cadaver skull fracture) (53,.54) a'I\Cl none on living subadult nonhuman primate$, bm the adult deta have been extrapolated to youngsters and u.se,d ta develop the
Hybrid ll/ll1 and Child Restr.iint-Air B~ Interaclion CC'RA.B O models (SS) and to propose standard&
for playground equlpmcnc (56,63). We ~mply do
DOl blow eitbei k:incmadc: or nonkinemadc limits
in the peditatric population (57.58).
Eacb of die f:alls in mis srudy excccdcd cs,ablishcd adu.lt kinematic thel:$1:ao\cb for traumatic
bnin injury (41,48-S2). Casual anlllysis of (he falls
suggesu: that most were primarily tnlll$latfomi1.
However, deformation and iPlteNUJ/ angular :acceleration of die sk:Dll and brain cous~d by the impact
produce the injwy. Whal happens during Ebe impact, .not during the fan, determines I.be outcome.
.. $ubdural Hemorrbate

_

A ""i;h sD'llin" il'f1pact (shon pulec dv.rrarion and
high ~ for decelemion OOSCt) typical for I fall is
~ore likely to cause subdural bemorrhscc rhan a

scram•• impact (long pulse duration and low
for deceleration onset) ~ t is typical of a
motor vehicle accident (42.61). The dL1ration of decd.eration far a bcad-imi,Mct fiall aiainst a nonyield-

"tow
r.i1e

- cxrcndcdlatothepo!teno:natirhemisphenc 6ssure · - -- -- - ·
in 5 of the 10 children in this S1Udy ('in whom i:hc
blood was identifiable on CT or magnetic resonance scans and tbe scans were available for reView) and along Ebe ·anlerior falx or anterior intechetnispheric fissu1T in an additionw 2 of rhe 10.

L11cid Int~
Disruption of the ~cncepbalic and midbrain porlions of the reti.c:ul::ar activ.a.tiqg system (RAS)
causes Ul'consci.ousness (36.69,70). "Shearing.. or
..diffuse axcmal" inj\lry (DAI) is thought co be d:ic
primary biophysic£! mechanism for immediate
traumatic unconsciousness (3~71). Axonal injury
bas been coofirmed at atopsy ia pe,son~ wbo bad
a brief lou of consciousness after a bead injury and
wbo ian:r died from olber c ~ . such as coronary
artccy dise.tsc (72). However. if unconsciousncS5 is
momentary or brief ( ..coneuSSiOll'') subsequent deterioration musr be due to a mechanism other lhan
DAL Apnea and ca.~holamine release have been
suggested u signi6can1 factor:s in me ouicome following head injury (73,74). In *'5dlcion, uie ~

aipcw

thcol)'

o! traumatic unconsciousness

states

d\at -~rimary disnaplion of the RAS wW not occur
in isolatiOA sad tbat suucmral brainstem dam.ap
from inerti31 (impulse) or iro.pact (conta<:t) loading
be accomp~ni~ by evidence for conical and
subcortical damage (36). This theory has been validated by mapietic resonance imaging and CT scans
in :idults and child~n (75 176). Only
of lbc cln"ldren lll r.bis smdy (c.ue ~) tiad evidence fnr any
f.':Omponenl of DAL 111hl child had focal hcmOr-

mus,

one

000126
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rh,age in the posterior midbnin and pons, thought
amination and ha.c: been re.comsnended as pan of
by the pathologist to be prim.uy, although there
the evaluation of any pediatric patient with bead
was no skul1 fracture, only "a film"' of ·subdural
uawna (89). None
the children in this study bad
hemorrhage, no {eazs in rhe corpus callul.um, amd
a formal retinal evaluation. and only six had funduscopic ex.aminll.tion documenmd in the medical
no ~ O D S of rhe cerebral white matter (grossly
cw micn,acopically).
record. Four of the six tmd bilateral retinal bemorThe usual cause fQI' delayed deterioration in inmage.
faats and children is ~bnl edema. whereas in
Pn-existing Coodilions
adults it is an expatiding extra-axial hematoma
· Ooe of these children (case 16) bad a suban41•
(77). If l:hc mechanism for delayed dea:riorzllion ·
noid AV malfonnao.on .dlat contribuicd u, develop(eJ.Cept for an expll.Ddiag extra-axial mess) is vement of th~ su bdutal hcmaloma. causing bis death.
oospasm. cerebral edema may be lbe only moJPhoOne
(cue 7) had TAR syndrome (90), but bis death
logic Dl31XC&", The ''talll: and die or deteriorate
WIU thought to be caused by malignant cen:bnl
(TADD)" syndrome is well cbarac:teriz.ed io adults
edema not an expanding extra-axial mass.
· (78). 1\va reports in the pediatric literature discuss
TADD, documcntmg 4 fatalities among 1OS cbil- ·
dren who bad a l,tcid interVal after head injury and
Cenbrovucolar Thrombosis
subsequently deLcriontcd (17,79). Many \)hysic:ian.s
Thrombosis Of dissc.r;tion of carotid or vertebral
believe lhat a lucid ;nterVal ;" an 1,1ltimately fat.a!
arteries as ;l cause of delayed deterioration after
pe~c bead injury is extremely unliJcely or docs head ~ neck iajwries is docu~entad in bolh adults
not ~cw unless there is an epidural bematoma
and children (91,92). CQe \4 1s the tio;t ~ of a
(7,8,11). Twelve cbildrea in lhii study had a lucid
death due to ttaumatic cerebrovascular wombosi.li
··-- ·-·-- ----in~1.:-1cnoncatclatit-witnessca·-9·-0-rmcsc~1: 2---c---in·m-infantor--child-Intrmal·-carotid-ancry-tb.J'om-:------ ----f.:aUs. One child had a epidural bcmncoma. ·
bosis was suggested ndiogra.phicaJly in an additional ck;.aeh tcuc: .13) but could not be confirmed at
autop")'.
However, this child died 6 days after adllednal Bemorrhap
mission_ to the hospital. and 6brinolysis may have
The majority of publi$hed studies conclude that
removed any evid~cc for tbrombo$1& at me lime
retinal hert1ot'Tha1e.. especially if bilateral and pos-

or

terior or associaled with retitto~c:hi$is. is hichly
sui:geslive of. if noc diagnostic for. nonxcidentrt.l
injury (9,l...,21). Rarely. n:tinal hemonhacc has
been a..q.oc:iated with an accidental head injury, bul
. in lhcsc cases the bleeding wa_..; -1,11\ilar.eral (80). I~ is
also st.ited that mwmaric retinal hemorrhage may
be die .direct mech111ical effect of violent shDking
{15). Howner, retinal bemOIThage may be caused
~ l y either by ligati.Ag mo cetVl"31 rctial
vein or its tributaries or by suddenly increa.cing intraeranial prcssw:c (81,82): relin~chisis is the n:sull or brca.k.througb bleeding and venous $tasis not
..violent shalcing" (1S.83). Any sudde11 lnctease in
inttaeranial pressure may callk rctiw hemorrhage
(84-87). Deformation of lhc skull eoif\C,dent to an
impact nonselective)y increases i.ntracranial picssuie. Venospasm · secondary to u-.i.umatic;- brain injury sc:lectively i1QUSeS venous pressure. Either

mechanism may cause retinal bemorrba1e irrespective of whet.her die ,tnusma was acc:iOental or inflicted. f un.bc:r, retinal 1111d optic nerve sheath bemonbagcs assocutled with a tuptUred vascular
malformation are due tO an increase in venous piessure not exiension of blood aloni; ex1111vascular
spKes (ll-83,88). Dlla1ed eye e;iu1minalion wilb an
1ndirecl opbi:ha1moscope ;, lhou;ht tn be more Rn,ili'lfe far detecting retinal b\eedLne than routine ex-

the autopsy was pctfcmned.

Limitatiom

I. Six or lhe 18 falls were not wimessed or were
.seen only by lhc ;,,dull ~ . and it is possible that ;mother person caused the nonobserved lojwiC$.
·
2. The ex.act height of th& faU could be detumincd .in ·onty lO cases. The ocheq (1 swi11g
a.nd J nation~ pl:a.lform) could bave been
from as little as 0.6 meterS (2 feet) to as much
as 2.4 meters (8 feet) .
3. A minimum impact 'Velocity sufficient ID
cau.,c f:lta.l braicl lnjmy cannot be ,at~
from this study. Ltb'Wise. the probability rbfal
&1l in~ividual fall will have a r.aal OUICOIDC
cannot be stated because the dambase depends
on volunuary n:porting and contt"..cwal agree-

ments with selected U.S.

SUlle

a1enaes. The

NeiSS sununmies for the sn,dy years esti.ma.a:d that there wen: more than 250 dealbs
due u, head and neck injurii:.'I u11ociallcd witb
playground equipment, but there uc only 114
in lhe filu. 'Further. thia ~tudy docs no1 inclu~ OU\lt&" no.npl:ayeround equipmen1-ntbced
rwai Jails. w11:nessed or not witnesScd. in .the
CPSC dac:ib:i.se (32).
Alff J" FotttUIC f,fa/ ,..,,,.,,, l,t,I, 22, rlo.
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CONCLUSIONS

is not uniform (4S). This analysis requires awareness
1. Every fall is a complex event. There must be a.
of the shape of the deceleration.curve. knowlcd~ of
biomechanic;al analysis for any incident in
the mecbwcal. properties and geometry of the c;ra~hich _the severity of the i.nj~ry appears to be
nial system., and comprehension of tbe suess and
mcons,su:nt wii:b the history. The question is
sttai11 charaacristics foe the specific pan of the skull
not "Can an infant or child be scrious]y inand brain cha1 soi~ the :round. A purely nnslajurcd or killed from a short-dislmlee fall?"" but
tional fall requires that the body is rigid and that the
rather ..If a chijd fa).}$ (x) meterS and :strikes
extcmal fcm:es acting on the body pass only lhrough
hi.s or her bead on a nonyielding surface. wh~t
rhe COM, i.e.. there is no rotational component. A 1will bappenT"
·
metu-tall 3-year-old hanging by her knees from a
2. Relinal hemorrhage may occur whenever inhotizonw ladder with tbe veru:x of her skull O.S metracrania.1 pressure exceeds venous pressure or
ters above hard-packed earth appro~tes this
model. lf she looses her grip and falls. sinking the
whenever tb.cr.c is venous obsttuction. The
cbaraeteristic of Lhe bleeding cann0t be used
occipital scalp, her impact velocity is 3.l Ill/second.
to detcrm.ine Ebe ultimate cause.
An exeJusively angular fall also requires that the
3. Axona.l damage is wilikely co be the mechabody is rigid. In addition. the rowion must be abOUt
nism for lcrhal injury in ll \ow-ve\ocicy impact
a fixed axis or a given point internal or atemal to
such as !IOm a fall.
lhe body, ¥.11d the applied moment and rhc inertial
4, .CeRbrovascubr thrombosis or dissection
moment must be at the identical point or axis. IC Ibis
muse be con.siden:d in any injllty with apparsa_me child ~ a 0.5-mcr.cr COM and has a ··matcb. -~- _ -·· _ ____ _ __ ~~ ~la~d deterioration, and especially in
~tick" f.ul ~.le standing on the _ground. again sa:ikonc wm,-ac:i:ieoran11fuc:cor-atcuuusual··ms~--------uigher..occ1put•. b~-1.11~-ve10ci1y.is..S.42,.radlsec... _ ··--···· _______ _
tribution for cerebral edema.
oDd ~changential velocity 5.42 m/:second at irnpacL
S. A Wl from le$$ Ihm 3 meters (10 feet) in an inThe ~pact velocity ls higher than predicted for an
fant or c:bild may cause fatal .hcsd inju.ry and
cxclu~1vely ~slational orextetn~l-axis an.gular fall
may oor cause immediaLC symptoms. The iu. when die applied moment and me inerml moment
jw:;y may be a,~ociatcd wirh bilatcm. retinal
are at a different fixed point (slip and fall) or when
'bemonhage, and an ossocuued subdllr&l
I.he ini.lial velocity is not zero (walloni: or running,
hematoma may exte.nd into lhe inlerhemidlen ttip and fall). and the vec:'tOrs a.re additive. Howspheric fiss-ure.. A history by the caretakef ,hat
cv!r. the head: neck, limb$. and tol'SO do not move
the child may have fallen cannot be dismissed.
uruformly d11n11g a fall because telaove morion oc·,
curs wilh different velocities and accelerations for
,'cknowledternenti.: The ~uthor tb:lnks the law eneach component. Calculation of cbe impacl vcl.Ocity
forcement. emer;eney medical services. and rnedi=l
for an actual fall requires solution.~ of diffeiential
professionals who wiUi.ngly helped bim obtain~ ~iequations for oach simul~ _,,.,.,1'"·=ona1 and
MJ ~ records alDd isrvestiptioas: Ida Harper-Brown
... _ _
(1-:hnaal \nfanna1ic,n spec;.lisL) ~ Je11n Kennedy
.rowional motion (45). .fwthc:%. ..i.oetti.a1 Dr impulse
(ScDior CompU:ince Officer) from the U.S. CPSc. w'ho!c
loading {whiplash) m1&y cause head accclcr1&tion
cndmsiascic uaiswace made chi$ ANdy poQ.iblc; Ayvb
more than twice that of the midbody input force and
Ommaya. M.D .• ano Werner Gold$milh. Ph.D.. for erid·
may be imponint in 11. fall where the initial impact is
c::a.uy -reviewini tbe ID.BftUScrii,<: Ju E. Lc:csnna. M.D..
i
ad Faris, A. Bandalc. Pb:O.. for helpful canunenUt: Mau.
~ 1he ,eel.bunoclc. back. or shoulder, and the 6nal
Myers, MJ)., and M.icbael B. Plumn. M.D., for re..
il'DpllCt is lo lhe bead (46,47).
vacw of me ntedical icna;irta $\udicl: Jc:aDDC R.curer md
The rrans)arional motion of a rigid body at conKaday. Gonnowski. for patience, humor, and ~ompl1nins
snw gravitational accelcralion (9.8 m/S:.) is ca.lculhe manllSCript: and all cb.e WDilics wbo shared the stoltatcd from:
~ ~ dam sons :md daughters and for whom Ibis work
v'1 = 2as
V : at
Ill ded1c1te(t,
F= ma

K.

6:

APPENDIX
New1onlan mechanics involving cOMtant acceleration m&y be used IO deletmille the impact velocity
in a pvitational fall. However. COftSW\l accelen,ll01l formL&lls canno1 be used to eatculau: me rehi~
lions amonc velocit)'. acc:c:leralion, 1111d dlsamc:e
ttaveled during an i&npacl bcc:ause dle decelcrmion

where F - the sum of allforces a,;ong on the body .
(newton). m - mass (kg). a - accclc:iatioa (mls2},
v = velocity (m/S), s = distance (m), and l =rime($),
The angular motion of a rigid body about a fixed
axis at , ;ivcn p0inl or Lhc body unaer· constant
gravit:itlonal acctleradon (9.8 m/si) ii calc.ulatc.d

from;
M • la·

111 ..

v'lr

a.

-Otf~128
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....
where M = me applied moment about the COM
or about the fixed point where the a.xis of rotation is
located. l = die inertial moment a.bout this same
COM or fixed point, a.
angular ~leration
{r3dls2 ), w
angular velocity (rad/s), r
radius
· (111):·v"' ·=·-wigenti.al velocity (mis). and a' - .tangential acceleration (ml~).
'The angu.lac velocity w for a rigid body of length
L rotating a.bout a fixed point is calculated from:

=

=

~2

= maLl'2

~

=

= (1/3) mL2

where Io == ~ initial inertial moment, w = angular velocity {rad/&), m ...;, ma.q (kg), a
gravitational acc;eleration (9.8 m/sl), and L = length.

=
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Dennis Benjamin, ISB #4199
Deborah Whipple, ISB #43SS
.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & .BARTIETT LLP
P .0. Box2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83 701
(208) 343.1000

Fl LED
2012 DEC 13 Pf1 l 38

Attorneys for Petitioner

-IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF
TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.

).
")
)
)

)
)

S'rATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

CASE NO. CV-12~1798

AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHAN L.
ARDEN,MD

)
)
)

Jonathan L. Arden, MD, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says:
1. That I am an MD certified in both anatomic and forensic pathology by the American
Board of Pathology and licensed to practice medicine in five states.
2. That I am President of Arden Forensics, PC, a consulting practice in forensic
pathology and medicine.
3. That I also hold a part-time appointment as a Forensic Pathologist in the Office of the
Chief Medical Examiner for the State of West Virginia.
4 That I have testified more than 700 times, including in this Court in State v. Grove,
No. CR-2007-768, as ari expert in child abuse, neglect, and issues relating to pediauic deaths.
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5. That I was requested to review matciials and to provide consultation in th.is
post-conviction proceeding, Grove v. State, No. CV-12-01798.
9.

Thatl prepared a Report of Consultation dated December 4, 2012.

l 0. That the Report of Consultation is attached as an exhibit to this affidavit.

11. That by this affidavit. I affirm that all the factua] statements and conclusions in the
report are true to the best ofmy knowledge.

This ends my affidavit.

.Avl:L-~
-u
Jonathan L. Arde~ MD

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
~1»1t:me this _l!t_~ of December, 2012.
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'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l.5,

2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the
I CERTIFY that on December
foregoing document including all attachments to be:

mailed
hand delivered

K-,
to:

faxed to 208-799-3073

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Jonathan L. Arden, MD

.Ardt.'11 f.'QJensic1, PC
1390 Chain l\rldge Rood *I 05
Md.«n, VA .22l01

Presicknt

ro~.749.0227 nfflc11.
i03,563.lill59 foJt

jlnnlenmd@llrdenf()r.•11-,l.:.,.rom
www.ardentot",anslcs.com

4 December 2012
Dennis Benjamin, Esq.
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett
303 W. Bannock, PO Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

Report of Consultation
Re: §tace Grove, Post-Conviction Relief
Dear Mr. Benjamin:

Introduction
You have asked me to review materials and to provide consultation in the field of forensic
pathology, which I have practiced for more than twenty five years. After receiving my MD
degree from the University of Michigan in 1980, I completed training in anatomic pathology at
the New York University Medical Center (1980-1983) and in forensic pathology at the Office of
the Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Maryland (1983-1984); I was certified in both
anatomic and forensic pathology by the American Board of Pathology in 1985. I am currently
licensed to practice medicine in five states. I spent most of my career as a governmentemployed medical examiner, including nine years with the Office of Chief Medical Examiner for
the City of New York where I finished as First Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, and more than
five years as the Chief Medical Examiner of Washington, DC. I am currently president of Arden
Forensics, PC, a consulting practice in forensic pathology and medicine, and I hold a part-time
appointment as a Forensic Pathologist in the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner for the State
of West Virginia. (Full curriculum vitae is attached.)

I have pursued a special interest in pediatric forensic pathology throughout my career. In
addition to my own ca·sework investigating deaths of and performing autopsies an children and
infants, I have ·lectured extensively on child abuse and neglect, the sudden infant death
syndrome as well as on other aspects of pediatric deaths. I served as Program Chair for the
Interim Meeting of the National Association of Medical Examiners In February, 1997; the topic of
the program that I arranged and presented in was child abuse fatalities. I was appointed by
Governor Pataki to the New York State Domestic Violence Fatality Commission in 1996-1997. I
was a memt>er of child fatality review teams in New York City and Washington, DC for a total of
approximately 14 years, and I was a member of the SIDS Community Advisory Council for New
York City. I have testified in family courts and criminal courts as an expert in child abuse and
neglect, including issues concerning injuries of living children.
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Re: Stace Grove, Post-Conviction Relief, Report of Dr. Arden, 12/4/2012

I have testified as an expert witness in various state and federal courts, as well as in grand
juries and depositions, a total of more than 700 times. My fees are not contingent upon the
outcome of any case in which I consult.

Case Background and Issues to be Addressed
I was originally retained in 2008 as a consultant to the defense in ID v. Stace Grove, and I was
called to testify at trial. In that capacity, I was provided and reviewed materials that included the
autopsy report for
Martin with neuropathology consul~ation {i.e., brain examination),
autopsy photographs, microscopic slides from the autopsy, medical records of
Martin
Including some imaging studies, organ donation records, police investigation reports, narrative
of Stace Grove, Grand Jury transcript and various interviews. In 2012, I was engaged to consult
with you regarding the post-conviction relief efforts for Stace Grove. For this current
consultation, I have again reviewed the materials related to the autopsy and medical care
including receiving another set of microscopic slides for examination, and I have been provided
transcripts of my trial testimony and of other medical expert witnesses.
During all of my consultation in these matters I have also relied upon my education, training and
experience as a physician, forensic pathologist and a medical examiner.
The majority of my testimony and opinions offered at trial addressed timing or aging of various
injuries, especially in relation to the day the child presented clinically and the timing of when Mr.
Grove had exclusive custody of him. Another pertinent aspect of my testimony was related to
the assessment of brai-n injuries•.. In this report, I shall discuss various aspects of the autopsy
examination, the materials that were not made available to me for examination prior to offering·
t1;1stimony·, my current opinions after reviewing the records again with additional materials that
were not provided to me before trial, and aspects of the presentation of expert test lmony and
medical evidence by the prosecution.

Analysis and Opinions
The most critical area of my testimony at trial fnvolved estimating ages of various injuries found
at autopsy, which held serious implications regarding when Mr. Grove had cus1ody of the child
and exclusive opportunity to have inflicted those injuries. The single most important method I
employed to arrive at opinions regarding the ages of injuries was microscopic examination. I
was provided a set of routine microscopic slides from the autopsy including the brain
examination prior to trial, which did contribute to reaching my opinions and providing testimony.
However, in addition to the routinely stained slides, selected slides were subjected to special
stains that highlight specific features that may not be visible (or fully appreciable) In the routine
stain. One of these Is called an iron stain, which primarily stains certain iron-containing
chemicals that are formed during the process of healing hemorrhage; positive iron staining
permits determination of minimal age intervals for Injuries, and may also identify older areas of
healed injury. The other special stain that was applied to the brain slides was the beta amylold
precursor protein (APP) stain, which may assist in the Identification and characterization of
certain types of brain injury (see below). No special slain slides were provided to me for
examination prior to trial to permit me to examine them Independently, such that I could arrive at
my own analysis and opinions based (in part) oh that evidence. Instead, I was forced to rely on
the recorded observations of these slides in the autopsy and neuropathology reports, although I
· did request that all of the existing microscopic slides be provided to me for examination at the
time. In the course of this post..convictlon review, I was provided slides from the general
autopsy in the routine stain and the iron stain, but no slides from the brain examination were
available to me for this examination.
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The iron stains are useful at minimum to establish that the process of response to hemorrhage
has begun, Including chemical breakdown of the oxygen-carrying protein in the red blood cells,
hemoglobin. !n most circumstances, it requires at least 2-3 days of inflammation and response
for positive iron staining to become visible microscopically (although in some circumstances it
may take longer), and the positive Iron staining may persist for much longer (in some ins1ances
months or even years). The medical examiner who performed the autopsy and authored the
autopsy report (Dr. Ross) did report that he found positive iron staining in some of the lnjuries
examined microscopically. I was able to rely on his reported observations as a basis for some
of my opinions that these were injuries older than the day of clinical presentation of the child
with his injuries. However, I have now examined the iron stains myself. Aside from confirming
some ofthefindings recorded by Dr. Ross, I have made additional observations that support
and extend my opinions on the ages of the injuries. Some of the iron staining that I see is co~xistent with the fresher-appearing hemorrhage; this, in conjunction with the inflammatory
response, indicates that the hemorrhage is In the early stages of response, consistent with the
opinions I expressed at trial (generally in the ranges of several to five days). Dr. Ross offered
testimony that the fresher hemorrhage was coincidentally located with the positive iron staining,
thus representing older and newer injury in the same locations. I disagree with this
interpretation, which relies on coincidence and fails to synthesize the totality of the findings into
a unified diagnosis. Moreover, by my re~ntexamination of the iron stains that were not made
available to·me prior to trial, I have now also found positive iron staining trapped within
connective tissue (i.e., separate from the visible hemorrhage), which represents the remnants of
much older, healed bleeding. In other words, the autopsy slides contained evidence not only of
signtticant aging of the more recent injuries such thatthey were not particularly consistent with
having been Incurred just prior to clinical presentation (i.e .• when Mr. Grove had custody of the
child) but also of much older bleeding, reflective of older injuries; this child had been injured at
some much ear1ier time or times, unrelated to when he was with Mr. Grove.
Another Important area of my analysis and testimony was the interpretation of the
neuropathology examination of the brain. This examination was. performed by a consulting
neuropathologist, Dr. Reichard, in a separate Institution (in New Mexico). Dr. Reichard authored
a separate neuropathQlogy report that was appended to the autopsy report, and his results were
incorporated into the final autopsy diagnoses by Dr. Ross. Dr. Reichard missed certain findings
In his slides, such as the inflammation and early healing in the subdural hemorrhage, that I
identified and demonstrated photographically at trial; these findings also demonstrated that the
subdural hemorrhage was actually older than the day of presentation to the hospital (on the
order of having occurred 3-5 days before death, with some features suggesting as much as 7
days). Dr. Reichard microscopically identified a laceration of a brain structure (the corpus
callosum), which I was able to demonstrate photographically at trial (using his routine
microscopic slides) to be an artifact, i.e., not a real injury: One of the features noted by Dr.
Ross was a pattern of positive APP staining in the tissue surrounding 1his purported laceration;
such positive staining would be supportive of his interpretation, the other features that I showed
consistent with it being an artifact notwithstanding. This pattern of APP staining surrounding a
localized brain lesion has been termed "penumbra! axonal injury" (PAI), and Dr. Reichard was
first author on a paper describing APP staining of different forms of axonal injury (including PAI)
in non-accidental head trauma of children, published In 2003 (see below). I did not have the
opportunity to examine APP stained slides from the neuropathology examination either prior to
trial or in the course of this current review. Performing my own independent examination of
those slides would afford me the opportunity to assess all of the evidence relevant to this critical
question, and potentially would have allowed me to have rebutted those findings and that
opinion further at trial, but absent being provided those slides I could not do so.
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The APP staining also bears on the broader interpretation by the medical experts in this ca:::,e of
the type and severity of brain Injury that
Martin did or did not sustain. Positive APP
staining of brain tissue Identifies a type of damage called axonal Injury which may occur in
several different patterns. These patterns have implications for the mechanisms of causation of
the axonal injury, including: traumatic axonal injury {as may be seen in non-accidental head
trauma In children); vascular axonal injury (typically caused by inadequate blood supply and
oxygen resulting from brain swelling, which may be secondary to many underlying processes,
both traumatic and not}: and the above-mentioned PAI (seen adjacent to localized brain
lesions). If axonal injury is present, then its type and severity also relate to the expected clinical
manifestations, including the rapidity of developing symptoms (a factor in alleged child abuse
that frequently relates to which person or persons had opportunity to have inflicted the injuries).
The PAI identified by Or. Reichard (assuming for discussion that it was present) is a localiz~d
phenomenon, and by his own publication does not imply that more diffuse or widespread axonal
injury is present. This is significant in this case because diffuse axonal injury does Imply a
severe brain injury that typically becomes severely symptomatic very rapidly. (On the contrary,
the type of head Injury that
Martin did have, subdural hemorrhage, may take time to
accumulate before it presses on the brain, resulting in an interval between injury and clinical
presentation during which clinical manifestations are minor or absent.) In fact, Dr. Reichard, the
specialized neuropathologlst, did not diagnose diffuse traumatic axonal injury in 1he brain of
Martin. However, Dr. Ross, the medical examiner who had the ultimate responsibility for
the autopsy, opined at trial that the child did have traumatic axonal injury, effectively
contradicting (and overruling) the neuropathologist who examined the brain. (Note that Dr.
Ross did not personally examine the slidesfrom the brain, either the routine or APP stains.)
Similarly, Dr. Harper, the child abuse pediatrician, testified (well beyond her area of expertise)
not only about the cause of death, but specmcally that the child did indeed have an intrinsic
brain injury (suggestive of axonal injury), an opinion contrary to the clinical CT scan and to the
neuropathology examination. Dr. Harper also disf'flissed the importance of microscopic
examination in her testimony, not only straying outside her expertise to mislead the jury, but
also relying on much less accurate clinical indicators, some of which were clearly contradicted
by the autopsy findings (both gross and microscopic).
Some of the issues raised above involve evidence that was not provided to me pretrial as the
defense medical expert (e.g., Iron stains) that would have had a material effect on my opinions
regarding ages of injuries. Some relate to the misrepresentation of medical evidence to the jury,
in particular the diagnoses of brain injuries, that held significant implications for the mechanism
of causation {e.g., axonal injury versus subdural hemorrhage) of head injuries and timing of
clinical manifestations. The presentation of the interpretation of the neuropathologic findings is
another issue of concern In this case, given that Dr. Reichard, who actually performed that
examination and authored that consultation report, was never called to testify to those findings
and opinions. Had Dr. Reichard provided testimony at trial, several major issues could have
been explored_.by the defense. These include the significance of the APP staining, in which he
would likely have testified consistent with his report that the vascular axonal injury pattern
precluded a diagnosis of traumatic axonal injury, and consistent wi1h his own publication that the
PAI pattern did not indicate the presence of more diffuse axonal injury; this area would also
have opened the door to cross-examination that would have exposed the Inconsistencies
between his opinions and those expressed by both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper. He could have
been confronted with the photographic evidence that I produced which was disclosed before
trial regarding the laceration being an artifact, which would have countered the only positive
evidence of a primary brain Injury.
could have been further confronted with the evidenc10 I
. produced concerning the age of the subdural hemorrhage, which contradicted his report. Since

He
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he did not appear at trial, none of these issues was available for explora'tion by the defense at
trial.

Conclusion
All opinions are expressed with reasonable medical certainty. I reserve the right to amend any
statements or opinions If presented with additional significant information, as well as the right to
rebut opinions expressed within my areas of expertise.

Yours truly,
Arden Forensics, PC

By: Jonathan L. Arden, MD
President
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

9

10
11

STACEY GROVE

12

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

Petitioner,

13
14

··-··

v.

15
16

-

BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

STATE OF IDAHO

17

Respondent

18
19

FACTS

20
21

22

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder and received a life sentence with 22
years fixed. Petitioner appealed the conviction; on March 25, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals

23
24

affirmed the conviction and sentence. On September 12, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court denied

25

Petitioner's Petition for Review. Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and

26

accompanying Affidavits in Support of the Petition for Post-Convicti-0n Relief on September 7,

27

2012. This brief is in response to that petition and in support of a motion for summary disposition

28
filed b Nez Perce Coun
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1

2

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

3

An application for post-conviction relief is a special proceeding, civil in nature, which

4

allows a person to seek relief from a criminal conviction. Matthews v. State, 130 Idaho 39, 4L _ __"

5
6

(Ct.App.1997); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,456 (1991). A post-conviction proceeding is

7

commenced by filing an application in the district court in which the conviction occurred. LC.§ 19-

8

4902. An application must be filed within one year after the time for appeal has expired or after a

9

decision on appeal has been issued. Id Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22

sentenced for a crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims:
(1) That the conviction of the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United
State or the constitution or laws of this state;
(2) That the court;w~ witlioutjuris.m~tiQn to inlp9.s.e s.eI1te11ce;_
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material fact, not previously presented and heard, that
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation or conditional release was unlawfully
revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is otherwise unlawfully held
in custody or other restraint;
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho Code, that the
petitioner is innocent of the offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground
or alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ,
motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy.
LC. § 19-4901(a).
Furthermore, an application for post-conviction relief must contain more than a short and

23
plain statement. The application "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal
24
25

knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations

26

must be-attached or the application must state why such.supporting evidence is not included with .

27

the petition. LC.§ 19-4903." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,287 (Ct.App.1995). In other

28
29
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words, the petition must present, or be accompanied by, admissible evidence supporting its

1
2

allegations, or the petition will be dismissed. Hoffman v. State, 277 P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct.App.2012).

3

The Petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the

4

allegations upon-which.his request for .post,,conviction relief is based. I. C. _§ 19,...4907; Stuart.v. __

5
6

State, 118 Idaho 865, 869 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271 (Ct.App.2002). Idaho Code

7

§ 19-4906 permits summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief upon motion of a party

8

or upon the court's own initiative. "Summary dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's

9

evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor,

10
11

would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary

12

hearing must be conducted." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,561 (2008); Goodwin v. State, 138

13

Idaho 269, 271 (Ct,App,2002). Petiti0I1S that are unverifi~cl and concluso:ry m~y b~ dismissed by

14

motion for summary disposition. LC. § 29-4906. Conclusory or unverified allegations are

15
"insufficient to entitle petitioner to an evidentiary hearing." King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 446
16
17

(Ct.App.1988).

ARGUMENTS

18
19

Petitioner fails to meet the requirements ofl.C. §19-4901(a) for Post-Conviction Relief

20
because he fails to assert claims that are valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
21
22

he has failed to support his claims with affidavits or evidence sufficient to provide an issue of

23

material fact, and he raises issues that could have been raised on direct appeal but were not.

24

Therefore, the petition fails to raise a claim for relief and should be summarily dismissed.

25

_26.
27

Petitioner alleges five causes of actions for post-conviction relief. Each cause of action
-

- ·-

- ··-·-- ..

..
-

- -·

addressed individually.

28
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1. Whether Petitioner was denied the right to confront witnesses against him when
State's witnesses testified at trial about tests and results they personally did not
perform nor had personal knowledge.

3
4

Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses against him was violated when State's
witness~s.testified_attrial aho11tneu,n>_pathQ\pgytest~- and examin1:1ti9nresu,lts in whichthey neit4.er

5

5

performed nor had personal knowledge; and, the neuropathologist, Dr. Reichard, who performed

7

the tests and examination, was not a witness at trial. However, the State's witnesses, Dr. Ross and

&

Dr. Harper, were testifying to facts and data of which they were made aware through Dr. Reichard' s

~

report. The Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E) provide that an expert witness is one ''who is qualified

10

11

as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience training, or education" and "may testify in the form of

12

an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

13

h~lp the trier of fact t()_ unde~s~and the evide11ce or !() detei:mine_ ~ _fact in_ issue; (b) the testimony is

14

based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;

15
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." I.R.E.

16
17

702. Furthermore, an expert may base his or her opinion testimony on "facts or data in the case that

18

the expert has been made aware of ... ". I.R.E 703 (emphasis added).

19
20

In this case, Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper testified as expert witnesses. Furthermore, Dr. Ross
and Dr. Harper based their respective opinions and testimony on facts and data, about which they

21
22
23

24

25

were made aware from Dr. Reichard's report.
Petitioner's claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he did not have an
opportunity to confront Dr. Reichard is incorrect and Petitioner's claim should be summarily
dismissed.

26
27

28
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2. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct (a) outside the presence of the
Court during trial, (b) during the state's case-in-chief, (c) during the crossexamination of Petitioner and (d) during closing and rebuttal argument.

3

Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in multiple ways:

1

4

5
6

7
8
9

• ... first, he projected family photos of the victim prior to the Court going on record, thus. __ .
exposing the jury to extra-judicial evidence;
• second, he appealed to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury through the use
of inflammatory tactics by eliciting testimony of the victim's sister;
• third, he elicited inadmissible evidence during cross-examination·of Petitioner and Dr.
Arden; and,
• finally, comments during his closing and rebuttal arguments constitute conduct
sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error.

10
11

12

13
14

It is generally held that "a conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only
. when conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho
77~ 785 (1997). "Prosecutorial misconductrises to the level of fundamental error when it is
calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the defendant,

15

16
17

18
19

or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the
evidence." Id. (citing, State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 (1994)).

In the first instance cited by the petitioner, the prosecutor was merely setting up the
projector screen and preparing for his presentation. In the second instance, Petitioner's counsel

20
21

objected to the elicitation of the victim's sister's testimony and the District Court overruled the

22

objection allowing the prosecutor's questioning to continue. The act of setting up a presentation is

23

perhaps untimely in preparation but cannot be deemed to be calculated to influence the jury. The

24

prosecutor had no knowledge that the jury was entering at that exact time. Eliciting testimony from

25

26

I

I~'4

the victim's sister following the objections of Counsel and subsequent ruling of the Court is not

27

egregious conduct, and does not support a claim of fundamental error resulting from prosecutorial

28

misconduct and thus, should be summarily dismissed.
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1

As previously stated. a petition for post conviction relief must be supported by affidavits,

2

records, or other evidence supporting its allegations. LC. § 19-4903. Petitions that are conclusory or

3

unverified may be summarily dismissed. In this instance, Petitioner fails to include any supporting

4

eviden.Ge.thatthe prosecutor's conductduring er.ass-examination.of Petitioner and_Dr. Arden was so

5
6
7

8

9

egregious as to. result in fundamental error and are simply conclusory allegations. Therefore,
Petitioner's claims ofprosecutorial misconduct should be summarily dismissed.
Furthermore, "prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument will be deemed
fundamental er_ror only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent

10
11

prejudice could not have been remedied by a timely objection and a ruling from the trial court

12

informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded." State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 9

13

{Q!.App: 199~). During his closingar~ent_at trial, the prosecutor's comments to thejury and his

14

comments regarding Dr. Arden's testimony were not so egregious nor inflammatory that any

15

prejudice arising therefrom could not have been remedied by the trial court directing the jury to

16
17

disregard the comments in a timely fashion. Consequently, Petitioner's alleged claims of

18

prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument do not rise to a level of fundamental error and

19

thus should be summarily dismissed.

20

Finally, Petitioner is precluded from raising issues in a post-conviction petition that could

21

22

have been raised on direct appeal but that Petitioner failed to raise previously. Furthermore, issues

23

that could have beeil raised on direct appeal but were not are precluded and cannot be raised in

24

post-conviction proceedings. LC.§ 19-4901(b). Petitioner's allegations ofprosecutorial misconduct

25

should have been raised on direct appeal. Therefore, Petitioner's claims of prosecutorial misconduct

26
27
28

are not valid claims for post-conviction relief under LC.§ 19-490l(a) and should be summarily
dismissed.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION - Grove

6

131

..

······-· .

···------···

...

:'

-

~'-···--

.

· - · · · · · · ·-·

. 3. . Whether Petitioner was denied due process when jurors engaged in misconduct by
allegedly sleeping during the presentation of evidence.

1

2
Petitioner asserts that jurors engaged in misconduct when they were allegedly sleeping
3

4

during the presentation of evidence as various points throughout the trial. A similar issue was

5

presented in Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 (Ct.App.2006).

6

Murphy did not identify which day of the five-day jury trial the juror allegedly slept,
describe the length of time the juror allegedly slept, or explain what testimony or evidence
the juror allegedly slept through. In the absence of such evidence, there was no showing of
deficient performance or prejudice. Therefore, it was proper for the court to dismiss this

7
8

clain;i.

9

10

Id. at 150. Petitioner faces similar circumstances in this case. Although Petitioner presents affidavits

11

that identify days in which jurors allegedly slept, Petitioner has not presented affidavits, records, or

12

other evidence indicating the length of time the jurors allegedly slept nor has Petitioner explained

13
-

14

-

-

-

-

-·

-·

what testimony or evidence the jurors allegedly slept through. Additionally, one of Petitioner's

15.

affidavits cannot clearly name the juror that was allegedly sleeping. Lastly, five of the six affidavits

16

in support of Petitioner's petition for relief generally allege that jurors were sleeping during

17

''various times during the proceedings" and do not indicate specifically which day these jurors

18
19

allegedly slept or what testimony was allegedly slept through. While there is some indication in

20

some of the affidavits that reference which testimony jurors allegedly slept through, the allegation

21

does not also indicate which jurors were allegedly sleeping through the reference testimony. The

22

affidavits are not evidence and are simply non-specific conclusions by audience members watching

23
the trial offered in support of Petitioner's allegations. Thus, there is no showing of juror

24
25

misconduct, the allegations are conclusory in nature and without verification. Petitioner's

26

allegations of juror misconduct should be summarily dismissed.

27

28

4. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for deficient performance for either
failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct or juror misconduct.
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Next, Petitioner asserts appellate counsel was ineffective for either failing to raise on appeal

2

the alleged issue of prosecutorial misconduct or the alleged issue of juror misconduct. "To prevail

3

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate both that his attorney's

4

performance was deficient, and thathe was thereby prejudiced in the defense of the criminal

5

6

charge." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145 (Ct.App.2006); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

7

668,687 (1984). In addition, to show the attorney's performance was deficient "a defendant must

8

overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating "that

9

counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of competence." Roman v. State, 125

10
11

Idaho 644,648 (Ct.App.1994). Furthermore, if counsel's performance is proven to be deficient,

12

defendant must show that ''there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

13

errors, the result 9f the pr9ceedin.g wolJ.ld llav~ be~n different." Striqldan4 44q lJ.S_. at 694.

14

Nothing in Petitioner's petition supports an argument that appellate counsel's representation

15
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Appellate counsel is a respected member of the
16
17

Idaho State bar with no other sustained or substantiated complaints for ineffective assistance of

18

counsel.

19

Petitioner's argument that Mintun (holding that it cannot be ineffective assistance for

20
appellate counsel to fail to raise claims of.fundamental error for the first time on appeal) is
21

22

contrary to Strickland and should be overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court is dispositive. Petitioner

23

is arguing for a rule that does not exist. Simply believing that the Mintun decision should be

24

overruled because it is contrary to Strickland is not sufficient to establish a claim for relief

25

Therefore, Petitioner's claim of ineffective appellate counsel should be summarily dismissed.

26
27
28

5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for numerous actions such as failing to
present an adequate analysis, failing to move for a mistrial, failing to challenge for
cause a juror, and for rendering deficient performance.
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Petitioner offers a laundry list of claims that trial counsel was ineffective. However,

2

Petitioner fails to support this laundry list of claims with affidavits, records, or other evidence.

3

Conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by fact, are insufficient to entitle the Petitioner to an

4

_______ eyidentiacy hearing. LC._§ 19-49.03. In this instance; Petitionero1f~rs no factsJo_ support his bare

5
6
7

8

9

and conclusory allegations. Therefore, Petitioner's claims that trial counsel was ineffective should
be summarily dismissed.
Furthermore, Petitioner fails to meet the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington for
purposes of determining whether counsel was ineffective. A court will "not second-guess strategic

10
11
12
13
14

and tactical decisions and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the
decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law ... "
. State v. Pay_ne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008);Pratt v. State, 134 Iciah() 581, ?~4(2000). In addition, _
"[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of

15
professional assistance." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).
16
17

Petitioner has not shown that any of trial counsel's strategic decisions (e.g., summoning a

18

new jury pool, or peremptory challenge of a juror) resulted from inadequate preparation or

19

ignorance of the relevant law. Therefore, Petitioner's claims of ineffective trial counsel cannot be

20

the basis for his relief and should be summarily dismissed.

21

CONCLUSION

22
23
24
25

Petitioner fails to meet the requirements ofl.C. §19-490l(a) for Post-Conviction Relief
because he has failed to support his claims with affidavits or evidence, he fails to assert claims that
are valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and he raises issues that could have

26
27

been raised on direct appeal but were not.
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1

The State respectfully requests that this Court grant the State's Motion for Summary

2

Dismissal because the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact and

3

therefore, the petition fails to raise any claims for relief that may be granted under The Uniform

4

Po.st-Conviction Procedure Act.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, was hand delivered via court basket to:

(l}_ _ hand delivered; or
(2)
(3)
(4)

X_

hand delivered via court basket, or
sent via facsimile, or
mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United
States Mail.

ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Dennis Benjamin
Deborah Whipple
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701 ,
DATED this
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Ji:...
day of Decemper, 2012.
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C~gal Assistant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
STACEYL. GROVE,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
CASE NO. CV12-01798
)
vs.
)
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
)
STATUS CONFERENCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)Defendant.
)

Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief due: January 4, 2013; and,
State's response due: February ·12, 2013; and,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Tuesday, the 12th day of February, 2013, at the hour
of 11:15 AM. Pacific Time in the District Court of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, Lewiston,
Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Status Conference in the above-entitled matter with
THE COURT initiating the call.
DATED this

/t"' day of December, 2012.
CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
STATUS CONFERENCE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE
was:

~hand delivered via court basket, or
_ _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2012, to:
Dennis Benjamin
P 0Box2772
Boise ID 83701

/

/'f,,. day of December,

-l.+'llV.'fd__

Nance Ceccarelli
PO Box 1267
Lewiston ID 83501
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
STATUS CONFERENCE
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Dennis Benjamin, ISB #4199
Deborah Whipple, ISB #4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
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Attorneys for Petitioner

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATEOFIDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS:
1. Petitioner, Stacey Grove, is currently incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Institution
in Orofino, Idaho.
2. Mr. Grove is serving a sentence imposed by the District Court of the Second Judi~ial.
District, State ofldaho, County of Nez Perce, the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, presiding.
3. The Nez Perce County District Court Number for that case is CR-2007-768.
4. Mr. Grove was charged with the first-degree murder of

Martin (hereafter

"
5. Mr. Grove was represented at trial by attorney Scott Chapman (hereafter "defense

1 - AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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counsel").
6. The state was represented by the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney, Daniel
Spickler (hereafter "prosecutor").
7. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
7.1 A true and correct copy of the Clerk's Record in the criminal case is attached
as Exhibit A.
7.2 A true and correct copy of the transcripts of the proceedings in
the criminal case is attached as Exhibit B.
7.3 A copy of the exhibits introduced at trial are attached hereto as Exhibit C.
8. The district court sentenced Mr. Grove to a life sentence with 22 years fixed.

9. -Mr. Grove·appealedfrom the judgment and sentence:·
10. Attorneys Diane Walker and Eric Fredericksen (hereafter "appellate counsel")
represented Mr. Grove on appeal.
11. On March 25, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction
and the sentence. State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483,259 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied
(September 12, 2011).
11.1. A copy of the opinion is attached as Exhibit D.
12. The Supreme Court denied Mr. Grove's Petition for Review on September 12, 2011.
13. The remittitur issued that same day.
14. With respect to this conviction, Mr. Grove has not filed any other petitions for
post-conviction relief.

2 -AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

140

ll...~.

~'"---

----

-1

r

----------------

I

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

Petitioner was Denied the Right to Confront
Witnesses Against Him in Violation of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article, 1, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution (LC.§ 19-4901(a)(l)).

A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action.

15. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-14 above.
16. Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses was violated when state witnesses testified at
trial about neuropathology tests and examination results when those witnesses neither performed
nor had personal knowledge of the neuropathology testing and examination, and when the
neuropathologist who did perform the tests and examinations was not a witness at the trial.
16.1. A further con:frontation--elause violation occurred when the autopsy report
was admitted into evidence at trial.
17. Dr. Marco Ross is a forensic pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 892, ln. 20.
18. Dr. Ross performed the autopsy of

while he was employed at the Spokane

County Medical Examiner's Office. Exhibit B, pg. 893, ln. 23.
19. Dr. Ross testified at Mr. Grove's trial. Exhibit B, pg. 892-988.
20. Dr. Ross's autopsy report was introduced as State's Exhibit 11 at the trial. Exhibit C
(State's Exhibit 11); Exhibit B, pg. 902, ln. 5.
20.1. Defense counsel did not object to the introduction of the autopsy report. Id.
21. Dr. Ross testified that there have been occasions where the Medical Examiner's
Office would send tissue samples to outside experts for examination and interpretation. Exhibit ___ _
B, pg. 900, ln. 21-24.

3 - AMENDED VERJFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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22. In this case, Kyler's brain was sent to Dr. R. Ross Reichard, a forensic
neuropathologist at the University of New Mexico for examination. Exhibit B, pg. 901, ln. 5-7;
pg. 928, ln. 18-20 .
... -- - - ---

23. The results ofthe examination were-included in the autopsy report which was

admitted as Exhibit 11 at trial. Exhibit B, pg. 901, ln. 1-2.
24. At trial, Dr. Ross was permitted to testify to Dr. Reichard's findings. Exhibit B, pg.
928, ln. 21 - pg. 930, ln. 23.
24.1. Dr. Ross testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were bilateral subdural
hemorrhages in the brain. Exhibit B, pg. 928, ln. 21-23.
24.2. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were bilateral
"" subarachnoid hemorrhagesinthe brain. ExhibitB;pg: 929, ln: l-2.
24.3. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported that the brain was swollen.

Id
24.4. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there was a laceration in
the corpus callosum. Id, ln. 3.
24.5. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there was a hypo-ischemic
injury to the brain. Id, ln. 5-6.
24.6. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were vascular axonal
injuries to the brain. Id, ln. 10.
24. 7. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were autolytic
-· . -changes in the brain. Id, ln. 11.
24.8. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported that the subdural
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hemorrhage and the subachnoid hemorrhages were "acute." Exhibit B, pg. 930,
In. 3-4.
24.9. Dr. Ross testified that the significance of a tear in the corpus callosum
__ reported by Dr. Reichard-is that it-is indicative of a.high dr.,gree of force which
would render the victim unconscious or nearly unconscious at the time of impact.

Id, In. 21-23.
24.10. Dr. Ross also testified that the ·swelling reported by Dr. Reichard indicated
that the fatal injury occurred sometime immediately before death or within a day
or two prior to death. Id, In. 6-9.
24.11. Dr. Ross testified that the degree of hemorrhage in the brain and the tear in
the corpuscallosumreported by Dr. Reichard would be inconsistent with a fall
from a kitchen counter onto a linoleum floor. Exhibit B, pg. 936, In. 3-7.
24.12. Dr. Ross testified that the degree of hemorrhage in the brain and the tear in
the corpus callosum reported by Dr. Reichard would be consistent with a very
significant blunt force impact or impacts to the head that would be in excess of
what would be expected from a fall to the floor. Id., In. 12-17.
24 .13. Dr. Ross testified that the widespread vascular axonal swelling reported by
Dr. Reichard was indicative of injury to the axons which could occur as a result of
blunt force trauma tearing the axons. Exhibit B, pg. 941, ln. 13-18.
24.14. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard noted in his report that there were
axonal injury changes occurring in the vicinity of.the corpus callosum which
would be consistent with a shearing injury, in Dr. Ross's opinion. Exhibit B, pg.
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942, ln. 14-23.
24.15. Dr. Ross also testified that it was not surprising for Dr. Reichard to report
axonal injury given that he also reported a laceration or tear in the corpus

--eallosum. -Id., at-18-2-J,. -···-··
24.16. Dr. Ross repeated his testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear
in the corpus callosum shows there was "a very significant force" applied,
something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of stories or so," or a
"motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, ln.
5-12.
24.17. Dr. Ross also testified that the brain injuries reported by Dr. Reichard did
not result from a single impact Exhibit B, pg. 947, ln; 20.
24.18. Dr. Ross also repeated his testimony that the head injuries reported by Dr.
Reichard would have caused immediate or near immediate unconsciousness or
near unconsciousness to
24.19. Dr. Ross testified that

Exhibit B, pg. 948, ln. 23 -pg. 949, ln. 4.
could not have been engaged in certain

activities previously described by the state's witness Lisa Nash with the injuries
reported by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 949, ln. 5 -pg. 95, ln. 15.
24.20. On redirect examination of Dr. Ross, the prosecutor stated that "in the
report from New Mexico that the doctor there talked about the loss of clear
distinction between gray-white junction and generalized gray discoloration."
Exhibit B, pg. 984, ln. 23 - pg; 985, ln. 2.
24.21. Dr. Ross explained that finding to show that "brain death has occurred, but
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there's still ongoing cardiac activity." Id, pg. 985, ln. 3-5.
24.22. The prosecutor asked Dr. Ross, "Is there anything in your autopsy report or
in the report from Dr. Reichard that would be inconsistent with those injuries
-occurring appreximately 48 hours prior to cardiac death?" Id, pg. 9 87, ln. 4-7. ..... 24.23. Dr. Ross answered, ''No." Id, ln. 8.
24.24. Dr. Ross relied upon Dr. Reichard's report in his opinions that the cause of
death was brain swelling and cerebral hemorrhage due to blunt force impact to the
head, that the manner of death was homicide, and that the fatal injuries could have
been inflicted approximately 48 hours prior to cardiac death. Id, pg. 987, In. 9 pg. 988, In. 8.
25. Dr. Reichard was never called to testify at trial:
26. Dr. Ross admitted that he did not do anything with the brain other than to remove it,
examine its surface and have it sent to Dr. Reichard's laboratory. Exhibit B, pg. 951, ln. 23 - pg.
952, ln. 7.
27. Dr. Ross admitted he did not prepare the brain tissue slides or inspect the brain
internally. Exhibit B, pg. 952, ln. 10-12.
28. Dr. Ross admitted he did not observe the corpus callosum laceration. Exhibit B, pg.
956, ln. 10-15.
29. Dr. Ross admitted that he did not observe the global hypo-ischemic brain injury.
Exhibit B, pg. 956, ln. 18 - pg. 957, ln. 7.
30. Dr. Ross admitted he did not examine any of the original slides orrecuts of the brain
tissue. Exhibit B, pg. 959, ln. 10-15.

7 - AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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31. Dr. Ross testified that he did not recall whether he had seen any photographs taken of
the brain by Dr. Reichard. Id, In. 23-25.
32. The introduction of Dr. Reichard's report and Dr. Ross's testimony about Dr.
Reichard-'-s examination of the brain and his interpretation-ofthe meaning of those findings violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
33. Dr. Ross also testified about hemorrhages which he did not observe but were
reported "by the surgeon who did the transplant surgery," in the retroperitoneal areas and the
psoas muscles. Exhibit B, pg. 938, ln. 20-23.
34. That surgeon did not testify at trial.
35. That testimony from Dr. Ross also violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses.
36. The testimony of Dr. Donald Chin; which referred to the autopsy report, which in -

--

turn contained Dr. Reichard's observations, findings and conclusions, violated Mr. Grove's right
to confront witnesses.
36.1. Dr. Chin testified that based "on what I've read on this autopsy report is the
most brutal case ... I've ever seen." Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 5-6.
37. The testimony of Dr. Jay Hunter which referred to Dr. Reichard's observations,
findings and conclusions violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses.
37.1. While Dr. Hunter admitted that he is "not a pathologist," he testified that,
''this child on autopsy, had ... a fair amount of subarachnoid hemorrhage" that
"should have produce[d] immediate symptoms," such as "unconsciousness,"
given the degree of injury described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 874, 1n. 24 pg. 875, In. 22.
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37.2. Dr. Hunter also testified that the defense version of the events on the
evening prior to Kyler's hospitalization would be "virtually impossible" given the
injuries described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 876, ln. 11-20.

37.3. Dr. Hunter repeatedthattest-imon:y during the state's.redirect examination.Exhibit B, pg. 886, ln. 18-24.
38. The testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper which referred to Dr. Reichard's observations,
findings and conclusions violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses.
38.1. Dr. Harper testified that she had the autopsy report from Dr. Ross, which
contains the observations, findings and conclusions of Dr. Reichard, and which
was introduced at trial as State's Exhibit 11. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, In. 19-20.

- 382; Dr. Harper used that report, among otherthings, to reach her opinion as to
the cause of death, i.e., the brain injury. Exhibit B, pg. 1032, In. 3-10.
38.3. Dr. Harper also testified that based upon the injuries described by Dr.
Reichard,

"would have been unconscious or semi-conscious." Exhibit B,

pg. 1033, In. 17-18.

38.4. Dr. Harper also testified that in her experience, the extent of the brain injury
described by Dr. Reichard was unusually severe. Exhibit B, pg. 1034, In. 2-21.
38.5. Doctor Harper also testified that the defense version of the events on the
evening prior to Kyler's hospitalization would be "not consistent" given the
injuries described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 1036, In. 7-20; pg. 1037, In.
20-24.
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39: Trial counsel did not object to any of this testimony.
40. The failure to object was not a strategic decision on the part of trial counsel.
41. These violations of Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses were not harmless error.
-- - , -- - -

4-2-, The Court of Appeals <lid not-pe-nnit-Mr. Grove to raise this issue-for the ;firsttime on

appeal. State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 259 P .3d 623 (Ct. App. 2011 ), review denied.

B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with witnesses against him."
The Supreme Court has held "that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and
state prosecutions." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho
· Constitution similarly guarantees -a criminaldefendant the right to -"appear and defend in person." In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held
that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial are admissible only where declarant is
unavailable and where defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S.
at 59. Here, the statements of Dr. Reichard and others were introduced at trial without a showing
of unavailability or a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
Further, the testimony was undoubtedly testimonial in nature. The determination of
whether evidence is testimonial requires the court to consider the purpose behind the
Confrontation Clause. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143, 176 P.3d 911,915 (2007). The
Supreme Court noted in Crawford, supra, that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode ofcriminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused." Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143, 176 P.3d at 915,
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quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50 .
. The Hooper Court analyzed the guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in determining what constitutes testimonial statements: First, the Court looked to Webster's
dictionary definition of "testimony_')-frem-1828; i,e.-/'[a] rolemn declaration or affim1ation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Next, the Court
listed three formulations of "core" testimonial statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its
:functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;"
a,n:d (3 )"statements thatwere made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford,
541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). Dr. Reichard's report and its incorporation into
Dr. Ross's autopsy report clearly fits within the definition of "core" testimonial statements. See,
Bullcomingv. New Mexico, -U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2716-17 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009).
The unconstitutional admission of the evidence cannot be found to be harmless. Here, the
Court of Appeals in the direct appeal noted the importance of Dr. Reichard's evidence to the
state's case:
Initially, we clarify that the crux of this issue affects the central disputed question
in this case-when the injuries which ultimately caused K.M.'s death occurred and
whether it was likely thatK.M. would have lost consciousness and/or shown
severe symptoms immediately after the injuries were inflicted. In other words, did
the injuries occur on the morning that K.M. lost consciousness-and was alone
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with Grove--or several days prior, when it was undisputed that the injuries could
not have been inflicted by Grove because he was not alone with K.M. In this
regard, important to the state's theory of the case that Grove caused the fatal
injuries on the morning of July 10 was the conclusion of Dr. Reichard, based on
his microscopic examination ofK.M.'s brain, that K.M. had suffered a laceration
of the corpus callosum, which would have likely caused immediate loss of
-consciousness, thereby-imp-licating-Grove as.-th€:~eause-ofK.M.'sinjuries duringthe 36-45 minute period of time during which he was alone with K.M. Grove
points out that both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper recited Dr. Reichard's observations
in this regard, as gleaned from the autopsy report, as neither was present during
the autopsy nor conducted their own microscopic analysis, and relied on these
observations in forming their respective opinions that K.M.' s injuries had been
inflicted on July 10.
By contrast, Grove's expert, Dr. Arden, testified that he did not agree with Dr.
Reichard that a laceration was present and that the anomaly was the result of
handling of the brain after death. He also offered his opinion, after examination of
the microscopic slides, that K.M.'s injuries had been inflicted at least three days
prior to death (thus absolving Grove of having caused them) and that they would
not have necessarily resulted in immediate loss of consciousness.

State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483,490,259 P.3d 629,636 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied (Sept. 12,
2011). In light of the central importance of the evidence from Dr. Reichard, the state cannot
meet the burden of proving its unconstitutional admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("[W]e hold ... that before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

Petitioner was Denied a Fair Trial and Due
Process of Law in Violation of Idaho Constitution
Art. I,§ 13 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution by the Multiple
Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct (LC.§ 194901(a)(J)).

A. Facts Pertaining to .Cause of Action.
43. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-42 above.
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44. The prosecutor committed misconduct outside the presence of the Court during trial.
44.1. During the trial, but prior to the Court going on the record, the prosecutor
projected family photos of
the courtroom.

onto the court room screen while the jury entered
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44.2. The family photos would then be interchanged with the autopsy
photographs.
44.3. Affidavits of witnesses to this misconduct are being filed in support of this
Petition.
44.4. The prosecutor's actions exposed the jury to evidence outside the presence
of the Court, invoking sympathy for

and his biological family and arousing

passion and prejudice against Mt; Grove.
44.5. Defense counsel did not draw this behavior to the attention of the Court, ask
that the prosecutor be ordered to desist or move for a mistrial.
45. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the state's case-in-chief.
45.1. The prosecutor called

Bandel, the sister of

as a witness.

Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 25 - pg. 824, ln.l.
45.2. Defense counsel objected noting that

was a child and arguing that

the prosecutor's purpose in calling her was "obviously ... just to impassion or
inflame the jury" and he expected

to testify that when she last saw her

brother "he was lying on his mother's bed, and she gave him a hug and kiss and he
said good bye:" Exhibit B; pg. 821, ln. 24 - pg. 822, ln. 8.
45 .3. In response, the prosecutor told the Court that his purpose in calling
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was to elicit evidence regarding the "condition of

Martin on the morning of

July 101\ " and argued that he only had Lisa Nash and

to provide evidence

on that topic. Exhibit B, pg. 822, ln. 17-23. He stated, "I'm entitled to ask her
. what ·she .recalls that morning, what -she-recalls ofthe physical condition of her-.'. . ,-····-- .
brother the last time she saw him." Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 1-3.
45.4. The Court overruled defense counsel's objection "based on the argument
made by Mr. Spickler on behalf of the State." Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 8-9.
45.5. Mr. Spickler then elicited testimony from
strong little girl," that she said "bye" to

that she was a "[p]retty

before she left that morning, gave

him a kiss and a hug and that she never saw her "brother again after that." Exhibit
B, pg. 825; ln. 22; pg. 826, ln; 15"18;·pg. 827, ln. 16"17.
45.6. That testimony, elicited by the prosecutor from

went beyond what

the prosecutor told the Court he would elicit and it had the effect of inflaming the
passions and prejudices of the jury and encouraging the jury to convict Mr. Grove
for reasons other than the relevant evidence.
45.7. Defense counsel failed to object that the prosecutor's actual questioning of
went beyond what he had represented to the Court and was inadmissible.
45.8. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash
trailer approximately a month after

s death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg.

996, ln. 19 - pg. 997, ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6) .
. 45.9. The photos wereinflammatory because they included a large display of
sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash.
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45.10. These photographs were inadmissible under IRE 403 as the danger of
unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value.
46. The prosecutor committed misconduct in his cross-examination of Mr. Grove where
-the prosecutor characterized Mr. G.r-0v-e~s sw0mtestimony-asthe "story you told, which-.is.,'-~the--- ,- _story you need the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make
sense." Exhibit B, pg. 1113, In. 8-11.
47. In his cross-examination of Dr. Jonathan Arden, the prosecutor suggested by a
question that Dr. Arden was "on a special mission here, which is to provide such evidence as you
might that would support the defense's case[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1321, ln. 18-20.
48. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the cross-examination of Mr. Grove.
48.1. The prosecutor cross;,_examined Mr. Grove about the factthat Mr. Grove
was behind on child support to his biological son, a fact both irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial. Exhibit B, pg. 1115, In. 21-24.
48.2. During the cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor asked Mr.
Grove when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription "was a
result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12.
48.3. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical
situation has arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today" and did
not mention Mr. Grove or the nature of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg.
- 1067, ln. 3~S..-- :, .. --49. The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing and rebuttal argument.
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49 .1. The prosecutor misstated the def-ense position regarding preexisting head
injury, saying that the defense was that there was "some long-term brain injury."
Exhibit B, pg. 1419, In. 6-10.
-- :: ,,=>---,------49.2. The prosecutor -called-Dr. Arden:s--testimony about the absence of a tear in
0

the corpus callosum "a bit of smoke and mirrors to get you confused." Id, pg.
1426, In. 16-18.
49.3. The prosecutor suggested without supporting evidence that Dr. Arden's
"financial position" leads him to decide what cases he can take. Id, pg. 1429, In.
8-9.
49.4. The prosecutor testified that a "colleague" said that Dr. Arden's answers
during cross'-examination were slippery as an ice cube and the prosecutor opined
that the doctor ''was stretching things." Id, pg. 1430, In. 4-8; pg. 1461, In. 11.
49.5. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[c]are takers
kill little babies all the time." Id, pg. 1460, In. 5-6.
49 .6. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[p]arents kill
babies all the time." Id, ln. 6-7.
49. 7. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "there are
literally thousands of [similar] incidents in any given span of time[.]" Id., In. 810.
49.8. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that he believed
that "our local paper has probably shown ... probably six more of these cases
since - since this one started." Id, ln. 11-14.
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head injuries. Id., pg. 1462, In. 18-19.
49.10. The prosecutor argued that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking
Kyler's body.apart·pieee-ey pieGe[.-1" Id, pg.1464, In. 24-25a--_:,
49 .11. The prosecutor implied that he had evidence not presented at trial that Mr.
Exhibit B, pg. 1430, ln. 15-21.

49.12. The prosecutor argued that "we don't want to let a murderer go free." Id,
pg. 1466, ln. 9.
49 .13. The prosecutor told the jury that he did not call

I

i

I

..

49.9. The prosecutor misstated for a second time Dr. Arden's testimony about

Grove had previously been "violent with

f

s biological father as

a witness "because my medical experts unanimously, to no exception, said he
could not have done it:" Id, pg.1477, In. 18-20. 49 .14. The prosecutor argued without supporting evidence that the
emotional breakdown of Mr. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a
different kind of "emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that
morning that resulted in these injuries[.]" Id, pg. 1458, ln. 16-18.
50. Defense counsel did not object to any of the misconduct alleged in paragraphs 47-49.
51. The failure to object was not a strategic decision on defense counsel's part.
52. Had defense objected, the objections would have been sustained.
53. In addition, the Court would have given curative instructions to the jury.
54. Further, defens~ motions would have alerted the prosecutor that his misconduct
would be challenged, which would have prevented some or all ofthe subsequent misconduct..: ~'-5 5. Had a motion for a mistrial been made based upon the totality of prosecutorial
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misconduct, the motion would have been-granted.
56. This prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless error.
57. The unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct could not have been raised on appeal.

------- -,-Statev. Perry, 15-01daho2091-2-26,-245--P-;34-961-;978 (2010).

-

---- --- -

B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
The due process clauses of Art. 1, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and the Fourteenth
Amendment ensure, at a minimum, "that criminal trials shall be fundamentally fair."

Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19,576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Further, "[i]t is the
duty of a prosecuting attorney to see that the accused has a fair and impartial trial." State v.
Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 183,258 P.2d 1147, 1153 (1953) (emphasis added) (finding that the
-prose-cutor'smisconductwarranteda new trial). In this case; as demonstrated above, the prosecutor grossly violated his duty to ensure fairness at every stage of the trial proceedings.
He exposed the jury to extra-judicial evidence. He appealed to the emotions, passions
and prejudices of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics. And he elicited inadmissible
evidence both in direct and cross-examination of witness.
Further, his closing and rebuttal arguments are replete with misconduct. "Closing
argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal
case .... [t]o enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence." State
v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
Therefore, "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the prejudices of
the jury,"- ABAStandards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Functions §-3-5;8(3d..
ed.1993 ). The prosecutor is charged with the dual task of ensuring that the government's case is
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presented "earnestly and vigorously, using every legitimate means to bring about a conviction,
but also to see that justice is done and that every criminal defendant is accorded a fair trial."

State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,449, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ct. App.1991). Therefore, it is .
improper for-a prosecutor-to appeal-to-the emotions, passion or prejudice of thej-ury through-the. ....

'•.:

use of inflammatory tactics. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588. Here, however, the
prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, misstated the evidence, used
inflammatory language in reference to defense witnesses, argued evidence not presented at trial,
and misrepresented the state's burden of proof. This was clear and repeated misconduct.
The effect of the prosecutor's misconduct requires the granting of the petition. "The
cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself
might be har.mless; but wherra:ggregated show the absence·of a fair trial in contravention of the· defendant's right to due process." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct.
App.2008). Thus, it is the cumulative effect of the misconduct engaged in here that should be
considered. Id. Considering all the misconduct, it is clear that the state cannot meet its burden of
proving its misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Chapman v.

California, supra.

TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION:

Petitioner was Denied Due Process and the Rig/it
to Jury Trial in Violation of Idaho Constitution
Art I,§§ 7 and 13 and the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution
(J.C.§ 19-4901(a)(l).

A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action.
•. _- 58-:_.Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-57.above.
59. Petitioner was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and

19 -AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

157

.--

. cl

.

.. ·-------- -·· .

~~-,

jury trial when jurors repeatedly slept during the presentation of evidence.
59 .1. Affidavits of individuals who witnessed jurors sleeping during trial
testimony are being filed in support of this Petition.

ea by,thetrial transcript which -show th~- -- -

-~"-~·'""- ---··· -59 ,2; ---The witness'-s affidavits are- confirm

Court was required to take several unplanned recesses because jurors repeatedly
fell asleep during the presentation of the evidence. Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 - pg.
922, ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg. 1351, ln. 19-25.
60. Sleeping jurors cannot independently evaluate the evidence and function as the
constitution requires.
61. This issue could not have been raised on appeal under State v. Perry, supra, because
defense coun:sel'did notobject to the sleepingjurors or make a motion for mistrial.
62. This error was not harmless.

B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
A juror's inattentiveness, by sleeping during witness testimony, may constitute
misconduct. State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686,689,214 P.3d 672,675 (Ct. App. 2009). See e.g.,

State v. Majid, 914 N.E.2d 1113, 1115 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (Numerous instances of jurors'
sleeping during murder trial, including during eyewitness testimony, violated defendant's right to
due process and constituted plain error). "[A] juror who sleeps through much of the trial
testimony cannot be expected to perform his duties.'' Id, citing United States v. Smith, 550 F .2d
277,285 (5 1h Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 434 U.S. 841 (1977); United

•- States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333,335 (3rd Cir. 1972). . -"Due process mandates that the defendant is entitled to have a jury hear and evaluate the
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evidence," id., and the jurors in this case were instructed by the Court "to decide the facts from

all the evidence in the case." Exhibit B, pg. 1399, In. 24-25 (emphasis added). The repeated
instances of sleeping by one or more jurors, especially given they were sleeping during the
,c,ritical·medical testimony ofDrs.Ross and Ar-den;cd0nie4-Mr. Grove his state.and-federal- -constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner was Denied the Effective Assistance of
Counsel on Appeal in Violation of Idaho
Constitution Art. I, § 13 and the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution (J.C.§ 19-490J(a)(J)).
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action.

63. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1- 62 above.
64. · Alternative argument: If the Court determines thaHhe prosecutorial misconduct
issue raised in the Second Cause of Action could have been raised on direct appeal, Petitioner
alleges that it was therefore deficient performance for appellate counsel to fail to raise that issue.
64.1. Had appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal, the conviction would have
been reversed by the appellate court.
65. Alternative argument: If the Court determines that the juror misconduct issue raised

in the Third Cause of Action could have been raised on direct appeal, Petitioner alleges that it
was therefore deficient performance for appellate counsel to fail to raise that issue.
65.1. Had appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal, the conviction would have
been reversed by the appellate court.
· -B. Why Relief Should be Granted.

A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the

21 - AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

159

,·I

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process
-~·~'-a,.:·Clauses-efthe Fourteenth Amendment guarantee::the-.right-to counsel on-.appeal.-Douglas.v. ,-- ...

California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance
of that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC. § 19-852.

In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance· was· deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance;
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Stricklandv. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id.

An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth in
Strickland. See e.g., Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007).
Petitioner draws the Court's attention to the fact that Mintun holds that it cannot be
ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise claims of fundamental error for the frrst
time on appeal. Id. (Petitioner disagrees and believes the Mintun bright-line rule is contrary to

Strickland and should be overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court.) Right or wrong, the rule is
based in part upon a concern that the record. on appeal might notbe "complete enough to allow
appellate examination of all the factors that must be considered on such a claim." Id. Thus, the
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Court of Appeals decided to leave such issues "for presentation in a post-conviction proceeding,
where an adequate record could be developed." Id. Moreover, "the allowance of this type of
claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is ordinarily not necessary to protect a
___ ,.c'""--···,,,

·defendant's tights because the defenclant.eanb-rmg the-same claim:.ofimpropriety-in the trial- -- ----- -- proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for failing to object to the
alleged error in the trial court." Mintun, 144 Idaho at 662, 168 P.3d at 46.
In this case, Mr. Grove has raised claims ofprosecutorial misconduct and the deprivation
of the right to jury trial, which were not objected to below. Mr. Grove does not believe appellate
counsel could have raised those issues on direct appeal under State v. Perry, supra, as was the
case with his confrontation clause claim. Thus, he can raise all those issues in this Petition, both
as direcfclaifus and as aspects of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim alleged below.
See e.g., DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603-604, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009) (deprivation

of the right to testify raised as direct constitutional violation) with Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho
469, 476, 224 P.3d 536, 543 (Ct. App. 2009) (deprivation of the right to testify raised as an
aspect of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim). If the Court disagrees and holds that
Claims Two or Three could have been raised on appeal and thus cannot be raised now, it should
then grant relief due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as the rationale behind the
Mintun rule would no longer be applicable. In either case, trial counsel's failure to make proper

objections at trial to the errors above are all incorporated into the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim alleged below.
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-FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

Petitioner was Denied the Effective Assistance of
Counsel at Trial in Violation of Idaho
Constitution Art. I, § 13 and the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution (J.C.§ 19-4901(a)(J)).

-- -_-- .. ,, ----A~ Facts-Pertaining to Cause-oJ-Ac:tion.-~-- -:·---.-- -- - - .

--- ..

66. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-65 above.
67. Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to present an adequate
analysis to support his pretrial motion to allow the admission of alternate perpetrator evidence.
67 .1. The failure to present an adequate analysis resulted in the District Court
denying admission of that evidence - evidence which was crucial to the defense
and the lack of which was prejudicial.
···68; Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to move.for a mistrial or
for the summoning of a new jury pool after a potential juror made statements in voir dire that
polluted the entire jury pool.
68.1. The potential juror stated in front of all the potential jurors that he worked

in the funeral business and he knew the police officer witnesses Greene and Petrie
well, both from their work investigating cases that came through the funeral
home, and through their work for his wife who was the city manager, and that they
are very credible. Exhibit B, pg. 155, ln. 13-14.
68.2. He also stated he had worked in the funeral business for a long time and
seen "these situations" before and did not have a lot of empathy except for the
victims. Id., pg. 155, ln.21 -pg. 156,ln;.2;
68.3. The failure to object and move for a cautionary instruction or for the
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summoning of a new jury pool prejudiced Petitioner.
69. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to challenge for cause or
peremptorily challenge Juror #5 (Loetscher) after voir dire revealed that he worked at St.
Joseph's Hospital and knewof','_j-ust,-abouteveryone on-the[state's witness list],. ,-particularly

,,=_:-

the ER doctors that was listed there." Exhibit B, pg. 144, In. 14-19.
69.1. Juror #5 became the presiding juror. Exhibit B, pg. 1471, In. 19-22.
70. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to assert Petitioner's state and
federal constitutional rights to confrontation (Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13, United States Const.
Amendments 6 and 14) and by failing to make proper evidentiary objections.
70.1. During trial, state's witnesses, i.e., Nash, Chin, Harper, Hunter and Ross,
-

repeatedly testified to the contents of the autopsy report whicn contained ·
information from Dr. Reichard.
70.2. Dr. Reichard's information was the state's only basis of proof for the nature
of head and alleged brain injuries, the only basis for testimony as to the timing of
the head and alleged brain injuries, and the only basis for the state's claim that
had suffered a tear to the corpus callosum and axonal shearing.
70.3. However, the state did not present the testimony of Dr. Reichard in
violation of the state and federal constitutional rights of confrontation.
70.4. Petitioner was prejudiced because had counsel objected on confrontation
grounds, the state would have had no testimony as to any head or alleged brain
injuries and the timing of those injuries and thus., could not have obtained a
conviction.
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70.5. In response to the defense motion for acquittal or in the alternative a
new trial, the state argued that Dr. Reichard was the one person who
actually examined the brain and therefore was a more credible witness
· than Dr>Arden,~E:,mibitB, pg., 14~6,-cln-,6-1S.----· ·
70.6. Prosecutor Spickler said in discounting Dr. Arden's testimony,
" ... [Dr. Arden] was trying to contradict the findings of an expert in New
Mexico who actually had the brain and actually took a look at the brain in toto, as
opposed to one or more slides." Exhibit B, pg. 1486, In. 8-12.
70.7. Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Chin
which referred to Dr. Reichard's report.
70.8. ·Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Hunter which referred to and relied upon Dr. Reichard's report.
· 70.9. Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Harper
which referred to and relied upon Dr. Reichard's report.
70.10. The testimony ofDrs. Chin, Hunter, Harper and Ross which
related the findings of Dr. Reichard, were inadmissible under IRE 703 as
well as the confrontation clause.
7 0 .11. Had Dr. Reichard provided testimony at trial, several major issues could
have been explored by the defense. These include the significance of the APP
staining, in which he would likely have testified consistent with his report that the
-vascular axonal injury pattern=-pn~cluded a diagnosis of traumatic axenal injury,
and, consistent with his own publication, that the PAI pattern did not indicate the
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presence of more diffuse axonal injury. Had his testimony been to the contrary,
he could have been impeached with his own report and publication.

70 .12. In addition, defense counsel could have exposed the inconsistencies
betweenDr. Reiehard's opim0ns-and-those expressed by both Dr. Ross and Dr..,_"c- -- .·.
Harper.

70.13. Dr. Reichard also could have been confronted with the photographic
evidence that Dr. Arden produced regarding the brain laceration being an artifact,
which would have countered the only positive evidence of a primary brain injury.

70.14. Dr Reichard could also have been confronted with the evidence Dr. Arden
produced concerning the age of the subdural hemorrhage, which contradicted his

71. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to hearsay testimony
from Lisa Nash regarding the autopsy report contents.

71.1. At trial, Lisa Nash testified that she was told that

had blood in his

brain that could not be removed. She did not identify who told her this and the
testimony was admitted without limitation including for the truth of the matter
asserted. Exhibit B, p. 755, ln. 16-25.

71.2. Defense counsel did not object on hearsay grounds. Had counsel objected,
the objection would have been granted.

71.3. The failure to object prejudiced Petitioner because, as noted above, had
. co.unsel asserted Petitioner's constitutional confrontation rights, the state would
have had no proof of cause of death other than Ms. Nash's hearsay testimony.
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Without that testimony, Petitioner would not have been convicted.
72. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the testimony of Steve
Stocking, a paramedic, that Petitioner was too calm in his opinion when the paramedics arrived
in response todhe -9-1 l call. Exhibit B,'-pg_ -83-8, ln,--22, 72.1. Mr. Stocking was not a psychologist or psychiatrist and had no
qualifications as an expert on the appropriate reactions in a crisis.
72.2. His opinion regarding Petitioner was not relevant (IRE 401 and 402) and
did not fall within the scope of admissible opinion testimony by a lay witness
(IRE 701) because it involved specialized knowledge of the appropriate reaction
of people in crisis.
73. Defense counsel's performance was deficient-because he failed to object to Dr.
Chin's testimony that there was "no way we would have missed any of the[] injuries" described
in the autopsy report. Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 5-6.
73.1. Defense counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Chin on this claim even
though, according to Dr. Ross, some of the injuries in autopsy were old enough
that they did exist when he saw

specifically, Dr. Ross testified that the

injury to the left thigh and the injuries on the back were older. Exhibit B, pg. 978,
In. 23 - pg. 979, ln.17; pg. 987, ln. 9-20.
74. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Chin's testimony that what he "read in this autopsy report is the most brutal case" he had ever
seen. Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 6-'.J. --74. l. This testimony was not relevant under IRE 401 and 402.
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74.2. This evidence was unfairly prejudicial under IRE 403.
75. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's testimony that subarachonoid hemorrhage has to have immediate symptoms. Exhibit B,
pg.-874~~Jn. 24. - pg. 875, ln. 22 .. -
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75.1. There was insufficient foundation for that testimony as Dr. Hunter admitted
that he is not a pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 874, ln. 24-25.
76. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's testimony that

was either "ejected from an automobile" or "was beaten very

severely." Exhibit B, pg. 871, In. 12-14.
76.1. There was insufficient foundation for Dr. Hunter to give this opinion.
77: Defense-counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's testimony that a short fall "is rarely, rarely likely to produce any kind of significant head
injury or bleeding" and then failed to impeach that testimony. Exhibit B, pg. 888, In. 16-20.
77 .1. This evidence was inadmissible because there was no foundation for
his opinion.
77.2. Dr. Hunter's opinion could have been impeached with medical research
published in peer-reviewed medical journals.
77.3. That an affidavit with medical journal articles documenting the possibility
of serious head injury from short falls will be filed in support of this Petition.
78. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's opinion, stated without any qualification as an expert, that

had sure signs of

shaken baby syndrome. Exhibit B, pg. 869, ln. 4-16.
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79. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Ross's testimony that, although he did not see certain hemorrhages in the psoas and
retroperitoneal areas, he was told about them by the transplant surgeon. Exhibit B, pg. 93 8, ln.
20-23.
·.
·-· --···
..:._

79 .1. That testimony is inadmissible hearsay and violates the confrontation
clause.

80. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the
foundation for Dr. Ross's testimony regarding the head and alleged brain injuries because Dr.
Ross also testified that he had never viewed any of the slides or recuts himself. Exhibit B, pg.
959, In. 10-15.

81. Defense counsel's performance was. deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Ross's testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear in the corpus callosum shows there
was "a very significant force" applied, something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of
stories or so," or a "motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945,
ln. 5-12.
81.1. That testimony violates the confrontation clause.
81.2. That testimony is not admissible under IRE 703.
81.3. There was no foundation for Dr. Ross's opinion about the amount of force.
82. Counsel rendered deficient performance in regard to the testimony of Dr. Deborah
Harper.
.. 8~.l: Gounsel failed to object or move to strike when Dr. Haiyer vouched for th~ .
abilities of state's witness Dr. Ross. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, In. 12-14. ("Dr. Ross,
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I'm sorry to say, is no longer our - in our Medical Examiner's Office, because he
is a super clinician.")
82.2. Counsel failed to object to irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony
regarding the estimcited forc_e needed to inflict the injuries, comparing it to the
force of being hit by a car, or being dragged behind a horse, or having a horse step
on Kyler's abdomen, or being hit by a baseball bat, even though there was no
foundation showing she could accurately make such estimates of force. Exhibit
B, pg. 1034, In. 7-21.
83. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the admission of
photographs taken a month after Kyler's death, which included many sympathy cards sent to the
familY·-83.1. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash
trailer approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg.
996, In. 19 - pg. 997, In. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6).
83 .2. The photos were inflammatory because they included a large display qf
sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash.
84.3. If counsel had objected, the photographs would have been excluded under

IRE 403 as the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value.
84. Counsel rendered deficient performance in not moving to exclude any reference by
any witness to the brain autopsy because no valid chain of custody for the brain was presented.
.. 84J. The state. failed to present any evidence that the brain examined at the
pathology laboratory in New Mexico was Kyler's brain.
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85. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move to strike the
prosecutor's comments after his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination
was sustained. Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 12-13.
85.1. In his cross-:exarpination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor characterized Mr.
Grove's sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is "the story you need the
jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make
sense." Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11.
85.2. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, but counsel did not ask that the
comments be stricken or that the jury be instructed to disregard the comments. Id.
86. Defense counsel's performance was deficient when he failed to object to the
prosecutor asking Mr. Grove when he had been prescribed Ativan and_ whether the prescription
"was a result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12.
86.1. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical
situation has arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today" and did
not mention Mr. Grove or the nature of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg.
1067, ln. 3-5.
87. Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor
attempting to impeach Dr. Arden with alleged "gross mismanagement" when he was the Medical
Examiner in the District of Columbia. Exhibit B, pg. 1382, ln. 6 - pg. 1388, ln. 12.
87 .1. These allegations of administrative errors and allegations of sexual
harassment were irrelevant under IRE 401 and 402 because they did not
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impeach Dr. Arden's medical testimony.
87.2. The allegations' unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value
and were inadmissible under IRE 403.
87 .3. The allegations were not admissible under IRE 404, nor did the state
give any notice of its intent to use the evidence to the extent it claims the
evidence was admissible under IRE 404(b).
88. Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to attempt to rehabilitate Dr.
Arden on re-direct examination.
89. It was deficient performance for defense counsel to fail to introduce photographs of
taken at St. Joseph's Hospital soon after he arrived in an ambulance.
89. l. The photographs show no redness or bruising andtherefore _a.reinconsistent
with the state's theory that Mr. Grove had just brutally beaten
89.2. The photographs will be filed with the Court under separate cover.
90. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial
after many jurors fell asleep during the testimony. See e.g., Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 - pg. 922,
ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg. 1351, ln. 19-25.
91. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he introduced evidence in the
direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son
Alex. Exhibit B, pg. 1074, ln. 1-24.
91.1. This evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine
as it is both irrelevant and inadmissible. other acts evidence.
92. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the
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prosecutor questioning Mr. Grove about the fact he was behind on child support. Exhibit B, pg.
1115, ln. 21-24
92.1. This evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine as it is
both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence.
93. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to question
paramedic David Chenalt about Lisa Nash's reaction to Kyler's injury.
93.1. Mr. Chenalt could have testified that Ms. Nash's behavior was "the most
bizarre reaction we've ever seen for especially a kid call." See Grand Jury Tr. p.
214, ln. 5 - pg. 217, ln. 15.
93 .2. The fact that defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to elicit evidence from
a paramedic that Mr. Grove's affect was '~oo calm," whilefailing to bring ouL
evidence from a paramedic that Lisa Nash's affect was "the most bizarre reaction
we've ever seen" demonstrates the absence of a strategy regarding this type of
evidence.
93.3. The Grand Jury Transcript is not attached hereto as it is a confidential
document.
93.4. Mr. Grove asks the Court to take judicial notice of the Grand Jury
Transcript pursuant to IRE 201(d).
94. Defense counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient because he
failed to argue that the state had failed to carry its burden of proof because Dr. Reichard did not
testify and the other doctors had no foundation for their opinions ofwhentheinjury happened,.
95. Defense counsel's performance during the state's closing and rebuttal arguments was
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deficient because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the prosecutor.
96. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial
after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments.
97. Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in the presentation of the ex12ert ______ _
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden.
97.1 Dr. Arden requested that defense counsel provide him with all
existing microscopic slides for examination prior to trial.
97.l(a) Defense counsel did not comply with that
request and did not provide any special stain slides,
including iron stains, to Dr. Arden for review.
97.l{b)Those slides existed and have beenprovided
to Dr. Arden for review in connection with this
post-conviction petition.
97.l(c) Had defense counsel provided the iron stain
slides to Dr. Arden prior to trial, Dr. Arden could
have testified to his observations of the slides which
would have both confirmed and extended his
testimony on the ages of the injuries sustained by

97. l(d) Upon his review of the iron stains slides, in
preparation for this post-conviction action, Dr._
Arden was able to confirm some of the findings
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recorded by Dr. Ross.
97. l(e) Dr. Arden was also able to make some
additional observations that support and extend his
(Pr.Arden's) opini_on on fu.~ ages of the injuries.

_...

97.l(f) Some of the iron-staining is co-existent with
the :fresher-appearing hemorrhage; this in
conjunction with the inflammatory response,
indicates that the hemorrhage is in the early stages
of response.
97 .1 (g) This observation is consistent with and
strengthens the _opinion offered by Dr. Ardenthat
the injuries sustained by

had occurred several

days to five days prior to death.
97 .1 (h) Dr. Ross testified that the fresher
hemorrhage was coincidentally located with the
positive iron staining, thus representing older and
newer injuries in the same locations.
97.l(i) Dr. Arden disagrees with this interpretation,
which relies on coincidence and fails to synthesize
the totality of the findings into a unified diagnosis.
97.lG) Based upon Dr. Arden's post-trial_
examination of the iron stains, he has found positive
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iron staining trapped within connective tissue (i.e.,
separate from the visible hemorrhage), which
represents the remnants of much older healed
bleeding.
97.l(k) Had Dr. Arden been allowed to review the
iron stains prior to trial, he could have testified that
the iron stain autopsy slides contain evidence not
only of significant aging of the more recent injuries
such that they were not particularly consistent with
having been incurred just prior to clinical
presentation, {i.e., whenStace;y Grove was with
but also of much older bleeding, reflective of
older injuries.
97 .1 (I) Had Dr. Arden been allowed to review the

iron stains prior to trial, he could have testified that
had been injured at some much earlier time or
times, unrelated to when he was with Stacey Grove.
98. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to provide slides
from the brain examination to Dr. Arden for the doctor's examination prior to trial.
98.1. Dr. Arden did not have the opportunity to examine APP
stained slides from the neuropathology examination prior to trial.
98.2. He has not been able to review the slides since the trial.

37 -AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

175

98.3. Performing his own independent examination of the APP stained
slides prior to trial would have afforded him the opportunity to assess all
of the evidence related to penumbral axonal injury and potentially would
have allowed him to have rebutted Dr. Ross's opinion that there was a
laceration of the brain structure, but absent being provided those slides he
could not do so.
98.4. Petitioner will seek discovery of these slides.
99. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to point out the
differences between Dr. Reichert's report and the state witnesses' conclusions drawn from that
report.
99. L The PAiidentified by Dr. Reichard {assumingfm discussion that it was _
present) is a localized phenomenon and, by his own publication, does not imply
that more diffuse or widespread axonal injury is present.
99 .2. Dr. Reichard did not diagnose diffuse traumatic axonal injury in the brain of
Martin while Dr. Ross opined at trial that the child did have traumatic
axonal injury.
99.3. Counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Ross on this disagreement with Dr.
Reichard, the neuropathologist who examined the brain, or get Dr. Ross to admit
that he had not personally examined the slides from the brain, either the routine or
APP stains.
99.4. Counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Harper, the pediatrician, when she
testified that the child had an intrinsic brain injury (suggestive of axonal injury),
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an opinion contrary to the clinical CT scan and to the neuronathology
examination.
100. The cumulative effect of defense counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr.
Grove.

B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court should not look to
each example of deficient performance and determine whether it was prejudicial. Instead, the
Court should consider all the deficient performance and then determine whether the cumulative
effect was prejudicial. See, Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520,527,927 P.2d 910, 917 (Ct. App.
1996) and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App.1994). As the Ninth
Circuit has explained, "Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to see whether
their cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. They are, in
other words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel." Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003).
As set forth above, there is a reasonable probability of a different result had defense
counsel's performance not been deficient. Crucial state's evidence would have been excluded,
exculpatory defense evidence would have been presented, and egregious prosecutorial
misconduct would have been prevented or resulted in a mistrial, or a mistrial would have been
granted due to juror misconduct. Accordingly, this Court should grant the Petition.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner Requests the Following Relief:
A. That the judgment be vacated and anew trial be granted; and/or

B. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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Respectfully submitted this
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day of December, 2012.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT L P
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Dennis Ben}amin
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Deborah Whipple

Attorneys for Stacey Grove

VERIFICATION OF PETITION
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Respectfully submitted this _ _ day of December, 201-2.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Dennis Benjamin

Deborah Whipple

Attorneys for Stacey Grove

VERIFICATION OF PETITION
I, Stacey Grove, being duly sworn under oath, state:
I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and that the
matters and allegations set forth are tme and co1Tect to the best of my knowledge and belief.

J

Not
ublic for the St e ofldaho
Residing at: .....J..e=',l"-''1"_.._t~_·-'--'-~....,_-My commission expires:
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ORIGINAL
DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Prosecuting Attorney
NANCE CECCARELLI
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County, Idaho
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 799-3073
ISBN 7787

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY L. GROVE,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)

CASE NO. CV2012-0001798

)
)
)

ANSWER and AMENDED MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
AND DISMISSAL and TO SET FOR

)
)

HEARING

)
)
)

COMES _NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney of record,
NANCE CECCARELLI, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Nez Perce County, Idaho, and reiterates
its motion to this Court for Summary Disposition and Dismissal of Petitioner's Application for_
Post-Conviction Relief and Petitioner's AMENDED Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as it
presents no genuine issues of material fact, raises issues decided in other appeals or more
properly should have been raised elsewhere, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, and, the Respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Idaho Code §
19-4906(c).
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The Respondent, State of Idaho, further answers the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as follows:
1.

Respondent denies all allegations not specifically admitted or otherwise answered.

2.

Respondent admits allegations contained in paragraphs 1-15.

A. Petitioner's First Cause of Action:

3.

Respondent denies the allegations in paragraphs 16 and 16.1.

4.

Respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs 17 through 23.

5.

Respondent denies allegations paragraph 24 (and sub-paragraphs 24.1-24.24)
except Respondent admits that Dr. Ross testified as an expert witness, pursuant to
IRE 702 & 703.

6.

Respondent aqmits the allegations in paragraphs 25-31.

7.

Respondent denies the conclusory allegation in paragraph 32.

8.

Respondent denies the allegation made in paragraph 33 except Respondent admits
that Dr. Ross testified as an expert witness, pursuant to IRE 702 & 703.

9.

Respondent admits the allegation in paragraph 34.

10.

Respondent denies the conclusory allegation in paragraph 35.

11.

Respondent denies the conclusory allegation made in paragraph 36 (and sub
paragraph 36.1) except Respondent admits that Dr. Chinn testified as an expert
witness, pursuant to IRE 702 & 703.

12.

Respondent denies the conclusory allegation made in paragraph 37 (and sub
paragraphs 37.1 through 37.3) except Respondent admits that Dr. Hunter testified
as an expert witness, pursuant to IRE 702 & 703.
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13.
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Respondent denies the conclusory allegation made in paragraph 38 (and sub
paragraphs 38.1 through 38.5) except Respondent admits that Dr. Harper testified
as an expert witness, pursuant to IRE 703.

14. _

Respondent admits the.allegation i1LparagraphJ9.

15.

Respondent denies the allegation in paragraph 40.

16.

Respondent denies the allegation in paragraph 41.

17.

Respondent denies the allegation in paragraph 42, except the Respondent admits
that the Court of Appeals denied appellate review of Mr. Grove's case as a whole.

A. Why the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted with respect to
Petitioner's First Cause ofAC!ti9n.
While there is no doubt that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is the
"bedrock procedural guarantee" (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)) applicable in all
criminal prosecution and the Idaho Constitution provides a similar guarantee, as Petitioner points
out; in the case at hand, the testimony of expert witnesses for the State (pursuant to IRE 702 &
703) was in-person and available at trial for defense counsel to object to the opinions or the basis
of the expert's opinions and inferences. The Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E) provide that an
expert witness is one "who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience training, or
education" and

"may testify in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if: (a) the expert's

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." I.R.E. 702. Furthermore, an expert
---.ANSWERand--- --------- --- ---------
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may base his or her opinion testimony on "facts or data in the particular case" that "may be
perceived by or made known to" the expert. I.R.E 703 (emphasis added)

Unlike the Crawford analysis of three formulations of "core" testimonial statements, the
State's medical witnesses offered experLopinions_based_on an analytical report of examination.
Petitioner's witness at trial, Dr. Arden, provided an opposing opinion presumably based on
similar reports, analyses, or perhaps his own examinations.
Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses against him was violated when
State's medical witnesses testified at trial about neuropathology analyses and examination
results they did not personally perform; and, the neuropathologist, Dr. Reichard, who
performed analyses and examination, was not a witness at trial. However, the State's witnesses
opined based on facts and data of which they were made aware through Dr. Reichard's report,
as allowable under I.R.E. 702 and 703.
Petitioner's claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he did not have
an opportunity to confront Dr. Reichard is irrelevant and improper in that Dr. Reichard, through
written analysis in the form of a report of examination, merely provided facts and data that
formed the basis of expert opinions.

Petitioner had sufficient opportunity to object to any

improper testimony, had ample opportunity to cross-examine all witness offered by the State,
and presented similar medical expert testimony that served to support Petitioner's defense theory
of the case.
Petitioner's First Cause of Action should be summarily dismissed.

ANSWERand
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B. Petitioner's Second Cause of Action.

Respondent re-stat~s all responses to allegations in paragraphs 1-42 in the Petition

18.

for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
. ..19_.

Respondent denies_ the c_onclusory..allegations in paragraphs 44 through 49.

20.

Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegation in paragraph 50.

21.

Respondent denies the conclusory allegation in paragraph 51.

22.

Respondent denies the conclusory allegations in paragraphs 52 through 57.

B. Why the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted with respect to
Petitioner's Second Cause of Action.
Petitioner asserts thc!-:t the prosecutor committ~ !D.isconduct
•
•

•
•

mmultipl~ ways:

first, he projected family photos of the victim prior to the Court going on record,
thus exposing the jury to extra-judicial evidence;
second, he appealed to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury through
the use of inflammatory tactics by eliciting testimony of the victim's sister;
third, he elicited inadmissible evidence during cross-examination of Petitioner and
Dr. Arden; and,
finally, comments during his closing and rebuttal arguments constitute conduct
sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error.

It is generally held that "a conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct
only when conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error." State v. Porter, 130
Idaho 772, 785 (1997). "Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error when
it is calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the
defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors
outside the evidence." Id (citing, State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 (1994)).
The allegations presented by the Petitioner attempt to create a cumulative effect of
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misconduct from voir dire through verdict by the prosecutor without providing any evidence of
:fundamental unfairness. In addition, nothing articulated was so egregious or inflammatory that
any consequential prejudice could not have been remedied during the trial or through curative
instructions to thejury if.Petitioner_an.dhis_defens.ecounseldeemed those incidents (as cited _______ ,, . _____ _
above) material at the time. State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 9 (Ct.App.1995).
Petitioner's trial counsel had sufficient opportunity to bring to the Court's attention any
bad acts or misconduct by the prosecutor. Petitioner's trial counsel had sufficient opportunity
to object to any improper testimony.

Petitioner's trial counsel had sufficient opportunity to

move for a mistrial. Petitioner's trial counsel had sufficient opportunity to request curative
instructions.
The petition does not provide apreponderap.ce of evidence of prosecutorial misc011duct,
but rather an opinion and series of suppositions made as if prosecutorial misconduct were
already determined to have occurred. A petition for post conviction relief must be supported
by affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations. LC. § 19-4903. Petitions
that are conclusory or unverified may be summarily dismissed. In this instance, Petitioner
makes conclusory allegations as to the prosecutor's conduct and fails to include any supporting
evidence that the prosecutor's conduct was sufficiently egregious as to result in :fundamental
error. In addition, the Petition further makes allegations of expected results if the trial court
had heard objections from defense counsel or if the appellate court(s) reviewed.
Petitioner's claims ofprosecutorial misconduct should be summarily dismissed.
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C. Petitioner's Third Cause of Action.
23.

Respondent re-states all responses to allegations in paragraphs 1-57 in the Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

24_ _. Respondent denies the allegations and. conclusions. made in_paragraph 59 and. sub:: _.

paragraph 59.2, except Respondent admits the allegation in sub-paragraph 59.1.
25.

Respondent has insufficient information with which to admit or deny the
allegations of paragraph 60.

26.

Respondent admits the allegation in paragraph 61.

27.

Respondent denies the allegation in paragraph 62.

C. )Vhy _the State's Motion for S11mmary Dismissal should _be granted witb :respect t()
Petitioner's Third Cause of Action.
Petitioner asserts that jurors engaged in misconduct when they allegedly slept during
the presentation of evidence at various points throughout the trial. A similar issue was
presented in Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 (Ct.App.2006).
Murphy did not identify which day of the five-day jury trial the juror allegedly slept,
describe the length of time the juror allegedly slept, or explain what testimony or
evidence the juror allegedly slept through. In the absence of such evidence, there was
no showing of deficient performance or prejudice. Therefore, it was proper for the court
to dismiss this claim.

Id. at 150.
Petitioner faces similar circumstances in this case. Although Petitioner presents
affidavits that identify days in which jurors allegedly slept, Petitioner has not presented
affidavits, records, or evidence indicating the length of time the jurors allegedly slept nor has
Petitioner explained what testimony or evidence the jurors allegedly slept through.
ANSWERand
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Additionally, one of Petitioner's affidavits cannot clearly name the juror that was allegedly
sleeping. Lastly, five of the six affidavits in support of Petitioner's petition generally allege
that jurors were sleeping during "various times during the proceedings" and do not indicate
specifically. which day these jurors.allegedly slept or what testimony was allegedly slept
through. While there is some indication in some of the affidavits that reference which
testimony jurors allegedly slept through, the allegation does not indicate which jurors were
allegedly sleeping through the referenced testimony. Further, all of these individuals now
moved to provide affidavits in support of the Petitioner had sufficient opportunity to bring this
to the attention of Petitioner and trial counsel at a time wherein the issue could have been
raised to the attention of the Court. Alternatively, this is an issue more properly brought to the
attentioµ of the appellat~ collfts.
The affidavits are simply non-specific conclusions by audience members watching the
trial now offered in support of Petitioner's allegations of juror misconduct without any
verification. Thus, there is not a preponderance of evidence showing of juror misconduct.
Petitioner's allegations of juror misconduct should be summarily dismissed.

D. Petitioner's Fourth Cause of Action.
28.

Respondent re-states all responses to allegations in paragraphs 1-63 in the
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief.
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. 29.

Respondent has insufficient information upon which to admit· or deny -the
allegation in paragraph 64, except Respondent denies the allegation of deficient
performance of appellate counsel and the conclusory allegation in sub-paragraph
64.1.

30.

Respondent has insufficient information upon which to admit or deny the
allegation in paragraph 65, except Respondent denies the allegation of deficient
performance of appellate counsel and the conclusory allegation in sub-paragraph
65.1.

D. Why the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted with respect to
Petitioner's Fourth Cause of Action.
Petitioner asserts in the alternative that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise on appeal either the alleged issue of prosecutorial misconduct or the alleged issue of juror ·
misconduct. In addition, Petitioner asserts a conclusory result based solely on appellate
counsel raising either issue on appeal.
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate
both that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was thereby prejudiced in the
defense of the criminal charge." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145 (Ct.App.2006);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In addition, to show the attorney's
performance was deficient, "a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's
performance was adequate by demonstrating ''that counsel's representation did not meet
objective standards of competence." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,648 (Ct.App.1994).
Furthermore, if counsel's performance is proven to be deficient, defendant must show that
-ANSWER and-- ·
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"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result.of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694.
Nothing in Petitioner's petition supports an argument that the appellate counsel
representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. The particular attorneys
who represented Petitioner are respected members in good standing of the Idaho State Bar and
experienced in appellate work.
Petitioner's argument that Mintun (holding that it cannot be ineffective assistance for

appellate counsel to fail to raise claims offundamental error for the first time on appeal) is
contrary to Strickland and should be overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court is dispositive.
Petitioner is arguing for a rule that does not exist. Simply believing that the Mintun decision
should be oyerruled because it is contrary to Strickland is not suffic;ient to establish a claim for
relief.
Petitioner's claim of ineffective appellate counsel should be summarily dismfased.

E. Petitioner's Fifth Cause of Action.
31.

Respondent re-states all responses to allegations in paragraphs 1-66 in the Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

32.

Respondent denies the allegations in paragraphs 67 through 69, except
Respondent admits the allegation in sub-paragraph 69.1

33.

Respondent denies the allegations in paragraphs 70 through I 00, excepting certain
portions of sub-paragraphs in which Respondent has insufficient information
upon which to admit or deny allegations or conclusions contained therein.
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E. Why the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted with respect to
Petitioner's Fifth Cause of Action.
Petitioner offers a laundry list of claims that trial counsel was ineffective. However,
Petitioner fails to support this laundry list of claims with affidavits, records, or other evidence.
Conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by fact, are insufficient to entitle the Petitioner to an
evidentiary hearing. LC. § 19-4903. In this instance, Petitioner offers no facts to support his
bare and conclusory allegations. Rather, Petitioner offers suppositions of inaction as opposed
to documented ineptness by trial counsel. Petitioner asserts errors that may just as easily be
defined as trial tactics. Petitioner further indicates that the Court should string together this list
of errors and determine a prejudicial effect.
That trial counsel is anexperienced crirnin.al defense attorney and litigato,r in good
standing seems to bear no weight in Petitioner's 20-20 hindsight review. Also, not mentioned
is the fact the Petitioner was competent to stand trial, fully able and capable to assist trial
counsel in his own defense, and presumably participated fully in the strategies and decisionmaking throughout the course of the trial. As is customary in criminal cases in general and in
this case specifically, trial counsel and defendant prepared and presented to the jury a theory of
their defense, offered evidence and witnesses to support that theory. Together, the trial counsel
and client made decisions, strategic and tactical, throughout the conduct of the case. Th.ere is
nothing offered in the Petition or Amended Petition that demonstrate by a preponderance of
evidence, that Petitioner, by and through his trial counsel, was unable to present his entire case
and defense to the jury; or, th.at Petitioner, by and through his trial counsel, was prejudiced by
performance that was deficient.
Furthermore, Petitioner fails to meet the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington
··ANSWERand
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for purposes of determining whether counsel was ineffective. A court will "not second-guess
strategic and tactical decisions and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction
relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of
. the relevant law ... " State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561(2008); Prattv. State, 134 Idaho 581,
584 (2000). In addition, "[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within
the wide range of professional assistance." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).
Petitioner has not shown that any of trial counsel's strategic decisions resulted from
inadequate preparation or ignorance of the relevant law. Therefore, Petitioner's claims of
ineffective trial counsel cannot be the basis for his relief and should be summarily dismissed.

F. Conclusion.
-

-·

The Petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
allegations upon which his request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; St~art v.

State, 118 Idaho 865,869 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271 (Ct.App.2002).
Petitioner
Idaho Code § 19-4906 permits summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction
relief upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. "Summary dismissal is
permissible when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if
resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. If such a
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted." State v. Payne, 146
Idaho 548, 561 (2008); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271 (Ct.App.2002). Petitions that are
unverified and conclusory may be dismissed by motion for summary disposition. LC.§ 294906. Conclusory or unverified allegations are "insufficient to entitle petitioner to an
ANSWERand
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evidentiary hearing." King v. State, 114 .Idaho 442, 446 (Ct.App.1988).
The State respectfully requests that this Court grant the State's Motion for Summary
Dismissal because the Petition and the Amended Petition fail to:
•
•
•
•

meet the statutory requirements to properly support claims with evidence; and,
assert claims not valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act; and,
raise issues that could and more properly should have been decided on direct appeal
but were not raised; and,
demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact; and. therefore,
no relief may be granted under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

Alternatively, Respondent requests that this matter be set for hearing at a time
convenient for the Court.
DATED this 4th day of February 2013.

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR
HEARING was
_Jl)

~ d delivered, o .

~VVv~-?-:~~,cf

(2) _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or
(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or
(4) _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United
States Mail.
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Dennis Benjamin
Deborah Whipple
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

!

DATED this (f;

J/2_

day of February, 2013.

ANSWERand
AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSTION AND DISMISSAL
and TO SET FOR HEARING
14

194

eb 07 2~13 2:30PM Nevin Benjamin,McKay~~~rt 208 345 8274

page 2
,,:·?'-.

Fl LED

Dennis B~njamin
ISBA#4199
Deborah Whipple
ISBA #4355
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.0. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

·~PM··M__

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF
TIIB STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE>

Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798
PETITIONER'S RENEWED
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSIDON

Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks the Court to grant summary disposition in his favor and

grant the relief requested in his Petition. There is good cause to grant the motion because even
.considering the Respondent's Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition. and
Dismissal filed February 6, 2013, and construing the Amended Petition and Answer most
favorably to the Respondent, Petitioner has established that he is entitled to relief as a matter of
law.
This Motion is made pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c). It is supported by the affidavits
already filed herein as well as the allegations and arguments made in the Amended Petition.. See
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Amended Verified Petition, p. 10-12 (argumentreganling confrontation clause claim); p. 18~19
(argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct claim); p. 20-21 ( argument regarding juror
misconduct claim); p. 21-23 (argument regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claim); and p. 39 (argwnent regarding the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim).
Petitioner will :further support this Renewed Motion with a Memorandum of Law to be
filed pursuant to the schedule to be established by this Court at the status conference set for
February 12, 2013.
Respectfully submitted this ~day of February, 2013.

iJdud !dluj; !

Deborah Whipple

Attorneys for Stacey Grove
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on February~ 2013, I caused a true and corr~ct copy of the foregoing
document to be:

X mailed
hand delivered

~ emailed to nancececcarelli@co.nezperce.id.u.s
to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney

P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

~\lf;;.
Dennis Benjamin
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV12-01798
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and Petitioner's
Brief in Support of Petitioner's Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition due on or
before March 15, 2013;
2) State's Reply Brief in Support ofits Motion for Summary Disposition and State's
Response to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition due on or before March
29, 2013;

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

1
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3) Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petitioner's Renewed Motion for Summary
Disposition due on or before April 12, 2013;
4) Oral argument shall take place before the above-entitled Court in the Courtroom
of the Nez Perce County Courthouse on April 30, 2013, commencing at 1:30 p.m~
DATED this

12f'day of February, 2013.

G-e(ib

r?

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENT Was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, 1daho, this~ of
February,2013,on:
Dennis Benjamin
Debra Whipple
PO Box2772
Boise ID 83701
Nance Ceccarelli P O Box 1267

~"1 ~
- - - -J- ·

Lewiston ID 83501
PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK
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Deborah Whipple
ISBA#4355
Dennis Benjamin
ISBA#4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
Attorneys for Petitioner
ICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION

Petitioner, Stacey Grove, submits the following opposition to the state's motion to grant
summary disposition and in support of his motion for summary disposition.

I. INTRODUCTION

In proceedings under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, the applicant has the
burden of eventually proving the allegations which entitle him to relief by a preponderance of the
evidence. However, until the allegations contained in a verified application for post-conviction
relief are controverted by the state, they must be deemed to be true for the purpose of
determining if an evidentiary hearing is to be held. A motion to dismiss, unsupported by
1•
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affidavits, depositions or other materials does not controvert the allegations in the petition.

Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Thus, at this point, the state's
motion for summary disposition, which is unsupported by any evidentiary material, has not
controverted any of the allegations in-the Amended Petition.- Id.Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when
they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or do not justify relief as a
matter oflaw. This Court may summarily grant an application for post-conviction relief only
when it appears from the pleadings and the record that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw, but may not grant a motion to
dismiss a petition when, reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner, the
allegations would entitle the petitioner to relief. The standard to be applied to a trial court's
determination that no material issue of fact exists is the same type of determination as in a
summary judgment proceeding. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321,900 P.2d 795, 797
(1995), citing Kraftv. State, 100 Idaho 671,674,603 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1979).

In this case, the state has failed to meet its burden of showing that Mr. Grove would not
be entitled to relief if his allegations are true. Thus, summary disposition in its favor should not
be granted. At the same time, it has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the
truth of Mr. Grove's allegations. Consequently, summary disposition in his favor should be
granted.

2•

PETITIONER'S
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY
...
DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION

201

__ ·:_J

:_ __ _

I

--·

--.

IT.ARGUMENT

A. Mr. Grove's Right to Confront Witnesses Against Him was Violated
1. Legal background
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause-provides that, "In all crin?-inal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with witnesses against him."
The Supreme Court has held "that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and
state prosecutions." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution similarly guarantees a criminal defendant the right to "appear and defend in person."
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004),
significantly altered Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis prior to the trial in this
case; The Crawford Court held that testimonial statements of witnesses absentfrom trial are
admissible only where the declarant is unavailable and where defendant had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S. at 59. As to the definition of ''testimonial," the Court
first looked to an early dictionary definition of "testimony," i.e., "A solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." 541 U.S. at 51, quoting
l·N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). In addition, the Court
listed three "core" testimonial statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;".

3•
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and (3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford,
541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). This, however, is not an exclusive list of
''testimonial" evidence. Id.

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), followed Crawford. There, the United States
Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from
other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to
the Confrontation Clause." Therefore, the threshold question in Confrontation Clause analysis is
whether the statement is testimonial. If it is, the evidence may be admitted only if the witness is
unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the wi1ness.

Davis, 547 U.S. at 821.
The Idaho Supreme Court first applied the new confrontation clause analysis in State v.

Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007), the year prior to the trial in Mr. Grove's case. It
synthesized Crawford and Davis and stated that a statement is testimonial ''when the
circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, unless made in the course of
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." 145 Idaho at 144,
176 P.3d at 916. The Hooper Court found that a forensic interview of a child witness was
testimonial. "[S]ince the purpose of a forensic interview is to collect information to be used in a
- criminal-Prosecution, andth:ereis a clear connection between the police and the STAR Center,
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the interview was the functional equivalent of a police interrogation. Thus, it is testimonial under

Crawford and Davis, and inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness." 145 Idaho at 142-143, 176 P.3d at 914-15.
--The confrontation-Clause error is.subjected to a heightened harmless error test As the

Hooper Court wrote, "Whether a conviction for a criminal offense should stand when a state has
failed to accord a constitutionally guaranteed right is a federal question. Before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The test for harmless error is whether a reviewing court can
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the
admission of the challenged evidence." 145 Idaho at 146, 176 P.3d at 918, citing Chapman v.

-- State of California, 386 U.S.18, 24 (1967).
2. Why relief should be granted to Mr. Grove

Mr. Grove's right to confront Dr. Reichard was violated at trial. This Court should grant
summary disposition in his favor and order a new trial because there. is not a genuine issue of
material fact and the facts established prove the cause of action.

a. The facts alleged by Mr. Grove have not been controverted by the state
As to the factual background, the state has admitted many of the factual allegations
establishing the cause of action in the Amended Petition. See Answer (admitting ,r,r 1-15, 17-23,
25-31, and 34). In addition, the state has admitted in relevant part ,r,r 36-38. Id. The allegations
contained in ,r,r 24 (including subparts 1-24), 32-33, 36.1, 37.1, 37.2, and 38.1-38.5, while denied

- by the state, are all--eonclusively pr-oven as true by the transcript of the ·criminal trial, of whichthe~'-· - ____ _
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Court has taken judicial notice. Each of the allegations denied by the state listed above, contain a
citation to the portion of the trial transcript which establishes the claim. Thus, the mere fact that
the state has denied a factual allegation which is conclusively proven by the trial transcript does
-,

-

,~_ 0

:aot-raise a genuine iss:ue of material-fact, -esp€cially as the state has not made _a claim-that the _

- ~,.._.---- .-- -~-- -

transcript does not accurately represent the trial proceedings. See Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho
834, 838, 172 P .3d 1109, 1113 (2007) ("Allegations contained in the application are insufficient
for the granting of relief when ... they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings[.]"), quoting Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,523, 164 P.3d 798,803 (2007); see

also McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,570,225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). 1
b. The state's legal analysis of the claim is without merit
The facts alleged establish a confrontation clause violation. The state, however, argues
that the disputed evidence was admissible under I.RE. 702 and 703 and thus, there was no
confrontation clause violation. See Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition and
Dismissal (hereinafter "State's Motion"), pg. 3-4. As set forth below, there are at least two
problems with the state's analysis.
First, the fact that evidence may be admissible under the rules of evidence does not
necessarily make it admissible under the confrontation clause. As stated by the Idaho Supreme
Court, "The hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause have similar policy objectives.

Although the question was not directly presented in any of the cases cited, it logically
follows that if facts alleged by the petitioner which are conclusively disproved by the record are
insufficient for the granting of relief, then allegations denied by the state yet clearly proved by the
record are insufficient for the granting of relief in the state's favor. See also Cooper v, 8_tqf.g, :,_ -- _
supra. (A motion to dismiss, unsupported by affidavits, depositions or other materials, does not
controvert the allegations in the petition. )
1

___ --
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However, they are not coextensive. Some out-of-court declarations which are admissible under
hearsay exceptions may violate confrontation rights." State v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382, 384-85,
775 P.2d 1224, 1226-27 (l989)judgment affdwhile overruled on different grounds, 497 U.S.
-'~--~ ·- -----805(1990} An--0-xampleofthis-i-s-Brutenv, United-States, 391 U.S.,-123 (1968), (where the prior_, ... - ,_ .. ,,.
admissions of a co-defendant were held to be not admissible against defendant under the
confrontation clause when the co-defendant was not available to be cross-examined). In this
regard, the United States Supreme Court noted that ''we have more than once found a violation of
confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably
recognized hearsay exception." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970), citing Barber

v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Consequently, this
aspect of the state's argument in support of its Motion is squarely foreclosed by controlling Idaho
and United States Supreme Court precedent.
Second, the evidence was not fully admissible under the rules of evidence. Idaho Rule of
Evidence 703 states that:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts
or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.

: t·
I
I

(Emphasis added). The purpose of the italicized portion of the rule was to ensure that I.R.E. 703

I

''
I'

,I

l
I

not be BSe-d:as·ameans to avoid the prohibition on hearsay. State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, ,
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426-27, 224 P.3d 485, 493-94 (2009). "Some Idaho courts have allowed inadmissible evidence to
come in through an expert who testifies on direct about what he or she relied on in forming the
opinion and this has been a back door for getting this evidence in the record." Idaho Rule of
:::._·_

Evidenee-JQ3"~'setves,to-prevent an- expert witness from serving-as a conduit for the intr:oduotion -- s

-:----

of otherwise inadmissible evidence." Id. Professor D. Craig Lewis states that, "Properly applied,
this rule allows the expert to state an opinion based on inadmissible evidence and to indicate the
general nature of the sources on which the expert has relied, but not to disclose, directly or
indirectly, the contents of the sources on direct examination unless they are otherwise admissible,
or the court makes the required balancing determination." D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook

§ 16:9 (2d ed.). ·
- fu the present case, the Court did not make a finding that Dr; Reichard's report was
,

admissible because its probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the other experts' opinions
substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect, nor was it admitted for the limited purpose of
evaluating the other doctors' opinion, and it is plain that the testimony was not offered for this
limited purpose. Rather, the state clearly relied upon the hearsay evidence contained in Dr.
Reichard' s report for the purpose of demonstrating the truth of the matter asserted therein.
Accordingly, the various doctors' testimony as to hearsay received from Dr. Reichard was not
admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 703. State v. Watkins, supra.

c. The evidence was "testimonial"
Dr. Reichard's report and the hearsay testimony about its specific contents by other
doctors-dearly fits within the definition of"core" testimonial statements under.Crawford,.supra, :....
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arid its prodigy. The United -States Supreme Court applied Crawford in Melendez-Diaz v.

Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309-310 (2009), and held that the state's use of a forensic
laboratory report to prove that seized cocaine was of a certain quality and quantity violated the ·
· Confr-ontation Glause because-no live witness competenU.otestify to the truth of;the statement-s--- made in the report was available for cross-examination. In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, -

U.S.

- - , 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011 ), the defendant was arrested after failing field sobriety tests and
refusing a breath test. Bullcoming was arrested and required to give a blood sample to determine
his blood-alcohol concentration ("BAC"). The blood sample was ·sent to the New Mexico
Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division, where a forensic analyst signed a
"certificate of analyst," part of a standard form titled "Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis,"
recording Bullcoming's BAC as 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters of blood. ·Bullcoming was
then charged with aggravated driving under the influence. At trial, the prosecutor introduced the
report and certificate of analyst into evidence as a business record. However, the forensic analyst
who authored the report did not testify at trial and was not otherwise subject to
cross-examination. Instead, the prosecutor called as a witness a scientist from the same
laboratory who had not signed the Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis, and neither participated in
nor observed the test on Bullcoming's blood sample. The testifying scientist was, however,
familiar with blood-alcohol analysis and the laboratory's testing protocols. Bullcoming, 131
S.Ct. at 2706-12.
The United States Supreme Court held that the Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis was
··- -- -'~estim-0nial" and therefore within the ambitofthe Confrontation Clause underMelendez,...,..Diaz.
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Id. at 2716-17. It said-that "[a] document created solely for an 'evidentiary purpose,' ... made
in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial." Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2717, quoting

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532.). Bullcoming also clarified that the "surrogate testimony" of
- 0

~ithe-substitute-witness-!'does not meet the constitutional :requirement [of cross.".'examination.l- .The :accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst
is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that
particular [analyst]." Id. at 2710. 2
Pursuant to the authority above, Dr. Reichard's report was testimonial evidence and the
report and the hearsay testimony about it was not admissible absent a showing of both Dr.
I ,

Reichard's unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination, neither of which was
present here. In fact, the admission of autopsy reports have been held to violate the confrontation
clause by the federal courts and several state courts. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit applied Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming in United States v. Moore,
651 F.3d 30, 72-73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 2772 (U.S. 2012) and cert.

denied, 132 S. Ct. 2772 (U.S. 2012) and affd in part sub nom. Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. ·
714 (2013), and found the admission of an autopsy report was error. In Smith, the government

At the time of Mr. Grove's 2008 trial, the United States Supreme Court had decided
both Crawford (2004) and Davis (2006). Moreover, both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming apply
here because both are simply applications of the rule first announced in Crawford. But, even if
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming could be read as announcing a new rule of criminal procedure,
they would still apply here because they were both decided prior to the conclusion of Mr.
Grove's direct appeal and "decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court announcing a new rule apply to
.. ···- __ ... . all criminal cases still pending on direct review.:' Rhoades-v. State, l42Jdahol30, J39, 233
P.3d 61, 70 (2010). Melendez-Diaz was decided in2009 and Bullcoming was decided on June
23, 2011. The remittitur in Mr. Grove's direct appeal was not issued until September 12, 2011.
2
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called Dr. Jonathan Arden as a witness. At that time, Dr. Arden was the ChiefD.C. Medical Examiner. He was later a defense witness in the criminal trial here. Dr. Arden testified to the
contents of approximately 30 autopsy reports authored by other medical examiners in his office,
· · ·c-----'-' 0 , , - -

but·he·neither performed nor- observed the ,auiopsies.:and his-signature,.did-.notcappear-011 any.of -.
the reports. The autopsy reports were admitted into evidence over a defense confrontation clause
objection. The Circuit Court found that the autopsy reports were testimonial for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause. Moore, 651 F.3d at 72 ("The government's attempts to avoid the
Confrontation Clause, on the grounds that the autopsy reports rank as non-testimonial ... are
foreclosed by Bullcoming.") Accord, State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409,417 (Mo. Ct. App.
2007); Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104, 111 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010); see also, State v. Freeman,

-- 2012 WL 1656975 (Tenn. Court ofCriminalAppeals May 9;·2012} review denied (October 17,2012).
Dr. Reichard's brain pathology report admitted in this case was testimonial because it fit
into the first and third of the three types of"core" testimonial statements: it was the type of
pretrial statement ''that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially''; and it
was a statement that was "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford,
541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). If anything, Dr. Reichard's report is a clearer
example of testimonial evidence than the autopsy reports found to be testimonial in Moore v.

United States, State v. Davidson, Martinez v. State, and State v. Freeman. First, Dr. Reichard is a
forensic neuropathologist, Exhibit B, pg. 910, ln. 5-7, and as Medical Examiner for the State of

-

-

-

ll.

-- -

.
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New Mexico, his findings were no doubt regularly used in criminal prosecutions. Dr. Ross
explained that the medical examiner's office in New Mexico had a "forensic function." Exhibit
B, pg. 953, In. 1-7. Dr. Ross also testified that he decided to send the brain to Dr. Reichard

---<~-~-- --,-- -- ,rbecausethe-case involved an infant with4-blunt-fore© injury, ExhibiiB,-:pg.,927,-ln.-25-~pg~928, ---

--

1n. 20, again a clear indication that suspected criminal activity was being investigated and that
Dr. Reichard's report was part of that investigation. Consequently, Dr. Reichard's report
contained testimonial evidence which was not admissible under the confrontation clause because
the state never called Dr. Reichard to testify.
The unconstitutional admission of the evidence cannot be found to be harmless. Indeed,
the state does not raise a harmless error argument in its motion for summary disposition. The
state's failure to raise a harmless error argument is sensible because any such argument would be
disingenuous in light of the heavy emphasis the state put on Dr. Reichard' s testimony at trial.
(Dr. Ross's testimony regarding the testimonial statements of Dr. Reichard are set forth in ,r 24.1
-24.24 in the Amended Petition. Dr. Hunter's testimony regarding the testimonial statements of
Dr. Reichard are set forth in ,r 37.1-37.3. Dr. Harper's testimony regarding the testimonial
statements of Dr. Reichard are set forth in ,r 38.3-38.5.} During closing arguments, the state
argued, "if you believe the opinions of the State's witnesses, then the only person who had the
opportunity to inflict these injuries was the defendant sitting before you." Exhibit B, pg. 1415,

In. 17-20. What the prosecution was referring to was the finding in Dr. Reichard's report that
there was a tear in the corpus callosum, which was indicative of a high degree of force which
would have rendered

12_•

-

unconscious or nearly unconscious-at the time of impact. Exhibit B,
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pg. 930, ln. 21-23. Since,

was not unconscious at the time Lisa Nash left the house to go to

I!
l

work, Dr. Reichard's testimonial statements were the key in establishing the state's time line
which pointed to Jv.fr. Grove as the only person who could have inflicted the fatal injury.
--

-- '

,;.

I
i

I

,-- -The Court of Appeals inthe-:dir.ect..appeal noted.the_lmp.ortance ofDr. Reichard's.

----+:-

evidence to the state's case:
Initially, we clarify that the crux of this issue affects the central disputed question
in this case-when the injuries which ultimately caused K.M.' s death occurred
and whether it was likely that K.M. would have lost consciousness and/or shown
severe symptoms immediately after the injuries were inflicted. In other words, did
the injuries occur on the morning that K.M. lost consciousness-and was alone
with Grove-or several days prior, when it was undisputed that the injuries could
not have been inflicted by Grove because he was not alone with K.M. In this
regard, important to the state's theory of the case that Grove caused the fatal
injuries on the morning of July 10 was the conclusion of Dr. Reichard, based on
his microscopic examination ofK.M.'s brain, that K.M. had suffered a laceration
of the-·corpus callosum, which would have likely caused immediate loss of
consciousness, thereby implicating Grove as the cause ofK.M.'s injuries during
the 36-45 minute period of time during which he was alone with K.M. Grove
points out that both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper recited Dr. Reichard's observations
in this regard, as gleaned from the autopsy report, as neither was present during
the autopsy nor conducted their own microscopic analysis, and relied on these
observations in forming their respective opinions that K.M.' s injuries had been
inflicted on July 10.
'I-

By contrast, Grove's expert, Dr. Arden, testified that he did not agree with Dr.
Reichard that a laceration was present and that the anomaly was the result of
handling of the brain after death. He also offered his opinion, after examination of
the microscopic slides, that K.M.'s injuries had been inflicted at least three days
prior to death (thus absolving Grove of having caused them) and that they would
not have necessarily resulted in immediate loss of consciousness.

State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 490, 259 P.3d 629, 636 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied (Sept. 12,

2011). In light of the central importance of the evidence from Dr. Reichard, the state does not
argue harmless error and cannot meetthe burden of.proving the unconstitutional admission of _
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-testimonial evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967) ("[W]e hold ... that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
-·--, --~- -- ·--Finally, the state's -argument-that Mr.: Grovec:~haci.s-ufficient-0pportunity to object to any_
improper testimony," State's Motion, pg. 4, is not persuasive because the fact that defense
counsel failed to make proper evidentiary and confrontation clause objections does not nullify or
excuse the constitutional error. In fact, the state's argument simply goes to prove that defense
counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984), but
that is a different and separate cause of action which is addressed in Section E below.

d. Conclusion
As Mr. ·-Grove has presented uncontroverted ·evidence· of a confrontation clause violation·
and the state cannot show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should
deny the state's motion, grant Mr. Grove's motion for summary disposition, and order a new trial

B. The Misconduct by the Prosecutor Deprived Mr. Grove of a Fair Trial
1. Legal background
The due process clauses of Art. 1,-§ 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and the Fourteenth
Amendment ensure, at a minimum, "that criminal trials shall be fundamentally fair."

Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19,576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Further, "[i]t is the
duty of a prosecuting attorney to see that the accused has a fair and impartial trial." State v.
Spencer, 74 Idaho 173,183,258 P.2d 1147, 1153 (1953)(emphasis added)(findingthatthe
prosecutor-'s misconduct.warranted a new trial-)_:..The prosecutoris charged with the dual task of
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ensuring that the government's case is presented "earnestly and vigorously, using every
legitimate means to bring about a conviction, but also to see that justice is done and that every
criminal defendant is accorded a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,449, 816 P.2d
100-2;-1-006 {Ct. App. -199-1); -Th€refoce, .it is improper f.or-a-prosecutor to appeal.to the emotions, -·."~< _..,-- -~, _
passion or prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics. State v. Phillips, 144
Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007).
2. Why relief should be granted to Mr. Grove
While the state has denied the allegations in its Answer, it has not offered any proof that
the prosecuting attorney did not engage in the acts alleged in ,r 41-49 and the subparts thereof.
Nor could it in large part, as most of the allegations are conclusively proved by the record in the
-criminal case pursuant to Hauschulz·v.State; supra and Workman-v. State, supra:· The only···
exceptions are the allegations that Mr. Spickler exposed the jury to prejudicial extra-judicial
evidence found in ,r 44.1-44.2. These allegations, however, are supported by the affidavits of
Craig Stamper, Karen Stamper, Stacey Grove, Deborah Grove and Stevie Grove previously filed.
As there is no affidavit from Mr. Spickler denying the allegations, there is no genuine question of
whether this instance of misconduct occurred either.
a. The prosecutor exposed the jury to extra-judicial evidence

During the trial, but prior to the Court going on the record, the prosecutor projected
family photos of

onto the court room screen while the jury entered the courtroom. He then

interchanged the family photos with the autopsy photographs. Thus, the prosecutor exposed the
jury to evidence outside the presence .ofthe Court; invoking sympathy for

15 •
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biological family and arousing passion and prejudice against Mr. -Grove. This was prosecutorial
misconduct which amounted to fundamental error. "Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level
of fundamental error when it is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse prejudice or
· ·----·passion-·againstthe"defendant,-orisso inflammatory-thatthejurors may be influenced to- . , ... -=>-. ,-determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d 477,
480 (Ct. App. 2008), citing State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct.
App.2003).

b. The prosecutor violated this Court's order in limine
At trial, the prosecutor called
counsel objected noting that

Bandel, the sister of

as a witness. Defense

was a child and arguing that the prosecutor's purpose in

calling her was "obviously ... just to impassion or inflame the jury'' and he·expected-

to

testify that when she last saw her brother "he was lying on his mother's bed, and she gave him a
hug and kiss and he said good bye." Exhibit B, pg. 821, ln. 24 -pg. 822, In. 8. In response, the
prosecutor told the Court that his purpose in calling
"condition of
and

was to elicit evidence regarding the

Martin on the morning of July 10th," and argued that he only had Lisa Nash

to provide evidence on that topic. Exhibit B, pg. 822, ln. 17-23. He stated, "I'm

entitled to ask her what she recalls that morning, what she recalls of the physical condition of her
brother the last time she saw him." Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 1-3. The Court overruled defense
counsel's objection "based on the argument made by Mr. Spickler on behalf of the State."
Exhibit B, pg. 823, In. 8-9. Mr. Spickler then elicited testimony from

·"[p]retty strong little girl,'' that she-said :'bye" to

16 •
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kiss and a hug and that she never saw her "brother again after that." Exhibit B, pg. 825, In. 22;
pg. 826, In. 15-18; pg. 827, In. 16-17. Thus, the prosecutor elicited highly prejudicial testimony
in violation of this Court's order in limine. (Set forth at Amended Petition ,r 45.1-45.7.)
· ·· That-testimony went beyondwhat the pFosecutor told-the Court he would elicit-aadJ.t-hadthe effect of inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury and encouraging the jury to convict

Mr. Grove for reasons other than the relevant evidence. Accordingly, it was misconduct as a
prosecutor may not intentionally seek to admit evidence the court has previously ruled excluded.
''Violation of a district court order governing the presentation of evidence may constitute
misconduct." State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679,684,227 P.3d 933,938 (Ct. App. 2010)
(misconduct to ask about defendant's alleged possession of drugs which had been excluded pre-

- trial); State v: Martinez, 136 Idaho 521; 37 P.3d-18 (Ct. App:200I)(prosecutoriatmisconductin
eliciting a statement from the victim that had been excluded from the preliminary hearing and
attempting to elicit the contents of a doctor's report which had previously been ruled
inadmissible); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587,903 P.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1995) (prosecutorial
misconduct in eliciting hearsay evidence after the district court had sustained the defendant's
objection to this questioning); State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572, 165 P.3d 273,286 (2007)
(prosecutorial misconduct to raise issue on examination after court had instructed prosecutor to
alert the court beforehand so it could make a ruling on admissibility).

c. The prosecutor admitted highly prejudicial andimproper photographs of the
many sympathy cards sent to
'smother
During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash trailer
approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg. 996, In. 19 -pg. 997,
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ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6). These-photos were unfairly prejudicial and highly
inflammatory because they included a large display of sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash.
It was prosecutorial misconduct to introduce these photographs because they had the effect and
were.intend@<lto arose sympathy-towar-d-Kyl.er~sbiok>gicalparents and inflam~ th~_passionofthe _

jurors against Mr. Grove.
The above was prosecutorial misconduct because "[a]ppeals to emotion, passion, or
prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State v. Eldred,
148 Idaho 317, 320, 222 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 2009). See also State v. Raudebaugh, 124
Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993).

d The prosecutor's cross-examination ofMr. Grove was improper
T'heprosecutor committed misconduct during the cross.c-examination of Mr. Grove:- First,
he cross-examined Mr. Grove about the fact that Mr. Grove was behind on child support to his
biological son, a fact both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Exhibit B, pg. 1115, ln. 21-24.
The Idaho Supreme Court has written, "An accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled
to a trial upon competent, relevant evidence; evidence which at least tends to establish his guilt
or innocence; and evidence which has no such tendency, but which, if effective at all, could only
serve to excite the minds and inflame the passions of the jury should not be admitted." State v.

Wilson, 93 Idaho 194, 196-98, 457 P.2d 433, 435-37 (1969), quoting State v. Fleming, 154
N.W.2d 65, 66 (Neb. 1967). This is so because "[a] fundamental principle of criminal law is that
where the offen_se charged 'is of itself sufficient to inflame the minds of the average person, it is
required that there be rigorous insistence upon observance of the rules of the admission of
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evidence'." Id., quoting People v. Jones, 42 Cal.2d 219,266 P.2d 38 (1954). "However,
reception at trial of irrelevant and immaterial evidence, which serves no probative function, but
serves only to inflame the minds and passions of the jury to the prejudice of the defendant is
-- ---->roversible-error;"-Id- TheidahoSupremeGomt in-Wilson held that evidence~of-,';{t-]he-degree on

,---+~- ---,-·-

pain suffered by a young virgin upon being raped, as opposed to the feelings of a bride when first
experiencing intercourse with her husband," was patently inadmissible and reminded the
prosecutor that he was only "entitled to hit as hard as he can above, but not below, the belt." Id,

quoting State v. Rollo, 351 P.2d 422, 426-427 (Or. 1960). It went on to list several other
"examples of irrelevant, immaterial and inflammatory material, the admission of which into
evidence was held to be reversible error," including:
Evidence that defendant, -accused of Mann Act Violation, failed to file income tax
returns; evidence that defendant, accused of murder, was a deserter from the army;
evidence that defendant, accused of arson, had been treated for venereal disease;
evidence that defendant, accused of murder, while in the army offered a friend
$500.00 to shoot him in the foot in order to avoid :frontline duty; evidence, in
prosecution for 'Malicious shooting at and wounding another with intent to kill,'
of victim's prognosis for recovery and future ability to perform manual labor;
evidence, in rape prosecution, that victim was pregnant as a result of the rape;
evidence, in murder prosecution, that victim was married and a parent; evidence
that married defendant, accused of murdering wife's friend, had been seen with
other women[.]
93 Idaho at 198, 457 P.2d at 437.
The evidence about Mr. Grove's child support arrears fits squarely into the Idaho
Supreme Court's list of examples of "irrelevant, immaterial and inflammatory material" and it
was misconduct for the prosecutor to elicit such testimony because it had no such tendency to
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prove the charge and "could only serve to excite the minds and inflame the passions of the
jury[.]" Id.
The prosecutor also committed misconduct when he asked Mr. Grove when he had been
- : : "·'""~c..,--,----pr-escribed Ativan....and-whether the-prescription ''wa-s a result of [his] emotional st-ate Friday[.]::_<,.·_:- -<-"· ·""'Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of
the medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical situation has arisen
which affects our ability to proceed with trial today'' and did not mention Mr. Grove or the nature
of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg. 1067, In. 3-5. Further, the answer to the question was
totally irrelevant, yet highly prejudicial to Mr. Grove.
The prosecutor also committed misconduct in his cross-examination of Mr. Grove when
·he characterized Mr. Grove 's-swom testimony·as the "story you told, which is -"the story you
need the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make sense."
Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11. Counsel should not interject his personal opinion and beliefs about
the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho
82, 86, 156 P.3d 583,587 (Ct. App. 2007); citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,280, 77 P.3d
956, 969 (2003); State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11; 594 P.2d 146, 148-49 (1979); State v.
Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160,169,983 P.2d 233,242 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61,

69, 951 P.2d 1288, 1296 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14,909 P.2d 624,632 (Ct.
App. 1995); State v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373,376, 707 P.2d 484,487 (Ct. App. 1985). The
prosecutor's characterization of Mr. Grove's testimony as a "story you need the jury to believe"
and that "some things .. .just don't really make sense" are mere assertions of his personal .. --
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opinions and belief in Mr. Grove's guilt and to the lack of credibility of Mr. Grove's testimony,
and thus was misconduct.

e. The prosecutor's cross-examination ofDr. Arden was improper
, . 0 ~~-- ·-· :--- - - - - - ,

-

. _ . ., .

,

,The.same-type of misconduct was- committed when the.prQsecutorstated in his cr_g_s_~,:-,--- -_-:-- _ ,..

examination of Dr. Jonathan Arden, that the doctor was "on a special mission here, which is to
provide such evidence as you might that would support the defense's case[.]" Exhibit B, pg.
1321, ln. 18-20. The prosecutor's personal evaluation of motives (unsupported by any
a~issible evidence) and disparagement of Dr. Arden's credibility was misconduct. State v.

Phillips, supra and cases cited therein.

f The prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments were replete with
improprieties
"Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of
fact in a criminal case .... [t]o enlighten the jury-and to help the jurors remember and interpret the
evidence." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583,587 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal
quotations omitted). Therefore, "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to
appeal to the prejudices of the jury." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and
Defense Functions§ 3-5.8 (3d. ed.1993). While both sides in a trial have traditionally been
afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury, "[t]his latitude is not boundless,
however, and it is impermissible to appeal to the emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury
through the use of inflammatory tactics." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 266-67, 233 P.3d
190, 197-98 (Ct. App. 2010), citing State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20-21, 189 P.3d 477, 482-83
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007)
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("Considerable latitude, however, has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those
implied."). A prosecutor exceeds the scope of this considerable latitude ifhe or she "attempts to
secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the
·-------'

-"evidence-cadmitted,during trial,- including. reasonable inferew.es-thatmayhe drawn.fromJhaL ... ,,
evidence." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Idaho Supreme Court has long held that the limits on permissible closing argument apply
most stringently to a prosecuting attorney:

A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, "acting in a quasi judicial capacity." It
is his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable, and lawful means to secure the
conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted in the courts of his judicial
circuit. He should see that they have a fair and impartial trial, and avoid
convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt him to appeal to prejudices, to
pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury, which, whether true or not,
have not beenproved: The desire for success-should never induce him to endeavor -to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in the
case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the
same....

It will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do not look with
favor upon the action of prosecutors in going beyond any possible state of facts
which can be material as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a particular
case for which he is upon trial. Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of
the machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position, which
necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and
conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give
to counsel for the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and
ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in
so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the
prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent
evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he should guard against
anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them
from considering only the evidence introduced.
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State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 609-11 (1903). See also, State v. Babb, 125 Idaho
934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994); State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253, 268, 152 P. 1054, 1058
(1915).
C.:·-C_

---Here,theprosecutor committed multiple instances-.ofmisconduct.during closinga,nd..

rebuttal argument. He misstated the defense position regarding pre-existing head injury, saying
that the defense was that there was "some long-term brain injury." Exhibit B, pg. 1419, ln. 6-10.
The prosecutor misstated for a second time Dr. Arden's testimony about head injuries. Id., pg.
1462, ln. 18-19. And, the prosecutor suggested without supporting evidence that Dr. Arden's
"financial position" leads him to decide what cases he can take. Id, pg. 1429, ln. 8-9. It is
improper for a prosecutor to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence. State v. Raudebaugh,
124 Idaho 758,769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166, 610 P.2d
522, 525 (1980); State v. Tupis, 112 Idaho 767, 771-72, 735 P.2d 1078, 1082-83 (Ct. App. 1987);

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007).
The prosecutor stated in argument that a "colleague" said that Dr. Arden's answers during
cross-examination were slippery as an ice cube and the prosecutor opined that the doctor "was
stretching things." Id, pg. 1430, ln. 4-8; pg. 1461, ln. 11. This violated the prohibition against
using inflammatory words employed in describing a witness or defendant as well as the
prohibition against arguing facts not presented in trial. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507,
988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715-16,'85 P.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Ct.
App. 2003).

23 •

PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION

222

-

- ----------- __ -:_ :.J

"- _______ , __ -

- ___ ::J

----------

- -------- J

i-----

I

The prosecutor implied that he had evidence not presented at trial that Mr. Grove had
previously been "violent with

!

I

Exhibit B, pg. 1430, ln. 15-21. The prosecutor told the

I
jury that he did not call Kyler's biological father as a witness "because my medical experts

- --°'"-'·' 1:manimously, to no exception, said he could nothav-e.-done-it" Id, pg. 1A77,Jn.J8:-20-. .The __ ___ _
prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[c]are takers kill little babies all the
time." Id, pg. 1460, ln. 5-6. The prosecutor argued without supporting evidence that the
emotional breakdown of Mr. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a different kind of
"emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that morning that resulted in these
injuries[.]" Id, pg. 1458, ln. 16-18. And the prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence
that "[p]arents kill babies all the time," that ''there are literally thousands of [similar] incidents in
any given span of time" and that "our local paper has probably shown ... probably six more of these cases since - since this one started." Id, ln. 5-14. The authority is clear that it is
misconduct for the prosecutor to refer to facts not in evidence. "It is plainly improper for a party
to present closing argument that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the evidence." State v.

Troutman, 148 Idaho 904,911,231 P.3d 549,556 (Ct. App. 2010); see also Griffiths, 101 Idaho
at 166, 610 P.2d at 525; State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 525, 37 P.3d 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2001);

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587.
Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics
are impermissible. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 769, 864 P.2d at 607; State v. Smith, 117 Idaho
891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839,844,655 P.2d 46, 51
(1982); Griffiths, 101 Idaho at 168, 610 P.2d at 527. Yet, the prosecutor attempted to invoke
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sympathy for his expert witness and
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by arguing that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of

taking Kyler's body apart piece by piece[.]" Id, pg. 1464, In. 24-25. And he argued that "we
don't want to let a murderer go free." Id, pg. 1466, In. 9. However, "[u]rging the jury to render a
·· ~.:::.. ..,-.-,:_:---~i,~verdiet-basecl on factors other thanthe,evide1=1ee--and-jury instructions-; such as,sympathy for the ___ ... victim, has no place in closing arguments." State v. Felder, 150 ldaho 269, 275, 245 P.3d 1021,
1027 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576, 181 P.3d 496,502 (Ct. App. 2007)
Here the prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, misstated the
evidence, used inflammatory language in reference to defense witnesses, argued evidence not
presented at trial, and misrepresented the state's burden of proof by denigrating the presumption
of innocence with his argument that it was as bad to let a "murderer go free" as "convicting an
·1rmocent man." Jd:;pg:1466~ In. 6-9: To the contrary, the burden ofproofrequirementis the
contitutionally required "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,371
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Although it is manifest from the many instances of misconduct and the egregiousness of
the individual instances that the prosecutor was intentionally engaging in what he knew to be
improper behavior, it is not necessary for this Court to find intentional misconduct in order to
find prosecutorial misconduct. The "decisions of th[e United States Supreme] Court demonstrate
that the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219,
102 S. Ct. 940,947 (1982}. Whether.or not the prosecutorJmew-his actions were misconduct is
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not relevant to this analysis. Mr. Grove's right to a fair trial was violated irrespective of the
intent of the prosecutor.

g. The error is not harmless
· '" :--.. ~,i.- - "

--- -- - - · ·

---The-effect-of the prosecutor?-.s-~misoonduot-requires ~granting ofthe petition.-.:~The

cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself
might be harmless, but when aggregated show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the
defendant's right to due process." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477,483 (Ct. App.
2008). Thus, it is the cumulative effect of the misconduct engaged in here that should be
considered. Id.
The evaluation of the cumulative effect of the misconduct is a legal determination. Thus,

Mr. Grove is not required to present "supporting evidence thatthe prosecutor's conduct was
sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error," as argued by the state. State's Motion,
pg. 6. Instead, the Court must consider all the misconduct, established by the trial record and
affidavits, and then make a legal determination as to whether Mr. Grove is entitled to relief.
Considering all the misconduct, it is clear that the state cannot meet its burden of proving its
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Chapman v. California,

supra.
Finally, the state makes a variation on an argument made in its confrontation clause
argument: That ''trial counsel had sufficient opportunity to bring to the Court's attention any bad
acts or miscondµct by the prosecutor." State's Motion, pg. 6. But again, that argument proves
too much, at least from the state's point of view. Mr. -Grove agrees that defense counsel's
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performance was deficient because he failed to object to any of the many instances of
prosecutorial misconduct. Defense counsel should have objected to the prosecutor eliciting
highly prejudicial testimony in violation of this Court's order in limine. (Set forth at Amended
--- ·· ,, ··-- -· -

P-etitien 14S .1-45. 7;) He should4iave.-obj€Gted-to the highly -prejudicial and improper.- -- - - .
photographs of the many sympathy cards sent to Kyler's mother. (Set forth at Amended Petition
145.8-45.10.) He should have objected to the improper cross-examination of his client. (Set
forth at Amended Petition 146 and 48.1-48.3.) He should have objected to the improper crossexamination of his sole defense expert witness. (Set forth at Amended Petition 1 47.) And he
should have objected to the multiple instances ofprosecutorial misconduct set forth in the
Amended Petition at 149.1-49.14. But all the state's argument in this regard proves is that, in
·addition to a due process violation based upon prosecutorial misconduct, Mr; Grove was also
deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, supra.
That cause of action is addressed in Section E below.

h. Conclusion
As Mr. Grove has presented uncontroverted evidence ofprosecutorial misconduct and the
state cannot show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should deny the
state's motion, grant Mr. Grove's motion for summary disposition, and order anew trial.

C. Juror Misconduct Deprived Mr. Grove of a Fair Trial
1. Legal background
A juror's inattentiveness, by sleeping during witness testimony, may constitute
misconduct; State v. Strange.,.147Idaho 686.,-68.9~,214 P.3d672; 675 (Ct. App. 2009). See e.g.,_
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State v. Majid, 914 N.E.2d 1113, 1115 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (Numerous instances of jurors'
sleeping during murder trial, including during eyewitness testimony, violated defendant's right to
due process and constituted plain error). "[A] juror who sleeps through much of the trial
-- · testimony cannot be expectedt&perform his-duti.-es!-':.cJd,':e-iting-United States v, -Smith, 550 F.2d.- --, ,:c=__, .. _..,.._
277, 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 434 U.S. 841 (1977); United

States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333,335 (3rd Cir. 1972). "Due process mandates that the defendant
is entitled to have a jury hear and evaluate the evidence," State v. Majid, supra, that is why the
jurors in this case were instructed by the Court ''to decide the facts from all the evidence in the
case." Exhibit B, pg. 1399, ln. 24-25 (emphasis added). The repeated instances of sleeping by
several of the jurors, especially given they were sleeping during the critical medical testimony of
· Drs. Ross and Arden, denied Mr: Grove his state and federal constitutional rights to a jury trial
and due process.
2. Why relief should be granted to Mr. Grove

a. The uncontroverted evidence shows juror misconduct
Several affidavits of individuals who witnessed jurors sleeping during trial testimony
have been filed in support of this Petition. Stevie Grove, Deborah Grove, Lynette Walton, Jack
Grove and Carol Grove were all present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings
and they observed the following five jurors sleeping during court at various times during the
proceedings: Casey Neuman, Mike Keller, Cynthia Barrett, Greg Lind and James Yates. They
observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July 22, 2008, during the
testimony-of Dr. Deborah Harper on July24/6008, and during the testimony ofDr;-Jonathan
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Arden on July 29, 2008. Further, all saw that "[o ]ne juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep
that his head was resting against the back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony." Affidavit of Carol
Grove, pg. 2; Affidavit of Lynette Walton, pg. 2; Affidavit of Jack Grove, pg. 2; Affidavit of
- --- - -- •· ·- -Deborah Grove,-pg>2~i Affidavit of Stevie Gt-ove-,-pg;- 2~ ---- --- - -

••··-:-------,:-·:··.;.,-.T-::,.-::

:··-· .,_,___ ......- -:·----··:···_, __

Their observation of Juror Keller sleeping with his head resting against the back wall is
corroborated by Craig Stamper who stated that "during the testimony, t twice observed a juror in
the back row sleeping [and] [t]hat this sleeping juror leaned back to rest his head on the wall as
he slept." Affidavit of Craig Stamper, pg. 1. Lori Stamper observed a juror, either Michael
Keller or Kendall Loetscher (the presiding juror) in the back row sleeping. Affidavit of Lori
Stamper, pg. 1. Karen Stamper stated in her affidavit that she saw jurors sleeping.
Further, the witness's affidavits. ate confirmed by the trial transcripts which show the Court was
required to take several unplanned recesses because jurors repeatedly fell asleep during the
presentation of the evidence. Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 -pg. 922, ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg.
1351, ln. 19-25.
While the state has denied the allegations, it has not offered any proof that the jurors were
not asleep as alleged in the Amended Petition and the supporting affidavits. As there is no
affidavit from Mr. _Spickler or other witness denying the allegations, there is no genuine question
of whether this instance of juror misconduct occurred. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho at 545,531
P.2d at 1190.
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b. The state 's arguments are without merit
Confusingly, the state complains that the affidavits are from "audience members"
''without any verification." State's Motion, pg. 8. However, the state offers no reason why

.b "
.
. .
. the_,a._>------.c<·
· - "· au·di ence·mem·ers-.arenotas
competentto-co·bserve-and.testify. as thepartic1pantsm
courtroom proceedings. Further, all the affidavits are ''verified" in the legal sense that they are
sworn to under oath. See, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/verify. The affidavits also are
verified in the conversational sense that they establish the truth, accuracy, or reality of the claim
because there are six witnesses who all saw Casey Neuman, Mike Keller, Cynthia Barrett, Greg
Lind, and James Yates asleep during the testimony ofDrs. Ross and Arden. Further, those six
affidavits are corroborated by two other witnesses and the trial transcript.
Next, the state cites to Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho.139; 150, 139 P.3d 741, 752 (Ct.App.
2006), to argue that there was no due process violation, State's Motion, pg. 7, but that case is

easily distinguishable. In Murphy, the claim brought in post-conviction was that "trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to move to strike a juror who allegedly had fallen asleep at trial." 143
Idaho at 150, 139 P.3d at 752. However, "Murphy did not identify which day of the five-day jury
trial the juror allegedly slept, describe the length of time the juror allegedly slept, or explain what
testimony or evidence the juror allegedly slept through. In the absence of such evidence, there
was no showing of deficient performance or prejudice." Id.
By contrast, the claim in this cause of action is that Mr. Grove's due process rights were
violated by the sleeping jurors, thus he does not need to show either deficient performance, nor
prejudice to prevail here. (The -effect of Murphy on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
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set forth in Section E below.) To the contrary, since Mr. Grove has shown a due process
violation, i.e., the five jurors sleeping, the state has the burden of proving the constitutional error
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California; supra. Thus, the state's
······ eom:plaintthatMr; Grove "hasnotpr-es©nt-ed-affida:vits, records or evidence indicating-th'? (ength ..

of time the jurors allegedly slept nor has Petitioner explained what testimony or evidence the
jurors allegedly slept through," State's Motion, pg. 7 (emphasis in original), is not germane here
because those facts go to the harmless error question. It is the state's burden to prove that the
jurors did not sleep through any important evidence. In any case, unlike Murphy, the affidavits
do identify which day of the jury trial the jurors slept and further note that they slept during the
testimony of the two most important medical witnesses in the case, Drs. Ross and Arden.
· Defense counseltestified that he was cross-examining Dr. Ross when he was told by his ··
paralegal that a juror was asleep. Defense counsel said that he was "laying foundation for Dr.
Arden's testimony" during his cross-examination of Dr. Ross and that doing so ''was an
important thing to do." Depo., pg. 68, ln. 12 - pg. 69, ln. 23.
The state also argues that there was "sufficient opportunity to bring this to the attention of
the Petitioner and trial counsel at a time wherein the issue could have been raised to the attention
of the Court." State's Motion, pg. 8. However, trial counsel admitted that he noticed jurors
falling asleep and that, in one instance, his paralegal alerted him to that fact. Depo., pg. 66, ln.
22 - pg. 67, ln. 2. While it was ineffective assistance for defense counsel to fail to ask for a
mistrial after he noticed the sleeping jurors, that ineffectiveness does not alter the fact that the
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misconduct of the jurors also deprived Mr. Grove-of bis rights to a jury trial and due process of
law.
Finally, the state argues th.at ''this is an issue more properly brought to the attention of
·• -appellate~court," State's MGtion, pg.-8,-butdoes-not-support-that argument with.any-citation to - -- .
authority. That is no surprise because, in fact, this issue could not have been raised upon appeal

I

because there was no record made of the jurors sleeping at the time of trial, nor did defense
counsel make a motion for mistrial based upon the juror misconduct. Under State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209,226,245 P.3d 961,978 (2010), "where an error has occurred at trial and was not
followed by a contemporaneous objection, such error shall only be reviewed where the defendant
demonstrates to an appellate court that one of his unwaived constitutional rights was plainly
violated~" Here, of course, it was not possible for Mr. Grnve to raise ihis issue for the first time
on appeal because the criminal court record does not demonstrate that any of the jurors were
sleeping. As Mr. Grove's appellate counsel Diane Walker states in her affidavit, "[t]he juror
misconduct issue raised in the Third Cause of Action could not have been raised on direct appeal
because trial counsel did not draw the misconduct to the Court's attention or ask the Court to
take any action about it, and there was no definitive evidence in the record that jurors had been
sleeping during trial testimony." Affidavit of Diane Walker, pg. 2. See also Affidavit of Eric
Frederickson, pg. 2. Thus, the state's argument that the issue should have been raised on appeal
is plainly incorrect.
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As Mr. Grove has presented uncontroverted evidence of juror misconduct and the state
cannot show the error was harm.less beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should deny the state's
motion, grant Mr. Grove's motion for summary disposition, and order a new trial.

·,_,=_~,~». -:J'ltelneffective Assistance <>fAppellate--CounselClaim
0

.

-~·- !.-:-·,._' -;: -~-· .. -,..

A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance

of that counsel Evittsv. Lucey; 469 U:S: 387, 396 (1985). The-Idaho Constitution also
guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC. § 19-852.
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or

federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance;
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id.
Courts will not attempt to second-guess trial counsel's strategic decisions unless those decisions
are made upon the basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other .
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shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho at 145, 139 P.3d at
747. An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth
in Strickland. See e.g., Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007).

• •
• +1... Lr.•
•
th
• thi
The stateargues-m,1tsmotioncw.at-1v.tmtunr~qurres
- e courUo.summan·1y.d"1snnss
._ S:.~_--.<-claim because that case holds that it cannot be ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail
to raise claims of fundamental error for the first time on appeal. State's Motion, pg. 10. Yet, at
the same time it argues that the Juror Misconduct claim should have been raised on appeal and
asks the Court dismiss on that basis. State's Motion, pg. 8, 1_3.3 · The state, however, cannot have
it both ways. If appellate counsel should have raised the Juror Misconduct claim on appeal, then
it was ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to fail to do so. The correct answer, however, is
that the Juror Miscnnduct claim could not have been raised on appeal, even as fundamental error,
under State v. Perry, supra, as explained in the affidavits of appellate counsel Eric Frederickson
and Diane Walker.
As appellate counsel could not have raised the Juror Misconduct issues on direct appeal,
Mr. Grove can raise it in this Petition, both as a direct claim and as a part of the Ineffective
Assistance of Trial Counsel claim alleged below. See e.g., DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,
603-604, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009) (deprivation of the right to testify raised as direct .
constitutional violation) with Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469,476,224 P.3d 536, 543 (Ct. App.
2009) (deprivation of the right to testify raised as an aspect of an ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim). However, if the Court adopts the state's argument that the Juror Misconduct
.. ··.

--

-~--

-

It does not raise that argument as to the Confrontation Clause, Prosecutorial
Misconduct or Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel claims.
3
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claim should have been raised on direct appeal, notwithstanding Mintun and Perry, Mr. Grove
reserves the right to assert the Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel claim in the
alternative.

--~ -- ------

· .· E.- Mr. -Grtwe-was.Dep1ived ojthe-EffectiveAssistance of Xr.iafCaunsel .
1. Legal background
The legal standard for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was set forth
in Section D above.
2. Why the state's motion should be denied
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 7(b)(l) requires that "[a]n application to the court for
an order shall be by motion which ... shall state with particularity the grounds therefor[.]" See

- Saykhamchone v: State;·-127 Idaho at 322; 900 P;2d at-798 (1995)-(applying-ruletopost- - - - ·

- - - - --- -- -

conviction proceedings). The Court of Appeals wrote in Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818,
892 P .2d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 1995):

It is clear that in summary judgment proceedings the nonmovant is required to
respond only to alleged grounds for summary judgment asserted by the moving
party. The nonmovant need not address any aspect of the nonmovant's case that
has not been challenged by the opposing party's motion.... In Mason [v. Tucker
and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994)], we emphasized
the necessity of notice of the grounds for a motion in order to afford the
nonmovant an opportunity to address the issues raised and present evidence and
legal argument directed to those issues.

See also, DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009) (Rule 7(b)(l)
requires grounds be stated with ''reasonable particularity"), citing Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 288,
292, 399 P.2d 262, 264-65 (1965). Here the state's motion asserts vague and general objections
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and defenses to this cause of action without tying objections to a particular part of the claim,
which has several sub-parts, and thus does not satisfy the reasonable particularity requirement.
With regard to the specific arguments made, the state first makes the remarkable claim
thaIMtGrove'lias.failed to· supp.off Iiis ''claims witli affiaavits;recotds or othet~vidence,""
State's Motion, pg. 11, apparently overlooking the record of the trial proceedings, which
establish the factual basis for most of the claims, which largely consist of errors of omissions at
trial, the deposition of Mr. Chapman (which the state attended and participated in, but which was
not transcribed until after the state's motion was filed) and the ten affidavits containing facts in
support of the claims already filed. Thus, Mr. Grove has done far more than make "bare and
conclusory allegations." State's Motion, pg. 11. The failure to object to inadmissible evidence
and prosecutorial misconduct is conclusively shown-by the absence of a proper and timely
objection in the record of the trial proceedings. Further, one aspect of the prosecutorial
misconduct and the juror misconduct is shown by the many affidavits filed in support of Mr.
Grove's petition.
Next, the s~te's observation that "trial counsel is an experienced criminal defense
attorney and litigator in good standing" is irrelevant. The United States Supreme Court has said
that the duty of the defense lawyer "is to make the adversarial testing process work in the

particular case." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). Thus, it is
defense counsel's specific performance in Mr. Grove's case which matters, not his body of work
over a career or his reputation. The purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is not to castigate the lack of diligence or talent of the mediocre lawyers or to lionize
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·the career accomplishments of the best lawyers. "The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
The state's Motion also observes: ''Petitioner further indicates that the Court should string
_,~-"fogetlier this1ist of errors and defonnirie a prejtiillcraleffect."- Id, pg. 11. To the extent this
observation is intended as an argument that the cumulative error doctrine should not apply, it is
unsupported by citation to authority or analysis. Further it fails to acknowledge either Boman v.

State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P.2d 910, 917 (Ct. App. 1996) or Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24,
32, 878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App. 1994), both of which have been previously cited and which
recognize the cumulative error doctrine in cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Nor does the state address Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003), where
th~-Circuit Court explained that "[s]epara.te errors by counsel. .. should be analyzed togetlier fo
see whether their cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance.
They are, in other words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Thus, the state's assertion must fail.
The state also argues that "Petitioner was competent to stand trial, fully able and capable
to assist trial counsel in his own defense," State's Motion, pg. 11, as if that makes a difference
here. There is no rule that a competent defendant is not entitled to a competent defense attorney,
nor is there a requirement that a criminal defendant provide "effective assistance of client" in
order to receive the benefits of the Sixth Amendment. It is so well-established that it should go
without saying that it was not up to Mr. Grove to understand the rules of evidence and how the
- ··---··Confrontation Clause affects the admission of evidence. It was not up to him to properly prepare
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the defense expert witness for trial testimony, present evidence in his favor, or to properly crossexamine the state's witnesses. It was not up to him to object during trial to the prosecutorial
misconduct. In fact, had Mr. Grove tried to insert objections into the trial, the court would have
~ . --- -reminded him that he was represented by counsel: -Hacfhe -persisted~-he could have then been

removed from the courtroom. See, fllinois v. Allen, 391 U.S. 337 (1970). And it was not up to
him to make a motion for mistrial for juror misconduct after he alerted his attorney that several

jurors had fallen asleep. There would be no need for the right to counsel at all, if being
competent, fully able and capable to assist trial counsel were enough. But as the United States
Supreme Court has written:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
_~om-i:m~he11cl th~ right_ toJ:>e hewd_ 1Jycc:>.W1$~L_ Eveµ_tli~_i_pt1::)lig~gt aml. _1::4u,~at~d~
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence.
Gideon v, Wainwright, 312 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963), quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287

U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). The state's argument in this regard has been rejected for nearly 50 years,4
and has no force in either logic or law.
The state's motion should be denied and Mr. Grove's motion should be granted as
explained below.

4
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3. Why relief should be granted to Mr. Grove
Mr. Grove has shown that defense counsel rendered deficient performance in
several instances and the state has not controverted bis evidence. The effect of these errors both
individually and cumulatively merit the granting of relief.
a. Counsel's performance was deficient during voir dire

The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the Defense Function are a
starting point for determining whether counsel's actions were objectively reasonable. State v.
Larkin, 102 Idaho, 231,233,628 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1981). ABA Defense Function Standard 4-

7.2(a) states that defense counsel should prepare prior to trial to discharge effectively counsel's
function in jury selection "including the raising of any appropriate issues concerning the method
by which the jury panel was selected[.]"
In this case, defense counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to move for a
mistrial or for the summoning of a new jury pool after a potential juror made statements in voir
dire that polluted the entire jury pool. That potential juror stated in front of all the potential
jurors that he worked in the funeral business and he knew the police officer witnesses Greene and
Petrie well, both from their work investigating cases that came through the funeral home, and
through their work for his wife who was the city manager, and that they are very credible.
Exhibit B, pg. 155, In. 13-14. He also stated he had worked in the funeral business for a long
time and seen "these situations" before and did not have a lot of empathy except for the victims.
Id., pg. 155, ln. 21 -pg. 156, In. 2. These comments were prejudicial because they had the effect
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of unfairly bolstering the credibility of the state's witnesses and engendering sympathy for
s biological parents.
That counsel should have moved for a mistrial or the summoning of a new jury pool is
illustrated by United States V. Mach, 137F.3d 640 (9th Cif"1997): Mach presented a situation
quite similar to that in this case. Mach was on trial for sexual conduct with a minor. The first
prospective juror to be questioned in voir dire stated that as a social worker with the state, she
would have a difficult time being impartial given her line of work and that sexual assault had
been confirmed in every case in which one of her clients reported an assault. The court engaged
in further questioning of the potential juror warning her that she needed to decide the case on the
evidence. Mach moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the entire panel had been tainted. The
state court did not grant the motion, but did strike the potential juror for cause. Mach was
convicted. The Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief. The Court held that given the nature of the
potential juror's statements, the certainty with which they were delivered, the years of experience
that led to them, the Court would presume that at least one juror was tainted and entered into
deliberations with the conviction that children never lie about sexual abuse.
In Mr. Grove's case, the potential juror's statements, like those in Mach, vouched for the
state's witnesses and were based upon professional experience and observations. As in Mach, a
presumption that the potential juror's statements tainted the entire jury pool is warranted and the
failure to move for a mistrial or the summoning of a new panel was objectively unreasonable
representation by defense counsel.
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Counsel also rendered deficient performance in failing to challenge for cause or
peremptorily challenge Juror #5 (Loetscher) after voir dire revealed that he worked at St.
Joseph's Hospital and knew of"just about everyone on the [state's witness list] ... particularly
the ER doctors that was Iisteathere." Exhibit B, pg:"144, ltL 14-19. Mr. Grove was prejudiced
because Juror #5 became the presiding juror. Exhibit B, pg. 1471, In. 19-22.
b. Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to make a
confrontation clause objection
Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to assert Petitioner's state and federal
constitutional rights to confrontation (Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13, United States Const.
Amendments 6 and 14) and by failing to make proper evidentiary objections. During trial, state's

autopsy report which contained information from Dr. Reichard. See Amended Petition, pgs. 3-9.
However, the state did not present the testimony of Dr. Reichard in violation of the state and
federal constitutional rights of confrontation. Had defense counsel objected on confrontation
grounds, that evidence would have been excluded by the Court as argued in Section A above.
There was no conceivable strategic purpose to fail to object to the inadmissible hearsay
testimony which also related Dr. Reichard's testimony in violation of the confrontation clause.
Defense counsel, Scott Chapman, was deposed as part of this case. Mr. Chapman testified that
he was not the sort oflawyer who was shy about voicing an objection, if he thought it was
appropriate and that, generally speaking, he is not hesitant to do so, especially ifhe believes the
objection would make a difference. Deposition of Scott Chapman (''Depo"), pg. 10, ln. 4-17. At
the same time, Mr. Chapman stated that since one can never be sure that an objection will be
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sustained, there is an advantage in litigating important matters pre-trial. Depo., pg. 12, In. 15 pg. 13, In. 6.

In the deposition, Mr. Chapman stated that he did not object to the introduction of Dr.
Ross's autopsy repoff(which contained Dr. Reichard,.s report) because "[t]here wasn't anything ··· -·
in that autopsy report that didn't work with ... what my ... thrust of the case was going to be."
Depo., pg. 18, In. 10-23. He described the thrust of the defense as follows: "That the injuries that
occurred to

were inflicted at a time when Stace was not around or with the child in any

fashion that it could have happened." Id However, he admitted that there was, in fact, evidence
in Dr. Reichard's report which undermined the thrust of his case. Depo., pg. 19, In. 10-13. He
then explained,
··-

---------····---·

~

[E]ven though there was evidence that was contrary to our position, I had what I
believed to be evidence that his findings weren't totally correct, if you will. And
as such we had - a number of doctors were relying on that autopsy report,
including Reichard's report, and I felt that Dr. Arden would, in large degree, poke
enough holes in that to make reliance on that report misplaced.
Also had to, I guess, take into consideration the possibility that Dr. Reichard could
have been made a witness and come to testify and then have him and Arden sitting
there at opposing positions.
Depo., pg. 19, In. 17 -pg. 18, ln. 5.
This decision, however, was objectively unreasonable and was also based upon ignorance
of the relevant law. First, it is objectively unreasonable to allow the avoidable admission of
damaging evidence upon the belief that one possesses counter-evidence which is only capable of
'poking holes' in that evidence. That is tantamount to a strategy in a gun fight to allow
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oneself to be shot on the belief that the medic has sufficient skill and supplies to keep you from
dying of the wound. That plan does not further your goal of winning the gun fight and it is
objectively better to not be shot, just as it is objectively better to avoid the admission of the
evidence altogether rather than allow it iii-with the hope that

the jury might find reliance on the

evidence ''misplaced." In fact, defense counsel conceded that Dr. Reichard's conclusions were
harmful to the defense theory of the case and agreed that Dr. Reichard's conclusion about the tear
in the corpus callosuni, if believed, showed that his ''theory of the case was impossible." Depo.,
pg. 28, ln. 22-25. He also admitted that Dr. Reichard's conclusion about the tear in the corpus
callosum was "particularly damaging to the thrust of [his] defense" and agreed that [f]rom a
strategic point of view, it would have been better for [his] theory of the case to keep this evidence
out if [he] could." Depo. pg. 21, ln. 1-3 ("particularly damaging"); pg. 22, ln. 21-25 ("strategic
point of view").
Further, the decision to not object was not consistent with the trial strategy and appears to
have been caused by defense counsel's lack of understanding of the relevant law. Defense
counsel could not say whether he was familiar with the Crawford confrontation clause case at the
time of the trial. Depo., pg. 37, ln. 5 - pg. 38, ln. 9. Further, he described the holding in

Crawford as, "[t]hat there was a confrontation right that trumps hearsay exceptions." Depo., pg.
37, ln. 9-12. Further, he admitted, that the testimony about the particulars of Dr. Reichard' s
report was inadmissible under I.RE. 703. And counsel did not testify that he made a strategic
decision to not make an I.RE. 703 objection to testimony about the facts and data in Dr.
Reichard's report. Depo., pg. 31, ln. 15 - pg. 32, ln. 24.

43 •

PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION

242

I

I

As to the concern that Dr. Reichard might be called to testify, that was true whether
defense counsel objected to the evidence being admitted or not. However, it is highly unlikely
that Dr. Reichard would have suddenly been called from New Mexico to testify, if the state
hadn't pfa.rined for that in advance: 1n this respect, it is far more likely that the evidence ·would
have been excluded with a timely trial objection and that the state would not be able to produce
Dr. Reicherd to testify on such short notice. Further, as will be discussed below, there were
specific advantages to having Dr. Reichard testify and be cross-examined, rather than have others
interpret (and misinterpret) his report. However, defense counsel was not aware of these
advantages, possibly because he never spoke to Dr. Reichard prior to trial. Depa., p. 28, ln. 3-5.
Counsel said he believed speaking to Dr. Reichard ''wasn't necessary'' given his theory of the
·- ..
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case. Depo., pg. 28, ln. 21. Note that this failure to investigate and prepare with regard to Dr.
Reichard was itself objectively unreasonable performance. ABA Defense Function Standard 44.1 (a) states that counsel should "explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the
case" and make "efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution[.]" See

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374,383 (2005). See also, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533
(2003), stating, ' "[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable"
only to the extent that "reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation"' (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690-691).
Petitioner was prejudiced because had counsel objected on confrontation grounds, the
state would have had no testimony as to any head or alleged brain injuries and the timing of those
injuries and thus, could not have obtained a conviction. Dr. Reichard's information was the
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state's only basis of proof for the nature of head and alleged brain injuries, the only basis for
testimony as to the timing of the head and alleged brain injuries, and the only basis for the state's
claim that

had suffered a tear to the corpus callosum and axonal shearing.

the.state used Dr. Relchard's testimony to great effect during the entire trial. For
example, in response to the defense motion for acquittal or in the alternative a new trial, the state
argued that Dr. Reichard was the one person who actually examined the brain and therefore was a
more credible witness than Dr. Arden. (Prosecutor Spickler said in discounting Dr. Arden's
testimony, that he ''was trying to contradict the findings of an expert in New Mexico who
actually had the brain and actually took a look at the brain in toto, as opposed to one or more
slides." Exhibit B, pg. 1486, ln. 8-12.)
Moreover, had Dr. Reichard provided testimony at trial, several major issues could have
been explored by the defense. These include the significance of the APP staining -- he would
likely have testified consistently with his report that the vascular axonal injury pattern precluded
a diagnosis of traumatic axonal injury, and, consistently with his own publication, that the PAI
pattern did not indicate the presence of more diffuse axonal injury. Had his testimony been to the
contrary, he could have been impeached with his own report and publication. In addition,
defense counsel could have exposed the inconsistencies between Dr. Reichard's opinions and
those expressed by both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper. In particular, both Drs. Ross and Harper
claimed that Dr. Reichard's report contained conclusions about the nature of the injury and its
consequences which the report did not contain. Dr. Reichard could have clarified for the jury
that Drs. Ross and Harper did not understand the report and were drawing false conclusions from
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it. Dr. Reichard also could have been confronted with the photographic evidence that Dr. Arden
produced regarding the brain laceration being an artifact, which would have countered the only
positive evidence of a primary brain injury. Confronted with that evidence, Dr. Reichard likely
-·would have agreed thaf the laceration was or could have been an artifact. Either outcome would
have led to the state being unable to prove its time line and therefore Mr. Grove's guilt by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Dr. Reichard could also have been confronted with the evidence Dr.
Arden produced concerning the age of the subdural hemorrhage, which contradicted his report.
See Report of Consultation attached to the Affidavit of Dr. Arden.
c. Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to make a hearsay
objection to the Reichard testimony

Further, the testimony ofDrs. Chin, Hunter, Harper and Ross which r~lated. the facts and
data in Dr. Reichard's report, was inadmissible under IRE 703. That rule states, in relevant part,
that: "Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect."
Thus, the evidence, in addition to violating the confrontation clause was also inadmissible under
the rules of evidence. See argument at pages 7-8 above.
d. Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to make
a hearsay objection to the Nash testimony

Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to hearsay testimony from
Lisa Nash regarding the autopsy report contents. At trial, Lisa Nash testified that she was told
that
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this and the testimony was admitted without limitation including for the truth of the matter
asserted. Exhibit B, p. 755, ln. 16-25. Defense counsel did not object on hearsay grounds. Had
counsel objected, the objection would have been granted. The testimony was plainly an out-ofcourt statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and is quintessential hearsay under
I.R.E. 801(c). At the deposition, defense counsel agreed the statement was hearsay and could not
say why he failed to object. Depo., pg. 77, ln. 1-19.

e. Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to make a
foundation or relevancy objection to the Stocking testimony
Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the testimony of Steve
Stocking, a paramedic, that Mr. Grove was too calm in his opinion when the paramedics arrived
___ in response to the 91LcaU. Exhibit B, pg.838, ln. 22._

Mr. St9c~gwa.s_n,ota p~cliolC>gis_t or

psychiatrist and had no qualifications as an expert on the appropriate reactions in a crisis.
His opinion testimony was not relevant under I.R.E. 401 and 402, was unfairly prejudicial under
I.R.E. 403 and did not fall within the scope of admissible opinion testimony by a lay witness
under I.R.E. 701 because it involved specialized knowledge of the appropriate reaction of people
in crisis. See Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 846, 934 P.2d 17, 19 (1997)
("[A]court should disregard lay opinion testimony relating to the cause of a medical condition, as
a lay witness is not competent to testify to such matters.") See also State v. Missamore, 119
Idaho 27, 32, 803 P .2d 528, 533 (1990) (lay opinion testimony about mental state of defendant
held inadmissible). Defense counsel admitted that the testimony was not relevant and made Mr.
Grove appear to be uncaring about Kyler's condition. He could not think of why he did not
object to that testimony. Depo., pg. 78, ln. 2-20.
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f Counsel's cross-examination ofDr. Chinn was deficient
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Chin's
testimony that there was "no way we would have missed any of theO injuries" described in the
autopsy report. Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 5-6. Defense counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Chin on
this claim even though, according to Dr. Ross, some of the injuries in autopsy were old enough
that they did exist when he saw

specifically, Dr. Ross testified that the injury to the left

thigh and the injuries on the back were older. Exhibit B, pg. 978, ln. 23 - pg. 979, ln.17; pg. 987,
ln. 9-20. Defense counsel could not think of a reason why he did not cross-examine Dr. Chin
with Dr. Ross's statements. Depo., pg. 79, ln. 9-13.
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Chin's testimony that what he "read in this autopsy report is the most brutal case'; he had ever
seen. Exhibit B, pg. 851, In. 6-7. This testimony was not relevant under I.RE. 401 and 402 and
served only to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. Thus, to the extent it had any
probative value, it was inadmissible as unfairly prejudicial under I.RE. 403. Defense counsel
testified that he did not know why he failed to object to that testimony and could not think of any
advantage to the defense for the jury to hear that testimony. Depo., pg. 30, ln. 3-9.
g. Counsel's cross-examination ofDr. Hunter was deficient

Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's
testimony that subarachonoid hemorrhage has to have immediate symptoms. Exhibit B, pg. 874,
ln. 24 -pg. 875, In. 22. There was insufficient foundation for that testimony as Dr. Hunter
admitted that he is not a pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 874, ln. 24-25.
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Further defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's testimony that

was either "ejected from an automobile" or "was beaten very

severely." Exhibit B, pg. 871, ln. 12:-14. Again, there was insufficient foundation for Dr. Hunter
to give fuis opinion.
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's testimony that a short fall "is rarely, rarely likely to produce any kind of significant head
injury or bleeding" and then failed to impeach that testimony. Exhibit B, pg. 888, In. 16-20.
Ibis evidence was inadmissible because there was no foundation for this opinion. Further, Dr.
Hunter's opinion could have been impeached with medical research published in peer-reviewed
medical journals. See Plunkett, J., "Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-Distance
Falls," The American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2001)
(attached to the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin previously filed). The author of that article, John
Plunkett, M.D., a forensic pathologist, documented 18 cases of fatal head injuries where an infant
had fallen 3 meters or less. "The author concludes that an infant or child may suffer a fatal head
injury from a fall ofless than three meters (10 feet). The injury may be associated with a lucid
interval and bilateral retinal hemorrhages." Exhibit A, pg. 1 In this case, there was testimony
that

had both bilateral retinal hemorrhages and a possible lucid interval. And this 2001

study was readily available to defense counsel at the time of the trial.
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to object to Dr.
Hunter's opinion, stated without any qualification as an expert in the area, that

had sure

signs of shaken baby syndrome. Exhibit B, pg. 869, ln. 4-16.
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h Counsel's cross-examination ofDr. Ross was deficient
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Ross's
testimony that, although he did not see certain hemorrhages in the psoas and retroperitoneal
areas, he was told about them by the transplant surgeon: Exhibit B, pg. 938, In. 20-23. That
surgeon did not testify at trial. His statements to Dr. Ross, however, were simply admissible
hearsay and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make a timely objection. Defense
counsel admitted that this testimony was hearsay and could not say why he failed to object.
Depo., pg. 81, In. 17-23. He also admitted this evidence was damaging to his theory of the case
and supported the state's version of the events. Depa., pg. 88, In. 4 -pg. 24.
This evidence, as it turned out, was very important in the state's case. The testimony at
trial from the state's doctor witnesses was that those injuries would have been very painful to
The state used that testimony to argue that Mr. Grove must have cause those injuries
because

was not showing signs of internal distress or pain when Lisa Nash left for work:

They all testified that, at a minimum, having sustained the belly injuries, let's call
them, he would be in extreme pain. He wouldn't be able to eat, he wouldn't be
able to run around, wouldn't be able to play with his sister, wouldn't be able to sit
up and watch television on Monday morning.
Moreover, there's no testimony whatsoever that at any time
behaved like he
had received those abdominal injuries. No testimony from the defendant, no
testimony from his mother, no testimony from the grandparents, from anyone, that
at any time, whether it's healing or not healing, did he behave like he suffered
those severe, severe injuries.
Exhibit B, pg. 1418, In. 19-24; pg. 1419, In. 21 - pg. 1420, In. 2. This argument would not have
been available to the state had a proper hearsay objection been made by defense counsel.
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Counsel rendered deficient performance in not moving to exclude any reference by any
witness, including Dr. Ross, to the brain autopsy because no valid chain of custody for the brain
was presented. The state failed to present any evidence that the brain examined at the pathology
laboratory in New Mexico was Kyler's brain.

-

Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to object to the
foundation for Dr. Ross's testimony regarding the head and alleged brain injuries because Dr.
Ross also testified that he had never viewed any of the slides or recuts himself. Exhibit B, pg.
959, ln. 10-15.
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Ross's
testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear in the corpus callosum shows there was "a
very significant force" applied, something comparable to a ''very high fall" of "a couple of stories
or so," or a "motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, ln. S12. First, as noted above, that testimony violates the confrontation clause. Further, that
testimony is not admissible under I.RE. 703 because there was no foundation for Dr. Ross's
opinion about the amount of force needed.
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to point out the
differences between Dr. Reichert's report and the state witnesses' conclusions drawn from that
report. In particular, the PAI identified by Dr. Reichard (assuming for discussion that it was
present) is a localized phenomenon and, by his own publication, does not imply that more diffuse
or widespread axonal injury is present. Dr. Reichard did not diagnose diffuse traumatic axonal
injury in the brain of
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traumatic axonal injury. Counsel, however, failed to cross-examine Dr. Ross on this
disagreement with Dr. Reichard, or get Dr. Ross to admit that he had not personally examined the
slides from the brain, either the routine or APP stains. See Report of Dr. Arden, pg. 4-5.
Counsel admitted that he did not cross-examine br. Ross about tliis and that he was unaware that
Dr. Reichard had not diagnosed Diffuse Axonal Injury. Depo., pg. 99, ln. 5-20.
i. Counsel's cross-examination ofDr. Harper was deficient

Counsel rendered deficient performance in regard to the testimony of Dr. Deborah
Harper. Counsel failed to object or move to strike when Dr. Harper vouched for the abilities of
state's witness Dr. Ross. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, ln. 12-14. ("Dr. Ross, I'm sorry to say, is no
longer our - in our Medical Examiner's Office, because he is a super clinician.") Counsel did
not have a reason for his failure to object. Depa., pg. 84, ln. 9-12. Counsel also failed to object
to irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony regarding the estimated force needed to inflict the
injuries, comparing it to the force of being hit by a car, or being dragged behind a horse, or
having a horse step on Kyler's abdomen, or being hit by a baseball bat, even though there was no
foundation showing she could accurately make such estimates of force. Exhibit B, pg. 1034, ln.
7-21.
Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to cross-examine Dr. Harper,
when she testified that the child had an intrinsic brain injury (suggestive of axonal injury), an
opinion contrary to the clinical CT scan and to the neuropathology examination. See Report of
Dr Arden, pg. 4-5. Defense counsel stated that he did not cross-examine Dr. Harper about this
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because he was not aware of the difference between Dr. Reichard's report and Dr. Harper's
testimony about it. Depo., pg. 100, In. 8-15.
k. Counsel's performance during the testimony ofDet. Birdsell
_was deficient

Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the admission of
photographs taken a month after Kyler's death, which included many sympathy cards sent to the
family. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash trailer
approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg. 996, ln. 19 - pg. 997,
ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6). The photos were inflammatory because they

included a large display of sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash and thus were inadmissible under

_J_RJ~. 4_o3 "becaus_e th_e ~a11ger of unfair__p__i:_~J_.udi_ _~e out\¥eigh.~4 any probative vah.1e. _pefense
--

--

counsel could not think of why he did not make an objection to this evidence. Depo., pg. 46, ln.
2-12.
l. Counsel's performance was deficient during the direct and
cross-examination ofMr. Grove

Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he introduced evidence in the
direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son
Alex. Exhibit B, pg. 1074, ln. 1-24. There was no valid strategic purpose for introducing this
evidence as, even if it were expected to be brought up by the state, it could have been kept out by
filing a motion in limine as it is both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence. Defense
counsel could not say why he brought out this evidence. Depo., pg. 93, In. 9-17.
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Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the prosecutor
questioning Mr. Grove about the fact he was behind on child support. Exhibit B, pg. 1115, ln.
21-24. The state's cross-examination about this topic was improper as discussed in Section B
above. Moreover, even if it were relevant, this evidence could have been kept out by filing a
motion in limine as it is both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence.
Further, in his cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor characterized Mr. Grove's
sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is ''the story you need the jury to believe" and then
opined that "some things ... just don't really make sense." ExhibitB, pg. 1113, In. 8-11. While
defense counsel's objection was sustained, counsel did not ask that the comments be stricken,
that the jury be instructed to disregard the comments or that the prosecutor be reprimanded for
his blatant misconduct. Id.
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient when he failed to object to the
prosecutor asking Mr. Grove when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription
''was a result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12. This questioning
was clearly objectionable because it went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical situation has arisen
which affects our ability to proceed with trial today'' and did not mention Mr. Grove or the nature
of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg. 1067, ln. 3-5.
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m. Counsel's performance was deficient during the preparation
for his testimony and in the direct and cross-examination ofDr.
Arden
Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in the presentation of the expert
testimony of Dr. Jonath~ Arden. Specifically, Dr: Arden :requested that defense counsel provide

him with all existing microscopic slides for examination prior to trial. Defense counsel,
however, did not comply with that request and did not provide any special stain slides, including
iron stains, to Dr. Arden for review. Those slides existed and have been provided to Dr. Arden
for review in connection with this post-conviction Petition. Had defense counsel provided the
iron stain slides to Dr. Arden prior to trial, Dr. Arden could have testified to his observations of
the slides which would have both confirmed and extended his testimony on the ages of the
injuries sustained by
Upon his review of the iron stains slides, in preparation for this post-conviction action,
Dr. Arden was able to confirm some of the findings recorded by Dr. Ross. Dr. Arden was also
able to make some additional observations that support and extend his (Dr.Arden's) opinion on
the ages of the injuries. Some of the iron-staining is co-existent with the fresher-appearing
hemorrhage; this in conjunction with the inflammatory response, indicates that the hemorrhage is
in the early stages of response. This observation is consistent with and strengthens the opinion
offered by Dr. Arden that the injuries sustained by

had occurred several days to five days

prior to death. Dr. Ross testified that the fresher hemorrhage was coincidentally located with the
positive iron staining, thus representing older and newer injuries in the same locations. Dr.
Arden disagrees with this interpretation, which relies on coincidence and fails to synthesize the
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totality of the findings into a unified diagnosis. Based upon Dr. Arden's post-trial examination
of the iron stains, he has found positive iron staining trapped within connective tissue (i.e.,
separate from the visible hemorrhage), which represents the remnants of much older healed
bleeding.
Had Dr. Arden been allowed to review the iron stains prior to trial, he could have testified
that the iron stain autopsy slides contain evidence not only of significant aging of the more recent
injuries such that they were not particularly consistent with having been incurred just prior to
clinical presentation, (i.e., when Stacey Grove was with

but also of much older bleeding,

reflective of older injuries. And had Dr. Arden been allowed to review the iron stains prior to
trial, he could have testified that

had been injured at some much earlier time or times,

unrelated to when he was with Stacey Grove.
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to provide slides from the
brain examination to Dr. Arden for the doctor's examination prior to trial. Dr. Arden did not
have the opportunity to examine APP stained slides from the neuropathology examination prior
to trial. He has not been able to review the slides since the trial as their location is unlmown.
Performing his own independent examination of the APP stained slides prior to trial would have
afforded him the opportunity to assess all of the evidence related to penumbra! axonal injury and
potentially would have allowed him to have rebutted Dr. Ross's opinion that there was a
laceration of the brain structure, but absent being provided those slides, he could not do so.
Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor
attempting to impeach Dr. Arden with alleged "gross mismanagement" when he was the Medical . _ _ _ ..
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Examiner in the District of Columbia. Exhibit B, pg. 1382, In. 6 - pg. 1388, In. 12. These
allegations of administrative errors and allegations of sexual harassment were irrelevant under
IRE 401 and 402 because they did not impeach Dr. Arden's medical testimony. Further, the
allegations' unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value and were inadmissible under IRE
403. The allegations were also not admissible under IRE 404, nor did the state give any notice of
its intent to use the evidence to the extent it claims the evidence was admissible under IRE
404(b). Defense counsel's performance was also deficient for failing to attempt to rehabilitate
Dr. Arden on re-direct examination by pointing out that the allegations of mismaganment had
nothing to do with his abilities as a forensic pathologist or his conclusion in this case. Defense
counsel admitted that he was aware of these allegations prior to trial, Depo., pg. 85, In. 12-13, so
he could have moved in limine to exclude that evidence. Or, failing that, he could have alerted
the jury to those allegations himself. Defense counsel stated., "I should have [alerted the jury to
the allegations]. I should have pulled that thorn. That was a mistake." Depo., pg. 85, In. 18-22.
Finally, defense counsel could not think of a reason why he did not object to the
prosecutor's allegation that Dr. Arden was on a "special mission." Depo., pg. 47, In. 6-16.
n. It was deficient performance for defense counsel to fail to

introduce photographs of
taken at St. Joseph's Hospital soon
after he arrived in an ambulance
Photographs taken of

when he arrived at St. Jospeh's Hospital are attached (under

seal) to the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, previously filed with this Court. These photographs
show no redness or bruising and therefore are inconsistent with the state's theory that Mr. Grove
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which resulted, in part, in serious abdominal injuries. It was

deficient performance for defense counsel to fail to introduce those photographs.

o. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed
to move for a mistrial after many jurors fell asleep during the
testimony
Counsel admitted that he was made aware by his paralegal that a juror was asleep during
his cross-examination of Dr. Ross. In fact, however, counsel was aware during the trial that
jurors were falling asleep during the testimony ofDrs. Ross and Arden. He was also put on
notice regarding the sleeping jurors because the Court was required to take unscheduled recesses
because of it. See e.g., Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 - pg. 922, In. 6; pg. 983, In. 9-13; pg. 1351, In.
19-25. As set forth in Section C above, jurors' sleeping during the presentation of evidence is a
form of juror misconduct which deprives the defendant of due process of law and it was deficient
performance for defense counsel to fail to move for a mistrial.

p. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed
to question paramedic David Chenalt about Lisa Nash's reaction
to
's injury

Mr. Chenalt could have testified that Ms. Nash's behavior was ''the most bizarre reaction
we've ever seen for especially a kid call." See Grand Jury Tr. p. 214, In. 5 -pg. 217, In. 15.5 The
fact that defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to elicit evidence from Steve Stocking that Mr.
Grove's affect was ''too calm," while failing to bring out evidence from a paramedic that Lisa
Nash's behavior was ''the most bizarre reaction we've ever seen" demonstrates the absence of a
strategy regarding this type of evidence. If counsel believed Mr. Stocking's opinion was

The Grand Jury Transcript is a confidential document in the criminal case of which the
Court has taken judicial notice.
5
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admissible, there would be no conceivable reason to fail to call Mr. Chenalt to testify about Ms.
Nash's affect. Defense counsel testified that he did not know why he failed to introduce this
testimony. Depo., pg. 95, In. 1-8.

q. Defense counsel's performance during closing argument was
deficient
Defense counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient in several respects.
First, he failed to argue that the state had failed to carry its burden of proof because Dr. Reichard
did not testify and the other doctors did not have an adequate basis for their opinions of when the
injury happened. Defense counsel's performance during the state's closing and rebuttal
arguments was deficient because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the
pro~ecutor. These inITT@ces cU"e discu~sed in S~ction B abc)Ve. A,tthe cleposttion, defense
counsel could not say why he did not object to the prosecutor's comments about Dr. Arden's
"financial position," Depo., pg. 47, In. 6-16; pg. 57, In. 11-15, or the proesecutor's comments
about having evidence that Mr. Grove had been violent with

in the past, Depo., pg. 60, In.

10-12, or his comments that ''we don't want to let a murderer go free," Depo., pg. 60, In. 13-16,
or his comments that Mr. Grove had "a different kind of emotional breakdown" which resulted in
the injuries to

Depo., pg. 62, In. 7-13.

Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial
or curative instructions after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. While defense
counsel expressed doubts about the efficacy of curative instruction, Depo., pg. 63, In. 10-14, such
a request would have at least preserved the prosecutorial misconduct issue for appeal. Depo., pg.
65, In. 14-18.
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r. Mr. Grove was prejudiced
As noted above, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court
should not look to each example of deficient performance and determine whether it was
prejudicial. Instead, the Court should consider all the deficient performance and then determine -whether the cumulative effect was prejudicial. Boman v. State, 129 Idaho at 527, 927 P.2d at
917 and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho at 32, 878 P.2d at 206. See also Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d
at 1001. The cumulative effect here demonstrates a reasonable probability of a different result
had defense counsel's performance not been deficient. Crucial state's evide~ce would have been
excluded, exculpatory defense evidence would have been presented, and egregious prosecutorial
misconduct would have been prevented or resulted in a mistrial, or a mistrial would have been
-.

granted due to juror misconduct.

ID. CONCLUSION

Mr. Grove has established a Confrontation Clause violation, that he was deprived of due
process of law by Prosecutorial and Juror Misconduct and that he was deprived of the Effective
Assistance of Counsel. Consequently, this Court should deny the state's motion, grant Mr.
Grove's motion for summary disposition and vacate the criminal judgment and conviction.
f~

Respectfully submitted t h i s ~ day of March 2013.

iltM-M

Deborah Whipple

~
~!QJ.1\.J;. ~~~-LJ~( D
~
Dennis Benjamin

Attorneys for Stacey Grove
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Nance Ceccarelli
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P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

9
10
11

STACEY GROVE

12

Petitioner,

CASE NO. CV- 12-01798

13
14

v.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION and RESPONSE to
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

15

16
17
18
19

STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent

20
21

22

_Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Nez Perce County Deputy

23

Pros~cuting Attorney, Nance Ceccarelli, submits the following in support of the State's Motion for

24

Summary Disposition currently before th.is Court, and in response to the Petitioner's brief in

25

support of the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition currently before this Court.

26
27
28
29
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FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder following a jury trial in July 2008;
Petitioner was sentenced in January 2009 to life in prison with 22 years fixed. Petitioner appealed
the CQnvictio11. ~}v1~cll 20! l,_the Id849 Court of Appeals affirmed t_1-e copv_ictio_n and sente~ce.

5
6

On September 12, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Petitioner's Petition for Review.

7

Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and accompanying Affidavits in Support of the

8

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on September 7, 2012. The State and the Petitioner have each·

9

filed Motions for Summary Disposition.

10

11

12

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

13

The crux of the Petitioner's arguments rests in various assertions and allegations that

14

attempt, but do not succeed in raising issues of material fact. Petitioner surmises as to the intent of

15
witnesses, trial counsel, and jurors present at trial and supports those conclusions based on his
16
17

reading and hind-sight analysis of the trial transcript. (see various citations to the trial transcript in

18

Petitioner's Brief in Response.to State's Motion. .. )

19

20

"Summary dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine
issue of material °fact that, ifresolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the

21
22

requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented,

an evidentiary hearing must be conducted."

23

State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271 (Ct.App.2002).

24

Petitions that are unverified and conclusory may be dismissed by motion for summary disposition.

25

LC. § 29-4906. Conclusory or unverified allegations are "insufficient to entitle petitioner to an

26
27

evidentiary hearing." King v. State~ 114 Idaho 442,446 (Ct.App.1988).

28
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1

The Petitioner bears the burden ofproving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the

2

allegations upon which his request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; Stuart v.

3

State, 118 Idaho 865,869 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271 (Ct.App.2002) (emphasis

4

added). Petitioner has requested that the Court take judicial notice of transcripts,_ a:ffida~w, lg<;l_ged.

5
6

documents, exhibits, and the entire record. Additionally, the Petitioner has provided the Court with

7

numerous citations to state and federal case law as if the allegations made in the petition are true;

8

however, few of the allegations are substantiated or corroborated with anything more than affidavits

9

by family members who were present during the trial (and could have brought the alleged failings

10
11

12

of jurors and defense counsel to the attention of the Petitioner) or a backwards-looking interpretive
analysis of what happened and conjuring a different result.

13
14

ARGUMENTS

15
Petitioner fails to meet the :requirements of LC; §19-4901(a) for Post-Conviction Relief
16
17

because he fails to assert claims that are valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,

18

he has failed to support his claims with affidavits or evidence sufficient to provide an issue of

19

material fact, and he raises issues that could have been raised on direct appeal but were not.

20

Therefore, the petition fails to raise a claim for relief and should be summarily dismissed.

21

22
23

Petitioner alleges five causes of actions for post-conviction relief. Each cause of action is
addressed individually.

24
25
26
27
28
29
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1. Whether Petitioner was denied the right to confront witnesses against him wht:n
State's witnesses testified at trial about tests and results they personally did not
perform nor had personal knowledge.

I
t
I·

1

l

_Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses:against him was violated when tht::

!

5
6

f

State's witnesses testified at trial about neuropathology tests and examination results which they

7

neither performed nor had personal knowledge; and further, that the neuropathologist, Dr. Reichard,

8

who performed the tests and examination, was not a witness at trial. Trial counsel for the Petitioner

iI

admits that he was aware of the report of Dr. Reichard, the contents of the report, that State experts

I

9

10

11

witnesses relied upon and opined based on the contents of the report, and trial counsel did not raise

12

objections to the testimony of the various State expert witnesses, because of"where we were going

13

and what we were trying to accomplish in the defense "(Depo. pg. 18, ln.4-pg. 32, ln. 25).

14

15

Petitioner's trial counsel admits familiarity with Crawford v. Washington and its import
related to the confrontation clause and specifically admits that he did not object-to the expert

16

17

testimony and specifically did not make any objections based on confrontation clause during trial

18

for the "same reasons we've talked about" (referring to his trial plan, strategies, objectives, and

19

overall defense of the Petitioner Depo. pg. 37, ln 19)J

20

Petitioner's Sixth Ainendment rights related to the confrontation clause were not violated

21
22

23
24

because he had opportunity to plan, prepare, and present a defense that confronts the information
relied upon by State witnesses and specifically did not.
Petitioner's claim should be summarily dismissed.

25

26
27

28.
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I

1
2.
3

4

2. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct (a) outside the presence of the
Court during trial, (b) during the state's case-in-chief, (c) during the crossexamination of Petitioner and (d) during closing and rebuttal argument.
, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor committed .mi~()onduct in multiph: ways:

5
6

•

7

•

8

•

9
•

10

first, he projected family photos of the victim prior to the Court going on record, thus
exposing the jury to extra-judicial evidence;
second, he appealed to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury through the use
of inflammatory tactics by eliciting testimony of the victim's sister;
third, he elicited inadmissible evidence during cross-examination of Petitioner and Dr.
Arden; and,
finally, comments during his closing and rebuttal arguments constitute conduct
sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error.

11
12

13
14

Petitioner is precluded from raising issues in a post-conviction petition that could have been
raised on direct appeal butthat Petitioner failed to raise previously. Furthermore, issues that could
have been raised on direct appeal but were not are precluded and cannot be raised in post-

15

16

conviction proceedings. LC. § 19._490l(bJ. Petitioner's allegations ofprosecutorial misconduct

17

should have been raised on direct appeal and are not valid claims for post-conviction relief under

18

LC.§ 19-4901(a) and should be summarily dismissed.

19

The deposition of Petitioner's trial counsel makes it very clear that:

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

1) Certain instances of allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were
unobserved by trial counsel (setting up power point exhibits Depo. pg.38-40,
In. 23);
2) State's exhibits at trial are now construed by Petitioner to be inflammatory
and prejudicial when in fact it is impossible to discern from the photographs
what kind of cards were on display and therefore impossible to determine what
effect, if any, the photographs had on the jury at that time (Depo. pg. 45 In. 18pg. 46 ln. 12 and State's trial exhibits 4, 5, 6);
3) Trial counsel did not see any grounds for a mistrial because "if I (sic) had ...
I would have made that motion. And again, I didn't want to hammer it home."
(reference to the concept of not highlighting or emphasizing negative things to a
jury Depo. pg. 52 In. 6).
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1

Reading all of this voluminous record, including the transcript of the trial and of trial

2

counsel's deposition, there is no evidence of egregfous conduct by the prosecutor and

3

consequently of any fundamental error, as alleged by the Petitioner. There is nothing in the

4

_ record, too, to sµggest that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raiseJlie i_ssll.~ of

5
6

prosecutorial misconduct when it appears that there was no notice of prosecutori~ misconduct

7

observed by or brought to the attention of the Court by trial counsel or Petitioner or of

8

"observers" who now come forward with affidavits. Thus, this claim should be summarily

9

dismissed.

10
11

12

3. Whether Petitioner was denied due process when jurors engaged in misconduct by
·
allegedly sleeping during the presentation of evidence.
Petitioner asserts that jurors engaged in misconduct when they were allegedly sleeping

13
14

during the presentation of evidence as various points throughout the trial. Petitioner engages in a

15

discµssion attempting to distinguish this case from Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 (Ct.App.2006):

16

Murphy did not identify which day of the five-day jury trial the juror allegedly slept,
describe the length of time the juror allegedly slept, or explain what testimony or evidence
the juror allegedly slept through. In the absence of such evidence, there was no showing of
deficient performance or prejudice. Therefore, it was proper for the court to dismiss this
claim.

17

18
19
20

21

22

Id. at 150.
However, although Petitioner presents affidavits that identify days in which jurors allegedly
slept, and while there is some indication in some -0f the affidavits referencing testimony that jurors

23
allegedly slept through, the allegation does not indicate which jurors were allegedly sleeping

24
25
___ 26:_
27

through the referenced testimony. Thus, does Petitioner expect us to assume that all jurors were
. sleeping all of the time, or tlrroµgh all of th~ ~pop:ant testnne>ny,_:~r.through only the testimony
that was in support of Petitioner's defense?

28
29
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1

In fact, trial counsel was aware of only one specific time during Dr. Ross's testimony in

2

which a juror was "falling asleep" (Depo. pg. 67 ln. 1 - pg. 70 1n. 1). Without any specific

3

information as to the amount of "important" testimony allegedly missed by the jurors, with the

4

.... ·~ .____ -··- --

s~gle documented exception noted above_dllring the cross examina,tion of Dr. ~~ss by trial counsel,

5
6

it is unfathomable that for a trial lasting more than a week that these audience members, who now

7

recall jurors sleeping, would not have shared this critically important information with trial counsel

8

or the Petitioner. There is nothing in this vast record that supports any claim of due process

9

violations because of juror misconduct. Further there is nothing in this vast record that supports

10
11

12
13
14

any claim of appellate counsel or trial counsel being ineffective for deficient performance for
failing to raise the issue of juror misconduct.
Petitioner's allegations of juror misconduct should be summarily dismissed.

15

4. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for deficient performance for either
failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct or juror misconduct.

16

Nothing in Petitioner's petition or in the record supports an argument that appellate

17

counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further, there is

18
19

nothing in the record to support a claim that either of these allegations of misconduct occurred other

20

than in hindsight. Finally, trial counsel specifically admits that his lack of making a record on these

21

issues was likely strategic (Depo. pg. 52 ln. 6; Depo. pg. 67 ln. 1 - pg. 70 ln. 1; and, other multiple

22

references within the Deposition to trial counsel's reasoning).

23

24
25

Petitioner's claim of deficient performance by appellate counsel should be summarily
dismissed.

26
27

28
29
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1

2
3
4

5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for numerous actions such as failing to
present an adequate analysis, failing to move for a mistrial, failing to challenge for
cause a juror, and for rendering deficient performance.
Petitioner offers a laundry list of claims that trial counsel was ineffective. However, the

5
6

deposition of Petitioner's trial counsel makes it clear that there was a competent, strategic defense

7

planned around a theory that the Petitioner was innocent and that the Petitioner could not have

8

murdered

9

(Depa pg 104 In 7 - pg. 105 1n 9).

Therefore, Petitioner's claims that trial counsel was ineffective and deficient should be

10
11

summarily dismissed.

12

Petitioner fails to meet the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington for purposes of

13

determining whether counsel was ineffective. This Court cannot" ... second-guess strategic and

14

tactical decisions and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the

15

decision is shown.to have resulted from inadequate preparation. ignorance ofthe relevant law. ... "
16
17

State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008); Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584 (2000). In addition,

18

"[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of

19

professional assistance." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).

20

Petitioner has not shown that any of trial counsel's strategic decisions (e.g., summoning a

21

22
23
24
25

new jury pool, or peremptory challenge of a juror) resulted from inadequate preparation or
ignorance of the relevant law (Deposition of Scott Chapman in its entirety).
Therefore, Petitioner's claims of ineffective trial counsel cannot be the basis for his relief
and should be summarily dismissed.

26
27
28
29
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1
CONCLUSION

2
3
4

Petitioner fails to meet the requirements of LC. §19-4901(a) for Post-Conviction Relief
because he has failed to support his claims with affidavits or ,evidence, he f~ls to assert claims that

5
6

7

8
9

are valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and he raises issues that could have
been raised on direct appeal but were not.
The State respectfully requests that this Court grant the State's Motion for Summary
Dismissal because the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact and

10
11

12

therefore, the petition fails to raise any claims for relief that may be granted under The Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

13
14

DATED this 29th day of March, 2013
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19
20
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22
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25
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1
2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

3
4

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, was hand delivered via court basket to:

5

(l)J(_~,or~~~~j

6

(2) t
hand delivered via court basket, or
U
(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or
(4) _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United States Mail.

7

8
9
10

ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:

11

14

Dennis Benjamin
Deborah Whipple
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP
P.O.Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

15

DATED this 29th day of March, 2013.
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- Attorneys for Petitioner

IN 11IB DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

. THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
)

STACEY GROVE,

Petitioner,

vs.

)

Case No. CV-12-01798

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW PARNES

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respon~ent.

)
)
)

I

Andrew Parnes, being duly swom and upon oath, hereby states:
1.

I am an attorney who has been licensed to practice in the State of Idaho

since 1990.

2-

I graduated from Williams College (B.A. 1967); Stanford University (M.A.,

1971; Ph.D., 1973) and Boalt Hall School of Law~ University of Californi~ at Berkeley

(JD., 1978).
3.

I am also admitted to the State Bar of California and U.S. District Court,
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Northem District of California (1978); U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (1981); and
the U.S. Supreme Court (1982).
4.

I am AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell and have been named one

of the

nBest Lawyers in America." I am a past president of the Idaho Association of Crimin~
Defense Lawyers and a member of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

5.

My practice focuses on criminal defense:, including appellate and post-

conviction practice~ in both the state ~d federal courts. I have represented clients :i,n

numerous capital cases in Idaho~ California and Utah overth.e past twenty five years.
6. ·

twas asked to provide my opinions regarding any deficient performance of

trial cou.ri.sel 'r~garding the failure to object to the introduction ofinadmissible hearsay in
.

;

· violation ofth~ defendant's constitutional right of confrontation and the failure to .object

.

.

to instances of!P1"osecutorial misconduct during trial.. In preparation of this affidavit, I
i

have· reviewed !the foUowing materials:

at

The Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed :in this

matter;
b;

The Answer filed by the State of Idaho;

c.1

The Briefs filed by :Mr. Grove and the State of Idaho rega:rding the

Motions
d.:

for: Summary Disposition;

The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Grove, 151 Idaho
483,259 P.3d 629 (Ct App. 2011);
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e.

The deposition of Scott Chapman, dated January 24, 2013;

f.

Portions of the discovery related ta the reports provided by Drs.

">-Chm,- Harper. Huntet;~Ross ·ma Reichard;
g.

The report of Dr. Arden, dated December 4. 2012;

h..

Portions of the trial transcript inclucling the testimony of Dr. Chin,
Dr. Hunter. Dr. Ross> Dr. Harper and Dr. Arden;

1.

The trial tronscript containing the opening and closing statement.s of
counsel for the State and Mr. Grove.

7.

Based upon my experience and the review of the above materials, it is my

professional opinion that trial counsel, Scott Chapman, did not provide effective

assistance of counsel as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668-(1984) and
its progeny in several respects as set forth in more detail herein below.
8.

The central issue in the case was the timing oftbe injuries to the child. Mr.

Chapma:n acknowledged this fact in both his opening statement and closing argument at
trial. See, also, Chapman Deposition, p. 18. In its opinion, the Court ofAppeals referred

i
i

to the iss.ue as ''the central disputed question in this case - when the injuries which

!

u1timately caused K.M. 's. death occurred and whether it was likely that K.M. would have
lost consciousness and/or shown severe symptoms :immediately after the injuries were
inflicted/' State v. Grove, 151 Idaho a.t490. Thus, ex:clusion of any·evidence supporting

the prosecution's theory tha1 the injuries occurred only in the morning when Mr. Grove
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was alone with the child was critical to the defense of the case, and a reasonably

competent attorney would have taken all steps necessary to seek ·exclusion of s:uch
evidence. Since the-basis for the testifying expeits'

opinions about the time -0f tbe .•,-s,-,..,.---~-·,-·:·--.

injuries was based upon the report of Dr. Reichar~.wh~ was not listed as a prosecution
witness and was not called by the prosecution, a reasonably competent attomey should
have sought to exclude all refe:r:ence to Dr. Reic4ard' s report

9·.

In preparation for trial, Mr. Chapm·an contacted a forensic pathologist to·

review the findings of the experts provided in the State's discovery; however, Mr.
Chapman did not interview Dr. Reichard at any point before or during trial. See,

Chapman Deposition,· p~ 28. A reasonably competent attorney preparing for trial in this
matter would have inten,iewed Dr. Reichard for a number of reasons. including to obtain
.
.
ail. understanding of why Reichard made the conclusions about the laceration of the
corpus calfosum. · This is especially critical in light of 'the contrary conclusions reached by
the defense expert, Dr. Arden. 1n my experience, experts, such as Dr. Reichard, are
willing to discuss their :findings with defense attorneys.
10.

Mr. Chap;man stated that his main reason for not objecting to the Reichard

report was that he believed thatDr. Arden would, in large degree, ·~poke enough holes in
that to make - I guess in a sense hopefully make reliance on that report misplaced."
Chapman Depositi.o~ p. 19. :Mi". Chapman also "guess[ed]" that he had to talce into

accqm:lt the p_ossibility that the State could have called Dr. Reichard to testify. Chapman
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Deposition, p. 20.

11.

A reasonably competent attorney would have at least known at the

beginning:oftri-althat Dr; Reich;a:td"Was riot listed as a witness by the State" o_dcfentifie~fas·

·,:----

-a witness during the jury voir dire process. In addition, the reasons given by Mr.
Chapman provide no valid excuse for his failure to investigate the basis for Reichard's

opinions· by contacting Reichard before trial. Mr. Chapman's stated concern, that Dr.
Reichard might be called to testify ifhe objected, is unreasonable given Dr. Reichru:d's

unavailability and the fact .that Dr. Reichard could have been called as a rebuttal witness
to Dr. Arden, _irrespective of whether a confrontation clause objection had been made.
12.

A reasonably competent attorney preparing for a first degree murder trial in

2008 should have been aware of the Idaho Rules of Evidence relating to the introduction
of expert evidence and the limitation placed upon the reliance by expem on the reports of
others as set forth in Rule 703. An objection to the testifying doctO!"s' reliance on the
Reicha.td report as well

H.8

an objection to the mtroducti.Qn ofthe autopsy report (trial

exhibit 11), whlch included-the Reichard report, should have been made on the basis of
the rules of evidence. Mr. Chapman provided no tactical reason for his failure to object
to the report on the basis of this rule. See, Chapman Depositio~, p. 32.

13.

Furthermore, reasonably competent attorneys preparing for trial in 2008

should have been aware of the decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
.. and us~c;iitas

abasis to seek exclusion of the Reichard report and the testifying doctors'
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reliance on that report. Mr. Chapman could not recall ifhe even considered Crawford as
a means of e~cluding this harmful evidence at the_time of trial. Chapman Deposition, pp.
-·-:. - ,-·"' - ,:_=-_-_
•.

-14.

C:--.-. •

:-·:.·

The opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals notes that "the Confrontation

Clause ,rio1ation issue complained ofin this case implicates a_ constitutional right (a
conclusion not disputed by the state), ..." Grove, 151 Idaho~ 491. However, because
Mr. Chapman failed to object to the evidence at trial, the appellate court did not reach the
merits of the constiti.rtional violation. A critical part of trial counsel's duty is to make
proper objections so that his client will be able to seek an appeal on those objections, if
the defendant i:s convicted at trial. Beca.use Mr. Chapman clid not object to the Reichard
report,. he failed to represent his client as required by the Sixth Amendment.
15.

- Trial_counsel also has a responsibility to assure that instances of

prosecutorial misconduct are brought to the attention of the trial judge so that the judge
_can admonish the prosecutor, exclude the evidence or improper comment, or if the
objection is overruled, so that there is a basis for an appellate court to review the

objections.
16.

In this case, there are numerous instances where 1vfr. Chapman failed to

object to such misconduct. Mr. Chapman could not recall why he failed to make such
objections but speculated that he might not have wanted to highli~t the improper

e~~~ce or a.rgum~tto the jury. Chapman Deposition, pp. 43,; 47, 78. However, during
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the prosecutor's closing argument, Mr. Chapman did make one objection in front of the

jury which was sustained by the judge and the juzy was ins1ructed to disregard tlurt
. __ cpmment. See, TrialTranscript, pp. 1430. It is therefore unlikely that the'speciilative

.--~-·,-,'

.

-

-~

rea_sons given by :Mr. Chapman for his failure to object to other instaJ,.ces of misconduct
support a finding that he was acting as a reasonably competent attorney.
17.

A reasonably competent attorney would have objected if family photos not

admissible in evidence were projected on a· screen when the jury was.present. Such
family photos are highly inflammatocy and prejudicial as well as lacking in relevance.
The State did not even seek to introduce these photos and their being placed in front of
the jury in this. circumstance should have been the basis for an objection, including a
motion for mistrial and at least curative instructions. Similarly, a reasonably competent

attomeywould have objected to the admission oftrial exhibits 4, 5 and 6, which depicted
the trailer home of Lisa Nash and were taken on August 1, 2006, weeks after K.M.'s
death. :Mr. Chapman failed to object to these photos which niay have been of slight

· relevance related to the testimony of the officer reg~g the dimensions of the trailer but

contained highly prejudicial evidence of what appear to be numerous sympathy cards sent
after K.M. 's death. A reasonably competent attorney would have sought to exclude these
photographs as irrelevant under I.RE 401 and 402, or alternatively more prejudicial than

probative under I.RE. 403, as there was no dispute about the dimensions of the trailer.
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18.

Having filed an objection to the admission ofKaylee's testimony and

having obtained a specific limitation on that testimony from the tria1 judge, a reasonably
.

... ·,_.~_:_>,.

.

---oompetentatto:rney·wow.d'have objected lo any extension of:hertcsfunoiiy-'tfeyoricfihc

:->~.:,--,,.---- ... ·-.,.-

court ruling, :including the prejudicial testimony of her last goodbye to her brother.
19.

On the day that M.r. Grove was originally scheduled to testify, he suffered a

medical condition and based upon that condition. the court briefly continued the trial.
The court informed the jury of a general medical matter but did not reference Mr. Grove

ot the nature of the condition. During cross-examination of11r. Grove, the prosecutor
asked .lvfr. Grove about his prescription for Ativan and his "emotional condition" on

Friday, without objection fro:m defense counsel. A reasonably competent trial comIBel
would have objected to those questions, which were irrelevant to the case. Instead of
.

.

objecting, Mr. Chttp:tnan brought that testimony up during his closing argument telling the

jury this evidence had "nothing to do with anything," in essence acknowledging that he
should have objected ta the questioning. During closing argument, the prosecutor

. referred to this testimony, again with.out objection, trying to connect Mr. Grove~s medical
condition during trial to his "emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger" whe11
Mr. Grove allegedly hit K.M.
20.

During closing arguments, the prosecutor made other improper and

objectionable comments to the jury, including attacks on the defense expert, references to
the numb·~ of child abuse cases and murders throughout the country and in the

councy;· ---·
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reasons why the prosecutor did not call K.M ~s father to testify, as well as an argument

that the jury should not let a murderer "go free."· Mr. Chapman objected to none of these
comments~,- A reasonably competent attorney would hEIVe olJJected to these

iiillamii:iitory·,. . - . -· -· .

comments in order to obt.ain a curative instruction from the court or possibly a mis-trial if
the pros~cutor continued to make these types of comments to the jury: There is no
tactical reason to fail to object to such instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

~ ~------===
SUBSRIBED AND SWORN TO
before me this .\@day of April, 2013.

Notary Public for the State of Idaho
Residing at: ~ tC~
MyCommissionExpires: 'g-31-\ 8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on April
document to be:

R

2013,. I caused a true and correct co_py of the fofogoing
·~---:-

.

... ;~-·-·, -···-

hand delivered ·

X faxed
to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting· Attorney
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF IN
- SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

Petitioner, Stacey Grove, submits the following reply brief in support of his motion for
summary disposition.

I. INTRODUCTION
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief may be granted if this Court
determines no genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions
together with any affidavits on file. The Court must liberally construe the facts and reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277,
1281 (2010). Here, the Court may consider the verified allegations in the Amended Petition, the

1•
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admissions by the state in its Answer, the files and records of the criminal case proceedings, the
deposition of Scott Chapman and the many affidavits filed, including the affidavits of Andrew
Parnes and Dr. Jonathan Arden. The state has not filed any affidavits in response. As explained
below, no genuine issue-of material fact exists and summary disposition should-be, granted in
favor of Mr. Grove.

II.ARGUMENT
A.

Mr. Grove's Right to Confront Witnesses ,4.gainst Him was Violated

Mr. Grove set out at pages 3-14 of his Brief in Response to State's Motion for Summary
Disposition and In Support of Petitioner's Motion (Petitioner's Brief) why there is no genuine
issue of fact and why summary disposition should be granted in his favor because his Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was violated. At pages 3-4 of his brief,

Mr. Grove set out the relevant law. At pages 5-14, Mr. Grove set out why the application of the
relevant law to the uncontroverted facts before this Court requires that post-conviction relief be
granted to him on the confrontation claim.
The state's Reply Brief in Support of State's Motion for Summary Disposition and
Response to Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition
(State's Brief) does not address either Mr. Grove's statement of the law or his discussion of the
application of the law to this case. State's Brief page 4. Rather, the state argues that trial counsel
was familiar with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and did not object to the
violation of Mr. Grove's constitutional rights in accord with a trial plan, strategies, objectives
and overall defense. State's Brief at page 4. The state further asserts without citation to ·

2•
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authority that because Mr. Grove had an opportunity to prepare a case to confront the evidence
against him and did not do so, there was no confrontation clause violation. Id.
The state's failure to dispute either Mr. Grove's statement of the relevant law or his

~--~-·a:n.atysiS' of the application of the law to the-fact-s111-dicatesthe state's agreement wiili,Mr: Grove's -analysis. See State v. Almaraz, _Idaho_, _P.3d_, 2013 WL 1285940 (2013), holding
that the state's failure to argue harmless error precluded a finding ofhannless error even in the
face of the "unassailable" evidence of guilt. 2013 WL 1285940 (Jones, J., dissenting).
The state's argument, rather than denying a violation of the confrontation clause, appears
to be that even though the facts would ordinarily establish a violation, there was no constitutional
error because defense counsel was aware of Crawford and did not object and because Mr. Grove
had an oppo:rtunity to present a defense. State's Brief at 4.
However, the state offers no authority for its underlying premise - that a knowing,
voluntary and intelligent waiver of confrontation rights may be made by counsel without his
client's consent See State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 858, 655 P.2d 46, 65 (1982) (Bistline, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting), "[C]ounsel had a right - better said - a duty - to challenge
evidence obtained in violation of statutory or constitutional rights, or both." Because the state
offers no authority for the finding that counsel could waive Mr. Grove's constitutional rights
without his consent, this Court should not consider the state's argument and should grant
summary disposition in Mr. Grove's favor on the confrontation claim.
Finally, the state's argument that Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses was not violated
· because "he had opportunity to plan;prepare,-andpresent adefensethat confronts the

3•
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information relied upon by the State witnesses and specifically did not," State's Reply Brief, pg.
4, is a non sequitur. The opportunity to defend against "the information relied upon by the State
witnesses" is not related to the question of whether that information was improperly admitted in
· ,_--''"'~", · --- ., violation ofthe confrontation clause; ·Pla:inly,..,.Mr:"Grove ·could not--'con.front the source of-critical
evidence relied upon by the state, i.e., the observations and report of Dr. Reichard and the
observations of the unnamed transplant surgeon because those people were not called to testify.
He could not cross-examine the missing witnesses. But insofar as the state is again arguing that

Mr. Grove's counsel somehow waived Mr. Grove's rights by failing to make proper
confrontation clause objections, it again cites no authority for the proposition that counsel may
waive such a right without Mr. Grove's knowledge and consent. Contra, State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209,227,245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010) ("In Idaho, we permit a defendant to waive a right of
constitutional magnitude, so long as the defendant does so knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently."); State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391, 630 P.2d 674, 678 (1981) ("While
ordinarily a client is bound by his attorney's actions .... an attorney may not waive a
'fundamental' right of a client without the client's informed consent.").
Moreover, even if the state's unsupported argument is considered, summary disposition
should be granted in Mr. Grove's favor based upon the following.
The state argues that Mr. Chapman had a strategic reason to fail to object to the evidence
which was inadmissible under I.RE. 703, the confrontation clause, or both. However, this Court
need not defer to strategic decisions which result "from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law or other shortcomings capable-of objective review:~'- Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho
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558, 561, 149 P.3d 833, 836 (2006). What Mr. Chapman said at the deposition was he had two
reasons he did not object to the introduction of the autopsy report (which included Dr. Reichard's
report). The first was that "[t]here wasn't anything in that autopsy report that didn't work with ..

on to explain his ''thrust of the case" as: "That the injuries that occurred to

were inflicted at

a time when Stace was not around or with the child in any fashion that it could have happened."

Id., ln. 20-23. But this statement proves that it was an objectively unreasonable decision to not
object because Dr. Reichard's report contained the most important fact pointing to the injury
occurring when Mr. Grove was alone with

i.e., the laceration in the corpus callosum. If

Mr. Chapman had objected to the admission of the report (and the many testimonial descriptions
of Dr. Reichard's findings by other state witnesses), the jury would have been unaware of the
existence of the alleged laceration at all, a plainly better position for the defense to be in. In fact,

. Mr. Chapman frankly admits that "Dr. Reichard's report undermined the thrust of [the] defense."
Depo., pg. 19, ln. 10-13. Further, he admits "[t]hat finding is particularly damaging to the thrust
of [his] defense of Stace Grove." Depo., pg. 21, ln. 1-4. And, he admitted that "[f]rom a
strategic point of view, it would have been better for [his] theory of the case to keep out this
evidence if [he] could." Depo., pg. 22, ln. 21-25. Thus, Mr. Chapman's decision to not make
meritorious hearsay and confrontation clause objections due to his belief that Dr. Reichard's
findings worked with the thrust of his case is objectively unreasonable.

Mr. Chapman also speculated that he might have a second reason to not object. He said,
"Also had to, J guess; take into consideration the possibility-that Dr. Reichard could have been·made a witness and come to testify and then have him and Arden sitting there at opposing
5•
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positions." Depo., pg. 20, In. 1-5 (emphasis added). This, of course, is pure speculation on Mr.
Chapman's part. Moreover, it is objectively unreasonable. Mr. Chapman admits that he never
even spoke to Dr. Reichard prior to trial:

--- ------Q. -Okay. Prior to the trlal~ 'dioycru ever-speak ttr-Dr~ Reichard?
A. No.

Q. Did you make any efforts to speak to him?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall why you did not speak to Dr. Reichard in this case?
A. Again, I had a theory, and it was based on where we - "we" as in where Stace
was at at given times and places, 8.1'.ld it wasn't ne~essary.

Q. But Dr. Reichard's conclusion was due to the tear in the brain that your theory
of the case was impossible?
A. Dr. Reichard's conclusion, yes.
Depo., pg. 28, In. 3-25. Thus, Mr. Chapman did not speak to Dr. Reichard because he believed
that Dr. Arden's testimony would counteract Dr. Reichard's testimony. Consequently, it cannot
be that he failed to make hearsay and confrontation clause objections because he was afraid that
Dr. Reichard might testify. 1

As previously argued, Mr. Chapman's-decisionto allowhighly damaging inadmissible _
evidence to be introduced because he believed Dr. Arden's testimony would counter it was also
an objectively unreasonable decision. Petitioner's Brief in Response to State's Motion for
Summary Disposition and in Support of Petitioner's Motion ("Petitioner's Brief'), pg. 42-43.
6•
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Moreover, had defense counsel spoken to Dr. Reichard, he would have learned that Dr.
Reichard had not been contacted by the prosecutor about testifying2 and could have made his
objections at trial knowing that the doctor was in New Mexico and not available to testify. But
even without speakirigtcfflr:Retchatd, it shouldhav-e'been·obvious to Mr. ChapmanthatDr.
Reichard was not going to testify because he was not among the trial witnesses provided by the
state to the Court. See Exhibit B (Trial Transcript), pg. 137, In. 9 - 138, In. 6 (where the court
reads a list of forty witnesses not including Dr. Reichard to the jury panel during voir dire).
Thus, Mr. Chapman's failure to object, to the extent it was based upon a concern that Dr.
Reichard might be called to testify, was based upon inadequate preparation and ignorance of the
law, ICR 16 (b)(7), on his part. 3
Further, the absence of objection to the evidence was due to ignorance of the law. Mr.
Chapman did not testify that he was familiar with Crawford v. Washington, supra, at the time of
the trial. He was asked whether he was currently familiar with the case. Depo., pg. 37, ln. 5 - pg.
38, ln. 9. And, he testified that he could not say whether he was aware of the case at the time of
the criminal trial. Depo., pg. 37, In. 23-25. Moreover, Mr. Chapman erroneously described the
holding in Crawford as, "[t]hat there was a confrontation right that trumps hearsay exceptions."

This assertion is based upon a telephone conversation held between counsel for Mr.
Grove and Dr. Reichard on March 25, 2013, where he stated that he was never contacted by
either the prosecutor or defense counsel with regard to his autopsy report.
2

3

In addition, a decision to not object in order to avoid Dr. Reichard testifying in person

would be objectively unreasonable because Dr. Reichard's findings were, in ~ome respects, more
favorable to Mr. Grove than the opinions of the other doctors. For example, Dr. Ross suggested
that there was evidence of shear injury, -ice, --diffuse axonial injury, in the brain. Exhibit B, pg.
942, In. 14-17. Dr. Reichard, however, noted in his report that "[t]he extensive nature of
V[asular]A[xonial]I[njury] precludes interpretation for diffuse axonial injury." Reichard Report,
pg. 2.
7•
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Depo., pg. 37, In. 9-12. This does not show the level oflegal knowledge needed to make an
intelligent decision about whether an objection to the evidence would be meritorious. To the
contrary, Mr. Chapman's belief regarding the holding of Crawford shows that he is not - even
now - familiar witlrthe"imp-0rrofthat case:'-''--'-''·'c:·- ..

.. . : ----""----- ·-:··

Counsel also admitted that the testimony about the particulars of Dr. Reichard's report by
other doctors was inadmissible under I.R.E. 703. Depo., pg. 31, ln. 15 - pg. 32, ln. 19. When
asked why he did not make a Rule 703 objection he said: "I cannot sit here and specifically tell
you why I did not, other than, again, my general thought process about where we were going and
what we were trying to accomplish in the defense." Depo., pg. 32, ln. 20-23. But, as shown
above, his "general thought process" in this regard was based upon inadequate preparation
(because he failed to detennmethatDr: Reicharcfwas riot going.to be called as a witness),
ignorance of the relevant law (due to his incomplete understanding of Crawford v. Washington)
and other shortcomings capable of objective review (his opinion that the admission of Dr.
Reichard' s report and the testimony about his findings by the other doctors would not harm the
thrust of his defense when the true effect was precisely the opposite). Consequently, under

Estrada, this Court owes counsel no deference.
As to the hearsay evidence regarding the abdominal injuries, counsel could not say why
he failed to object.
Q. Okay. When Dr. Ross4 testified that he had been told by the transplant
surgeon about hemorrhaging in Kyler's abdomen, you failed to object to that. Can
you tell me why?

In addition, Dr. Harper also testified without objection about what the transplant
surgeon observed. Exhibit B, pg. 1032, ln. 20 - pg. 1030, In. 11.
8•
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A. No.
Q. Would you agree that that would be hearsay?
A. Yes.
Depo;, pg:-81~"-fi:L 17-23. Counsel acknowledged that the evidence was importantto the sta-tei.s- --- ·
0

theory of the case.

Q. Okay. Would you agree that an important piece of evidence at trial was the
that were found during the transplant
evidence of the internal injuries of
procedure?

A. I think they were important, but I think the brain was the focus.
Q. And one of the reasons why the internal injuries evidence was important was
would have been in excruciating pain, correct?
because the doctor said that
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And that hurt your theory of the case because biological mom and
Stace did not report
being in excruciating pain, correct?
A. I would agree that they did not report him being in excruciating pain.
Depo., pg. 88, ln. 4-19. Again, it was objectively unreasonable for defense counsel to fail to
make a meritorious objection to this evidence.
Finally, if counsel failed to exercise Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses without Mr.
Grove's permission, that would only be additional proof that Mr. Grove did not receive the
constitutionally mandated effective assistance of counsel.

9•
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B.

The Misconduct by the Prosecutor Deprived Mr. Grove of a Fair Trial
The state now argues that the prosecutorial misconduct issue cannot be raised now

because it could have been raised on direct appeal. 5 In doing so, it again fails to even
. acknowledge· much less discuss Stafe-iCYefl',W-Wliicli held that:

If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall only
be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental error doctrine. Such
review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of
persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of
the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need
for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3)
was not harmless. If the defendant persuades the appellate court that the
complained of error satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court
shall vacate and remand.
direct
appeal,
it could not be shown that
Mr. Chapman's
150 Idaho at 228,245 P.3d at 980. On
--·
....
--

failure to object was not the result of an intentional waiver on the part of trial counsel and Mr.
Grove. Thus, the claim could not have been raised upon appeal. See also Affidavits of Diane
Walker and Eric Frederickson. Thus, the state's argument that the issue should have been raised
on direct appeal should be rejected.
However, it is now clear that there was not such a waiver by Mr. Grove. Further, Mr.
Chapman could not have intended to waive his objection to some of the misconduct because he
admitted that he may not have been aware of the misconduct that had occurred. In particular, Mr.
Chapman stated he could not recall whether the prosecutor projected autopsy photos along with
family photos of

in the mornings prior to testimony while the jury entered the jury room

At the same time, the state argues that appellate counsel's performance was not
deficient notwithstanding the failure to raise the issue on appeal. State's Brief, pg. 7. As
previously argued, the state cannot have it both ways in this regard. Petitioner's Brief, pg. 34-35.
The state fails to even attempt to reconcile this fundamental contradiction in its briefing.
10 • PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
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through the courtroom. Depo., pg. 40, ln. 1-24. Thus, he could not say whether he had a reason
for failing to object.
Further, at the deposition, defense counsel could not say why he did not object to the
·- prosecutor's misconduct in·exceedirrg'the scope of-this Court's ruling regarding-the admissibility
of Kylee Bandel's testimony. Depo., pg. 43, ln. 5-8. He could not think of a reason why he
failed to object to the admission of State's Exhibits 4-6 (showing the family living room and
approximately 25 sympathy cards) at the trial, Depo., pg. 46, In. 10-12, or to the prosecutor's
comments that Dr. Arden was on a "special mission," Depo., pg. 47, ln. 14-16, orto the
prosecutor's comments about Dr. Arden's "financial position" affecting his testimony, Depo., pg.
47, In. 6-16; pg. 57, ln. 11-15, or the prosecutor's comments in closing argument about how it
was coiimion for parerikfo killbabie-s, -Depo., pg. 59, In: 8-11; or his comment that Dr. Ross had
the "unenviable task of taking Kyler's body apart piece by piece," Depo., pg. 59, In. 14-18, or his
comment about having evidence that Mr. Grove had been violent with

in the past, Depo.,

pg. 60, In. 10-12, or to the prosecutor's comments that ''we don't want to let a murderer go free,"
Depo., pg. 60, ln. 13-16, or his comments that Mr. Grove had "a different kind of emotional
breakdown" which resulted in the injuries to

Depo., pg. 62, In. 7-13. Mr. Chapman did

not testify that he made an intentional decision to not object.
The state also argues that trial counsel's decision to not ask for a mistrial based upon
misconduct was a reasonable strategic decision because Mr. Chapman said he did not want to
"hammer it home." State's Reply, pg. 5, quoting Depo., pg. 52, In. 6. This argument is without
· force because it ignores that a motion for mistrial is not made before the jury and thus defense
counsel's decision could not have logically been made on that basis.
11 •
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Next, the state argues that it was not clear that State's Exhibits 4-6 were improper
because it is not possible to discern from the photographs what kind of cards were on display.
State's Reply, pg. 5. The photographs speak for themselves in this regard. The exhibits clearly
,-

0

--'--'c<sl'iow the presence ofmany sympathy cards::--Moreover; one would not expect:Cbristmas cards to,..;___ ·
still be on display on August 1, the day when the photographs were taken by Detective Birdsell,
but one would expect sympathy cards as

passed away on July 10. Exhibit B, pg. 996, ln.

23-2.
Finally, it is··important to note that the state does not argue that the many instances of
misconduct did not occur. Instead, the state weakly suggests that prosecutorial misconduct must
be "egregious" or "fundamental error" before it can be raised in post-conviction. State's Reply
Brief, pg. 6 (emphasis in original). In addition to being offensive to the ideals of fair play and
justice for the prosecutor to argue his intentional misconduct should be tolerated because it just

wasn 't all that bad, the state fails to cite to any authority in support of that proposition. Id. In an
earlier pleading, it did argue that a conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only
when conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error. State's Answer and
Amended Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal ("State's Motion"), pg. 5, citing State

v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,785,948 P.2d 127 (1997). However, the "fundamental error" rule in
Porter refers to the scope of review when the appellate court is asked to reverse based upon
unobjected-to error raised for the first time on appeal: "Because Porter did not object ...we can
address this issue only if it constitutes fundamental error." Id. This is clear because there is no
· indication inPvrter that there was a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's comment
that a defense witness was "lying" or to alleged errors during closing arguments. Further the
12 •
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Porter Court relied upon State v. LeMete, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d 46 (1982), a case which also
dealt with a claim of prosecutorial misconduct raised for the first time on appeal. Recently, the
.Supreme Court cited Porter for exactly this proposition: "Accordingly, when an objection to
·== ,._.""_---:,·-,-~-proseclit6nal nri'scoiidi.ict is not raised·at trial; ·fue·miscom:luct will seft'e as a basis for setting---

aside a conviction only when the "conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error.

State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997)." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694,716,215 P.3d 414,436 (2009); see also State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679,683,227 P.3d
933, 937 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Accordingly, when an objection to prosecutorial misconduct is not
raised at trial, the misconduct will serve as a basis for setting aside a conviction only when the
'conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error.' State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,

·1ss, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997VJ "The cases cifod by the state are thus not apposite to this case.
C.

Juror Misconduct Deprived Mr. Grove of a Fair Trial

In this section of its Reply Brief, the state merely repeats its previous citation to Murphy

v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 139 P.3d 741, 752 (Ct. App. 2006), but totally fails to address Mr.
Grove's argument that Murphy is distinguishable from this case. See Petitioner's Brief, pg. 2930. In addition, it ignores Mr. Grove's argument that the state has the burden of proving the
constitutional error, i.e., the jurors' misconduct, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See also, State v. Almaraz, supra, reversing a
murder conviction where the state failed to make any argument to carry its burden of proving

Chapman harmless error. Thus, the state's repeated complaints that Mr. Grove has not
· specificaily proved which jurors were sleeping during precisely what portions of the testimony
flips the burden of proof upside down. It is the state which must prove that the jurors were not
13 •
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sleeping during any evidence which may have made a difference in the deliberations. However,
it has not supported its (implicit) claim of harmless error with any evidence and thus no genuine
question of material fact exists. Consequently, summary disposition in favor of Mr. Grove

D.

The Ineffective Assistance ofAppellate Counsel Claim
The state does not argue in its Reply Brief that any of the claims other than Prosecutorial

Misconduct have been forfeited under I.C. § 19-4901(b) because they could have been raised on
appeal. That argument was addressed above and need not be repeated here. 6

E.

Mr. Grove was Deprived if the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel
The state fails to respond to Mr. Grove's objection that the state's motion for summary

disposition is not sufficiently specific under DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599-, 601, 200 P :3 d
1148, 1150 (2009) and I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l), which requires grounds for a motion be stated with
"reasonable particularity." Compare Petitioner's Brief, pg. 35-36 with State's Reply, pg. 8. Mr.
Grove takes this as an implied concession of the point especially in light of the state's cursory
and desultory one-page reply to his detailed argument in support of summary disposition in his
favor. Compare Petitioner's Brief, pg 35-60 with State's Reply, pg. 8.
Mr. Grove set forth seventeen general areas of deficient performance (subsections (3 )(a)-

(q) of section E) in his brief. Of these, the state mentions only argument (3)(a), i.e., trial
counsel's failure to summon a new jury pool after prejudicial comments made by a venire

Earlier the state argued that the Juror Misconduct claim should have.been raised on
appeal and asked the Court dismiss on that basis. State's Motion, pg. 8, 13. The reason why that
argument is incorrect was addressed in the Petitioner's Brief, pg. 33-35. The state has apparently
abandoned that argument as it makes no attempt to address Mr. Grove's arguments.
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member and the failure to peremptorily challenge Juror #5. It claims that those decisions were
not shown to have been the result of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law ... "
State's Brief, pg. 8, quoting State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123 (2008). However,
- that·deference·to trial counsel's actions is only applicable-to strategic decisions made-by counseL ·

It does not apply in this instance because counsel never claimed that the decision to not seek a
new jury pool was strategic. He said that while it ''would have been [of] some concern," he did
not see it as "an earth shattering concern." Depa., pg. 73, pg. 18-20. Likewise, defense counsel
could not say why he did not challenge Juror #5 for cause. Depo., pg. 77, In. 1-3. Thus the
state's reliance upon Payne is misplaced as there is no evidence that either shortcoming was a
matter of strategy. (Why counsel's performance was deficient during voir dire is explained at
page 39-41 of the Petitioner's Brief.)
Instead of addressing the other sixteen issues raised, the state merely observes that "the
deposition of trial counsel makes it clear that there was a competent, strategic defense planned
around a theory that Petitioner was innocent and that the Petitioner could not have murdered
State's Reply, pg. 8. However, while having a theory of defense is necessary to provide
effective representation, it is not sufficient by itself to provide constitutionally adequate
representation. Here, the state simply fails to address the multiple instances of deficient
performance and fails to raise a material question of fact as to any of them. And as Mr. Grove
has also established that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial (and the state has never
argued otherwise), his motion for summary disposition should be granted.

15 •
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III. CONCLUSION
The Court should grant Mr. Grove's motion for summary disposition, vacate the
conviction and order a new trial.

4

''"'-'-~,.,,.----~,--Respectfully-submitted this--· /()-day'o-fAprit2&Br:·

-:·.:__ -.--...

Attorneys for Stacey Grove
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on April
document to be:

/D, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

-~mailed
hand delivered
_

emailed to nancececcarelli@co.nezperce.id.us

to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATEOF IDAHO;
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS
BENJAMIN

Dennis Benjamin, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho.

2. Deborah Whipple and I represent the Petitioner herein.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of email correspondence between Dr. Marco
Ross, then of the Spokane County Medical Examiner, and Dr. Ross Reichard, then of the New
Mexico Office of the Medical Investigator.
4. This correspondence shows that Dr. Reichard was contacted on August 3, 2006, three
weeks after

Martin's death, by Dr. Ross in regards to conducting neuropathology

consultations "in cases that have a significant potential to require his services as an expert
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witness in court"
5. Dr. Ross writes Dr. Reichard that ''we usually obtain neuropathology consults in just
about all of our infant and child homicides (or suspected homicides)[.]"

- 6i-Dt. Ross writes Dr. Reichard that '~we are primarily interested in sending our brains
from pediatric homicides and pediatric suspicious deaths[.]"
7. Dr. Ross asks Dr. Reichard about his fee schedule and Dr. Reichard responds by
noting his fees to conduct the examination and his additional fees for testimony.
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a Spokane County Medical Examiner Chain-ofEvidence Form.
9. The form shows that tissue was sent from the Spokane Medical Examiner to the New
Mexico. Office of Medical Investigations onAugust 14, 2006, and was received on August 15,

2006.
10. These documents demonstrate that Dr. Reichard was contracted to produce a report
about

Martin which could be used in future criminal trial proceedings and that Dr.

Reichard was aware that was the case.

11. These documents show that Dr. Reichard's findings and opinions expressed in his
autopsy report are "core testimonial statements" under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-

52 (2004), as the report contains "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions" and also
because the statements contained therein are "statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statements would be
available for use at a later trial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted).
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This ends my affidavit.

Dennis Benjamin)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on April
document to be:

.ln_, 2013,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

(l._mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

~~.. "F-Dennis Benjamin
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Ross, Marco
Sent:
To:
Subject:

R Ross Reichard [RReichard@salud.unm.edu]
Thursday, August 03, 200611:53 AM
Ross, Marco
Re: Neuropathology Consults

Attachments:

Ross Reichard CV May06.doc

From:

[J ( .r y
-·

Ross Reichard CV
May06.doc (58 •••

Dr. Marcos,
I appreciate your inquiry and would be interested in providing neuropathology service for
your office. I've been out of town the last couple of days, hence the delay in my
response. For outside brain consultations I typically have the referring pathologist fix
the brain for 2-weeks in 20% fonnalin and then. ship it. I'll cut it the week I receive
it. If only H&Es are needed then I usually have a finalized report within 2 weeks of
receiving the brain. If.· I have to ·order i.mmunostains or special stains then that adds
another.week 9r so, depending on the complexity of the.case. We charge $1250 and that
includes slides and stains. Of course, if I have to come testify that is additional. Our
office charges $350/hr or $2800/day. I also return all slides,.photos, tissue, blocks etc
to·you.

I hope this answers some of your questions. Please do not hesitate to call me, office
505-272-0722 or cell 505-379-9·509. I've also attached a .copy of my CV.
Ross
Ross Reichard, MD
Medical Investigator
Director of Neuropathology
Assistant.Professor of Pathology
MSCll 6030
1.University of New Mexico
. .Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001
Phone: (505) 272-0722
Fax: (505) 272-0727
>>> ".Ross, Marco" <MRoss@spokanecounty.org> 7/27/2006 4:44 PM >>>
Dr. Reichard:

A couple of months ago you replied to the Name-L listserv that you would be interested i~
doing neuropathology consults. We usually obtain neuropathology consults in just about
'--all o:f; our infant and child homicides (or suspected homicides) and selected adult cases.
The neuropath,ologist that we currently use provides very thorough and timely
consultations. However, because of the demands of his private practice, he has expressed
reluctance to do cases that have a significant potential to require his services as an
expert.witness in court.
Obviously, those are usually the infant homicide cases. So we hope to find another
neuropathologist who can help us out.
I woul.d appreciate finding out about what you might be able to offer us, what your fee
schedule is, and anticipated turnaround times. We are primarily interested in sending our
brains from pediatric homicides and pediatric suspicious deaths, but would also send our
other neuropathology consults, as well, if you desired.
Marco Ross
Marco A. Ross, M.D.
Deputy Medical Examiner
1
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· ciin·alysis at the request of Dr. Sally ~lken/Dr. Marco Bg§s. Plec3se sign and return
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Spokane County. Medical Examiner .
5901 N. Lidgerwood, Suite 24B
Spokane, WA 99208 .
,
Call immediately If seal Is broken, or contents are not as listed (509) 477-2296.
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
· 303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

)
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798
AFFIDAVIT OF STACEY GROVE IN
OPPOSITION TO STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

Stacey Grove, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says:
1. That I am the Petitioner herein.
2. That I am told that the Respondent argued at the hearing on the State's Motion for
Summary Disposition, held on April 30, 2013, that Scott Chapman and I devised a trial strategy

together where I would waive my right to cross-examine Dr. Ross Reichard. I state the
following in response to that argument.
3. I did hot know and I was never informed by Mr. Chapman that I had a right to
confront witnesses.
1-
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4. In particular, I was never told by my attorney that the right to confront witnesses
meant more than just the right to cross-examine the witnesses actually called by the state at
trial.
5. While I knew that I had the right to ha~e my attorney cross-e~amin~"the witnesses
actually called by the state at trial, I did not know that evidence coming from a person who did
not testify could be excluded in some cases if Mr. Chapman did not have the opportunity to
cross-examine that person.
6. I never told Mr. Chapman that I was willing to waive the right to have such evidence
excluded from trial.
7. I never gave Mr. Chapman permission to waive for me the right to have such
evidence excluded from trial.
8. Mr. Chapman and I never devised a trial strategy together. Mr. Chapman did not
involve me in matters of trial strategy, saying that he had the case "under control."
9. We never spoke about a trial strategy that involved my waiver of my right to
confront witnesses.
10. I never waived or intended to waive my right to confrontation.
This ends my affidavit.

......
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
day of May, 2013.

2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on May _ , 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be:
mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

DJ,~.

Deb Grove

3-
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'!.. D3
DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Prosecuting Attorney

NANCE CECCARELLI
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County, Idaho
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 799-3073
ISBN 7787

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY L. GROVE,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2012-0001798
MOTION TO STRIKE

)

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney of record,
NANCE CECCARELLI, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Nez Perce County, Idaho, and hereby
requests that the Affidavit of Stacey Grove in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary
Disposition be stricken from the record in the above-entitled proceedings. This motion is based
on the reasons that the presentation and filing of the affidavit is untimely and blatantly unfair. ____ _
Petitioner, and opposing counsel, were provided ample opportunity to share opinions and

MOTION TO STRIKE
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offer evidence pursuant to the Court's briefing schedule and date set for oral argument. (See
attached Exhibit A) Petitioner, through opposing counsel, had the "last word" in oral argument
during the April 30, 2013, hearing on both the State's and Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Dismissal.
Petitioner now submits an affidavit in response to the State's oral arguments after the
Judge has taken the case under advisement. Thus presented, the State is unable to research,
contradict, or respond to allegations made as factual statements in the Petitioner's affidavit.
Petitioner is attempting, it appears to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the quality
of the representation of trial counsel and the existence of a concerted trial strategy presented to
the jury. The premise that Petitioner participated in and contributed to the development and
conduct of his defense and the trial strategy was raised and specifically argued in the State's
"Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal" (filed in February
2013) to which opposing counsel replied and responded.
Petitioner should have presented his affidavit along with his initial petition pursuant to
Idaho Code § 19-4903, or the amended petition, or following receipt and review of the deposition
of Petitioner's trial counsel, or at any time up to the date of oral argument.
The State respectfully requests that this Court strike the affidavit of Stacey Grove and
rule according to the record as complete following the oral arguments of April 30, 2013. Or in
the alternative, if this Court does not grant the State's Motion to Strike, then the State
respectfully requests leave and sufficient time to properly respond to the allegations in this new
affidavit.
DATED this

____gt_ day ofM~y, 2013.
ce Ceccarelli
'-1:)eputy Prosecuting Attorney
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE was

~·

(l) _ _ h ;

,c_.)

(2) _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or
(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or
(4) {/mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United
States Mail.
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Dennis Benjamin
Deborah Whipple
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

DATED this

dlt:()

day of May, 2013.
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IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV12-01798
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

TIIBREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Summary D_~position and Petitioner's

Brief in Support of Petitioner's Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition due on or
before March 15, 2013;
2) State's Reply Brief in Support ofits Motion for Summary Disposition and State's
Response to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition due on or before March
29, 2013;

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT
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3) Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petitioner's Renewed Motion for Summary
Disposition due on or before April 12, 2013;
4) Oral argument shall take place before the above-entitled Court in the Courtroom
of the Nez Perce County Courthouse on April 30, 2013, commencing at 1:30 p.m.
DATED this I 2 f'aay of February,_ 2013.

0-e(J(

,:?

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that _a true copy of fi:e foregoing O~ER SC~DULJNG BRI_EY~
AND
ARGUMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, tbisl£:.'CT.a.Y of
February, 2013, on:
Dennis Benjamin
Debra Whipple
PO Box2772
Boise ID 83701
Nance C~carelli P O Box 1267

VILU"-3 ~
- - -

·

r.

Lewiston ID 83501

PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
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Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
Deborah Whipple
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ISBA#4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

Attorneys for Pe:titioner
1N THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICLl\L DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,

Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798
OIJJECTION TO STAT:ff?S [d9TTIGi.'}

TO STRIKE

Petitioner, Stacey Grove, objects to the State's Motion to Strike dated May 8> 2013.

:rv1r.

Grove objects to the motion because it is based upon a misstatement of the proceedings to- dr!Li.:. in
this Court.
The State has moved to strike the affidavit-of Mr. Grove filed fol1owh1g the 1\prH JO,
2013, hearing on cross-motions for

summary judgment on the grounds that the affidavit is

witimely and unfair. Mr. Grove filed the motion in response to the State's theory, raised for th:-:
first time during the April 30, 2013, hearing, that he and Scott Chapman devised ,L fi:ial st1 atcgy
together according to which Mr. Grove would waive his constitutional right to cross-examine Dr.

1•
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page ~~-

08 i2.013 3:05PM Nevin Benjamln,McKay~Bart 208 345 8274
' ~

Ross Reichard.
The State claims in its motion that "The premise that Petitioner participated in and
contributed to the development and conduct of his defense and the trial strategy was rniscd anrl
specifically argued in the State's 'Answer and Amended Motion for Sunm1ary Disposition and
Dismissal'[.]" State's Motion to Strike page 2. The State does not offer a page citation within ils
fourteen page Answer and Amended Motion to support its claim. However, review of thi; cntiri;;

document demonstrates that the State's Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition
and Dismissal ·does not raise ''the.premise" that Mr. Chove acted in concert with Mr. Chapman to
· voluntarily waive his constitutional right to confrontation ... This them:y was first raised hy the

State in its oral argument on April 30, 2013. Mr. Grove could· not have responded to this new
theory prior to the oral argument because h!;' had no idea that the State intended to mn.ke such an
argument. In assessing the lack of notice to Mr. Grove, it shouJd be noted that none of the
State's pleadings nor the deposition of Mr. Chapman ever in any way alluded to the State's
.

.

current claim that Mr. Grove acted in concert with Mr. Chapman to v..raive his constitutional
confrontation rights. See Chapman Deposition, pg.. 104, ln. 6-pg. 106, In. 11; pg. 109, ln. 2··6
(entirety of questioning by State of Mr. Chapman). Nor has the State ever offered any citation to

any statement from either Mr. Grove or Mr. Chapman which would support suc-h a theory.
Mr. Grove requests that the State~s Motion to Strike be denied.

ntj

Respectfully submitted this _I_ day of May, 2013.

/hkJ, ~

Deborah Whipple
Attorneys for Stacey Grove

2•
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on May~, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the forcgoi11g
document to be:
mailed
hand delivered
_

faxed to (208) 799-3080

le·

emailed to mi.ncececcarelli@co.nezperce.~d.us

to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

p~T1'1'~0.~Ef.KS. ~
\-1
I.
1'' I

o£.PU1'<
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OPINION AND ORDER
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

This matter came before the Court on the State's-Motion for Summary
Disposition and the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition. 1 The Petitioner was
represented by Dennis Benjamin, of the firm Nevin; Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett. The
State was represented by Nance Ceccarelli, Nez Perce County Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney. Oral argument was heard on April 30, 2013. The Court, being fully advised
in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
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CASE NO. CV 2012-1798

1 Following the hearing on these motions, the Petitioner submitted the Affidavit of Stacey Grove in
Opposition to the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. The State filed a Motion to Strike,
which is granted. The affidavit was not timely, and further, the testimony presented within can be
addressed at the evidentiary'hearing held on this matter.

-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STACEY GROVE,

-

r
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-

------------------- -

-

BACKGROUND
Following a trial by jury, Stacey Grove was found guilty of first degree felony
murder by aggravated battery of a child under twelve years old. The victim was twentythree month old

Martin. The jury returned the guilty verdict on July 30, 2.008.

Judgment of conviction was entered on January 28, 2009. The Court of Appeals of Idaho
considered the Petitioner's appeal of his judgment of conviction. On March 25, 2011, the
Court issued an appellate opinion which affirmed Grove's conviction of first degree
felony murder.

'

A detailed factual summary of this case is found in the Court of Appeals Opinion,
State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 485-489, 259 P.3d 629, 631-635 (Ct. App. 2011). Facts of

this case which are pertinent to issues below are set forth in detail in the following
analysis. However, a brief timeline of events is as follows: The victim was in the custody
of his father on July 9, 2006, and then returned to his mother's home early that evening.
In the morning hours of July 10, 2006, paramedics arrived at the home of the victim's
mother, and immediately transported the victim to the hospital in Lewiston, Idaho. The
emergency room physician immediately recognized the child needed more specialized
care than the hospital could provide, and thus arranged transport to a hospital in Spokane,
Washington. The victim was declared brain dead on July 11, 2006; cardiac death

r

occurred on July 12, 2006, when an organ donation procedure was performed. An
autopsy of the body was performed on July 12, 2006.
The Petitioner initiated this proceeding for post-conviction relief by filing a
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on September 7, 2012. On October 5, 2012,
the State filed a motion for summary disposition. The Petitioner filed a motion for
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summary disposition on October 15, 2012. On January 2, 2013, an Amended Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed by the Petitioner. On April 30, 2013, the

r

Court heard oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary disposition.

· · POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution
of the United States or the constitution or laws ofthis state;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
interest of justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was
unlawfully revoked by the court in whichhe was convicted, or that he is
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint;
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy.

r

LC.§ 19-490l(a).
A petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 194902(a)
Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709,
711, 905 P.2d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 1995). "An application for post-conviction relief

i"

initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,
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287,912 P.2d 653,655 (Ct. App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction
relief "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant, and affidavits, records or other-.evidence supportip.g its ~llegations must 1?_~ -. _ . . . ,. ... __...
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with
the petition. LC. § 19-4903." Id.
In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of

f

pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim
for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844,846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994).
Under I.C. § 19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However,
- ..

"[s]ummary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
petitioner to the requested relief." Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287, 912 P.2d at 655. "If
the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an
r

evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, at 711,
905 P .2d at 644. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any
fact, is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing." Baruth v. Gardner,
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986).
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ANALYSIS

('

The petition before this Court has been appropriately filed pursuant to the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act (hereafter ''UPCPA")2. "[T]he UPCPA was
· instituted as the exclusive vehicle-to present claims,. regarding whether a co:nviction or,
sentence was entered in violation of constitutional or statutory law." Eubank v. State,
130 Idaho 861, 863, 949 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Ct. App. 1997); Still v. State, 95 Idaho 766,
768,519 P.2d 435,437 (1974). The Petitioner asserts five claims within the Amended
Petition.
1. Whether Petitioner was denied the right to confront witnesses against him in
violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Idaho Constitution.

The Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses was violated during the r
criminal trial. This alleged violation occurred when witnesses called by the State testified
about neuropathology tests and examination results which were relied upon and
incorporated into the autopsy report for purposes of determining the cause and manner of
death of the victim. The Petitioner contends medical witnesses relied on results of
neuropathology testing; however, those witnesses neither performed nor had personal
knowledge of the neuropathology testing and examination. The right to confront
witnesses was further violated when the neuropathologist who did perform the tests was
not a witness at the trial.

r

The Petitioner's claims do not fall under the constitutional remedy of habeas corpus. "A writ of habeas
corpus, on the other hand, is the appropriate method for challenging unlawful conditions of confinement."
Id.; Olds v. State, 122 Idaho 976, 979, 842 P.2d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1992). The distinction between a
petition for post-conviction relief and a writ of habeas corpus is important because the constitutional
remedy of habeas corpus has no time limitation. Id.
2
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a. Testimony at trial
An autopsy of the victim's body was performed on July 12, 2006, shortly after his

death, for the purposes of determining the cause and manner of death. Forensic
•., -pailiol-ogist-Dr-.- Marco Ross-performed the autQµS-y•.-~--D.r. Ross removed_the :viG:tim,:s
brain, and consistent with his office's procedures, he sent the brain to Dr. Ross Reichard,

r

a neuropathologist at the University of New Mexico. Dr. Reichard performed the
autopsy of the brain and sent a report of his findings and conclusions to Dr. Ross. 4 Dr.
Ross incorporated the Neuropathological Diagnoses, taken directly from Dr. Reichard's
report, into the Autopsy Report. Other than the incorporated Neuropathological
Diagnoses, Dr. Reichard's report was not offered or admitted at the trial.

Dr. Ross later testified at Grove's criminal trial. 5 During the tria1Dr. Ross's
autopsy report was introduced, without objection, as State's Exhibit 11.6 Dr. Ross relied
on Dr. Reichard's report for purposes of completing his autopsy report. Dr. Ross reached
the following conclusions regarding cause and manner of death in the autopsy report:
r

The cause of death is cerebral edema and subdural hemorrhage due to
blunt force impact to the head. The intra-abdominal contusions are the
result of blunt force impacts to the abdomen. The manner of death is
homicide.
Autopsy Report, at 3(State's Exhibit II).

Dr. Ross was the Deputy Medical Examiner at the Spokane County Medical Examiner's Office. The
victim died at the hospital in Spokane, Washington, and the autopsy was performed by the Spokane County
Medical Examiner's Office on behalf of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
4 Dr. Reichard's Autopsy Report is included in this record as Plaintiffs Exhibit I, attached to the
Deposition of Scott M. Chapman, taken on January 24, 2013. Dr. Ross relied on this report, and included
the Neuropathological Diagnoses in the Autopsy Report, at page 2 (See State's Exhibit 11, included within
Exhibit C, attached to the Verified Petition of Post-Conviction Relief). Dr. Reichard's full report was not
introduced or admitted at trial.
5 Dr. Ross's testimony can be found in the record of this case as Exhibit B, Volume II, attached to the
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Dr. Ross's testimony is located in the trial transcript at pages
3

892-988.
6 A copy of Dr. Ross's autopsy report can be found in the record of this case as State's Exhibit 11, included
within Exhibit C, attached to the Verified Petition of Post-Conviction Relief.

r
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The State also called Dr. Deborah Harper to testify. Dr. Harper is a pediatrician ·
from Spokane who has special training regarding physical and sexual abuse and neglect
of children. 7 Dr. Harper had examined the victim at the hospital in Spokane,
,. · · · - · ·-Washington, prior to his death. -In addition:.to-her-,own.observations, Dr. Harper.spoke ...
with the victim's parents, relied on the autopsy reports of Dr. Ross and Dr. Reichard, 8
and also reviewed various medical records, including notes from the organ harvest team.
Dr. Harper used this information to come to a conclusion about the victim's death and his
physical manifestations of injury prior to death.
Two other doctors also testified at the trial. Dr. Hunter9 was the emergency roorrf
physician who attended to the victim at St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center, in
Lewiston; Idaho, when the paramedics brought him to the emergency room. Dr. Hunter
relied on the autopsy report submitted as State's Exhibit 11. He testified that based upon
his review of the report, the injuries suffered by the victim should have produced
immediate symptoms such as unconsciousness, given the degree of injury described in
the autopsy. In addition to Dr. Hunter, another emergency room physician also testified.
Dr. Chin is an emergency room physician at Tri-State Memorial Hospital, in Clarkston,
Washington. Dr. Chin examined the victim at the emergency room on July 8, 2006, two
days before

was taken to St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center, and ultimately to
r

7 Dr. Harper's testimony can be found in the record of this case as Exlubit B, Volume II, attached to the
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: Dr. Harper's trial testimony is located in the transcript at
rages 1021-1059.
Dr. Harper also relied on the surgery notes from the organ harvest procedure that occurred after the victim
was declared brain dead, but before his body was taken off life support.
9 Dr. Hunter's testimony can be found in the record of this case as Exhibit B, Volume II, attached to the
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Dr. Hunter's testimony is located in the trial transcript at
pages 857-891.
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the hospital in Spokane. 10 Dr. Chin also reviewed the autopsy report and testified
did not have the types of injuries that were present within the autopsy report at the time
he was examined at Tri-State Hospital on July 8, 2006. Dr. Chin explained why he
--'-'"'"·

r

· - --.- -- -- --reached this conclusion, based uponJ(yler?s-.actions and responses duri,p_g bis exam. _
Further, Dr. Chin testified that based on what he had read in the autopsy this was the
most brutal case he had ever seen.
The Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses was violated when the
autopsy report prepared by Dr. Reichard was admitted into evidence, and also referred to
in testimony by four witnesses during the trial. As indicated above, Dr. Reichard's
autopsy report was not separately admitted into evidence; only a portion of the report was
incorporated into Dr. Ross's Autopsy Report that was admitted as State's Exhibit 11.
b. Confrontation Clause analysis from Crawford v. Washington until
present.
r

The Confrontation Clause found within the Sixth Amendment confers upon the
accused the right to be confronted with witnesses against him.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him." We have held that this bedrock
procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923
(1965).

10

The victim's father, Todd Martin, had taken
to the emergency room at Tri-State while
was in
his custody days prior Kyler's death. Martin was concerned about a sore on Kyler's nose and some bruise~the child had, as well as the fact
had broken his leg-incidents that Martin felt may be the result of
child abuse. Dr. Chin's trial testimony can be found in the transcript attached as Exhibit B, Volume II to
the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Dr. Chin's testimony is located at pages 845-857.
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Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1359, 158 L.Ed.2d

177(2004). 11 The Idaho Supreme Court first applied Crawford in State v. Hooper, 145
Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007). 12
- Crawford altered this anal"¥,Sis with-regardto te.stuponials,tatements.Jn
Crawford, the Court held that testimonial statements of witnesses absent

from trial are admissible only where declarant is unavailable and where
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S.
at 59, 124 S.Ct. at 1369, 158 L.Ed.2d at 197. Although the Court declined
to spell out a comprehensive definition of "testimonial," the Court did set
forth some guidelines. First, the Court looked to Webster's dictionary
definition of ''testimony" from 1828. Testimony is "[a] solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d at 192 (quoting
1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).
The Court then listed three formulations of "core" testimonial statements:

r

(1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examination&, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially;"
(2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions;" and
11

"Prior to Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of an
unavailable witness's statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears 'adequate indicia of
reliability.' Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d at 608. To meet that test, the declarant
must be unavailable and evidence must either fall within a 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' or 'bear
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."' State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142-143, 176 P.3d 911, 914'
- 915 (2007).
12 The United States Supreme Court applied the Confrontation Clause analysis from Crawford in the
consolidated cases Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165
L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that "[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution." Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.2d at_.
Thus, a statement is testimonial under Crawford and Davis when the circumstances objectively
indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, unless made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2274,
165 L.Ed.2d at_.
State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143-144, 176 P.3d 911,915 - 916 (2007).
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(3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial."

r

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct at 1364-1365, 158 L.Ed.2d at
192-193 (internal citations omitted). This is not an exclusive list of
--''testimonial" evidence'""-Rather.,.these fonnulations_ ~ share a ~~common
nucleus" and then define the Clause's coverage at various levels of
abstraction around it Id
Hooper, 145 Idaho at 142-143, 176 P.3d at 914-915. Further, "a statement is testimonial
under Crawford and Davis when the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution, unless made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." Id. at 143-144, 176 P.3d at 915-916,

citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2274, 165 L.Ed.2d 224

r

(2006). Thus, the Hooper Court endorsed a primary purpose test to determine whether
an out-of-court statement is testimonial.
Since State v. Hooper, other cases have come before the United States Supreme
Court for further analysis on the issue of whether a defendant's right to confrontation was
violated. The next case to be considered by the high court was Melendez-Diaz v.

Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). InMelendezDiaz, the trial court admitted into evidence an affidavit from a state laboratory reporting
the results of forensic analysis of a substance. The affidavit attested that material seized
by police, and connected to the defendant, was cocaine. The Melendez-Diaz Court
r
determined that these affidavits from the state laboratory were "testimonial," and thus the

affiants were "witnesses" subject to the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth
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Amendment Id. at 307-308, 129 S.Ct at 2530. The Melendez-Diaz Court held that the
defendant's right to confront witnesses 13 was violated. "The Sixth Amendment does not
permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits, and the
admission of such"evidenceagainstMelendez.-,-Diaz was-error." Id. at 329, 129.S.Ct at
2542. The Melendez-Diaz Court rejected several arguments offered by the State as bases

r
for claiming the affidavits were excluded from the scope of the Crawford rule, including:
the analysts who conducted the tests were not accusatory witnesses, statements in the
affidavits were obtained by neutral, scientific testing, and that the affidavits were akin to
official and business records. These arguments were not persuasive because the forensic
testing on the substance taken from the defendant at arrest was performed for the limited
purpose of determining whether the substancewas cocaine, so that the results could be
used in a later criminal prosecution against the defendant. The affidavits were prepared
specifically for use in a criminal trial, and thus were "testimony against" the defendant,
subject to confrontation. Id. at 324, 129 S.Ct. 2527.
Two cases addressing the right to confrontation were addressed by the United

t

States Supreme Court in 2011: Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S._, 131 S.Ct 1143, 179
L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) and Bullcomingv. New Mexico, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180
L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). In Michigan v. Bryant, out-of-court statements were made by the
victim of a shooting to the police officers who responded to the call. The victim
identified the man who shot him and described the circumstances of the shooting; he died

· 13 In Melendez-Diaz, counsel for the defendant objected to the admission of the reports at trial, arguing that

the analyst should be required to testify in person. "Petitioner objected to the admission of the certificates,
asserting that our Confrontation Clause decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354,
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), required the analysts to testify in person. The objection was overruled, and the
certificates were admitted pursuant to state law as 'prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and
the net weight of the narcotic ... analyzed."' Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. at 309, 129 S.Ct. at
2531.
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within hours. Id. at_, 131 S.Ct. at 1150. The Bryant Court followed principals similar
to Davis v. Washington, and determined that the ongoing emergency where an armed
shooter was at large objectively indicated that the primary purpose of the police
questioning· was-to -address the emergency,-and-thus,.-thevictim' s statements to. the ,poli0,e=_,:.""- ... ,-··.· :·····were not testimonial in nature. Id. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 1166-1167.
In Bullcoming, the defendant was arrested on charges of driving while
intoxicated, and a forensic laboratory report certifying that Bullcoming's blood-alcohol
concentration was well above the threshold requirement was admitted. The prosecutor did
not call the analyst who signed the report as a witness; instead another analyst who was r
familiar with the lab's procedures was called as a witness. 14 This analyst had neither
· participated in nor observed the test on Bullcoming's blood sample. Jd. at._, B 1 S.Ct.
at 2709.
The Bullcoming Court held:

Similar to Melendez-Dias, counsel for the defendant objected to the State calling the substitute analyst.
The case was tried to a jury in November 2005, after our decision in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), but before Melendez-Diaz.
On the day oftriai the State announced that it would not be calling SLD analyst Curtis Caylor as
a witness because he had "very recently [been] put on unpaid leave" for a reason not revealed.
2010-NMSC-007, ,r 8, 147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d l, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted); App.
58. A startled defense counsel objected. The prosecution, she complained, had never disclosed,
until trial commenced, that the witness "out there ... [was] not the analyst [ofBullcoming's
sample]." Id, at 46. Counsel stated that, "had [she] known that the analyst [who tested
Bullcoming's blood] was not available," her opening, indeed, her entire defense ''may very well
r
have been dramatically different." Id, at 47. The State, however, proposed to introduce Caylor's
finding as a "business record" during the testimony of Gerasimos Razatos, an SLD scientist who
had neither observed nor reviewed Caylor's analysis. Id, at 44.
Bullcoming's counsel opposed the State's proposal Id, at 44-45. Without Caylor's
testimony, defense counsei maintained, introduction of the analyst's finding would violate
Bullcoming's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." lbid.FN2
The trial court overruled the objection, id., at 46-47, and admitted the SLD report as a business
record, id, at44-46, 57.FN3 The jury convicted Bullcoming ofaggravatedDWI, and the New
Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that ''the blood alcohol report in the
present case was non-testimonial and prepared routinely with guarantees of trustworthiness."
2008-NMCA-097, 1 17, 144 N.M. 546, 189 P.3d 679, 685.
Bullcomingv. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. at2711-2712.
14
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The question presented is whether the Confrontation Clause permits the
prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a
testimonial certification-made for the purpose of proving a particular
fact-through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the
certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification. We
hold that surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional
r
~quirement.· The accused!s,xight-is,;t0-be-confronted with-the analyst who. ···'"-'"·-c:c-,-~_,.__
made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the
accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular
scientist.

i ...

Id. at_, 131 S.C.t at 2710. Thus, the blood-alcohol tests results were testimonial in

nature because the report was "created solely for an 'evidentiary purpose' ... in aid of
police investigation." Id. at_131 S.Ct. at 2717.
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court decided Williams v. Illinois, 567
U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012), where the issue was whether Crawford
bars an expert from expressing an opinion based on facts gleaned from a laboratory report
when the expert lacked firsthand knowledge regarding the preparation of the report. Id.
at_, 132 S.Ct. at 2227. The hearsay evidence was a DNA profile prepared by an

r

outside laboratory using vaginal swabs collected from the victim of the crime. The

fVilliams Court distinguished the forensic reports from Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming
from the DNA testing in Williams.
In Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the Court held that the particular
forensic reports at issue qualified as testimonial statements, but the Court
did not hold that all forensic reports fall into the same category.
Introduction of the reports in those cases ran afoul of the Confrontation
Clause because they were the equivalent of affidavits made for the
purpose of proving the guilt of a particular criminal defendant at trial.
There was nothing resembling an ongoing emergency, as the suspects in
both cases had already been captured, and the tests in question were
· relatively simple and can generally be performed by a single analyst. In
addition, the technicians who prepared the reports must have realized that
their contents (which reported an elevated blood-alcohol level and the
presence of an illegal drug) would be incriminating.

OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

13

r

327

The Cellmark [DNA] report is very different. It plainly was not
prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. In
identifying the primary purpose of an out-of-court statement, we apply an
objective test Bryant, 562 U.S., at--, 131 S.Ct., at 1156. We look for
the primary purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to the
statement, taking into account all of the surrounding circumstances. Ibid.
--

-:

_.-_·.:.:::_.

---

--·--

.--.:~

;~~--_'-"-~-~-----,~-------·"-- --
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Id. at_, 132 S.Ct. at 2243. The Williams Court explained the purpose of the DNA

report was not to accuse the defendant or create evidence for use at trial.
Here, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed objectively,
was not to accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial. When the
ISP lab sent the sample to Cellmark, its primary purpose was to catch a
dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain evidence for use
against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under suspicion at that
time. Similarly, no one at Cellmark could have possibly known that the
profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate the
petitioner-or for that matter, anyone else whose DNA profile was in a
law enforcement database. Under these circumstances, there was no
''prospect of-fabrication" and no incentive to produce anything other than_
a scientifically sound and reliable profile. Id., at--, 131 S.Ct., at 1157.
The situation in which the Cellmark technicians found themselves was
by no means unique. When lab technicians are asked to work on the
production of a DNA profile, they often have no idea what the
consequences of their work will be. In some cases, a DNA profile may
provide powerful incriminating evidence against a person who is
identified either before or after the profile is completed. But in others, the
primary effect of the profile is to exonerate a suspect who has been
charged or is under investigation. The technicians who prepare a DNA
profile generally have no way of knowing whether it will tum out to be
incriminating or exonerating--or both.

r

r

In short, the use at trial of a DNA report prepared by a modem,
accredited laboratory ''bears little if any resemblance to the historical
practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate." Bryant, supra,
at--, 131 S.Ct., at 1167 (THOMAS, J., concurring).

· · · -Id. at_, 132 S.Ctat 2243-2244. Ultimately, to determine whether there is a violation

of the Confrontation Clause, the Williams case requires the application of an objective
test, considering ''the primary purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to
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the statement, taking into account all of the-surrounding circumstances." Id. at __, 132
S. Ct. at 224 3. If the forensic report was "made for the purpose of proving the guilt of a
r

particular criminal defendant at trial," it is testimonial. Id.
In the case athand, the Petitioner urges this Court to find Dr. Reichard's report to

be testimonial, in a manner similar to the forensic analysis considered in Melendez-Diaz
and Bullcoming. In support of this argument, the Petitioner relies on a case from the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir.
2011). In Moore, the government called Dr. Jonathan Arden, chiefD.C. Medical
Examiner15, and Jerry Walker, a DEA senior forensic chemist. Dr. Arden testified
regarding the contents of approximately 30 autopsy reports authored by other medical
examiners in his office, and Walker testified regarding24 drug analyses, only four of
which were performed by Walker. 651 F.3d at 71. The autopsy and DEA reports 16 were

r

admitted into evidence over the defendants' objection.· Id.
The Moore Court found that the autopsy reports were testimonial statements,
analogous to the laboratory reports in Bullcoming.
First, "solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact" are testimonial statements. MelendezDiaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Put
another way, "[a] document created solely for an 'evidentiary purpose,' ...
made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial." Bullcoming,
131 S.Ct. at 2717 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532). The
Supreme Court concluded the certifications in the laboratory report
analyzing Bullcoming's BAC were testimonial because "a lawenforcement officer provided seized evidence to a state laboratory
required by law to assist in police investigations," the certifying forensic
analyst ''tested the evidence and prepared a certificate concerning the
As the Petitioner has noted in briefing, this case involves the same forensic pathologist that the Petitionef
called as an expert witness at trial to refute the testimony of Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper regarding the time of
injury that caused
s death.
·
16 One autopsy report was admitted into evidence pursuant to stipulation. By footnote the Moore Court
noted the admission of this report raised no Confrontation Clause issue. Moore, 651 F.3d at 71.
15
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-result of his analysis," the certificate was formalized in a signed document
and headed a "report," and the document referenced court rules relating to
the admissibility of certified blood-alcohol analyses. Id at 2717.
Analogous circumstances make the autopsy reports here testimonial.
The Office of the Medical Examiner is required by D.C.Code § 51405(bKll~ to investigate"[cijeathsfor_which the Metropplitan fl91ice
Department ["MPD"], or other law enforcement agency, or the United
States Attorney's Office requests, or a court orders investigation." The
autopsy reports do not indicate whether such requests were made in the
instant case but the record shows that MPD homicide detectives and
officers from the Mobile Crimes Unit were present at several autopsies.
Another autopsy report was supplemented with diagrams containing the
notation: "Mobile crime diagram (not [Medical Examiner]-use for info
only)." Still another report included a "Supervisor's Review Record" from
the :MPD Criminal Investigations Division commenting: "Should have
indictment re John Raynor for this murder." Law enforcement officers
thus not only observed the autopsies, a fact that would have signaled to the
medical examiner that the autopsy might bear on a crimiruil. investigation,
they participated in the creation of reports. Furthermore, the autopsy
reports were formalized in signed documents titled "reports." These
factors, combined with the fact that each autopsy found the manner of
death to be a homicide caused by gunshot wounds, are "circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial." Melendez-Diaz, 129
S.Ct. at 2532 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 72-73. The Moore Court found the admission of the autopsy reports was a violation
of the Confrontation Clause. 17 The Court in Moore did not have available to it the
r

analysis from Williams v. lllinois, which was decided the following year.
After the United States Supreme Court decision in Williams v. fllinois, the

Supreme Court of illinois decided the issue of whether an autopsy report is testimonial in

People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570(2012). In this case an autopsy was performed by a state
medical examiner who had since retired prior to defendant's criminal trial. Id. at 575. At
trial, a different medical examiner testified, stating she had reviewed the autopsy --

0

-

-

protocol, toxicology reports, investigator's reports, and photographs that documented the
17 In Moore the Court did not vacate the conviction, however, because the Court determined the admission
of the autopsy report, while an error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 73.
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retired medical examiner's external and internal examinations of the victim's body. Id.
Ultimately, the medical examiner testified that she did not conduct the autopsy
examination, but that she agreed with the retired medical examiner's finding of
strangulation; Id. at576.The lliinois Supreme Court applied an objective primary purpose test, as
described in Williams v. lllinois, in order to determine if the autopsy report was
testimonial.
The Williams dissent rejects this focus on the targeting of a particular
individual, reminding us that Davis formulated the test as whether the outof-court statement was "made for the primary purpose of establishing 'past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution'-in other words,
for the purpose of providing evidence." Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2273
(Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ.)
(~uoting Davis, 547U.S. at 822,126 S.Ct. 2266). The dissent accuses the
plurality of adopting, without explanation, a new formulation of the
primary purpose test when forensic testing is involved, asking whether the
report was prepared "for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted
individual." Id. a t - , 132 S.Ct. at 2273.

r

Id. at 590. Ultimately, the Illinois Court determined the report was not testimonial
because it was (1) not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual
or (2) for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal case. Id. The lliinois
Court determined the autopsy report was not testimonial based upon the following
analysis:
Under state law, as soon as a coroner "knows or is informed that the
dead body of any person is found, or lying within his county,* * * [he]
shall * * * take charge of the same and shall make a preliminary
investigation into the circumstances of the death" if any one of five
enumerated conditions exists. 55 ILCS 5/3-3013 (West 2010). One such
condition is that the death was "sudden or violent death, whether · ·· ·
apparently suicidal, homicidal or accidental." 55 ILCS 5/3-3013(a) (West
2010). Further, even when the police suspect foul play and the medical
examiner's office is aware of this suspicion, an autopsy might reveal that
the deceased died of natural causes and, thus, exonerate a suspect. For
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS
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example, an autopsy of an apparent victim of a crime could reveal that the
cause of death was a ruptured congenital brain aneurysm and that the
physical altercation was not a contributing cause.
In the present case, although the police discovered the body and
arranged for transport, there is no evidence that the autopsy was done at
- - - '"' -the specific request of the police. The medical ~xarniner's. office perforrped __
the autopsy pursuant to state law, just as it would have if the police had
arranged to transport the body of an accident victim.

The statute also requires that when the coroner or medical examiner
determines that the cause of death is homicide, he shall withdraw certain
specimens from the body and shall deliver these specimens to the Illinois
State Police, Division of Forensic Services, "in addition to any other
findings, specimens, or information that [he] is required to provide during
the conduct of a criminal investigation." 55 ILCS 5/3-3013 (West 2010).
Thus, Dr. Choi, as the assistant medical examiner assigned to this case,
was required by law to prepare a report and to submit that report, along
with other items, to the police. Although he was aware that the victim's
husbandwasincustody andthathehad admittedto '_'choking"her, his
examination could have either incriminated or exonerated him, depending
on what the body revealed about the cause of death. See Williams, 567
U.S. at--., 132 S.Ct. at 2228. In short, Dr. Choi was not acting as an
agent of law enforcement, but as one charged with protecting the public
health by determining the cause of a sudden death that might have been "
suicidal, homicidal or accidental." 55 ILCS 5/3-3013 (West 2010).

r

Further, while it is true that an autopsy report might eventually be used
in litigation of some sort, either civil or criminal, these reports are not
usually prepared for the sole purpose of litigation. A finding of accidental
death may eventually lead to claims of product liability, medical
malpractice, or other tort. A finding of suicide may become evidence in a
lawsuit over proceeds of a life insurance policy. Similarly, a finding of
homicide may be used in a subsequent prosecution of the accused killer.
But the primary purpose of preparing an autopsy report is not to accuse "a
targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct" ( Williams, 567 U.S.
at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2242) or to provide evidence in a criminal trial (
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266). An autopsy report is prepared in
the normal course of operation of the medical examiner's office, to
determine the cause and manner of death, which, if detennined to be
homicide, could result in charges being brought. ·
And, unlike the forensic report at issue in Melendez-Diaz, the autopsy
report was not certified or sworn in anticipation of its being used as
evidence; it was merely signed by the doctor who performed the autopsy.
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(Thus, the autopsy report would not be deemed testimonial by Justice
Thomas, because it lacks the formality and solemnity of an affidavit,
deposition, or prior sworn testimony.)
In the present case, the autopsy report did not bear testimony against
the defendant. Nothing in the report directly linked defendant to the crime.
,,.,., · ,-c,

·Unlike a DNA-test whi-ch-might identify.a.defondantas the perpetrator.of-a
particular crime, the autopsy finding of homicide did not directly accuse
defendant. Only when the autopsy findings are viewed in light of
defendant's own statement to the police is he linked to the crime. In short,
the autopsy sought to determine how the victim died, not who was
responsible, and, thus, Dr. Choi was not defendant's accuser.
Finally, as a practical matter, because a prosecution for murder may be
brought years or even decades after the autopsy was performed and the
report prepared, these reports should be deemed testimonial only in the
unusual case in which the police play a direct role (perhaps by arranging
for the exhumation of a body to reopen a "cold case") and the purpose of
the autopsy is clearly to provide evi4ence for use in a prosecution. The
potential for a lengthy delay between the crime and its prosecution could
- severely impede the cause of justice if routine autopsies were deemed
testimonial merely because the cause of death is determined to be
homicide.

r

Id. at 591-593.
The Illinois Court also acknowledged that at this time there is a split of opinion
amongst various courts regarding the application of the primary purpose test to reports of
forensic testing. 18 Ultimately, however, the Court determined nothing in the autopsy

18

The Illinois Court provided the following cases regarding the split of opinion on this matter:
We acknowledge that defendant has cited several cases from other jurisdictions in which the
courts of our sister states have held that an autopsy report is testimonial hearsay, either in a case
in which the report was admitted or in which a medical examiner other than the one who
performed the autopsy was permitted to testify to the contents of the report. See, e.g., State v.
Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409,417 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (holding that when an autopsy report is
prepared at the request of law enforcement in anticipation of a murder prosecution and the report
is offered to prove the victim's cause of death, the report is testimonial); Martinez v. State, 311
S.W.3d 104, 111 (Tex.Ct.App.2010) (holding that an autopsy report is testimonial when its
primary purpose is to establish or prove past events, ·as· demonstrated by-police officer's
attendance at autopsy, his taking of photographs during autopsy, and where statutory basis for
performance of the autopsy was suspicion of death by unlawful means); United States v. Moore,
651 F.3d 30, 73 (D.C.Cir.2011) (per curiam) (classifying autopsy reports as testimonial when
requested by law enforcement, officers are present during autopsies, and officers participated in
preparation of diagrams and other portions of the reports), cert. granted in part in Smith v.
United States, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2772, 183 L.Ed.2d 638 (2012).
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report directly-Iinked the defendant to the crime and that the autopsy sought only to
determine how a victim died, and not who was responsible for the death. Thus, the

r

medical examiner who prepared the report was not the defendant's accuser, as required
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c. Application to the case at hand

As noted by the Court of Appeals of Idaho in State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 259
P .3d 629 (2011 ), the centrally disputed issue in the Petitioner's criminal trial focused on
the time the injuries that caused Kyler's death occurred.
Initially, we clarify that the crux of this issue affects the central
disputed question in this case-when the injuries which ultimately caused
K.M.'s death occurred and whether it was likely that K.M. would have lost
consciousness and/or shown severe symptoms immediately after the
injuries were inflicted. In other words, did the injuries occur on the
morning that K.M. lost consciousness-and was alone with Grove--or
several days prior, when it was undisputed that the injuries could not have
However, these cases are countered by cases holding that an autopsy report may be admitted
into evidence without the testimony of the pathologist who performed the autopsy without
violating the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 110 Ohio
St.3d 306, 2006--0hio--4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, at ,i,i 80-88 (concluding that autopsy reports are
admissible nontestimonial business records), review granted by State v. Craig, 126 Ohio St3d
1573, 2010-0hio--4539, 934 N.E.2d 347 (table); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236-37
(2d Cir.2006) (holding that autopsy reports are admissible as business records and are
nontestimonial "even where the declarant is aware that [the report] may be available for later use
at trial"); Banmah v. State, 87 So.3d 101, 103 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) (autopsy reports are
nontestimonial because they are prepared pursuant to statutory duty and not solely for use in
prosecution); Cato v. Prelesnik, 2012 WL 2952183, *3 (W.D.Mich. July 18, 2012) (rejecting
Crawford claim in habeas petition on basis that Crawford did not clearly establish that autopsy
results are testimonial in nature and that even under Melendez-Diaz, the answer to this question
is uncertain). In addition, the cases cited by defendant predate the Supreme Court's decision in
Williams.
This split of opinion and the confusion regarding application of the primary purpose test to
reports of forensic testing may eventually be resolved by the United States Supreme Court. In
the meantime, while we are not prepared to say that the report of an autopsy conducted by the
medical examiner's office can never be testimonial in nature, we conclude that under the
objective test set out by the plurality in Williams, under the test adopted in Davis, and under
Justice Thomas's "formality and solemnify'' rule, autopsy reports prepared by a medical
examiner's office in the normal course of its duties are nontestimonial. Further, an autopsy report
prepared in the normal course of business of a medical examiner's office is not rendered
testimonial merely because the assistant medical examiner performing the autopsy is aware that
police suspect homicide and that a specific individual might be responsible.
People v. Leach 980 N.E.2d at 593-594.
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been inflicted by Grove because he was not alone with K.M. In this·
regard, important to the state's theory of the case that Grove caused the
fatal injuries on the morning of July 10 was the conclusion of Dr.
Reichard, based on his microscopic examination ofK.M.'s brain, that
K.M. had suffered a laceration of the corpus callosum, which would have
likely caused immediate loss of consciousness, thereby implicating Grove
as the cause ofK.M.'s injuries,,d_urin~the36-45 minute-period of time.
during which he was alone with K.M. Grove points out that both Dr. Ross
and Dr. Harper recited Dr. Reichard's observations in this regard, as
gleaned from the autopsy report, as neither was present during the autopsy
nor conducted their own microscopic analysis, and relied on these
observations in forming their respective opinions that K.M.'s injuries had
been inflicted on July 10.

r

By contrast, Grove's expert, Dr. Arden, testified that he did not agree
with Dr. Reichard that a laceration was present and that the anomaly was
the result of handling of the brain after death. He also offered his opinion,
after examination of the microscopic slides, that K.M.'s injuries had been
inflicted at least three days prior to death (thus absolving Grove of having
caused them) and that they would not have necessarily resulted in
immediate loss of consciousness.

Id. at 490,259 P.3d 636. The testimony at issue here is limited to two issues: first, the
Neuropathological Diagnoses from Dr. Reichard's report, which was incorporated into
the Autopsy Report. Second, witnesses who were offered as medical experts testified
regarding their reliance on Dr. Reichard's brain autopsy report.
The Petitioner claims the introduction of the Autopsy Report and the testimony
from witnesses regarding Dr. Reichard's report were violations of the Petitioner's right tQ
confront witnesses. It is undisputed that defense counsel did not object to the admission
of the Autopsy Report, nor did defense counsel object when medical experts testified
regarding Dr. Reichard's findings from the brain autopsy. As noted above, every case
that found a violation of the Confrontation Clause originated from testimony or reports
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thafwere admitted over objection at trial. 19 Because there was no objection.2° to-the

r

report or the testimony in this case, there cannot be a Confrontation Clause violation.
Further, as noted by the Court of Appeals, the decision to not object to the autopsy report
•...::~--;·:~~-,\

,.

~~c"-c•··--··

may have been a tactical decisiotr---en.-fue-,part-of counseLc..Counsel's,,choice ofwitnesses, __ -manner of cross-examination, and lack of objections to testimony are considered tactical,
or strategic, decisions. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365,368 (1994).
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel will be addressed in a different section
within this opinion.

In the alternative, this Court notes the issue of whether an autopsy report is
testimonial is a matter of first impression in Idaho. As such, this Court follows direction
from State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007). Further, this Court finds the r
Petitioner's reliance on US. v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011), unpersuasive.
Instead, the more recent analysis from Williams v. lllinois, 567 U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2221,
183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012) is applicable. The Williams case considered DNA analysis that
was performed by an outside laboratory. In this case, Dr. Ross relied on the findings of
Dr. Reichard when reaching his opinion that the cause of death was:
The cause of death is cerebral edema and subdural hemorrhage due to
blunt force impact to the head. The intra-abdominal contusions are the
result of blunt force impacts to the abdomen. The manner of death is
homicide.

Autopsy Report, at 3(State's Exhibit 11). It is also clear that Dr. Ross adopted a portion
of Dr. Reichard's report when writing the Autopsy Report which was admitted at trial.

r

This issue was before the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Grove. The Court considered the
fundamental error doctrine and concluded that Grove could not challenge the admission of the testimony
for the first time on appeal. Id. at 493, 259 P.3d at 639.
20 The admission of State's Exhibit 11 can be found in the trial transcript at pages 901-902. Defense
counsel asked one question in aid of objection, but elected not to object after hearing Dr. Ross's answer to
his question.
19
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There is nothing in this record which establishes that Dr. Reichard's separate report was
admitted into the record at trial. Thus, this Court must consider whether the admission of
Dr. Ross's autopsy report was testimonial, and whether this admission was a violation of
---- "the Confrontation Clause~-- .flased.::Upontheobjectiv~-p:cimmy p.UFposes test as setforth in
0

Williams, the report was not testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.

r

Nothing in this record establishes the autopsy report was "made for the purpose of
proving the guilt of a particular defendant at trial." Williams, 567 U.S. at_, 132 S.Ct.
at 2243. Instead, the report is akin to the DNA testing and reporting that was at issue in

Williams. Here, while it is not disputed that an autopsy report may be used during the
criminal prosecution of homicide simply based upon the determination of manner of
death, nothing in the testimony establishes that Dr. Ross, or Dr. Reichard, were creating
autopsy reports for the purposes targeting a specific defendant.
The Williams Court explained that a DNA profile may provide powerful
incriminating evidence, but in the alternative, the report may also exonerate a suspect
who has been charged or under investigation. Id. at_, 132 S.Ct. at 2243-2244. An r
autopsy report is much the same. In the case at hand, there is no indication that Dr. Ross
knew of a potential suspect of the crime. Further, nothing in the Autopsy Reports or Dr.
Ross' s testimony refers to a specific defendant, nor was the Autopsy Report created
solely for an evidentiary purpose in aid of police investigation, as the drug analysis
reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.
There were two witnesses who referred to Dr. Reichard's report during testimony
at trial: Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper. This testimony was not objected to at trial. However,
based on this Court's analysis, any objection to the testimony would have been overruled.
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Petitioner also asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the doctors
referred to Dr. Reichard's report. Because there was no violation of the confrontation
clause, counsel's performance could not be deficient for failing to object, thus, it is not
-- - ··-- --·-- - - - necessary for this Gourtto,address-the-ineffective:-assis:tance-of cou,nsel claims.as .they_ -relate to Dr. Reichard's report. The State's motion for summary disposition is granted on
this issue. The Petitioner's motion for summary disposition is denied.
2. Whether Petitioner was denied a fair trial and due process of law by multiple
instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

The Petitioner sets forth several instances during the trial that he contends the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct that was a gross violation of the prosecutor's duty to

r

ensure fairness in every stage of the trial. Amended Petition, at 12-18. These events
include the following assertions: First, that the prosecuting attorney projected family
photos of the victim on a screen when jurors were entering the courtroom; sec011g,_ :$e.
prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by calling and questioning the victim's
sister, a young child; third, the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct while crossexamining the defense's expert witness; and lastly, allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct during the closing statements at trial.
It is undisputed that the claims above were not objected to at trial. Further, the
issues were not raised in the appeal before the Idaho Court of Appeals. The Petitioner

r
asserts that the issues could not have been raised on appeal, and thus, the Court should
engage in a fundamental error analysis, or in the alternative, analysis under the
cumulative error doctrine.
First, this Court notes that even though the assertions were not objected to during
trial, the matter could have been presented on appeal, similar to the issues regarding the
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Petitioner's right to confront witnesses, as addressed above; The proper forum for
considering fundamental error or cumulative error was before the Court of Appeals.
Because this issue was not raised on appeal, it may not be considered in post-conviction
r

The scope of post-conviction relief is limited. An application for postconviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. LC.§ 19-490l(b). "[A]
claim or issue which was or could have been raised on appeal may not be
considered in post-conviction proceedings." Whitehawk v. State, 116
Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct.App.1989) (citing LC.§ 194901(b)).
Rodgers' claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on statements
concerning Cox's ability to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege could
have been raised during the earlier litigation that also challenged the
prosecutor's conduct. 119 Idaho at 1074, 812 P.2d at 1235. Since this
issue could have been raised on appeal, it is not properly before this Court
in an appeal ofa post-conviction proceeding. --

Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348,353 (1997). Therefore, the State's
-. -···

motion for summary disposition is granted as to this issue, and conversely, the
r

Petitioner's motion for summary disposition is denied.
3. Whether Petitioner was denied due process and the right to a jury trial due
to juror misconduct

The Petitioner alleges he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to
due process when jurors repeatedly slept during the presentation of evidence at the
criminal trial. The Petitioner has submitted affidavits from several individuals who
attended the trial in the audience. These individuals aver that several. jurors were
sleeping, most notably during the testimony of Dr. Ross, Dr. Harper and Dr. Arden.
There is_ evidence in the record that jurors were having some difficulty staying awake
during the afternoon when Dr. Ross testified. A recess occurred in the afternoon, after
the following statement by the prosecuting attorney: "Your Honor, if I might, it's gettini
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pretty warm in here, and I've recently noticed that the jurors might be in need of a break.
They're having a hard time staying awake. This might be a good time." Petitioner's

Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 983. After this statement, a break was taken, after which
- -defense-effilll:sef.stated he had finished cross.. e-xamination of Dr, Ross. Petitioner/s., ,-7.,:;--_ '"··---, 0·,,

·:·c:-

Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 984.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has expressed disfavor of allegations of juror
inattentiveness being raised days, weeks, or months after a verdict has been rendered in r

State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437, 146 P.3d 703 (Ct. App. 2006). In that case the defendant
filed a motion for a new trial based upon juror misconduct. The Bolen Court emphasized
that if jury misconduct is known to the defendant and no request for curative action is
made, a post-verdict motion for a new trialwill not lie.
With respect to the instant issue, if jury misconduct occurs during trial and
is unknown to the defendant and defense counsel until after .a guilty
verdict, relief may lie pursuant to a motion for a new trial. In contrast, if
the jury misconduct is known to the defendant or to defense counsel and
no timely request is made of the trial court to ameliorate the same or take
other curative action, a post-verdict motion for a new trial on that basis
will not lie. In essence, the rule is a corollary of the contemporaneous
objection rule as to evidence. See Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a)(l). As
the United States Supreme Court has noted, "[a]llegations of juror
misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time
days, weeks or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the
process." Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739,
2747, 97 L.Ed.2d 90, 106 (1987).

r

With regard to the instant circumstance of inattentive or sleeping
jurors, the great weight of authority from other jurisdictions is in accord
with the reasoning of Baker and Fox in that if the defendant or his counsel
know that a juror is sleeping or otherwise inattentive and the matter is not
brought to the attention of the trial court, post-verdict relief will not be
·granted pursuab.t to ~ftnotion for a new trial or mistrial. See United-States
v. Rivera, 295 F.3d 461, 470-71 (5th Cir.2002); United States v. Krohn,
560 F.2d 293,297 (7th Cir.1977); Whitingv. State, 516 N.E.2d 1067,
1067-68 (Ind.1987); Randleman v. State, 552 P.2d 90, 93-94
(Okla.Crim.App.1976); see generally cases collected in George L. Blum,
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Annotation, Inattention ofJuror from Sleepiness or Other Cause as
Ground for Reversal or New Trial, § 5 Necessity of Preserving Claim of
Error for Review, 59 ALR 5th 1, 58 (1998).

r

Id at 440, 146 P.3d at 707. The Bolen Court determined that the trial court did not err in

of the alleged jury misconduct during the trial. Id. at 441, 146 P.3d at 708.
In the case at hand, there is evidence in the record that defense counsel was aware

that jurors may be sleeping. First, the record reflects that the Court allowed for a recess
based upon the request by the prosecutor that he was concerned jurors were having
difficulty staying awake. Petitioner's Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 983.21 Second, in
his deposition, defense counsel states he was informed by his paralegal during the cross··· examination of Dr. Ross-that a juror was sleeping.. Deposition ofScott Chapman, at 66- ·I~
68. Defense counsel indicated he believed that a recess was taken at this time. Id.
........___:,.

As stated above, the scope of post-conviction relief is limited. Similar to the

matter regarding prosecutorial misconduct, this issue could have been raised in the direct
appeal of the criminal trial. The Petitioner has submitted the affidavit of appellate
counsel, which states that this issue could not have been raised on direct appeal because
trial counsel did not draw the misconduct to the Court's attention. Affidavit ofDiane

Walker, at 2. Nevertheless, there is some information in the record that jurors may have
been having difficulty staying awake. Thus, because the matter should have been
addressed on appeal, this Court will not address this issue at this juncture. See

Whitehawkv. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct.App.1989) (citing r
LC. § 19-490l(b)).
21 On page 921, the Court interrupts the prosecuting attorney in order to consult with counsel whether it
would be appropriate to recess early for lunch. The record indicates the trial recessed at 11 :30 a.m. during
Dr. Ross's direct examination.
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The Petitioner has raised a question of-material fact on the issue of whether
counsel was ineffective for failing to bring to the Court's attention that jurors may be
sleeping. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing will be held on the limited issue of

4. Whether Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
The Petitioner asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

r

two issues on direct appeal, whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
issues on appeal regarding prosecutorial misconduct or juror misconduct. Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, for trial counsel or appellate counsel, are judged under the
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 674(1984).
An accused has a constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805
(1963). The right to counsel necessarily includes the right to effective
assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90
S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, ri.. 14 (1970); Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801,806,839 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1992). The right to
effective assistance of counsel extends to the defendant's first appeal as a
matter of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396, 105 S.Ct. 830,836, 83
L.Ed.2d 821, 829 (1985).

r

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a postconviction petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was
deficient and, in most cases, must also show that prejudice resulted from
the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,
520,960 P.2d 738, 741 (1998); Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900
P.2d 221,224 (Ct.App.1995); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d
654,656 (Ct.App.1990). Deficient performance is established if the
applicant shows that the attorney's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct. at 2064,
80 L.Ed.2d at 693; Berg, 131 Idaho at 520, 960 P.2d at 741; Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell, 118 Idaho
at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance
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the outcome of the criminal casewould have been different. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697; Berg, 131 Idaho at
520, 960 P.2d at 741; Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell,
118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656.

Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 658-659, 168 P.3d 40, 42-43 (Ct. App. 2007). The
..•-..~--- . =.

.
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Petitioner is claiming appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues on
appeal which were not objected to at trial. Appellate counsel avers that the issues could
not be raised on appeal because the trial record was not sufficient, and the issues could
not be raised under the fundamental error doctrine under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009). Affidavit ofDiane Walker; Affidavit ofEric Fredericksen. A
f

similar matter was addressed inMintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct. App.
2007).
First, Idaho case law establishes no bright line delineating categories of
errors that will be deemed fundamental, and thus subject to appellate
review without objection below. Therefore,zrule deeming appellate
counsel ineffective for failing to raise an issue of fundamental error would
force appellate attorneys to raise on appeal nearly all possible errors,
whether preserved by objection in the trial court or not, to avoid the risk of
being declared ineffective. This would be a misuse of the resources of
appellate defense counsel, the Idaho Attorney General's Office, and the
Idaho appellate courts. Such a rule would also place on our trial and
appellate courts in post-conviction proceedings the difficult task of
determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular error was
actually "fundamental" and whether the record on direct appeal was
sufficient to review the claim at that time.
Second, it is often not to a criminal defendant's advantage to raise an
issue of fundamental error on direct appeal because the record in the
criminal proceeding may not be adequately developed for a full
presentation of the defendant's claim. For example, Idaho's appellate
courts have held that the State's violation of a plea agreement is
fundamental error that may be reviewed in the absence of objection in the
trial- court, State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74, 106 P.3d 397,400 (2005);
State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 915-16, 693 P.2d 1112, 1117-18
(Ct.App.1985), but this Court has also declined to address such claims
where the record on appeal is not complete enough to allow appellate
examination of all the factors that must be considered on such a claim.
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State v. Kellis, 129 Idaho 730, 733-34, 932 P.2d 358, 361-62
(Ct.App.1997). In the latter circumstance, we have left the issue for
presentation in a post-conviction proceeding, where an adequate record
could be developed. We have also observed that if the appellate court were
to consider, as fundamental error, the merits of a claim that cannot be
adequately supported by the bare record in the criminal proceedings, it
-would require that we rule-against the appealing defendant, and that ruling
would be res judicata, precluding the defendant from later pursuing the
issue in a post-conviction action where adequate evidence to support the
claim might be presented. See generally State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374,
376,859 P.2d 972,974 (Ct.App.1993). See also I.C. § 19-4901(b)
(precluding assertion in a post-conviction action of any issue that was or
could have been raised on direct appeal).

,,

I,
1,

I
:-J

!

Third, a trial attorney's failure to object to inadmissible evidence or
other potential errors may be done for legitimate strategic or tactical
purposes. See, e.g., Prattv. State, 134 Idaho 581,584 n. 1, 6 P.3d 831,834
n. 1 (2000). The record on direct appeal would rarely disclose this
practical strategy, and it would be incorrect to grant relief to a defendant in
such a circumstance.
Finally, the allowance of this type of claim for ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel is ordinarily not necessary to protect a defendant's rights
because the defendant can bring the same claim of impropriety in the trial
proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for
failing to object to the alleged error in the trial court.

j:

J
1:

11

I

r

For all of the foregoing reasons, a rule allowing a post-conviction claim
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise an issue of
fundamental error would be impractical, inefficient, and often
disadvantageous to defendants whose interest would be better served by
presenting such a claim in a post-conviction action asserting ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.

Id. at 662, 168 P.3d at 40. For the same reasons as asserted inMintun, these claims
would be best addressed in this post-conviction proceeding as ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims. Therefore, the Petitioner's motion for summary disposition is denied
on this claim. The State's motion for summary disposition is granted.

r
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5. Whether Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.

As stated above, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are judged under the
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.
----·-.- - ·

- Ed. 674 (1984}· , --- To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a postconviction petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was
deficient and, in most cases, must also show that prejudice resulted from
the deficiency. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,693 (1984); Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517,
520,960 P.2d 738, 741 (1998); Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900
P.2d 221,224 (Ct.App.1995); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d
654,656 (Ct.App.1990). Deficient performance is established if the
applicant shows that the attorney's representation fell below an objective
standard ofreasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064,
80 L.Ed.2d at 693; Berg, 131 Idaho at 520,960 P.2d at 741; Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell, 118 Idaho
-at6'7, -794-P .2d-at 656. To establish prejudice, .the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance
the outcome of the criminal case would have been different. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068., 80 L.Ed.2d at 697; Berg, 131 Idaho at
520,960 P.2d at 741;Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell,
118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656.

r

Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 658-659, 168 P.3d 40, 42-43 (Ct. App. 2007).
The Petitioner sets forth several claims that trial counsel was ineffective. The
Petitioner has raised issues of material fact regarding whether trial counsel was
ineffective, thus, an evidentiary hearing will be held on this matter, limited to the issues r
set forth below.
a. Issues which are summarily dismissed

The State's motion for summary dismissal is granted with respect to the issues set
forth below. For each of these issues, the Petitioner has failed to set forth material facts
which establish that trial counsel's performance was deficient, or that the deficiency
prejudiced the defendant at trial.
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i. Whether counsel's performance was deficient for failing tor
object when expert witnesses referred to Dr. Reichard's
report

This issue was addressed at length in the foregoing analysis. Because this Court
0

'.l'.ms determined that the expert's reliance and testimony regarding Dr. Reichard'cS-r.eport, ___ _ ___
was not in violation of the Confrontation Clause, trial counsel could not have been
deficient in his performance for failing to object to this testimony. Therefore, the State's
motion for summary dismissal is granted as to these claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
ii. Whether counsel's performance was deficient during voir
dire

The Petitioner claims counsel was deficient during voir dire for failing to move

r

for a mistrial when a potential juror stated he worked in the funeral business and knew
Officers Greene and Petrie welL See Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 155-l56. In_ addition,

-

-

-. ·-·- - ----

the Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge for cause or
peremptorily challenge Juror #5 who revealed he worked at St. Joseph's Hospital and
knew State's witnesses who also worked there. See Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 144.
The Petitioner relies on Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1997) in support
of his argument. In Mach, during voir dire a potential jury member stated she was a
social worker who had been involved in cases where children had accused an adult of
sexual assault. The jury stated that in her experience children who testified in these cases
had never been known to lie about sexual abuse. 137 F.3d at 633. In this case, the

r

reviewing Court assumed that at least one juror may have been tainted as a result of the
statements.
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The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial "guarantees to the criminally
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors." Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961).
"Even if 'only one juror is unduly biased or prejudiced,' the defendant is
denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury." United States v.
Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir.1979); see also United States v.
- -Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir.1977)"0ue11r-0cess requires thatthe defendant be tried by a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely
on the evidence before it. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,217, 102 S.Ct.
940, 945-46, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

r

At a minimum, when Mach moved for a mistrial, the court should have
conducted further voir dire to determine whether the panel had in fact been
infected by Bodkin's expert-like statements. Given the nature of Bodkin's
statements, the certainty with which they were delivered, the years of
experience that led to them, and the number of times that they were
repeated, we presume that at least one juror was tainted and entered into
jury deliberations with the conviction that children simply never lie about
being sexually abused. This bias violated Mach's right to an impartial jury.

Id. The ease at hand is distinguishable from Mach. First, although the potentialjuror
was a professional, his professional capacity as a funeral director did not rise to the same
level as a social worker who works with children in a child sexual abuse case. Further,
the Petitioner has not established a material issue of fact that if counsel was deficient,
prejudice resulted from the deficiency, as required by Strickland.

r

A claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal if
the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to
each essential element of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the
burden of proof. DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,603,200 P.3d 1148,
1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in
the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief.

Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,902,277 P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this
issue will not be considered at the evidentiary hearing. The State's motion for summary
dismissal is granted on this issue.
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iii Whether counsel's performance was deficient because he ·
failed to make a hearsay objection to the Nash testimony.

· The Petitioner asserts that counsel was deficient for failing to offer a hearsay
objection when the victim's mother testified she was told

had blood in his brain

that could not be removed. The victim's mother was testifying regarding the events that
occurred at Sacred Heart Hospital after her son had been.transferred there. Exhibit B,

Trial Transcript, at 754-756. Ms. Nash was not testifying as to the truth of the matter
asserted, but r~ther explaining her understanding of the events of the day. Thus, the
Petitioner has failed to establish that a hearsay objection would have been sustained.
Further, the Petitioner has not established a material issue of fact that if counsel was

r

deficient, prejudice resulted from the deficiency, as required by Strickland. Thus, this
issue will not be considered at the evidentiary hearing. The State's motion for summary
disposition is granted as to this issue.
iv. Whether counsel's performance was deficient for failing to
make a foundation or relevancy objection to the Stocking
testimony

The Petitioner asserts counsel was deficient for failing to object to the testimony
from paramedic Steve Stocking regarding the Petitioner's demeanor when the paramedics
arrived in response to the 911 call. See Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 838-839. The
paramedic stated that he felt the Petitioner was too calm, because parents are usually
excitable when their child is very sick. The Petitioner relies on Bloching v. Albertson's r

Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 846, 934 P.2d 17,19 (1997), wherein the Court found the plaintiff ·
could not testify to the medical opinion that seizures he had were a result of the
pharmacist providing a different type of insulin than he was prescribed. The Court held a
lay witness was not competent to testify to such an opinion. Bloching is distinguishable
OPlNION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS
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:frorri the case at hand where the testimony was about the witness's perception of the
Petitioner's demeanor.

In State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 32,803 P.2d 528, 533 (1990), the Court held
r
that a dialogue between the prosecutoranda victim was prejudicial where the victim-·repeatedly stated the defendant was harassing.
Generally, a trial court may allow a lay witness to state an opinion about a
matter of fact within his or her knowledge, as long as two conditions are
met. First, the witness's opinion must be based on his or her perception;
and second, the opinion must be helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. I.RE. 701;
accord State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 714 P.2d 93 (Ct.App.1986).
The admissibility of such testimony turns upon its underlying factual
basis, not the fact that it is in the format of an opinion. See Report of the
Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, comments to I.RE. 701 at 4 (1983
and 1985 Supp.).
·

Id. In the case at hand, the paramedic's statement was based on his perception of the
scene of the call;-and also was helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's te$timony.,._
The Petitioner has not raised an issue of material fact that counsel was deficient for

-e---..

r

failing to object to this statement. Further, the Petitioner has not .established a material
issue of fact that if counsel was deficient, prejudice resulted from the deficiency, as
required by Strickland. Thus, this issue will not be considered at the evidentiary hearing.
The State's motion for summary disposition is granted as to this issue.

v. Whether counsel's performance was deficient during the
testimony of Detective Birdsell
The Petitioner asserts counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object
to the admission of photographs ofNash's home, taken a month after Kyler's death,
which included a view of sympathy cards sent to the family. See Exhibit B, Trial

Transcript, at 996-1007; Exhibit C, State's Exhibits 4,5, and 6. Detective Birdsell
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provided a diagram ofNash's home, and described the location where the paramedics
found the victim. Detective Birdsell also discussed the height of the kitchen counter and
whether the floor indicated a fall had happened.
The pictures in ques-tion-po1tray,the furniture--n1,theroom,.and a collection of
cards is visible upon the entertainment center located in the living room. However, the
Petitioner fails to establish how sympathy cards sent to Nash were inflammatory or
unduly prejudicial to the Petitioner. A review of the testimony establishes that sympathy
cards were never mentioned. The Petitioner has not raised an issue of material fact that r
counsel was deficient for failing to object to the pictures. Further, the Petitioner has not
established a material issue of fact that if counsel was deficient, prejudice resulted from
the deficiency, as required by Strickland. Thus, this issue will not-be considered at the__
evidentiary hearing. The State's motion for summary disposition is granted as to this
.

-~-:-.-'-·.

issue.
vi. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to introduce
photographs of
taken at St. Joseph's hospital soon
after he arrived by ambulance

Photographs of the victim were taken after the paramedics took him to St.
Joseph's Regional Medical Center. The Petitioner alleges counsel was deficient for
failing to have these photographs introduced. Petitioner's argument centers on the idea r
that the photos show no redness or bruising, and thus, are inconsistent with the State's
theory that the Petitioner had just brutally beaten the victim. State's Exhibit 12 provided
a full view of Kyler's body before the autopsy. This photo is also void of any evidence
ofredness or bruising. See Petitioner's Exhibit C, Trial Exhibit 12. Further, Dr. Ross
testified regarding the presence or absence of bruising on the child during the autopsy.
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With respect to Exhibit 12, Dr. Ross explained that most of the discoloration found on the
child's body was due to Betadine or iodine based solution to sterilize the body surface
prior to surgery. Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 904. A review of the record establishes

r

that at no time was-tliere-=--signiflcantredness-or--bruising·visible-on tlie-victim's-body.-Thus, the Petitioner has failed to establish a material question that the Petitioner was
prejudiced by counsel's failure to present the photos taken at St. Joseph's. Further, the
Petitioner fails to establish he was prejudiced by tliis decision of counsel.
vii. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to question
paramedic David Chenault regarding Lisa's reaction to
Kyler's injury

The Petitioner claims counsel was deficient for failing to call paramedic David
Chenault as a witness in this case. During the grand jury proceedings, Chenault testified
tliat the victim's mothers reaction to Kyler's injuries during the 911 call were the "most
r
bizarre reaction we've ever seen especially for a kid call." The Petitioner asserts Chenault

should have been called to testify in order to rebut Paramedic Stocking's testimony.

In his deposition, trial counsel avers that his theory of the case was that ''the injuries that
occurred to

were inflicted at a time when Stace was not around or with the child in

any fashion that it could have happened." The testimony that Petitioner claims Chenault
would have testified about does not further tlie theory of the case as stated by trial
counsel.
The Petitioner has established that this decision by counsel was a strategic
decision. "[T]actical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant

r
law or other shortcomings capable of objective_ evaluation." Howard v. State, 126 Idaho
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231,233, 880 P.2d 261,263, citing Davis v. State, 116Idaho 401; 406, 775 P.2d 1243,
1248 (Ct.App.1989). Because this was a tactical decision, summary dismissal is
appropriate on this issue.
·b. IssneS'-tobe,addressed-,at-theevidentiary-hearing ·.-The Petitioner has raised issues of material fact on the following claims, and thus,
an evidentiary hearing will be held for the presentation of facts on these limited issues: r
i. Whether counsel's performance was deficient during direct
and cross-examination of the Petitioner

The Petitioner asserts counsel's performance was deficient during the direct and
cross-examination of the Petitioner during the criminal trial. Specifically, the Petitioner
claims counsel was deficient because he introduced evidence regarding the Petitioner's
relationship with his son, Alex, and then failed to object when the prosecuting attorney
asked whether the Petitioner was behind on child support payments. Finally, the
Petitioner asserts defense counsel was deficient for failing to object when the prosecutor
questioned the Petitioner regarding an Ativan prescription. The Petitio:o.er will be
allowed to address these claims in an evidentiary hearing.
r

ii. Whether counsel was deficient during the direct and crossexamination of Dr. Arden

The Petitioner has presented a question of material fact regarding whether counsel
rendered deficient performance in the presentation of the expert testimony of Dr. Arden.
The Petitioner asserts that Dr. Arden was not supplied with all existing microscopic slides
for examination prior to trial. Further, the Petitioner asserts counsel was deficient for
failing to object when the Prosecutor elicited testimony for purposes of impeaching Dr.
Arden. The Petitioner will be allowed to address these claims at the evidentiary hearing.
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iii. Whether counsel was· deficient for failing to move for a
mistrial because jurors may have been sleeping during the
presentation of testimony

r

As addressed above, Petitioner bas raised a material issue of fact regarding
whether:defense·eounselwas--dencientfor failing-to- bring-to the Court's attention.that j-""'"''"'-,"' ,~ _, ,
jurors may be sleeping. Therefore, this issue may be addressed at the evidentiary
hearing.

iv. Whether defense counsel's performance during closing
argument was deficient
Lastly, the Petitioner asserts that counsel's performance was deficient during
closing statements because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the
prosecuting attorney. Further, defense counsel failed to move for a mistrial or curative

f'

instruction following the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. The Petitioner has
"- -'.·

raised a question of material fact on this issue, and therefore, will be allowed to address
this claim at the evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, there are issues of material fact with regard to
whether the Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial in this
case. Thus, an evidentiary hearing will be held on these issues, limited to those four
claims as set forth above. The State's motion for summary disposition is denied with
respect to these limited issues. However, the State's motion is granted as to the
remaining issues, consistent with the foregoing analysis. The Petitioner's motion for

r

summary disposition is denied.
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ORDER
The Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition is hereby DENIED.
The State's Motion for Summary Disposition is hereby DENIED in part, and

- GRANTBD-m part, based-upontheforegoing-opinio1r.- -- r

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

JJ 'a.ay of July, 2013.

U({JL____-o
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge

·

..
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

.

Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks this Court, pursuant to I.C.R. l l(a)(2)(B), to reconsider its
order granting in part the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. A memorandum of
law in support of this motion is filed contemporaneously herewith.
Dated t h i s ~ day of August, 2013.

~ . 1 ~!~~
Dennis Benjamin

Deborah Whipple
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Attorneys for Stacey Grove

1•

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

356

--

- -.- .·--·--- .- . -.. . ,-·ab, ___ ·.____ -· ·__.' ,-: _-- - -: . ·.·,

.

~;

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on August}_, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be:

~ mailed
.----.-.:.--::- __ ...,_._;....

----- ..

-

hand delivered
faxed
to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

2•

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

357

___ J

.. '."·.·!

f:\\
Cf)
I
L.. .....

Dennis Benjamin
ISBA#4199
Deborah Whipple
ISBA#4355
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

I

""11

Cl·"

--

nu\J 9 Rl1 9 39

r-1 ,,...

p,\TTY 0. WEEKS
Cl ERKJJ)r)j,.DJi.L COURT

~~~
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

I. INTRODUCTION
Stacey Grove submits the following in support of his motion for reconsideration of the
Court's order granting in part the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition.
Reconsideration should be granted because the Court's Confrontation Clause analysis is in error.
Moreover, there is a similar case now pending before the United States Supreme Court, and this
Court should not dismiss Mr. Grove's claim prior to decision in that case. Further, the
Prosecutorial and Jury Misconduct claims could not have been raised on appeal and should not
have been dismissed on that basis here. In the alternative, if the issues could have been raised on

1•
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appeal, it was ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to do so and so the claims should
be heard in an evidentiary hearing as elements of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claim. Finally, many of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims have been dismissed
without mention or discussion by the Court.
II. WHY RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GRANTED

A.

The Court Should not Have Dismissed the Confrontation Clause Claim
The Court should reconsider its conclusion that the admission into evidence of the portion

of the autopsy report which contained Dr. Reichard's findings and the testimony about those
findings did not violate Mr. Grove's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Court
has two bases for its ruling: 1) that the evidence was not objected to by defense counsel, and 2)
the evidence was not ''testimonial." See, Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary
Disposition ("Opinion") pg. 22. First, the Court dismissed this claim on a theory not advanced
by the moving party. Second, a constitutional violation may be raised for the first time in a postconviction petition, even when there was an opportunity to object at trial. Third, the Court's
confrontation clause analysis is incorrect, especially as to the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. Fourth, the evidence was inadmissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. And, lastly, a
claim similar to Mr. Grove's is currently pending before the United States Supreme Court in a
petition for a writ of certiorari, and this Court may wish to defer any ruling dismissing Mr.
Grove's claim until after the petition is decided.
1. The Court dismissed without prior notice on a basis not raised by the state
First, Mr. Grove objects to the Court dismissing this claim on a ground which was not
argued by the state in its motion. The state first argued that the evidence was admissible under

2•
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I.R.E. 702 and 703 and thus there was no confrontation clause violation. See Respondent's
Answer and Amended Answer for Summary Disposition and Dismissal ("State's Brief'), pg. 3-4.
It later argued that trial counsel's failure to object was part of a legitimate trial strategy.

Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of State's Motion for Summary Disposition and Response
to Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition ("State's Reply
Brief'), pg. 4. It never argued that Dr. Reichard's report was not ''testimonial" evidence for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
The Court summarily dismissing on grounds not raised by the state violated Mr. Grove's
constitutional right to due process and his statutory right to twenty days notice of the grounds for
a sua sponte dismissal. In Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758, 653 P.2d 813 (1982), instead of
accepting the State's sole argumentthat the petition was untimely, the court relied on different
grounds and dismissed Gibbs's petition "upon its own initiative." Id. (emphasis in original). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the district court improperly dismissed because it did not
give the 20-days notice required by I.C. § 19-4906(b). 1 The Supreme Court later endorsed the
holding in Gibbs, writing that "[w]here the state has filed a motion for summary disposition, but
the court dismisses the application on grounds different from those asserted in the state's motion,
it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide twenty days notice." Saykhamchone v.

State, 127 Idaho 319,322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995).
Reconsideration should be granted on this basis alone. In addition, both of the Court's
bases for dismissing the Confrontation Clause claim are in error.

When a court is satisfied ... that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief ..
. it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing.
The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal."
1

3•
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2. This claim may be raised in post-conviction
This Court finds that "because there was no objection to the report or the testimony in this
case, there cannot be a Confrontation Clause violation." Opinion, pg. 22. However, this
conclusion is foreclosed by the text of the post-conviction statute, which does not require a
contemporaneous objection before an issue may be raised. Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a) states that
"[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime, and who claims ... that the
conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United States ... may
institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this act to secure relief." No
contemporaneous objection is required under the statute.
In addition to the absence of textual support for the ruling, there is no support for the
Court's position in the structure of the post-conviction act. To the contrary, to require a
contemporaneous objection to a constitutional violation before the issue could be raised in postconviction would be diametrically opposed to the provision, found in the very next section of the
statute, that "[a]ny issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited
and may not be considered in post-conviction." LC. § 19-4901(b). Statutes dealing with the
same subject matter must be read in para materia in order to determine what the legislature
intended. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho 808,654 P.2d 901 (1982)
("Statutes which are in pari materia are to be construed together to the end that legislative intent
will be effected"); Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 97 Idaho 917, 556 P.2d 1197
(1976) ("[A]ll sections of the applicable statutes should be considered and construed together to
determine the intent of the legislature").
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Reading subsection (a) of§ 19-4901 to require an objection in order to raise an issue in
post-conviction while reading subsection (b) to bar the raising of that same issue because, with
an objection, the issue could have been raised on appeal is inconsistent with the legislative
purpose of the post-conviction which is to "comprehend[] and take[] the place of all other
common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the
conviction or sentence." LC. § 19-490l(b). It would, in effect, suspend the writ of habeas
corpus in a large number of cases, in violation of Article I, § 5. ("The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety
requires it[.]") This would be contrary to the purpose of the post-conviction act, which has been
construed by the Supreme Court "as an expansion of the writ." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235,
459 P.2d1017 (1969).
Finally, there is no support in the case law for such a restriction on the scope of the postconviction act. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals has held that unobjected-to error should
not be raised on direct appeal, but should be raised in post-conviction. For example, in Mintun v.
State, 144 Idaho 656, 661-62, 168 P.3d 40, 45-46 (Ct. App. 2007), the petitioner argued that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a Confrontation Clause issue on direct appeal as
a claim of fundamental error. The Court of Appeals held that Mintun's appellate counsel could
not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a claim of fundamental error on an issue that was
not preserved by objection in the trial court. One of the reasons given for the holding was that
"it is often not to a criminal defendant's advantage to raise an issue of fundamental error on
direct appeal because the record in the criminal proceeding may not be adequately developed for
a full presentation of the defendant's claim." In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that claims
5•
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could be raised more effectively in post-conviction because a more complete record could be
developed, especially about why no objection had been made. Id. (As will be seen below, there
is additional evidence presented in post-conviction, which was not presented at the criminal trial,
which demonstrates that Dr. Reichard's report and the testimony describing its contents was
testimonial. The deposition of defense counsel also shows there was no strategic reason for
failing object to the evidence.) Thus, it is clear that unobjected-to violations of a constitutional
right may be raised in post-conviction proceedings.
Examples of such cases are common. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised
for the first time in post-conviction proceedings are too common to require citation to authority,
but other unobjected-to constitutional errors have been raised too. These include:
• Violation of plea agreement: Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,519,960 P.2d 738,
740 (1998) ("Berg asserted that the prosecutor breached the parties' plea
agreement by recommending that he be sentenced to prison rather than
recommending a retained jurisdiction."); Short v. State, 135 Idaho 40, 41, 13 P.3d
1253, 1254 (Ct. App. 2000).
• Violation of the right to testify: Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,706,274
P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Apr. 25, 2012) ("[T]he issue of the
failure of a defendant to testify may be viewed in post-conviction proceedings
either as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a claim of a deprivation
of a constitutional right."); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 924 P .2d 622 (Ct. App.
1996); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603-04, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009)
("The district court erred in analyzing DeRushe's claim as alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel rather than as alleging denial of his constitutional right to
testify on his own behalf[.]"); Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 224 P.3d 536 (Ct.
App. 2009).
• Due process right to participate in defense: Murillo v. State, 144 Idaho 449,
452, 163 P.3d 238,241 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Murillo argues that he was rendered
unable to participate in his defense because he had an insufficient opportunity to
confer with his trial counsel with the aid of an interpreter and was not provided
with copies or oral translations of documents related to his case.")
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• Adequacy of plea colloquy: Noel v. State, 113 Idaho 92, 94, 741 P.2d 728, 730
(Ct. App. 1987) ("Noel's petition alleged, among other things, that he was not
adequately advised by his legal counsel, or by the court, of the 'requisite specific
intent to commit murder, nor of the possible consequences of a guilty plea.'").
• Suggestiveness of line-up and other issues: Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542,
545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975) ("He maintains the district court should have
investigated through the medium of an evidentiary hearing his application wherein
he raised questions as to: (1) the unfair suggestiveness of the lineup; (2) the lack
of counsel at the lineup; (3) pleas induced by false statements of counsel; and (4)
appellant's mental capacity during the criminal proceedings.")
Thus, it is clear there is no case law bar to Mr. Grove rasing the confrontation issue in
post-conviction. To forbid him to do so, after trying to raise it on appeal and being rebuffed by
the Court of Appeals, would put Mr. Grove in a constitutional Catch-22 where he has no forum
to raise his claim. This situation would deprive Mr. Grove of his state consitutional right to
access to the courts under Article 1, § 18. The Court should reconsider its holding and permit the
claim to proceed on its merits.
Insofar as the Court was literally holding that the Confrontation Clause cannot be violated
in the absence of an objection by the defense, the Court is incorrect. See, Michigan v. Bryant,
_U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1150-51 (2011), citing People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL
1882551 (Aug. 24, 2004) (per curiam), which specifically notes that Bryant was raising the
Confrontation Clause claim for the first time on appeal. At no point did the U.S. Supreme Court
state in Bryant that the failure to object at trial foreclosed a Confrontation Clause violation. See

also, People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 580-81 (2012), cited by this Court at pages 16-20 of its
Opinion. Leach specifically notes that the question of whether admission of the autopsy report
violated the Confrontation Clause was being reviewed for plain error because no objection was
made below. The Court reached the Confrontation Clause issue because, "the issue implicates a
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fundamental constitutional right and is in need ofresolution by this court." 980 N.E.2d at 581,
citation omitted. And, in Mr. Grove's case itself, the Court of Appeals did not decline to review
the Confrontation Clause issue on direct appeal because the lack of an objection at trial precluded
the existence of a constitutional violation but rather because the record available to the appellate
court could not establish that counsel's failure to object was not a tactical decision. State v.

Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 492-93, 259 P.3d 629, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2011).
Further, it is of note that the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him or
her is a fundamental right made obligatory on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068 (1965). There is a presumption against
the waiver of constitutional rights. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1247
(1966} Nonetheless, the right of confrontation may be waived. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4, 86
S.Ct. at 1246-47, 16 L.Ed.2d at 317; Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452, 32 S.Ct. 250, 25253, 56 L.Ed. 500, 504 (1912). In order for a waiver to be effective, "it must be clearly
established that there was an 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."' Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4, 86 S.Ct. at 1247, 16 L.Ed. at 317, quoting Johnson v.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461, 1466 (1938). In this case,
defense counsel did not make an intentional relinquishment of Mr. Grove's constitutional right to
confrontation as evidenced by his email to the State Appellate Public Defender that he had not
discussed Mr. Grove's confrontation rights. Exhibit to Chapman deposition.
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3. The contents of Dr. Reichard's report were inadmissible under the Confrontation
Clause
a. Justice Alita 's plurality opinion in Williams has no precedential value
The Court finds the analysis in Williams v. Rlinois, 567 U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2221 (2012),
to be applicable. Opinion, pg. 22. That conclusion is incorrect because, while there were five
Justices finding no confrontation clause violation, there was no majority rationale. Justice
Thomas concurred in the result on a completely different rationale than the affirming plurality.
Justice Alito, writing for the affirming plurality, set forth two rationales for the plurality result: 1)
the DNA match evidence was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and 2) the DNA
report did not have the "primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in
criminal conduct." Williams, 132 S.Ct. 2235-42 (plurality).
According to the Harvard Law Review, "In failing to issue a majority opinion, the
Supreme Court [in Williams] deeply muddled Confrontation Clause doctrine." Further, "The
Court's failure to issue a majority opinion is Williams 's principal fault, leaving doctrinal
confusion in the wake of its 4-1-4 vote." Leading Cases, Sixth Amendment - Confrontation
Clause-Forensic Evidence: Williams v. Illinois, 126 Harvard Law Review 266,272 (2012). The
Ohio State University law professor Douglas Berman, less formally, but perhaps more to the
point, wrote his reading of Williams led him ''to this simple conclusion: 'What a bloody mess."'
Berman, D., "Williams v. Illinois, the latest SCOTUS Confrontation Clause ruling, finally
handed down by deeply divided Court," Sentencing Law and Policy,
www.sentencing.typepad.com (June 18, 2013) (last visited 8/1/2013).
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In the absence of clear doctrinal guidance from the United States Court, this Court should
look to the pre-Williams cases for guidance, as Williams is limited to precise facts before it due to
a lack of a majority rationale. It is important to note that neither Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564
U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011), nor Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009),
were overruled by Williams and are still controlling law; likewise Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 125 S.Ct. 2266 (2006),
were not overruled and remain controlling. Thus, the law continues to be that statements are
testimonial if they were made for the primary purpose of establishing "past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution"-in other words, for the purpose of providing evidence.

Davis, 547 U.S., at 822. Applying these controlling cases requires a finding that the
Confrontation Clause was violated; -See; Petitioner's Brief in Response to State's Motion for
Summary Disposition and in Support of Petitioner's Motion pg. 3-14, and Petitioner's Reply
Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition, pg. 2-8.
Nevertheless, even if the Court attempts to apply Williams to this case, the conclusion is
the same: the evidence was not admissible. As this Court does not rely upon the first rationale of
the Williams plurality2, this memorandum will focus upon Justice Alito's second rationale.

b. The primary purpose ofDr. Reichard's report
(i) "primary purpose" according to Justice Alito
Even if there was a majority in support of Justice Alito's "primary purpose" test as
applied in Williams, application of the test supports the exclusion of Dr. Reichard's evidence.

A majority of the Court rejects Justice Alito's first rationale and it therefore has no
precedential value. Justice Thomas, id., at 2258, and the four dissenters, id., at 2268.
2
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According to Justice Alito' s plurality opinion, evidence which falls within his "primary
purpose" is testimonial evidence under the Sixth Amendment. As explained by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals:
If the four-Justice plurality would deem a statement testimonial under the targeted
accusation test, the four dissenting Justices surely would deem it testimonial under
the broader evidentiary purpose test. Similarly, if Justice Thomas would deem a
statement testimonial employing his formality criterion along with the evidentiary
purpose test, the four dissenting Justices necessarily would deem it testimonial
using the evidentiary purpose test alone. It therefore is logically coherent and
faithful to the Justices' expressed views to understand Williams as
establishing-at a minimum-a sufficient, if not a necessary, criterion: a
statement is testimonial at least when it passes the basic evidentiary purpose test
plus either the plurality's targeted accusation requirement or Justice Thomas's
formality criterion. Otherwise put, if Williams does have precedential value as the
government contends, an out-of-court statement is testimonial under that
precedent if its primary purpose is evidentiary and it is either a targeted accusation
or sufficiently formal in character.

Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (D.C. 2013).
The plurality explained that "if a statement is not made for 'the primary purpose of
creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony,' its admissibility 'is the concern of state
and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause."' Williams v. lllinois, 132 S. Ct., at
2242-44, quoting Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 829-832 (2006). Here, Dr. Reichard was
engaged by Dr. Ross for the very purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony. Further, the state knew that Dr. Ross would rely upon the findings of Dr. Reichard as
a basis for his own conclusion. This is shown by the email correspondence between Dr. Ross
and Dr. Reichard which conclusively demonstrates that the primary purpose of Dr. Reichard's
consultation was to develop evidence for use in a criminal case where expert testimony might be
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required. See Exhibit A to the Second Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed on April 12, 2013
("Second Benjamin Affidavit").
When a Court looks for an out-of-court statement's "primary purpose," it looks "for the
primary purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to the statement, talcing into
account all of the surrounding circumstances." Williams, 132 S. Ct., at 2242-44. The primary
purpose of the Cellmark report in Williams, viewed objectively, was not to accuse the defendant
or to create evidence for use at trial. In this case it was the opposite. The primary purpose of Dr.
Reichard's consultation was to obtain a report from an expert who was available to provide
expert testimony in homicide cases. Dr. Ross said in his email to Dr. Reichard:
We usually obtain neuropathology consults in just about all of our infant and child
homicides (or suspected homicides) and selected adult cases. The
neuropathologist that we currently use ... has expressed reluctance to do cases
that have a significant potential to require his services as an expert witness in
court.
Obviously, those are usually the infant homicide cases. So we hope to find
another neuropathologist who can help us out.
I would appreciate finding out what you might be able to offer us, what your fee
schedule is, and anticipated turnaround times. We are primarily interested in
sending our brains from pediatric homicides and pediatric suspicious deaths[.]
Exhibit A to Second Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin.
Unlike Williams, where "[t]he technicians who prepare a DNA profile generally have no
way of knowing whether it will turn out to be incriminating or exonerating-or both," Dr.
Reichard knew that the brain he received in this case would be evidence in a homicide case.
Also, unlike Williams, where the affirming plurality found it "significant that in many labs,
numerous technicians work on each DNA profile," thus making a requirement that all of them
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testify unworkable, in this case only Dr. Reichard worked on the brain. Williams v. fllinois, 132
S. Ct., at 2242-44. And, Dr. Reichard told Dr. Ross that he was willing and able to testify if
needed. Exhibit A to Second Benjamin Affidavit.
The documents show that Dr. Reichard's report was "prepared for the primary purpose of
accusing a targeted individual." This fact distinguishes Mr. Grove's case from Williams v.

fllinois, where a rapist was unidentified, still at large and the report was prepared in order to
identify and apprehend an unknown person out of millions of possible individuals. Here, Dr.
Reichard's report was intended to confirm Dr. Ross's belief that a homicide had been committed
by one of a very small number of possible homicide suspects, e.g., Kyler's care givers. Further,
unlike the case in Williams, "where no one at Cellmark could have possibly known that the
profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate petitioner-or for that matter, anyone else
whose DNA profile was in a law enforcement database," Dr. Reichard would have known there
was an extremely limited universe of possible suspects in this case and would have realized that
the results of his examination would be incriminating.
The email correspondence shows that Dr. Reichard was contacted on August 3, 2006,
three weeks after

Martin's death, by Dr. Ross in regards to conducting neuropathology

consultations "in cases that have a significant potential to require his services as an expert
witness in court." Attached as Exhibit B to the Second Benjamin Affidavit is a Spokane County
Medical Examiner Chain-of-Evidence Form. That form shows that tissue was sent from the
Spokane Medical Examiner to the New Mexico Office of Medical Investigations on August 14,
2006, and was received on August 15, 2006.
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In short, the opinion of the affirming plurality in Williams v. fllinois, does not support the
Court's conclusion. Since the "primary purpose" of Dr. Reichard's report was to develop expert
testimony for use in a criminal trial against one of a very small number of possible homicide
suspects, Mr. Grove being one, it would be considered to be "testimonial" under the plurality
opinion. The email correspondence and the chain-of-custody documents demonstrate that Dr.
Reichard was contracted to produce a report about

Martin which could be used in future

criminal trial proceedings and that Dr. Reichard was aware that was the case. The "primary
purpose," of Dr. Reichard's consultation and report was to develop evidence in a homicide case
where there were a limited number of suspects. Thus Dr. Reichard's evidence was ''testimonial,"
that term is understood by Justice Alito and the plurality, and Mr. Grove's right to confront
witnesses was violated.
(ii) "primary purpose" according to Justices Thomas and Kagan
The documents also show that Dr. Reichard's findings and opinions expressed in his
autopsy report fall within those "core testimonial statements" under Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004), because they are "extrajudicial statements ... contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions"
and also because they are "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statements would be available for use at a later
trial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted).
As noted by Justice Kagan,
We have previously asked whether a statement was made for the primary purpose
of establishing "past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution"-in
other words, for the purpose of providing evidence. Davis, 547 U.S., at 822, 126
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S.Ct. 2266; see also Bullcoming [v. New Mexico], 564 U.S.[--], at--, 131
S.Ct. [2705], at 2716-2717 [180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011) ]; [Michigan v.] Bryant, 562
U.S.,[-] a t - , - , 131 S.Ct. [1143], at 1157, 1165 [179 L.Ed.2d 93
(2011) ]; Melendez-Diaz [v. Massachusetts], 557 U.S. [305], at 310-311, 129
S.Ct. 2527[, at 2532, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) ]; Crawford, 541 U.S., at 51-52,
124 S.Ct. 1354.

Williams, 132 S.Ct., 2273-74 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas agrees with the primary
purpose analysis, although he would also require the statement to be solemn or formal, akin to an
affidavit. Justice Thomas notes, however, that:
The original formulation of that test asked whether the primary purpose of an
extrajudicial statement was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution. I agree that, for a statement to be testimonial within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the declarant must primarily intend to
establish some fact with the understanding that his statement may be used in a
criminal prosecution.
Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Thus, Justice Thomas agrees that the Supreme Court's prior precedent
establishes the primary purpose test as described by Justice Kagan. And as the Williams plurality
opinion did not and could not overrule that prior precedent, it still controls.
As there was a Sixth Amendment violation under Justice Alito's "primary purpose" test
as well as under Justice Kagan's dissent, there is a majority of eight in Williams who would find
Mr. Grove's Sixth Amendment right was violated.

c. Justice Thomas 's definition of "testimoniaI"
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment in Williams, expressed a singular view of
what evidence is testimonial. He wrote:
In light of its text, I continue to think that the Confrontation Clause regulates only
the use of statements bearing "indicia of solemnity." This test comports with
history because solemnity marked the practices that the Confrontation Clause was
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designed to eliminate, namely, the ex parte examination of witnesses under the
English bail and committal statutes passed during the reign of Queen Mary.
Accordingly, I have concluded that the Confrontation Clause reaches '"formalized
testimonial materials,"' such as depositions, affidavits, and prior testimony, or
statements resulting from " 'formalized dialogue,' " such as custodial
interrogation.

Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct., 2259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal
citations omitted).
While Justice Thomas found the DNA report in Williams to not be testimonial, he would
have found both Dr. Ross's and Dr. Reichard's autopsy reports to be covered by the Sixth
Amendment. The reports were written by the doctor who did the examination, unlike the DNA
report which was signed by two reviewers who did not purport to have conducted the testing.
Therefore, the doctors' signatures attest to the accuracy of the findings, unlike the DNA report
where the reviewers did not and could not certify the accuracy of the testing results. Further, the
report here was made pursuant to Idaho law, which requires a written report of the result of any
investigation into a suspected homicide. LC.§ 19-4301. Thus, Justice Thomas would find the
evidence obtained from Dr. Reichard's report to be testimonial because it has sufficient indicia of
solemnity.
In addition, the four dissenters would have found Dr. Reichard's report and the testimony
about its contents to be testimonial. Thus, a close reading of Justice Thomas' s concurring
opinion shows there is a majority in favor of Mr. Grove's position here. Justice Thomas and the
dissenters all agree the evidence here was testimonial.
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d. The concurring opinion ofJustice Breyer

In addition to the above, there is another five-person majority favoring Mr. Grove in
Williams. The second majority consists of Justice Breyer and the four dissenters, who would all

find that Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses was violated, albeit on a different basis than
Justice Thomas and the dissenters.
Justice Breyer concurred in the affirming plurality's opinion. He wrote, "I would set this
case for reargument. In the absence of doing so, I adhere to the dissenting views set forth in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), and
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). I also join

the plurality's opinion." Williams v. lllinois, 132 S. Ct., at 2245 (Breyer, J., concurring). This is
important because under the dissenting opinions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, Dr. Reichard's statements would be considered to be testimonial. Adding Justice

Breyer' s vote to the four dissenting Justices in Williams and there is another five-vote majority
for the exclusion of the evidence.
Justice Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's dissent in Melendez-Diaz, which states that the
Confrontation Clause should be concerned with testimony from traditional witnesses. Justice
Kennedy explains that:
It is remarkable that the Court so confidently disregards a century of
jurisprudence. We learn now that we have misinterpreted the Confrontation
Clause-hardly an arcane or seldom-used provision of the Constitution-for the
first 218 years of its existence. The immediate systemic concern is that the Court
makes no attempt to acknowledge the real differences between laboratory analysts
who perform scientific tests and other, more conventional witnesses-"witnesses"
being the word the Framers used in the Confrontation Clause.
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Crawford and Davis dealt with ordinary witnesses-women who had seen, and in
two cases been the victim of, the crime in question. Those cases stand for the
proposition that formal statements made by a conventional witness-one who has
personal knowledge of some aspect of the defendant's guilt-may not be admitted
without the witness appearing at trial to meet the accused face to face. But
Crawford and Davis do not say-indeed, could not have said, because the facts
were not before the Court-that anyone who makes a testimonial statement is a
witness for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, even when that person has, in
fact, witnessed nothing to give them personal knowledge of the defendant's guilt.
Because Crawford and Davis concerned typical witnesses, the Court should have
done the sensible thing and limited its holding to witnesses as so defined. Indeed,
as Justice THOMAS warned in his opinion in Davis, the Court's approach has
become "disconnected from history and unnecessary to prevent abuse." 547 U.S.,
at 838, 126 S.Ct. 2266. The Court's reliance on the word "testimonial" is oflittle
help, of course, for that word does not appear in the text of the Clause.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330-31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This concern
was repeated by Justice Kennedy (again with Justice Breyer concurring) in Bullcoming, "This
Court's missteps have produced an interpretation of the word 'witness' at odds with its meaning
elsewhere in the Constitution, including elsewhere in the Sixth Amendment." Bullcoming v.

New Mexico, 131 S. Ct., at 2728, (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Dr. Reichard was not a laboratory analyst, rather, he was an ordinary witness under the

Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz dissents, and his statements would be covered by the
Confrontation Clause. Thus, the views of Justice Breyer added to the views in Justice Kagan's
dissent in Williams produces a majority for the proposition that a physician who is retained for
the purpose of investigating a suspected crime and who, by him or herself, conducts an
examination which leads to inculpatory evidence, is a witness whose evidence may not be
presented in absence of an opportunity for cross-examination.
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e. The Post-Williams autopsy report cases
The Court, in its Opinion, relies upon People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, 980 N.E.2d 570

(Ill. 2012). The Leach Court concludes ''that whichever definition of primary purpose [Justice
Alito's or Justice Kagan's] is applied, the autopsy report in the present case was not testimonial
because it was (1) not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual or (2)
for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal case." Id., at 590. However, Leach
is easily distinguishable because here the evidence clearly establishes that Dr. Reichard's portion
of the autopsy report fits into both categories. Dr. Reichard's services were only obtained when
it was anticipated that expert testimony in a criminal trial would be required, thus meeting both
the "targeted individual" and "primary purpose" requirements.
In addition, the Leach Court fails to take into account that the autopsy report there would
be considered to be testimonial by the Williams majority of Justice Breyer and the dissenters. Dr.
Reichard would be considered to be an ordinary witness by Justice Breyer and his out-of-court
statements would be subject to the Confrontation Clause. See section d above.
A contrary conclusion to Leach was made by the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v.

Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, (N.M. 2013). In Navarette, "the disputed issue was who shot
Reynaldo-the driver, who was closest to Reynaldo, or Navarette, who was several feet away
from Reynaldo. Relevant to this disputed issue, Dr. Zumwalt, the Chief Medical Examiner,
testified at trial. He repeated the assertion of Dr. Dudley, the doctor who performed the autopsy,
but who did not testify, ''that this was a distant range shooting, because Dr. Dudley did not see
any evidence of a close range shooting." 294 P.3d at 437. The New Mexico Court found that Dr.
Dudley's findings were testimonial under the Sixth Amendment.
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In so finding, the Court found that it was clear that the autopsy was performed as part of a
homicide investigation and "in fact, two police officers attended the autopsy." Thus, it "is
axiomatic that Dr. Dudley made the statements in the autopsy report primarily intending to
establish some facts or opinions with the understanding that they may be used in a criminal
prosecution." 294 P.3d at 440. In this case, Dr. Ross's report indicates that four police officers
and Prosecuting Attorney Spickler were at the autopsy. State's Trial Exhibit 11, pg. 12. Thus,
when the case was referred to Dr. Reichard for further examination it was for the purpose of
establishing facts to be used at a later criminal trial.
Next, the New Mexico Court found "that even if a statement (in this case, a forensic
report), does not target a specific individual, the statement may still be testimonial."
It explained that:
In Williams, four justices concluded that a forensic report was not testimonial
because the report did not target a specific individual. Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at
2243 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas rejected this approach in his concurring
opinion, stating "The new primary purpose test [from the Williams plurality
opinion] asks whether an out-of-court statement has the primary purpose of
accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct. That test lacks any
grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in logic." Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at
2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Writing for four justices who dissented in Williams, Justice
Kagan also rejected this approach, stating:
[T]he plurality states that the Cellmark report was not prepared for
the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. Where that
test comes from is anyone's guess. Justice THOMAS rightly shows
that it derives neither from the text nor from the history of the
Confrontation Clause. And it has no basis in our precedents.

Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg,
and Sotomayor, JJ.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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294 P.3d, at 438-439. Thus, while Dr. Reichard's report was targeted at a limited group of
possible suspects, it did not have to be in order to meet the primary purpose test of a majority of
the Supreme Court.
Further, the New Mexico Court concluded that "[b]ecause an autopsy conducted in the
context of a death caused by this type of injury will automatically trigger a duty by medical
examiners to report their findings to the district attorney, see [New Mexico Statutes] § 24-11-8,
we conclude that autopsy reports regarding individuals who suffered a violent death are
testimonial." Id. Likewise here, LC.§ 19-430l(B) requires the coroner to summon "a person
authorized to practice medicine and surgery in the state of Idaho to inspect the body and give a
professional opinion as to the cause of death." When a coroner is informed that a person has
died as a result of a homicide or under suspicious circumstances, the coroner must "refer the
investigation to the ... chief of police[.]" LC. § 19-4301. Under Navarette, autopsy reports in
Idaho are also testimonial.
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court found that its autopsy reports were
testimonial even post-Williams because its state statute required the Medical Examiner to
formulate opinions or testimony injudicial proceedings. State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905,922
(W.V. 2012). And as previously indicated, it does not matter that the autopsy report does not
target a specific person. The observations, findings, and opinions within the report are
statements that were made when Dr. Reichard understood that the statements might be used in a
criminal prosecution where there were only a few possible suspects.
The State of New Mexico has filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Navarette. The
case has been assigned Docket No. 12-1256. According to the United States Supreme Court
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website, the briefing has been completed and the case has been distributed to the Justices for
consideration on the Supreme Court's September 30, 2013, conference.
www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docket. That being the case, the Supreme Court could announce
whether it will accept review of the case as soon as when the Court comes back into public
session on October 7, 2013, the first Monday of October. This Court may want to defer ruling on
this motion until after the United States Supreme Court has decided whether to accept review of

Navarette.

j Conclusion
The evidence here is testimonial under both Justice Alito' s "primary purpose" test and
Justice Kagan's "primary purpose" test. Thus, there are eight votes that the evidence falls within
the Confrontation Clause. Even if the evidence did not fall within Justice Alito' s test, it falls
within Justice Thomas's "sufficient solemnity" test and is testimonial evidence when his vote is
added to the four dissenting votes. Further, Justice Breyer's views, as expressed in his
concurrence, added to the four dissenting votes, results in another five member majority in favor
of Mr. Grove's position. Finally, while the Illinois Supreme Court found an autopsy report to not
be testimonial post-Williams, that case is easily distinguished. At the same time, the Supreme
Courts of West Virginia and New Mexico have both found autopsy reports to be testimonial.
Reconsideration should be granted.

B.

The Court Should Not Have Dismissed the Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim
The Court summarily dismissed this claim "[b]ecause this issue was not raised on

appeal," noting "that even though the assertions were not objected to during the trial, the matter
could have been presented on appeal, similar to the issues regarding the Petitioner's right to
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confront witnesses, as discussed above." Opinion, pg. 24-25. As will be explained, this is not a
proper basis to dismiss the case.
First, as the Court notes in footnote 19 of the Opinion, appellate counsel attempted to
present the confrontation issue on appeal. However, the Court of Appeals found that it could not
be raised for the first time appeal. The Court of Appeals wrote, that:
[W]e conclude that we cannot ascertain from the record whether Grove's failure
to object to Dr. Ross's and Dr. Harper's testimony as to Dr. Reichard's findings
and conclusions was not a tactical decision-the record simply does not eliminate
the possibility that the failure to object was strategic.... As we noted above, our
Supreme Court has made it clear that application of the fundamental error doctrine
is to be limited, and we abide by that pronouncement and conclude here that
Grove cannot challenge admission of the testimony for the first time on appeal.

State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 492-93, 259 P.3d 629, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied
(2011). The Court of Appeals's treatment of the Confrontation Clause issue proves Mr. Grove's
point: The prosecutorial misconduct claims could not have been raised for the first time on
appeal. See also, Affidavit of Diane Walker; Affidavit of Eric Frederickson.
Second, Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720,725,932 P.2d. 348,353 (1997), the case relied
upon by the Court, is not applicable to this case. In order to understand the holding in Rodgers v.

State, that "Rodgers' claim ofprosecutorial misconduct based on statements concerning Cox's
ability to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege could have been raised during the earlier
litigation that also challenged the prosecutor's conduct," it is necessary to first look at the
arguments raised in the criminal case.
In the direct appeal, Mr. Rodgers asserted that the district court erred in not requiring codefendant Cox to testify, even though Rodgers had entered into a stipulation with the stattfthat
the witness was unavailable to testify due to right against self-incrimination. He also argued that
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"that defense counsel's failure to object to 'cloak[ing] Cox with a blanket right not to testify' is
not fatal because it was fundamental error to allow the prosecutor to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege on Cox's behalf." State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 1076, 812 P.2d 1227,
1237 (Ct. App. 1990) affd, 119 Idaho 1047, 812 P.2d 1208 (1991). The Court of Appeals
disagreed with Mr. Rodgers, writing:
We believe it is sufficient to say that under the circumstances shown above, the
trial court committed no error in accepting the stipulation of counsel that Cox was
an unavailable witness. Rodgers did not indicate that he needed the court's
permission to call Cox if, indeed, he wanted to. Moreover, it is clear that
defendant's counsel were not in any way deterred from calling Cox by the
prosecutor's statements. No request was made to the trial court to grant immunity
to Cox. Moreover, the record does not show that Rodgers requested the prosecutor
to grant Cox use immunity.
119 Idaho at 1076-77, 812 P.2d at 1237-38.
On post-conviction, Mr. Rodgers claimed that ''the prosecution misrepresented the right
of Daron Cox to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and improperly
represented that Cox would refuse to testify at trial." The Supreme Court would not consider this
issue noting "Rodgers' claim ofprosecutorial misconduct based on statements concerning Cox's
ability to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege could have been raised during the earlier
litigation that also challenged the prosecutor's conduct." Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho at 725, 932
P.2d at 353. That was obviously the case, because the allegation that the prosecutor had
misstated Cox's ability to assert the Fifth Amendment was part of the argument that the trial
court erred in not requiring him to testify. Thus, Mr. Rodgers could not raise in post-conviction
an aspect of the issue he actually raised on direct appeal because a post-conviction petition is not
a substitute for an appeal. LC.§ 19-4901(b).
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In this case, the instances of prosecutorial misconduct alleged in the post-conviction are
not aspects of any claim raised on direct appeal. Consequently, Rodgers is not apposite.
Moreover, the claim could not have been raised on direct appeal for the same reason the
Confrontation Clause issue was not permitted to been raised: There was no objection below and
the record before the appellate court was incomplete as to whether the failure to object was
strategic.
Moreover, since Rodgers the standard for what issues may be raised for the first time on
appeal has changed. At the time of Mr. Rodgers's direct appeal, fundamental error was loosely
defined as an error "which so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and
deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process." State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,
180,824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991), quoting State v. Morris, 116 Idaho 834,836,780 P.2d 156, 158
(Ct. App. 1989). At the time of Mr. Grove's direct appeal, the Mauro standard had been
modified by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,224,245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). As the Court of
Appeals explained in State v. Grove, supra.:
Recently in Perry, our Supreme Court summarized the analysis which applies in
cases of unobjected-to error:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
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State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 490-91, 259 P.3d 629, 636-37 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied
(Sept. 12, 2011). On direct appeal there was no "information as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision." Therefore, the error could not have been raised under the Perry
fundamental error doctrine. This is conclusively demonstrated by the Supreme Court's treatment
of the prosecutorial misconduct claim raised in that case. It refused to consider the claim on
direct appeal and stated that the claim should be raised in post-conviction:
It appears to be a reasonable possibility, under the facts ofthis case, that defense
counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's improper conduct in both eliciting
vouching testimony and later referencing that testimony during closing was a
strategic decision. Therefore, this claim cannot properly be dealt with in a
fundamental error review and is more properly pursued on post-conviction relief
where additional fact-finding may be conducted to determine the motivation for
defense counsel's failure to object.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at229,245 P.3dat 981; See also, Jeffrey W. Bower, Clarity and
Balance: Appellate Review of Harmless Error, Fundamental Error, and Prosecutorial Misconduct
After State v. Perry, 48 Idaho L. Rev. 85, 104-05 (2011);3 and State v. Skunkcap, 34746, 2013
WL 2714563 (Idaho Ct. App. June 14, 2013) (Court refuses to consider a claim raised for the
first time on appeal because "Skunkcap has failed to argue or demonstrate that the decision not to
object at trial was not a tactical decision.").
Here appellate counsel could not have even attempted to raise the incident of
prosecutorial misconduct where Prosecuting Attorney Spickler exposed the members of the jury

There, the author writes, "The second component [clear and obvious error] acts as a
limit on the first by requiring the appellate court to probe the record for any indication that the
clear or obvious error went intentionally unobjected to as part of a tactical decision by the
defendant with the hopes of using the error as grounds for reversal on appeal. It was this second
component of prong two that lead the court in State v. Perry to disregard Perry's claims of
prosecutorial misconduct during the prosecutors questioning of witnesses."
3
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to extra judicial evidence. Defense counsel testified that he did not see Mr. Spickler projecting
autopsy and family photographs of

on a courtroom screen while the jury reported for duty.

(According to the State, it is "very clear that: 1) Certain instances of allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct were unobserved by trial counsel (setting up power point exhibits Depo. pg. 38 -40,
ln. 23)[.]" State's Reply, pg. 5.) And according to the Supreme Court, "When facts outside the
record are to be used as the basis of a challenge . . . such issues cannot properly be raised on
appeal, but must be raised by application under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act[.]"

Kraft v. State, 99 Idaho 214,215,579 P.2d 1197, 1198 (1978). Thus, this unobserved,
unobjected-to, incident of misconduct could not have been raised on appeal because it does not
appear in the record of court proceedings. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the absence of an
objectionattrial did not prevent appellate counsel from raising the on-the-record instances of
prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, Kraft prevented them from raising the off-the-record
misconduct.
Finally, as pleaded in the Petition, if the issue could have been raised on appeal, it should
have been raised on appeal and thus was deficient performance on the part of appellate counsel.
This will be discussed in detail in Section D below. Even if the appellate counsel issue were not
viable, Mr. Grove should be able to raise specific instances of unobjected-to prosecutorial
misconduct as examples of deficient performance in his ineffective assitance of trial counsel
claims. This will be explained in detail in Section E below.
C.

The Court Should Not Have Dismissed the Juror Misconduct Claim
Similar to the prosecutorial misconduct issue, the Court finds that because "there is some

information in the record that jurors may have been having difficulty staying awake" the juror

27 •

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

384

misconduct issue "should have been addressed on appeal [and therefore] this Court will not
address this issue at this juncture." Opinion, pg. 27. However, the issue could not have been
raised on appeal under Perry. Mr. Grove could not demonstrate on the scanty trial court record
that any of the jurors had gone to sleep during the testimony. All the record of the trial
proceedings shows is that: 1) the Court took an early lunch break during the state's direct
examination of Dr. Ross (Exhibit B, pg. 921, In. 16 - pg. 922, In. 6); 2) the Court took a recess at
the prosecutor's suggestion and observation that the jurors were "having a hard time staying

awake" during the cross-examination of Dr. Ross (Exhibit B, pg. 983, In. 9-13) (emphasis
added); and 3) that the Court interrupted the cross-examination of Dr. Arden and, after consulting
with counsel, decided to break for lunch. (Exhibit B, pg. 1351, In. 19-25). None of these
instances show that the jurors were actually asleep during the important testimony of Drs. Ross
and Arden.
Therefore, on this record, appellate counsel could not have raised a fundamental error
claim because they could not have demonstrated the first and second of Perry's requirements:
They could not show that one of Mr. Grove's unwaived constitutional rights were violated
because they could not show that any of the jurors were actually asleep. Appellate counsel also
could not show that the error was clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision. Reconsideration should be granted.
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If the Previous Rulings Stand, the Court Should Not Have Dismissed the Ineffective
Assistance ofAppellate Counsel Claim

If the Court does not reconsider its decisions dismissing the prosecutorial misconduct and
jury misconduct claims, it should then reconsider its decision dismissing the ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim. If, as the Court writes, the juror misconduct issue and
prosecutorial misconduct issues could have been raised on appeal, it was deficient performance
for appellate counsel to fail to raise the issues. They would have been stronger appellate issues
on the merits than the challenge raised by appellate counsel to the Court's sentencing discretion.
They also would have been stronger issues than the Confrontation Clause issue raised, since the
Court of Appeals refused to even consider that issue. Mintun, supra.
Mr. Grove was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise the juror misconduct and
prosecutorial misconduct issues. It is no substitute for Mr. Grove to be able to raise the claims as
aspects of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because the standard of prejudice under

Strickland is higher for ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims than it is for ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims. In his trial counsel claims, Mr. Grove must show a
reasonable probability of a different result at trial. Specifically, he must show that if trial
counsel's performance with respect to the prosecutorial misconduct had been adequate, there is a
reasonable chance that the jury would have found him not guilty. Or, Mr. Grove must show a
reasonable probability that the Court would have granted a mistrial had defense counsel made a
timely challenge to the juror misconduct. Strickland, supra. In order to prevail on the ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims, all Mr. Grove needs to show is the reasonable probability
that he would have gained a new trial upon appeal. Mintun, supra.
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The Court should reconsider this issue, if it does not reconsider the prosecutorial and
juror misconduct issues.

E.

The Court Should Not Have Dismissed Several of the Ineffective Assistance of Trial
Counsel Claims
The Court granted an evidentiary hearing on some, but not all of the allegations of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As with the Confrontation Clause issue, the Court
summarily dismissed all of these claims on grounds not raised by the state. The state never took
the time to individually analyze each of the claims and only made a general argument that all of
the particular examples of deficient performance were examples of strategic decisions on the part
of defense counsel. See, State's Brief, pg. 11-12; State's Reply, pg. 8. However, that was not the
basis of the Court's summary dismissal. Thus, Mr. Grove's constitutional right to due process
and his statutory right to twenty-days notice of the proposed grounds for a sua sponte dismissal
were violated. Saykhamchone v. State, supra. In addition, the Court dismissed several issues
without discussion. Accordingly, reconsideration should be granted.

In Paragraph 70 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel
rendered deficient performance in failing to assert Petitioner's state and federal constitutional
rights to confrontation (Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13, United States Const. Amendments 6 and 14)
and by failing to make proper evidentiary objections. The Court dismissed this claim due to its
previous fmding that "the expert's reliance and testimony regarding Dr. Reichard's report was
not in violation of the Confrontation Clause[.]" Opinion, pg. 32. That conclusion should be
reconsidered for the reasons already set forth in the Confrontation Clause section above: 1) that it
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is a basis for dismissal not argued by the state, nor did the Court give notice prior to dismissal on
this basis, and 2) that there was, in fact, a Confrontation Clause violation.
In addition, the Court's Confrontation Clause analysis, which relies upon the 2012 case of

Williams v. fllinois, does not fit the analytical framework of the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim which must look back in time to see what a reasonably competent attorney would have
:
I

done at the time of trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,689 (1984) (holding that

'
'l

i t

If

ineffective assistance of counsel claims requires that conduct be evaluated from the counsel's

!
i'

perspective at the time of trial); see also, Carrera v. Ayers, 670 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) on

reh'g en bane, 699 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2039 (2013) (defense

: i

counsel's performance must be judged based on the law and prevailing legal standards as they
existed at the time of trial).
That being the case, it is important to consider counsel's actions in the legal environment
as it existed at the time of trial in July of 2008. At that time, the controlling U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions were Crawford v. Washington, supra., and Davis v. Washington, supra.

Crawford defined "testimonial" as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact." 541 U.S. at 51, quoting 1 N. Webster, An American
Dictionary of the English Language (1828). In addition, the Court listed three "core" testimonial
statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;" and (3) "statements that were
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made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal
citations omitted). This, however, is not an exclusive list of "testimonial" evidence. Id. In

Davis, the Supreme Court established a "primary purpose" test, defining statements made during
an interrogation as testimonial when "the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." 547 U.S., at 822. As
explained above, Dr. Reichard's statements were testimonial under Crawford and Davis.
The leading Idaho Supreme Court case in 2008 was State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176
P.3d 911 (2007), which synthesized Crawford and Davis and held that a statement is testimonial
''when the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, unless made in
the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." 145 Idaho at
144, 176 P.3d at 916. The Hooper Court found that a forensic interview of a child witness was
testimonial. "[S]ince the purpose of a forensic interview is to collect information to be used in a
criminal prosecution, and there is a clear connection between the police and the STAR Center,
the interview was the functional equivalent of a police interrogation. Thus, it is testimonial
under Crawford and Davis, and inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness." 145 Idaho at 142-143, 176 P .3d at
914-15.
Here, irrespective of the effect, if any, that William v. lllinois now has upon confrontation
clause doctrine, at the time of the trial in Mr. Grove's-case, the evidence about Dr. Reichard's
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findings was testimonial under the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Crawford, Davis and

Hooper. A Confrontation Clause objection to that evidence at trial would have been sustained.
Thus it was deficient performance to fail to make that objection because the exclusion of the
evidence would have furthered defense counsel's theory of the case. The deficient performance
prejudiced Mr. Grove because Dr. Reichart's findings severely undercut the defense theory of the
case by purporting to show that the fatal injuries were inflicted after Lisa Nash left the house for
work. Thus, the Court should permit an evidentiary hearing on this aspect of the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim.
Finally, Mr. Grove argued that the evidence, even if it did not violate the Sixth
Amendment, was inadmissible under the rules of evidence. This Court did not grant an
evidentiary hearing on this claim. At the same time, it did not discuss or expressly dismiss the
claim. Thus, reconsideration should be granted.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts
or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.

Id, (emphasis added). The conclusions found in the autopsy report (State's Exhibit 11) at page
2, Section I(E), entitled "NEUROPATHOLOGY CONSULTATION (UNIVERSITY OF NEW
MEXICO; ALBUQUERQUE, NM," all came from Dr. Reichard's report. In addition, the
injuries noted in Section Il(C) ("CLINICAL HISTORY OF RETROPERITONEAL
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HEMORRHAGE AND BILATERAL PSOAS MUSCLE HEMORRHAGES") were not seen by
Dr. Ross but were noted by transplant surgeon. Exhibit B, pg. 938, ln. 20 - pg. 389, ln. 3 ("I did
not see this, but the surgeon who did the transplant surgery in his notes described .... "). Thus,
these portions of the autopsy report were not admissible under I.RE. 703.
In addition to the testimony quoted immediately above, Dr. Ross also testified at length
about Dr. Reichard's findings. Exhibit B, pg. 940, ln. 21 - pg. 942, ln. 23; pg. 945, ln. 2-12; pg.
948, ln. 23 - pg. 950, ln. 17; pg. 984, ln. 22 - pg. 985, ln. 6; pg. 987, ln. 4-8. This testimony
about the transplant surgeon's and Dr. Reichard's findings were also inadmissible. Thus, defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the evidence on that basis. Defense counsel could
not specifically say why he failed to make an I.RE. 703 objection. Chapman Depo., pg. 32, ln.
20-25. However, defense counsel admitted that making such an objection would not have run
counter to his theory of the case. Id., pg. 36, In. 10-14. In fact, it would have forwarded the
defense strategy because an objection would have kept out evidence which showed that
would have had an immediate and acute reaction to the fatal head injuries.
While I.R.E. 703 permits the disclosure of inadmissible evidence if the court specifically
determines that the probative value of the inadmissible evidence in assisting the jury to evaluate
the expert's opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect, a majority of the Williams v.
Illinois Court rejects the validity of that portion of the rule. First, Justice Thomas wrote, "Of

course, some courts may determine that hearsay of this sort is not substantially more probative
than prejudicial and therefore should not be disclosed under Rule 703. But that balancing test is
no substitute for a constitutional provision that has already struck the balance in favor of the
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accused." 132 S.Ct., at 2259 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kagan, in the
dissent, also rejected the approach:
[U]nder the plurality's approach, the prosecutor could choose the analyst-witness
of his dreams (as the judge here said, ''the best DNA witness I have ever heard"),
offer her as an expert (she knows nothing about the test, but boasts impressive
degrees), and have her provide testimony identical to the best the actual tester
might have given ("the DNA extracted from the vaginal swabs matched Sandy
Williams's")-all so long as a state evidence rule says that the purpose of the
testimony is to enable the factfinder to assess the expert opinion's basis. (And this
tactic would not be confined to cases involving scientific evidence. As Justice
THOMAS points out, the prosecutor could similarly substitute experts for all
kinds of people making out-of-court statements.) The plurality thus would
countenance the Constitution's circumvention. If the Confrontation Clause
prevents the State from getting its evidence in through the front door, then the
State could sneak it in through the back. What a neat trick-but really, what a way
to run a criminal justice system. No wonder five Justices reject it.
132 S.Ct., at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the trial record in the criminal case shows that the Court was never asked to
perform the Rule 703 balancing test. But even if the evidence had been deemed admissible after
the balancing test, the Confrontation Clause analysis would continue to bar the evidence even if
it was admissible under Rule 703.
Reconsideration should be granted because the Court's analysis of the Williams case is
incorrect and, more to the point, it is not relevant to this claim because it had not been decided at
the time of the criminal trial. In addition, the Court does not expressly dismiss or even address
the I.RE. 703 claim in its Opinion. At the same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary
hearing on it. Therefore, the Court should address this issue upon reconsideration and grant an
evidentiary hearing on it.
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In Paragraph 71 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel
rendered deficient performance in failing to object to hearsay testimony from Lisa Nash
regarding the autopsy report contents. At trial, Lisa Nash testified that she was told that
had blood in his brain that could not be removed. Defense counsel did not object on hearsay
grounds. The Court dismissed this claim finding that the evidence was not hearsay because she
"was not testifying as to the truth of the matter asserted, but rather explaining her understanding
of the events of the day." Opinion, pg. 34. However, no limiting instruction was requested or
given and there is no reason to believe the jury self-limited its use of the evidence to its nonhearsay purpose. Thus, the failure to object to the testimony and obtain a limiting instruction
was deficient performance. Counsel's failure to do so prejudiced Mr. Grove because, as noted
above, had counsel asserted Petitioner's constitutional confrontation rights or made the proper
evidentiary objection to the Dr. Reichard evidence, the state would have had no proof of cause of
death other than Ms. Nash's hearsay testimony. Without that testimony, Mr. Grove would not
have been convicted.

In Paragraph 72 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel
rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the testimony of Steve Stocking, a
paramedic, that Petitioner was too calm in his opinion when the paramedics arrived in response
to the 911 call. Exhibit B, pg. 838, ln. 22. Mr. Stocking was not a psychologist or psychiatrist
and had no qualifications as an expert on the appropriate reactions in a crisis. His opinion
regarding Petitioner was not relevant (IRE 401 and 402) and did not fall within the scope of
admissible opinion testimony by a lay witness (IRE 701) because it involved specialized
knowledge of the appropriate reaction of people in crisis.
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The Court dismissed this claim finding that the testimony was "based upon his perception
of the scene of the call, and also was helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony."
Opinion, pg. 35. However, that was not the case.
First, Mr. Stocking's testimony that Mr. Grove was ''too calm" was not based upon his
perception. His perception was that Mr. Grove appeared calm. The testimony that Mr. Grove
was "too calm" was merely his opinion. The foundation for his lay opinion was never
established by the state. Thus, his opinion was not "rationally based upon the perception of the
witness" as required by subsection (a) of the rule. This is shown by Mr. Stocking's admission
that he had never met Mr. Grove before and did not have any idea how Mr. Grove usually reacts
to similar situations. Exhibit B, pg. 838, In. 22 - pg. 839, In. 2. Mr. Stocking's opinion was only
backed up by the testimony that "[p]arents are u-sually excitable when their child is very sick."

Id., pg. 839, In. 5-6. This testimony does not show what Mr. Stocking's past experience was
with regard to parents in similar situations. It also shows that he was judging Mr. Grove's
demeanor by erroneously comparing him to the usual reactions of parents, even though Mr.
Grove was not Kyler's father.
As the Supreme Court wrote in State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 32, 803 P.2d 528, 544
(1990), "The admissibility of such testimony turns upon its underlying factual basis[.]" Here, the
evidence does not meet that test as there was no showing of Mr. Stocking's factual basis for his
opinion, i.e., the number of times he had observed parents in similar situations, and, moreover,
the evidence showed that Mr. Stocking's opinion was based upon the false assumption that Mr.
Grove was Kyler's parent.

37 •

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

394

~::i

"' --

. -______ j

!-_.

-- ·--- " " -

~--

.

··-

-

.

- . ·:J

----- . - __ · -

Second, his opinion that Mr. Grove's demeanor was too calm does not aid the jury's
understanding of his testimony, which was merely a narration of arriving at the home, staying
there for two minutes --"tops"- before leaving in the ambulance with

Id, pg. 837, ln. 25 -

pg. 838, ln. 1. Thus, it was inadmissible under subsection (b) of Rule 701 as well. See Hudelson
v. Delta Int'/ Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244,249, 127 P.3d 147, 152 (2005) (Lay witness opinion
that a van pulled out into traffic "safely," was not admissible under I.R.E. 701.) The Supreme
Court in Huddleson, affirmed the district court determination that "Ms. Victor could testify at
trial regarding what she observed," but held that "her opinion of whether Mr. Phibbs's conduct
was safe or unsafe would not be helpful to a clear understanding of her testimony or to the
determination of an issue of fact." Id. Similarly here, the testimony that Mr. Grove was calm
was admissible under Rule 701, the testimony that he was too calm was not.
Moreover, even if the testimony was admissible under I.R.E. 701, that fact does not
overcome the relevancy problem with the testimony. Mr. Grove's demeanor, when compared to
the typical parent does not make any fact of consequence to the action more or less likely. Even
if it was proper lay opinion, the testimony was still inadmissible under I.R.E. 401 and 402.
The Court should reconsider its ruling on this claim and permit it to go to an evidentiary
hearing.

In Paragraph 73 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Chin's testimony that there was "no
way we would have missed any of the[] injuries" described in the autopsy report. Exhibit B, pg.
851, In. 5-6.
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The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.

In Paragraph 74 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Chin's testimony that what he "read
in this autopsy report is the most brutal case" he had ever seen. Exhibit B, pg. 851, In. 6-7. This
testimony should have been objected to because it was not relevant under IRE 401 and 402. In
addition, it was unfairly prejudicial under IRE 403.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsiderationand grant an evidentiary hearing on it.

In Paragraph 75 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's testimony that
subarachonoid hemorrhage has to have immediate symptoms. Exhibit B, pg. 874, In. 24 - pg.
875, In. 22. There was insufficient foundation for that testimony as Dr. Hunter admitted that he
is not a pathologist or neurologist. Exhibit B, pg. 874, In. 24-25.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.

In Paragraph 76 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's testimony that

was

either "ejected from an automobile" or "was beaten very severely." Exhibit B, pg. 871, In. 12-14.
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There was insufficient foundation for Dr. Hunter to give this opinion.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.

In Paragraph 77 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's testimony that a short fall
"is rarely, rarely likely to produce any kind of significant head injury or bleeding" and then failed
to impeach that testimony. Exhibit B, pg. 888, ln. 16-20. That evidence was inadmissible
because there was no foundation for his opinion. Further, Dr. Hunter's opinion could have been
impeached with medical research published in peer-reviewed medical journals.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.

In Paragraph 78 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's opinion, stated without any
qualification as an expert, that

had sure signs of shaken baby syndrome. Exhibit B, pg.

869, ln. 4-16.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.

In Paragraph 79 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Ross's testimony that, although he
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did not see certain hemorrhages in the psoas and retroperitoneal areas, he was told about them by
the transplant surgeon. Exhibit B, pg. 938, ln. 20-23. That testimony was inadmissible hearsay
under I.R.E. 703.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.

In Paragraph 80 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to object to the foundation for Dr. Ross's testimony
regarding the head and alleged brain injuries because Dr. Ross also testified that he had never
viewed any of the slides or recuts himself. Exhibit B, pg. 959, ln. 10-15.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.

In Paragraph 81 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Ross's testimony that Dr. Reichard's
observation of a tear in the corpus callosum showed there was "a very significant force" applied,
something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of stories or so," or a "motor vehicle
accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, ln. 5-12. That testimony was not
admissible under IRE 703. Further, there was no foundation for Dr. Ross's opinion about the
amount of force necessary to cause such an injury.
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The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.
In Paragraph 82 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel
rendered deficient performance in regard to the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper. Counsel failed
to object or move to strike when Dr. Harper vouched for the abilities of state's witness Dr. Ross.
Exhibit B, pg. 1031, ln. 12-14. ("Dr. Ross, I'm sorry to say, is no longer our - in our Medical
Examiner's Office, because he is a super clinician.") Counsel also failed to object to irrelevant
and unfairly prejudicial testimony regarding the estimated force needed to inflict the injuries,
comparing it to the force of being hit by a car, or being dragged behind a horse, or having a horse
step on

s abdomen, or being hit by a baseball bat, even though there was no foundation

showing she could accurately make such estimates of force. Exhibit B, pg. 1034, ln. 7-21.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.
In Paragraph 83 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel
rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the admission of photographs taken a
month after Kyler's death, which included many sympathy cards sent to the family. The Court
dismissed this claim finding that Mr. Grove had not shown the cards were unduly prejudicial to
him, especially as the sympathy cards were never mentioned during the testimony. Opinion, pg.
36. However, it is well established that appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
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through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86-87,
156 P.3d 583, 587-88 (Ct. App. 2007). This is true whether the appeal is subtle or overt.
As the Court observes in this case, Detective Birdsell provided a diagram of Lisa Nash's
home. He testified that he took detailed measurements of the home, entered the measurements
into a computer program called "Crime Zone, which then makes scaled diagrams based on the
information ... you put into the system." Exhibit B, pg. 1000, In. 14-23. These diagrams were
entered into evidence as State's Exhibits 7 and 8. He also testified that the kitchen counter was
36 inches off the ground. Id., pg. 1006, In. 7-8. Thus, the photographs of the entertainment
center with the sympathy cards had no probative value because it did not depict the area of the
house in question, i. e, the counter and the floor where

fell. Rather, the purpose of its

admission was to have the jury discover the 25 sympathy cards for themselves while examining
the exhibits during deliberations thus evoking sympathy for Lisa Nash and unfair prejudice
against Mr. Grove.
This Court should grant an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
In Paragraph 84 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel
rendered deficient performance in not moving to exclude any reference by any witness to the
brain autopsy because no valid chain of custody for the brain was presented. In particular, the
state failed to present any evidence that the brain examined at the pathology laboratory in New
Mexico was Kyler's brain.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.
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In Paragraph 85 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to move to strike the prosecutor's comments after
his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination was sustained. Exhibit B,
pg. 1113, ln. 12-13. In particular, during his cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor
characterized Mr. Grove's sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is "the story you need
the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make sense." Exhibit
B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11. While defense counsel's objection was sustained, it was deficient
performance to fail to ask the Court to strike the comments and instruct the jury to disregard
them.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. It would be manifestly unfair
to dismiss Mr. Grove's prosecutorial misconduct claim and then also deny him the opportunity to
raise this issue as a part of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court should address
this claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.

In Paragraph 93 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to question paramedic David Chenalt about Lisa
Nash's reaction to Kyler's injury. The Court dismissed this issue finding that "this decision by
counsel was a strategic decision." Opinion, pg. 37. However, what Mr. Chapman said in his
deposition was that he did not know why he failed to introduce this testimony. Depo., pg. 95, In.
1-8.
At most, the decision happened to not be inconsistent with the general defense strategy
that the injuries were inflicted at a time when Mr. Grove was not present, but was not made as
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part of that strategy. At the same time, the evidence that Ms. Nash's reactions also appeared
unusual would have added to the defense by neutralizing the state's evidence that Mr. Grove was
too calm by showing that people have a wide range of reactions to similar circumstances.
This Court should grant an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

In Paragraph 99 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's
performance was deficient because he failed to point out the differences between Dr. Reichard's
report and the state witnesses' conclusions drawn from that report. In particular, the PAI
identified by Dr. Reichard (assuming for discussion that it was present) is a localized
phenomenon and, by his own publication, does not imply that more diffuse or widespread axonal
injury is present. Thus, Dr. Reichard did not diagnose diffuse traumatic axonal injury in the
brain of

Martin while Dr. Ross opined at trial that the child did have traumatic axonal

injury. However, defense counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Ross on this disagreement with
Dr. Reichard or get Dr. Ross to admit that he had not personally examined the slides from the
brain, either the routine or APP stains.
Counsel also failed to cross-examine Dr. Harper, the pediatrician, when she testified that
the child had an intrinsic brain injury (suggestive of axonal injury), an opinion contrary to the
clinical CT scan and to the neuropathology examination.
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it.
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III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons above, this Court should grant reconsideration. The Court's
Confrontation Clause analysis is in error and not applicable to the Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel claim because it is based on cases not decided at the time of trial. The Prosecutorial and
Jury Misconduct claims could not have been raised on appeal and should not have been
dismissed on that basis. Finally, many of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims have
been dismissed without mention or discussion by the Court and reconsideration should be
granted on that basis.

1 ,1 day of August, 2013.

Respectfully submitted this

{J.Mu-u4

L1l7·~, f

D~rnh Whipple

~~~Dennis Benjamin

Attorneys for Stacey Grove
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on August h2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be:
~mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
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fN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
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vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

FETn~IONER''S REPLY
MEMORANDlJM lN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSH}ERA 'HON

The Coit.rt Should Not Haye Dismissed the Confrontation Clause Claim
The state complains that the document showing the emails betvveen Drs. Ross and

Reichard "was never admitted, was never offered as testimony or evidence[.]" Motion Objecting
to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration ("Respondent's Objection"), pg 2. Bul il is no

surprise that the emails were neve1· admitted, or offered as testimony or evidence because there
has not been an evidentiary hearing on the Confrontation Clause claim or any other claim. At
this point presenting evidence through affidavits is sufficient to avoid summary disposition.
I.R.C.P. 56(b ). The document in question is attached to the Second Affidavit of Dennts -- -
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Benjamin as Exhibit A and was before the court at the time of the hearing on the cross-motions.
Thus, it may be considered for purposes of granting or denying summary disposition. The state
has not moved to strike the document, nor has it alleged that the document is not a1.1thentic t>r th::it

it is not a true and correct copy of the actual email exchange.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procdure 56(e) states that "supporting and opposing affidavits sbnH
be made on personal know~edge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in cvic.lcncc,
and shall show affumatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters s:tat~d 1:"J:::rdo."

However, the Supreme Court has said that "we have not required the triai court to rnl.e Oil the
admissibility of the affidavit when there is no objection to it. If ther~ is no timely objection, the

trial court can grant sµn:nnary judgment based upon an affidavit that does not comply ·with Rule
56(e)." Esser Elec, v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 1451daho 912, 917-18, 188 P.3d

854, 859-60 (2008), citing State, Dept. ofAgric. v. Curry Bean Co. Inc._, J 39 Idaho 789, 86 P Jd
503 (2004) (conclusory affidavit)~ Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 607,
862 P.2d 299 (1993) (statements containing hearsay ru1d lacking adequate foundation); East
Lizard Butte Water Corp. v, Howell, 122 Idaho 679,837 P.2d 805 (1992) (statements lacked
adequate foundation). In Esser, the Court held that "[b ]ecause Esser Electric did not object to the
affidavit of Lost River's president, the district court d:id not err in relying upon it when granting
Lost River'~ moJion

fm_ summary judgment."

Id. See also James v. A1ercea, 152 Idaho 914, 918,

277 P.3d 361, 365(2012) (citing Esse,. and holding court did not abuse its discretion in
considering allegedly insufficient affidavit); Antim v. Fred Meyers Stores, Inc.> 150 Idaho 774,
782, 251 P .3d 602, 610 (2011) (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Esser and noting lack of objection). Here
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Mr. Grove does not
. eve11 seek to use
. the documents in support of his motion for summary
.

disposition, although it would be proper under the authority cjted above. He only seeks to use
them to avoid summary disposition and obtain the opportunity to fully prove the facts n.t an
evidentiary hearing.

The state also complains that the emails "served only in a capacity for rcforcucc for the
purpose of informing an expert opinion." Respondent's Objection, pg. 2. Mr. Grnve is not able.

to fully respond to this statement because its meaning and import are obscure. First, the phn:isc
.

.

that the ·emails "served only ~ a capacity for refer~nce'' is unintelligible in this con.text, at k:nst to
Mr. Grove ..Second. if the purpose of the emails was to 1'inform[] an expert witness," as c1ni.mcd

by the state, that purpose supports Mr. Grove's position that Dr. Reicl1ard's rcpo1i is i.es1in:10niul
evidence under Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (D.C. 2013). As previously
· noted, Young analyzed the four-Justice plurality in Illinois v. Williams, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct.

2221 (2012) and saw:

Williams as establishing-at a minimum-a sufficient, if not a necessary,
criterion: a statement is testimonial at least when it passes the basic evidentiary
purpose test plus either the plurality's targeted accusation requirement or Justice
Thomas's formality criterion. Otherwise put, if Williams does have precedential
value as the government contends, an out-of-court statement is testimonial under
that precedent if its priinary purpose is evidentiary and it is either a targeted
accusation _or sufficiently fonnal in character.

63 A.3d at 1043-44.
What the emails show isthat Dr. Ross engaged Dr. Reichard with the purpose that he

should develop evidence for use in future criminal prosecutions where he might be required to
testify in court and that Dr. Reichard was aware of this. The chafo of custody form (Exhibit B lo
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the Second Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin) shows that the brain was sent to the Office of the
Medical Examiner in New Mexico on August 14, 2002, eleven days after the email exchange. /\t
that point, the state had detemined that
people who had been with

s death was a homicide and targeting the very [ew

shortly before he died- specifically Lisa Nash and Si.ace Grr.-r.:t;-.

Thus, both the primary purpose test and the targeted accusation test of Justice Alilo arc
demonstrated by the email exchange. When the four plurality votes are adtlcd to the ·four
'

f\J-:··t

.·•. 1:1, ,;. '; '. . . . .

dissenting votes, there is an eight member majority in Williams for the proposjtion tlwt Dr.
Reichard's report was testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. Here, Dr. Reichard's

report was developed for the purpose of assisting the prosecution in a case of s11spected homicide
where only a few persons could have committed the offense.
Further the state totally fails to address the other argumc-nts as to why there was a
Confrontation Clause vfolation here as set forth at pages 2-22 of tl1e Memorandum in ,Support of
Motion for Reconsideration ("Petitioner's Memorandum"). In particular, the state fail to addrr.:ss
the argur1ent that th~ Gourt dismissed this claim on grounds not argued by the state in its
pleadings. In.Na;.;a_v._ Riv_aspel-Toro, 151 Idaho 853. 264 P.3d 960 (2011), the S1.1prcmc Court

reversed the anmtqfsuriima:r'yjw;lgipent on a basis not raised by the moving party. It wrote:
When filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must notify the
opposing
of the particular grounds for the motion. The motion must "state
with particularity the grounds therefor including the number of the applicable civil
rule, if any, under which it is filed and shall set forth the relief or order sought."
Idaho R.qv. P. 7(b)(l ) .... If a ground for summary judgment is not stated with
particularity in the moving papers, the opposing party need not address that
ground.

party

4• -

PETITIONER'S._REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATl-0).1

408
~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - · · - - · · - - - - ----·-'----·-·----·--·--·-----------·-··-·--··-·--····--------------· ···--·-··--------···--··- ----------- ,· --------·---

ei,, 03 ,2013 3:07PM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 8274

page 6

.-:r

151 Idaho at 862, 264 P .3 d at 969. Summary disposition should be reconsidered here because
the Confrontation Clause issue and the ineffective assistance of counsel issue were botb
dismissed on grounds not argued by the state.
In addition, the state fails to address Mr. Grove's arguments about why People v. LeaPh:
2012 IL_ 111534, 980 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. 2012) is distinguishable from this case and why State

i'.

Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, (N.M. 2013) is better reasoned, more applicable to the facts here and
should be followed.
All the state does in this regard is to repeat its previous argument that "Petitioner'~ iri,11
counsel had a particular trial strategy in mind in presenting a defense," whlch involved the
intentioJlal waiver of Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses. Neither the Deposition of Mr.
.

.

.

Chapman nor the Affidavit of Stacey Grove in Opposition to Respondent's Moliou for Srnnmary
Disposition (pending the State's Motion to Strike) support this theory. More to the point, the
argument is irrelevant with regards to Mr. Grove's Motion for Reconsideration because tllis

Court did not rely on that argument in dismissing the Confrontation Clause claim or th~ aspect.s
of the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim which related to Mr. Chapman's foilui:-e to object

to the admission of Dr. Reichard's testimonial evidence. Thus, furt]1er discussion ofthis poii:tt is
not curren~ly
called for and has, in any case, been refuted in detail elsewhere. See e.g.,
. .
'

'

Petitioner's Reply Brief in .Support of Petitioner's Motion for SununarJ Disposition, pg. ,,1..9_
In sum, the state presents no reason for the Court to not grant reconsideration

011

thi:::

issue.
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The Court Sho11ld Not Have Dismissed tlae Prosecutorial and Jury ~fisconduct C{ffhm·
Regarding the Prosecutorial and Juror Misconduct claims, the state ·writes that "jt i~i

· djfficult to distinguish legitimate, tactical trial strategy and true error by counsel." Respondent's

Objection, pg. 2. This statement is tantamount to a concession by the state that an evidcntinry
hearing is needed on these claims. And, indeed, the Court has granted hearings on some n.spc..:1.'.1
of those issues, but only within the context of the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cluirn~;. Thr,::
state does not address Mr. Grove's arguments that those claims are independent of tl::P- In1cfJ<.,c:t\·r:
Assistance of Counsel claims. Thus, no reply is needed.
The state does parrot the Court's citation to Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720,725, 932
P.2d. 348, 353 (1997), bµt it does not address the reasons Mr. Grove has presentc.d as to why tbnt
case is not applicable here. Petitioner's Memo, pgs. 22 -26. In particular it does not a.ddres:;

rvfr.

Grove's argument that the instances ofpro.secutorial misconduct alleged i11 the post-conviction
petition were not aspects of any claim raised on direct appeal and, consequently, Rodgers is not
apposite. Moreover, the state ignores the fact that the Prosecutorial Misconduct cfaim cou1c! nut
have been raised on direct appeal for the same reason the Confrontation Clause issue was not

permitted to been rai~ed: There was no objection below and.the record before the appellate c..:ourt
was incomplete as to whether tQe failure to object was strategic.
The state also fails to acknowledge that th<? standard for what issues may be raised for the
first time on appeal has changed since Rodgers was decided. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224,
245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Nor does it address the fact that trial cow1sel could not have objected
to the misconduct by Prosecuting Attorney Spickler which exposed the members of the .i'm-y to

6•
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extra judicial evidence because he was unaware of it. Likewise, this particular clah11 could not
have been raised on appeal because it does not appear in the record of court proceedings.

C.

The Court Sltould Not Have Dismissed the Ineffective Assista1ice of Coun.wd Claims
Finally, the_ state argues that the Court did not need to spedfically address why it

dismissed many of the individual ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Respondent's
Objection, pg. 3. However, that is not the case. Mr. Grove has a due process and statutory right
to be informed of the basis for the court's dismissal of his petition before it occur:i. The no rice
must come either from the state's motion for summary disposition or by the courl giving sua

sponte notice and grantingtwenty days to respond to that notice. Gibbs v. Stale, 103 ldalrn 75fc.,
653 P.2d &13 (1982) (district

court improperly dismissed petition because it did not give the

20-days notice required by t.c. § 19-4906(b)). In this case, the jneffective assistance of counsel
claims were all dismissed on grounds not raised by the state in violation of Nava v. Rivo.s-Del

Toro, supra, as was discussed above.

Further, there is no way to know why

the Court dismissed the claims it did not discuss.

Thus; Mr. Grove's right to prior notice and a fair opportunity to respond have been violated.

Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995) ("Where. the st.ate has
filed a motion for swnmary disposition, but the court dismisses the application on grounds
different from those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court
must provide_ twenty days notice.''). While Mr. Grove has responded in this Motion to the
reasons for dismissal set forth by the Court, he cannot respond to the claims which were
dismissed without discussion. Consequently, reconsideration should be grante-d,

7•
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Finally,
the
sta:te
not address
the-merits of Mr. Grove's arguments why
..
. . .• .
·:
.does
'
'' ' ,;, . ~.
...
'•

'

;

~

reconsideration should be granted as to the issues which were discussed by the Coru"t so no rep1y

is needed. See Petitioner's Memo pgs. 30-45.
D.

Conclusion
For all the reasons above and in the Petitioner's Memorandum, this Court should grant

reconsideration and order an evidentiary hearing on all the claims.

Respectfully submitted this ~ a y of Sep.tember, 2013.

LJ,zv~
Dennis Benjamin

Attorneys for Stacey Grove

8 •-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on Septembers_. 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:

/(. mailed
hand delivered
faxed

to:

Nance Ceccarelli
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor
P.O. Box.1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

DLM-~:e.~~~
Dennis Benjamin
\.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV 2012-1798
OPINION AND ORDER
ON PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

This matter came before the Court on the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Th~ Petitioner \.\'aS represented by Dennis Benjamin, oft.lie firm Nevin, Benjamin,
McKay & Bartlett. 1 The State was represented by Nance Ceccarelli, Nez Perce County
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. Oral argument was heard on October 28, 2013. The
Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
The Petitioner asks this Court to reconsider the Opinion and Order on Motions for
Summary Judgment, issued on July 11, 2013 (hereinafter July Opinion). A _summary of
1

Mr. Benjamin participated via teleconference.

OPINION AND ORDER ON PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

1

414

.:.,:..,::.,-,-..------------··-~----------,

_i~_,_:,,._"-1. -··

h·,--------------..::...

~-------~-:o.,--.. ~-~-- - ........ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -----------------····

the underlying criminal case and the history of this case are set forth in the July Opinion.
1'he .Petitioner is seeking reconsideration of this Court's ruling on five issues contained
within the July Opinion.

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution
of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state;
(2} That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
interest of justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint;
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy.

...

I.C. § 19-490l(a).
A petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 194902(a)
Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709,
711, 905 P.2d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 1995). "An application for post-conviction relief
initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,
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-_ ....,

287, 912"P.2d 653,655 (Ct. App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction
relief "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
--~

0

·• .,_...

·•··-· • · ••

·

··-applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its .allegations .must be
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with
the petition. I.C. § 19-4903." Id.
In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of

pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim
for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994).
UnderLC. § 19~4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-,conviction relief
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However,
"[s]ummary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no
genuine issue of material fact which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
petitioner to the requested relief." Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287, 912 P.2d at 655. "If
the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, at 711,
905 P.2d at 644. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any
fact, is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing." Baruth v. Gardner,
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986).

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD
On a motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.RC.P. 1l(a)(2)(B), the court must
take into account any new facts that may affect the correctness of the prior interlocutory
OPINION AND ORDER ON PETITIONER'S
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·order. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. Cazier, 127 Idaho 879,884,908 P.2d 57-2, 577
(Ct. App. 1995), citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank ofNorth Idaho, 118
Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). The burden is on the moving party to bring
·- ·-· ·- · · · -··· ··· · · the new facts tothe court's -attentien;-the court is-not required-to search the record. to
determine whether there are any new facts that would affect its earlier decision. Coeur

d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037. Finally, the decision to grant or
deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001).
ANALYSIS
The Petitioner is seeking reconsideration of this Court's ruling on five issues:
dismissal of Confrontation Clause claims;. dismissal of the prosecutorial misconduct
claim; dismissal of the juror misconduct claim; dismissal of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims with respect to prosecufurial and juror misconduct; and dismissal of other
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Court will first consider the dismissal of the
Confrontation Clause claims, and then discuss the remaining claims together.
1. Dismissal of Confrontation Clause claims

a.

I.C. §19-4906(b) notice requirement

The Petitioner asserts that reconsideration should be granted because the Court
did not give the Petitioner twenty-days notice that the claims would be dismissed,
pursuant to LC. § 19-4906(b).2 The Petitioner asserts the Court dismissed the application

21.c. § 19-4906

states in pertinent part:

(b) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the

record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served
by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application
and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days
to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or on default thereof, the court may order the
OPINION AND ORDER ON PETITIONER'S
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on grounds different than those asserted in the State's motion, thus the Court dismissed
the claims on its own initiative. The Petitioner relies on Saykhamchone v. State, 127
Idaho 319, 900 P.2d 795 (1995).
Where the statehas:-filed~a·-motion-for summacy-dispesition,. but the .court
dismisses the application on grounds different from those asserted in the
state's motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide
twenty days notice. Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758,653 P.2d 813
(Ct.App.1982).

Id. at 322, 900 P.2d at 798. In the case at hand, the Court granted the State's motion for
summary disposition in part, and denied it in part, reserving certain issues to be addressed
at an evidentiary hearing. The Court reviewed the record as a whole in reaching its
determination. The Court's ruling is made pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c); however, in the
alternative, the Petitioner was given an opportunity to reply to the dismissal as a result of
the motion for reconsideration currently before this Court. The Court has considered th:~
information set forth in the detailed Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration as a reply to the dismissal in this case. Thus, the Petitioner's reliance on
I.C. § 19-4906 is not a basis for allowing an evidentiary hearing on the issues related to
the Confrontation Clause claims which have been summarily dismissed.

b.

Consideration of State v. Navarette

The Petitioner asserts the Court erred in the determination that the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the testimony of witnesses in reference to Dr. Reichard's
application dismissed or grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the
proceedings otherwise continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there
exists a material issue of fact.
(c) The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application
when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
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report following a separate autopsy of the victim's brain. The Petitioner provides
additional analysis on this issue, and asks the Court to consider the determination of the
New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435 (N.M. 2013). The Court
has reviewed Navarette;~ and·finds the-case is distinguish.able from the matter before this
Court. In the case at hand, Dr. Ross performed the autopsy of the body of the victim, and
made observations about the body, and also limited observations of the victim's brain.
Dr. Ross then had the brain sent to Dr. Reichard for further in depth autopsy. Dr. Ross
i1:i~orpora1~d a portion of Dr. Reichard's report into the autopsy which was admitted into
evidence in this case. Further, Dr. Ross made some reference to Dr. Reichard's report
when he was testifying in open court.
In Navarette, the forensic pathologist who completed the autopsy of the victim,
Reynaldo, was not available to testify in court. Instead, the Chief Medical Examiner, Dr.
Zumwalt, testified based upon his review of her autopsy report. Navarette, 294 P.3d at
437. The defendant objected to both Dr. Zumwalt's testimony, and also the admission of
Dr. Dudley's autopsy report. The objections were overruled, the testimony was heard,
and the report was admitted. Id. The Navarette Court made the following determination:
[T]he importance of a bright-line constitutional rule that requires the
out-of-court declarant to be subjected to cross-examination is readily
apparent. Dr. Zumwalt testified that evidence of soot, stippling, or
gunpowder cannot always be easily seen by the naked eye and often ends
up on the clothing, rather than the skin, and therefore autopsy photographs
of the body would not necessarily capture such evidence. Consequently,
in material respects, the autopsy findings do not involve objective markers
that any third party can examine in order to express an independent
opinion as to the existence or non-existence of soot or stippling. Such
observations are not based on any scientific technique that produces raw
data, but depend entirely on the subjective interpretation of the observer,
who in this case was Dr. Dudley. How Dr. Dudley reached the conclusion
that there was no evidence of soot or stippling on Reynaldo's body or
clothing should have been the subject of cross-examination. Inquiry into

OPINION AND ORDER ON PETITIONER'S
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her training, the equipment used to arrive at her subjective conclusion,
whether the evidence of soot or stippling might have been masked by
blood, or any other variables that would influence her decision should
have been tested in the crucible of cross-examination. "[T]he analysts who
write reports that the prosecution introduces must be made available for
confrontation even if they possess 'the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie
···· · and=thc~-veracity-ofMotherT-eresa/3tBuZlcoming,-..U.S. at---, 131
S.Ct. at 2715 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
319 n. 6,129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d314 (2009)).
This is not to say that all material contained within an autopsy file is
testimonial and therefore inadmissible. Without attempting to catalogue all
material in a file that could be admissible, we note that an expert witness
may express an independent opinion regarding his or her interpretation of
raw data without offending the Confrontation Clause. See Aragon, 201 ONMSC-008, ,r,r 26-30, 147 N.M. 474,225 P.3d 1280 (confrontation case
framing the question presented as whether the testifying analyst was
testifying to his own opinion or merely parroting the opinion of the analyst
who performed the forensic analysis and noting that the testifying analyst
had not analyzed the raw data to reach his conclusion). For example, in
this case, after being shown the autopsy photographs, Dr. Zumwalt
expressed his own opinion-about the entry and exit wounds, explaining the
basis for bis opinion. He did not simply parrot the opinion or subjective
statement of the pathologist who performed the autopsy and took the
photographs. Thus, he was available for cross-examination.
Because Dr. Zumwfllt related testimo:riia1 hearsay from Dr. Dudley to
the jury, and it was not established that Dr. Dudley was unavailable and
Navarette had a prior opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Dudley,
Navarette's confrontation rights were violated. We therefore reverse his
convictions and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

..

··:- --_: ._-- --- -----· .... - ----···--

Id. at 442-443.

In the case before this Court, Dr. Ross was the lead forensic examiner. He
performed the autopsy of the victim, and made personal observations of every part of the
victim's body, including the brain. However, he then sent the brain to another
pathologist for more in-depth examination. Dr. Ross testified as to his observations and
opinions regarding the cause of death. Dr. Ross was available, and subjected to, thorough
cross-examination. The testimony of Dr. Ross was further scrutinized through the
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defendant's presentation of an expert witness. · Thus, the case is distinguishable from

Navarette, where the attending forensic pathologist was not available to testify in court.
This Court notes there is a split of authority on this issue, and referred to some
cases:considered by the Supreme~Courtof IUino-is,in-the analysis from People v. Leach,_~---...,-h--;,- - -- - --- -·
We acknowledge that defendant has cited several cases from other
jurisdictions in which the courts of our sister states have held that an autopsy
report is testimonial hearsay, either in a case in which the report was admitted or
in which a medical examiner other than the one who performed the autopsy was
pennitted to testify to the contents of the report. See, e.g., State v. Davidson, 242
S.W.3d 409,417 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (holding that when an autopsy report is
prepared at the request of law enforcement in anticipation of a murder
prosecution and the report is offered to prove the victim's cause of death, the
report is testimonial); Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104, 111
(Tex.Ct.App.2010) (holding that an autopsy report is testimonial when its
primary purpose is to establish or prove past events, as demonstrated by police
officer's attendance at autopsy, his taking of photographs during autopsy, and
where statutory basis for performance of the autopsy was suspicion of death by
unlawful means); United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 73 (D.C.Cir.2011) (per
curiam) (classifying autopsy reports as testimonial when requested by law
enforcement, officers are present during autopsies,.and officers.participated in
preparation of diagrams and other portions of the reports), cert. granted in part
in Smith v. United States, -U.S.--, 132 S.Ct. 2772, 183 L.Ed.2d 638
(2012).
However, these cases are countered by cases holding that an autopsy report
may be admitted into evidence witp.out the testimony of the pathologist who
performed the autopsy without violating the defendant's rights under the
confrontation clause. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306, 2006-0hio4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, at ,r,r 80-88 (concluding that autopsy reports are
admissible nontestimonial business records), review granted by State v. Craig,
126 Ohio St.3d 1573, 2010-0hio-4539, 934 N.E.2d 347 (table); United States v.
Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236-37 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that autopsy reports are
admissible as business records and are nontestimonial "even where the declarant
is aware that [the report] may be available for later use at trial"); Banmah v.
State, 87 So.3d 101, 103 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) (autopsy reports are
nontestimonial because they are prepared pursuant to statutory duty and not
solely for use in prosecution); Cato v. Prelesnik, 2012 WL 2952183, *3
(W.D.Mich. July 18, 2012) (rejecting Crawford claim in habeas petition on
basis that Crawford did not clearly establish that autopsy results are testimonial
in nature and that even under Melendez-Diaz, the answer to this question is
uncertain). In addition, the cases cited by defendant predate the Supreme Court's
decision in Williams.
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This split of opinion and the confusion regarding application of the primary
purpose test to reports of forensic testing may eventually be resolved by the
United States Supreme Court. In the meantime, while we are not prepared to say
that the report of an autopsy conducted by the medical examiner's office can
never be testimonial in nature, we conclude that under the objective test set out
by the plurality in Williams, under the test adopted in Davis, and under Justice
· ">-'fhomas·t~r''formality ancl·seiemnity''-rule, autopsy reports prepared by a~medical
examiner's office in the normal course of its duties are nontestimonial. Further,
an autopsy report prepared in the normal course of business of a medical
examiner's office is not rendered testimonial merely because the assistant
medical examiner performing the autopsy is aware that police suspect homicide
and that a specific individual might be responsible.

People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 593-594 (2012). Based upon the record before this
Court, the Petitioner's motion to reconsider this issue is denied.

2. Remaining claims
The Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the Court's ruling on four other claims:
dismissal of the prosecutorial misconduct claim; dismissal of the juror misconduct claim;
dismissal of ineffective assistance of counsel claims with respect to prosecutorial and
juror misconduct; and dismissal of other ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The
Court has reviewed the Petitioner's motion and finds no basis for reconsideration of the
Court's previous ruling. Further, no new facts have been presented with respect to these
claims, therefore, the Petitioner's motion for reconsideration is denied.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is
denied.
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ORDER
The Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
··..,.·_·:=_-:::.-~_-:""_.,.....-

.,,_.-,..

·-

~-"-]~.---

. ----

-----~----

-----.-. --·--·.

DATED this ~D~y of November 2013.

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of
-the foregoing OPU·~10N AND ORDER-ON
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at
Lewiston, Idaho, this Z I5,..., day of
November, 2013, to:
Dennis Benjamin
P 0Box2772

Boise ID 83701
~an~e Ce~~c8-:,elli - M..t~44tr
t' u .t:Sox lLO I
Lewiston ID 83501
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk
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STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)·
)·

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

ORDER GRANTING MOTJ.O.N J"{."1"-1
PER.l\ilISSI(?N FOR
INTERLOCUTORY A'PP1<:}(L

The Court, having reviewed the Petitioner's_ Motion for ~em1issio11 to Take
Interlocutory Appeal of i1s Ju]y 11,.2013, order summarily dismissing Mr. Gm ve' s firs,

1'.:1,: .. :·

of action (alleging a denial oftbe right to confront the witnesses against him in violoti:,.11 cd· ;;,:_

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article T, § 13 of th~
Idaho Constitution)and Mr. Grove's fifth cause of action (alleging a denial of cffec,1ivo

assfitan~e;._;f'aJ?;: .~~~bi~tion of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United S r.n.tt:::i
· -i • - • '.".;·_\('.(.;hflrit~}1J~·);1-J-::;-,;.\ . .:
Constitutibnand 1~tte'r; § 13.ofthe Idaho Constitution insofar as counsel foiled lo as:;1·rt

)\·fr.

··.'.? ·.,'(,.,:;,.,"!. ;• i/:,_1\(:,. '•?:ti::,:-~-.;~~·_:·' ..
Grove's state and federal rights to confrontation) finds good cause to grant foe motion. Tic
issues involve a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for
difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal would advance the ntdedy rc~;n]uli en.

of the litigation.
ACCORDINGLY, THE COURT HEREBY:

1 • ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION FOR INTERLOCUTORY 1\Vl' EAl,

. _,'. ·,·. ·~ ·,\;~ ·r:4~Jt~~Ft~i:,: .·: -· ·. ·

·
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L .GRANTS THE MOTION FOR PERMISSION ON APPEAL;

., ,;i.~ :b~cj~~'.~,PETITIONER TO FILE A MOTION ·wITH THE JD AHO

, · , ·. ·.~:. >.-Y,

/.~(:i ;. .3:--~ .... ~ .

,-~- _ . '·

SUPREME :~~;p'.RF1rEQ't:)~STING ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPEAL TJNDER
•

iA.R. °i2(c)(i)

~

-

..J~

• --·-~

,r;·-:,-~·---··-- -···· -.-----·----

'w!TI-IJN FOURTEEN DAYS AFfER THE FILD'fG OF TI:UR

ORDER.
SO ORDERED-thls

/1~day ofDecember, 2013.

Carl B. Kerrick
District Judge
.• ~-: ,:
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
· ·
FILED
IN THE MATIER OF THE MOTION
REQUESTING COURT TO ACCEPT
APPEAL BY PERMISSION. -

/_

- - - , i ~ JRN' 21 APl 10 09
)
)
)

-~---------~------·----------------------------~----STACEY LEWIS GROVE,
Petitioner,
V.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

,_,_,., __,,ul

.

•

· ORDE~ ENYING MOTION
REQ'CJESTING COURT TO ACCEPT
APPEAL BY PERMISSION

Supreme Court Docket No. 41714-2013
Nez Perce County No. 2012-1798
Ref. No. 14-22

A MOTION REQUESTING COURT TO ACCEPT APPEAL BY PERMISSION ·with

attachments and a MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION REQUESTING COURT TO
ACCEPT APPEAL BY PERMISSION with attachments were filed by counsel for ;petitioner on
December 31, 2013, requesting this Court for an Order granting permission to appeal the district
court's.Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition, file-stamped July 11, 2013, in Nez

Perce County case number CV 2012-1798.

Thereafter, an OBJECTION TO "MOTION

REQUESTING COURT TO ACCEPT APPEAL BY PERMISSION" was filed by counsel for
Respondent on 'January 7, 2014. The Court being fully advised; therefore, after due consideration,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Petitioner's MOTION REQUESTING COURT TO
ACCEPT APPEAL BY PERMISSION be, and hereby is, DENIED.
DATED this

_2../e.;anuary, 2014.

·
By Order of the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon, c\erk
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge Carl B. Kerrick

ORDER DENYING MOTION REQUESTING COURT TO ACCEPT APPEAL BY PERMISSION
-Docket No. 41714-2013
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· IN THE-DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEC
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF

v. SW.t

ORDER REASSIGNING ALL CIVIL C.liliES )
PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO DISTRICT }
JUDGE CARL B. KERRICK TO DISTRICT )
JUDGE JAY P. GASKILL
)

Cv12- t7tJ?
Administrative Order
No. 2014-2

All civil cases arising in the Second Judicial District currently assigned to
-

Judge Carl B. Kerrick

.

are REASSIGNED, effective February 28, 2014, to Judge Jay

P. Gaskill.
This Administrative Order shall be served on all parties by the Clerk of the
Court for each county in those cases currently assigned to Judge Kerrick. Receipt of

this Administrative Order shall constitute notice that a new judge has been
assigned pursuant to Rule 40(d)(l)(Et I.R.C.P.
DATED this

f'f-t1-- day of March 2014; nunc pro tune to February 28,

2014.

~{\_~

JoR.Stegner
Administrative District Judge

Administrative Order 2014-2 - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7 r,--..

A.IJYI' (

I hereby certify that on this _._ day o f ~ , 2014, a true copy of the
foregoing was delivered to the following:
.· _-,-:. : :_ .--: -:·--·-s--·---- ;,·· -:·- ,., .... ------· -

_ _ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Valley Messenger Service
_ _. Hand Delivery
~acsimile

_ _ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ _ Valley Messenger Service
_
_Jia:na)}elivery
tL. Facsimile

By

Administrative Order 2014-2 - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
STACEY L. GROVE,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
CASE NO. CV12-l 798
)
vs.
)
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
)
STATUS CONFERENCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Defendant.
)

ITIS HEREBY ORDERED that Tuesday, the 29th day of April, 2014, at the hour of
2:15 P.M. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Courthouse,
Lewiston, Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Status Conference in the above-entitled
matter with THE COURT initiating the call.
DATEDthis

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
STATUS CONFERENCE

~

1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the
foregoing
ORDER
FOR
TELEPHONIC STATUS ~~
CONFERENCE ;was waifed, postage
ptepaici,:, by the . uncier~igµ~d. __ at
Lewiston, Idaho, this ~ y of April,
2014 on:
Dennis Benjamin
P 0Box2772
Boise ID 83701
Fax: (208) 345-8274
Nance Ceccarelli
PO Box 1267

Lewiston ID 83501
Fax: (208) 799-3080
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
STATUS CONFERENCE

2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDIC

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
_____________

)
)
)
)
)
).
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-1798

ORDER OF VOLUNTARY
DISQUALIFICATION FOR
CAUSE

Pursuant to the Petitioner's Motion for Disqualification under ir.c.p. 40(d)(4),
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Jay Gaskill be disqualified a the judge-in

this case.
DATED this

1 •

a

i:--

day of April, 2014.

ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STACEY GROVE,
Plaintiff,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

_________
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CaseNo. CV12-01798 ··

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE

)
)
)

In accordance with the Order entered by the Supreme Court on January 31, 2014, it
is ORDERED that Senior Judge Carl B. Kerrick, is assigned to preside over all further

proceedings in the above-entitled matter until further order of the Court.
DATED this~y of April, 2014.

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete
and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE was faxed to:
Dennis Benjamin
POBox2772
Boise ID 83701
Fax(208)345-8274
Nance Ceccarelli
POBox1267
Lewiston ID 83501
(208) 799-3080
Hon. Carl B. Kerrick_:_hand delivered

on fuis.;{)~ay of April, 2014.

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
STACEYL. GROVE,
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CV12-1798
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
STATUS CONFERENCE

ITIS HEREBY ORDERED that Thursday, the 15th dayofMay, 2014, at the hour of
10:45 A.M. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Courthouse,
Lewiston, Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Status Conference in the above-entitled
matter with THE COURT initiating the call.

/ sr

DATED this ~~--day of May, 2014.

Q~

0

CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
STATUS CONFERENCE

1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the
foregoing
ORDER
FOR
TELEPHONIC STATUS
CONFERENCE was mailed, postage
prepaid,. .by the un~rsigned at
Lewiston, Idaho, this ~day of May,
2014 on:
Dennis Benjamin
P 0Box2772
Boise ID 83701
Fax: (208) 345~8274
Nance Ceccarelli
P OBox 1267
Lewiston ID 83501
Fax: (208) 799-3080
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk
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STATUS CONFERENCE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICTAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STACEY GROVE,

)
)
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)
)

Case No. CV-2012-1798
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

_________
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

In accordance with the order entered by the Supreme Court on January 31, 2014, it is
ORDERED that Senior Judge Carl B. Kerrick is assigned preside over all further

proceedings in the above-entitled matter until further order of the Court

DATED this 14th day of May 2014.

Jhn R. Stegner
Administrative District Judge

ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
ASSIGNING JUDGE was transmitted by facsimile to:
Dennis Benjamin

P0Box2772
Boise, ID 83701
Nance Ceccarelli
P0Box1267

Lewiston,. ID 83501
(208) 799-3080
Hon. Carl B. Kerrick - hand delivered
on this _rl_ day of May 2014.

. ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Prosecuting Attorney

on

201~ RUG 26 PJfJ ~ 27
· IGINiJ.rn o. WEEKS

Nez Perce County, Idaho
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
-- -:Y:elephone (208) 799-3073
ISBN: 2923

CLERK:p~
- _DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY L. GROVE,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,
_________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2012-0001798
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

COMES NOW, DANIEL L. SPICKLER, Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby
petitions this Court for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor in the case of
the Stacey L. Grove vs. State of Idaho, Case No. CV2012-0001798 and upon
being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says:
1)

That your affiant is the duly elected Prosecuting Attorney of Nez

Perce County, and was sworn into office on January 14, 2013;
2)

That your affiant has the duty to prosecute all felony criminal

and/or civil actions, pursuant to Idaho Code §31-2604 as Prosecuting
Attorney;
3)

That your affiant petitions this Court to appoint Jessica Lorrello, or

his/her delegee, a member of the Idaho Bar Association and an experienced

PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

Page 1
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,- ______-_-_______--____ -______ -_-,,1

,-_

attorney in criminal prosecution, as the Special Prosecutor in that he/she is a
suitable person to perform the duties required of your affiant in prosecuting;
4)

That your affiant petitions this Court to appoint Jessica Lorello, or

his/her delegee, as Special Prosecutor pursuant to LC. §31-2603 throughcrut ·the duration of all further proceedings in this case.

q.,e_

DATED this

aJi day of August, 2014.

Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
) ss.
)

On this~~ o f August, 2014, before me·, a Notary Public for Idaho,
appeared Daniel L. Spickler, known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

No ary Public,for the_p_!_ate of Idaho
Residing at: -e&,W:JTO"\-- ,
Idaho
/r
My Commission ·Expires·:-- --o-;-G~--dO -\o

PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, was
sent via:
hand delivered; e~-,-.---· - ...... -- .. -· .,,----· --{1}-(2)
hand delivered via court basket, or
(3)
sent via facsimile, or
(4)
mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail.
·

-S

ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Dennis Benjamin
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
Jessica Lorello
Attorney General's Office
Special Projects Unit
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

DATED this

(1'U.~ a y of August, 2014.

M
NIE S. KELLER
Legal Assistant

PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY L. GROVE,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2012-0001798
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

_________)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that Jessica Lorello,
or her delegee, be appointed as Special Prosecutor in the case of Stacey L.
Grove vs. State of Idaho, Case No. CV2012-0001798, in that she is a suitable
person to perform the duties required in prosecuting said case and that there
is a conflict of interest in the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's
continued prosecution of said case pursuant to I.C. §31-2604.
DATED thiltt~:y of August, 2014.

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, Order for
Appointment of Specia I Prosecutor,

-c1) _ _ hand delivered, or
(2) ___ hand delivered via court basket, or
(3)

sent via facsimile, or

(4) lLrnailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States mail, addressed to the following:

Prosecutor's Office P. 0. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
Dennis Benjamin
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
Jessica Lore Ilo
Attorney General's Office
Special Projects Unit
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

DATED this

zqP...day of August, 2014.

CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
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IN'IHBDISTRICTCOURTFOR'fHESECONDJlJ_DIC#•

.

m

STATE
OF·...:IDAHO,
OF NEZ PERCE
.
.
. IN AND FORT~ COUNTY
... .
~

·'

.•

STACEYGROVE;
.

.. .·
. ' :

vs.

STATE ·oF

)·- ''...
· .

. .-·-

..

:

.

J .·;

..Petitione,r, ..

:-·:·

·.·· .... ···:.
·: ..· : .
.
. . .• .

..

\

,:;-· .

).
)
))
)
)
)

.

iDAiio:. :. :·
Respondent.

··cASENO. CV-12-01798
'!' ...

·,ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
. :" PERMISSION TO CONDUCT
DISCOVERY

Pursuant to _the motion filed by Petitioner Stacey Grove and the State of Idaho for
permission to conduct Discovery, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner is granted

..

.

permission to obtain arid_.examine

the brain tissue of

Martin along with the histology

blocks, and histology slides from Dr. Ross Reichard's :neuropathological examination, all of
which are currently in possession of the Spokane County (Washington) Medical Examiner.

Ordered this

JO"faay of December, 2014.

Carl B. Kerrick
District Judge

l2-)l-14
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOff)J.ll'Wf:{:~NfJ'tU~IQ.$.L DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND Ft:ttrrtt1m t~TY OF NEZ PERCE
ClERK~F
T
DIST. COURT

- STACEY GROVE,

.

_

- ___ }
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

.

__

i

.

.

.

9EPUTY

CASE NO. CV-2012-01798
ORDER TO TRANSPORT
PETITIONER TO HEARING

It appearing the above-named Petitioner is in the custody of the Idaho Department of
Corrections and it is necessary that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings. IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the Sheriff of Nez Perce County, State ofldaho, bring the Petitioner
to the Court at Lewiston, Idaho, County of Nez Perce, State ofldaho, on or before the 23rd day of
March, 2015, so that he may attend the evidentiary hearing scheduled in this case on March 2426, 2015.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Department of Corrections release the said
Defendant to the Sheriff of Nez Perce County, State ofldaho, for the purpose of the
aforementioned appearance and retake him into custody upon return to the Department of
Corrections.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that immediately following the conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing, the Sheriff return the saidDefendant to the custody of the Idaho Department
of Corrections.
Dated this /1-ri-day of March, 2015.

<Le~

b

Honorable Carl B. Kerrick

1•
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STACEY GROVE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST
FOR PETITIONER TO WEAR
CIVILIAN CLOTHING AT
EVIDENTIARY HEARING

THE COURT, having considered Petitioner's request that he be allowed to wear civilian
clothing at the evidentiary hearing, HEREBY ORDERS THAT STACEY GROVE BE
ALLOWED TO WEAR CIVILIAN CLOTHING TO THE EVIDENTIARYHEARING TO BE
HELD BEFORE THIS COURT ON MARCH 24, 25 AND 26, 2015.

~
~Li.:_-.~~-'l!J~===:::::==::~C)--

Dated this :2Z'~y of March, 2015.

Carl B. Kerrick
District Judge
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Dennis Benjamin, !SBA# 4199
Deborah Whipple, ISBA #4355

rlLED_

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McK.AY & BARTLETI LLP
P .0. Box 2772
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho · 83701
(208) 343-1000

1D1S .RP~ 9 RP\ W ~8

· ~p,111.~i'!Y) .--.__
/.

Attorneys.for Petitioner

P\.l\'1'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

·

TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

STATE OP.IDAHO,

)
)

~esp ondent.

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION --

)

Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks this Court, pursuant to l.C .R. 11 (a)(2)(B), to reconsider its
order granting in part the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition as to the confrontation
clause issue and the confrontation clause aspects of the ine~ective assistance of counsel claim.
This motion is based~ in part, upon State v. Stanfield,-Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2015 WL 1452930
(Aprill, 2015). A memorandum oflaw in support of this motion is filed contemporaneously_
herewith.
Dated this

4"f'... day of April, 2015.

~hJ2~

Debo~ Whipple

Attorneys for Stacey Grove

1•

SECOND·MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on April'1:,_; 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoingdocument to be:
&mailed-··
hand delivered

faxed

to:

Jessica Lorello
Kenneth Jorgensen
Deputy Attorneys Gen~ral
Criminal Law Division
P .0. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

2•
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Dennis Benj!llIDll
ISB #4199
Deborah Whipple
ISB #4355
NEVIN, ~ENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
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Attorneys for Petitioner
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF
THE STAIB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
!STACEY GROVE~

Petitioner,
,vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-12-01798

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)·
)'
)

I. INTRODUCTION
Stacey Grove submits the following in support of his second motion for reconsideration

of the Court's order granting in part the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition.
Reconsideration should be granted because the Court's Confrontation Clause analysis is in error

in;light of State v. Stanfield, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2015 WL 1452930 (April 1, 2015). A true
and correct copy of Stanfield is attached hereto as Exhibit A for the court's convenience.

1•
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II. WHY RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GRANTED

A.

Tlie Court Should not Have Dismissed the Confrontation Clause Claim.
I . Introduction
-

--·-

The Court should reconsider ifs conclusion that the admission into evidence of the
testimony of other doctors about the ~dings contained in Dr. Ross Reichard' s- neuropathology
report did not violate Mr. Grove's Sixth Am~dm.ent right to confront witnesses. The Court had
two· bases for its ruling: 1) that the evidence was l}Ot objected to by defense counsel, and 2) the
evidence was not "testimonial."· See, Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition
("'Opinion") pg. 22. As will be- explained, the Court should grant an evidentiazy hearing on the
Confrontation Clause issue which is pleaded ~ a stand-alone claim and as an aspect of the.

Ineffective Assistance of Couns~l claim.
· First, a constitutional violatio~ may be raised for the first time in a post-conviction
petition, even when there was an opportunity to object at trial. The argument why Mr. Grove can

raise this issue even though there was no objection at trial was set forth in the Memorandum in
Support of the [First] Motion fur Reconsideration at pages 4-5, which is incorporated herein by
this reference. In short, there is no statutory bar to raising such claims and cases where an
unobjected-to trial error has been raised in post-conviction are common and include: Berg v.

State, 131 Idaho 517,519,960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998); Shortv. State, 135 Idaho 40, 41, 13 P.3d
1253, 1254 (Ct. App. 2000) (both raising breach

of plea agreement claims); Rossignol v. State,

152 Idaho 700, 706, 274 P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App.), review denied (2012); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho
3 60, 924 P 2d 622 (Ct. App. 1996); DeRushe v. State; 146 Idaho 599, 603-04, 200 P .3d 1148,

1152-53 (2009); and Barcello v. State, 148 Id~~ ~69, 224 P .~d 5~ 6 _{_(?t. ~pp. ~QQ2)J™traismg

2•
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deprivation of the right to testify claims); Murillo v. State, 144 Idaho 449,452, 163 P.3d 238,
241 (Ct. App. 2007) (raising a denial of the.right to participate in his defense claim); Noel v.

State, 113 Idaho 92, 94, 741 P.2d 728, 730 (Ct. App. 1987) (raising an adequacy of plea colloquy
cJaim); and Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P .2d 1187, ll90· (1975) (raising an unfair
suggestiveness of lineup. claim, among other stand-alone claims).
Second; reconsideration should be granted because the Court's ruling conflicts with State

"· Stanfield; supra. This will be discussed in detail in the section immediately below.
2. The contents of Dr. Reichard' s report were inadmissible under the Confrontation
Clause per State v. Stan.field.
The contents of Dr. Reichard's report, which were testified to by other doctors in this
case, were testimonial and thus inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment's confrontatic,n clause.

Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified what "testimonial" means in the context of forensic
evidence. The court first reviewed the three leading United States Supreme Court cases,

Melendez-Diazv. Massachusetts, 551 U.S. 305 (2009); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, -U.S.
- - , 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011) and Williams v. Rlinois, -

U.S. - - , 132 8.Ct. 2221 (2012),

noting that those "decisions are difficult to distill into controlling principles of law." Statifl,eld, at
*4. In fact, while this Court attempted to follow the confusing and splintered Williams opinion,

I

our Supreme Court took a very different interpretative approach. It found that ~[b]ecause no
position received support-from a majority of the justices, Williams does not provide us a
governing legal principle and this Court views the decision as limited to the unique set of facts
pre-sented in that case." Stanfield, at *8.

3•

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

451

lflr 09 2015 11:07AM Nevin Benjarnin,McKay&Bart 208 345 8274

page 7

Nevertheless, "[i]t is clear that a statement-forensic or otherwise--is testimonial if it is

made pr:imarily with an_evidentiary pmpose, regardless of its formality or any other particular
criteria." Stanfield, at *4. The Court went on to note:

The only consistent requirement that can be distilled from these decisions is that
in order. for a sta~ement-··forensic or otherwise--to be deemed testimonial, it
must have been made with a primary objective of creating an evidentiary record to
establish.·or prov~ a fact at trial. This Court has previously addressed the
definition testimoniaf statements only in the context of statements made by lay
.. witnesses/where' we.likewise applied the primary purpose test to determine
whether·.a·state,ment is·testimonial. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 144-146, 176
P .3d 91 l,' 916-184 (2007) (videotape of child victim's interview with police was
te~timoniar'
it was admitted as a substitute for her live testimony)[.] ....
[W]e conclude. tbat our ~quiry should focus on whether the ... statements were
made with a primary ·objective of creating an evidentiary record to establish or
prove a fact at trial.

of

because

Id (some internal citations omitted).
The Stanfield ~ourt~·s ·cit~on to State

v. Hooper is important in thls case because Hooper

~as
the most rec~t
Idaho
Supreme
Court Confrontation Clause case at the time of :M:r. Grove's
. .
.
. .
.
criminal trial. Trial counsel should have been familiar with.Hooper. Dr. Reichard's report was

testimonial· evidence under Hooper because he prepared the report at the request of Pr. Ross with
the priinary objective of creating an evidentiary record to establish or prove a fact at trial. The
email correspondence between Dr. Ross and Dr. Reichard conclusively demonstrates that the
primary purpose ofDr.. Reichard's consultation was to develop evidence for use in a criminal
case where expert testimony might be required. Dr. Reichard was contacted on August 3, 2006,
three weeks after

Martin's death, by Dr. Ross in regards to conducting neuropathology

consultations "in case_s that have a significant potential to require his services as an expert
'witness in court'' and Dr. Reichard agreed to perfonn that role. See Exhibit A to the Second
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Affidavit ~fDennis Benjamin, filed on April 12, 2013. Attached as Exhibit B to that affidavit is
a Spokane County Medical Examiner Chain-of-Evidence Form showing that tissue was sent from
.

.

the Spokane Medical Examiner to the New Mexico Office o~Medical Investigations on August
14, 2006, and was received on August 15, 2006. Dr. Reichard's report was testimonial
evidence.

-3. Conclusion
The testimony regarding Dr. Reichard's examination

and rept,rt violated the ::·

· Confrontation Clause under State v. Hooper and State. v. Stanfield. Reconsideration ·of this claim
.should be granted.

B.
.......

The Court S;hould Not Have Dismissed the IneffectiveAssfsia_nce of Trial Co1msf!/ ·
ClaimBasedUpon tlie Failure to make a Confrontatwn Clause Objection at Trial.
Even if Mr. Grove could not raise the Confrontation Clause issue
as a stand-alone claim,
·.
~

... ·.·

. 4e should be able to raise defense counsel's failure to obje~t to that' evidence as alleged in
· _. : Par~graph 70 of the Amended Petition. This Court dismissed the claim due to its previous
finding that '"the expert's reliance and testhnony regarding Dr. Reichard's report was not in
violation of the Confrontation Clause[.r Opinion, pg. 32 .. That conclusion should be
reconsidered in light.of Stanfield for the reasons already set forth. in the Confrontation Clause
section above.
It was deficient performance to fail to make a Confrontation Clause objection because the
exclusion of the evidence would have :furthered defense counsel's theory of the case. Dr.
Reichart' s finding of a tear in the corpus callosum tended to show that

suffered a violent

injury. The deficient perfonnance prejudiced Mr. Grove because Dr. Reichart's findings severely
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undercut the defense theory of the case. It pur:p01ted to show that the fatal injuries were inflicted

after Ms. Nash left

alone with .Mr. Grove because 1:Q.e immediate and debilitating nature of

such an injury would have been plainly apparent to her. There is more than a reasonable

probability of an acquittal in this case had Dr. Reichard's findings been excluded.
Reconsideration should be granted and the Court should pennit an evidentiary hearing on

this aspect of the meffective assistance '?{ trial counsel .claim.

III. CONCLUSION ·.
For all the reasons above, this Court should grant reconsideration of the Confrontation
Clause issues.

Respectfully subnrltted this~ day of April, 2015.

Attorneys for Stacey Grove
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Jessica Lorello
Kenneth Jorgensen
Deputy Attorneys General
Criminal Law Division
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State v. Stanfield, 2015Wl 1452930

P.3d -

(2015)

"'-"' Questions of Fact and Findings
When. a violation of· a constitutioll81 right is
asserted, the Supreme Court will defer to the trial
court's factual findings unless those findings are
clearly erroneous.

2015 WL 1452930
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
NOTICE: THIS· OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FORPUBUCATIONIN THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. ~-UL RELEASED.
ITIS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL,

Supreme Court ofldaho,
Boise, August 2014 Tenn.

Cases that cite this headnot.e

[2].

Criminal Law ·
,r.,.. Constitutional Issues in General
The Supreme Court exercises free review over

STATE of Idaho, Plainti:ff-Re~pondent,

the trial court's determination as to whether

v.

constitutional requirements have been satisfied
in light of fue facts found.

Katherine Lea STANFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 40301.

Cases that cite this headnote

April 1, 2015.

Syn.op.sis
Background: Defendant was convfoted in the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Ronald J. Wilper,
J.~ of first-degree murder. Defendant appealed.

[J]

Whether admission of evidence violates a
.defendant's right to confront- adverse wi1nesses · ·
under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause is a question of law over which the
Supreme Court ex.eroises_ free review_ U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Horton. J., held that:
[I] the trial court's admission of testimony from
neuropathologist did not violate defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights;
[2] neuropathologist's testimony that her laboratory's routine
procedures were followed and that the slides she viewed
contained the victim's brain tissue was hearsay; and
[3] the exception to the hearsay rule that allo'Wed an expert
to state an opinion based on inadmissible evidence and to
indicate the general nature of the sources on which the expert
has relied, but not to disclose, directly or indirectly, the
contents of the sources on direct examination unless they
were otherwise admissible applied to warrant admission of
nemopathologist's opinion testimony.

Criminal Law
t,;;> Reception of Evidence

Cases th.at cite this headnote

(4]

Criminal Law
.,._ Instructions

The issue of whether a particular jury instruction
is necessmy and whether the jury has been
properly instructed is a matter oflaw over which
the Supreme Court exercises free review.
Cases that cite this headnote·

[S]

Criminal Law
~

Hearsay in General

Criminal Law
Affumed.

West Headnotes (27)

[lJ

. +.!o Hearsay

The trial court has broad discretion in deciding
whether to admit hearsay evidence under one of
the exceptions, and the Sup.eme Court will not
overturn an exercise of that discretion absent 11
clear showing of abuse.

Criminal Law

Vi'estlawNexf © 2015 Thoms_on Reuters. No claim to orlglnal U.S. Government Works.
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The Confrontation Clause does not bar
statements not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. U.S.C.A. ConsLAmend. 6.

Cases that cite tlus headnote

{6]

Criminal Law

Cases that cite this headnote

e. Discretion of Lower Court

Whether Jhe .!Aflt.rict . court bas abused, its.
discretion is determined by examining; (I)
whether 1he court correctly perceived the is.sue
as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently within the _applicable lega]
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. .

fll]

Ifthe statement is testimonia1, then its admission
is permitted under the Confrontation Clause only
if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

Cases that cite this headnote
[7]

Cases that cite this headnote

Criminal Law
~ Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses

[12]

Criminal Law
Qs.t Acts or Conduct

Any - declaration,.- aifmnation, omission, or
nonvernal conduct made for the purpose of
establishing some fact;, qualifies as a statement

Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote

Criminal Law
'8!i.'t ·Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses
1he Confrontation Clause only applies to
witnesses against the accused, in other
words, 1hose who bear testimony. U.S.C.A.

(13)

Const.Am.end. 6.

Criminal Law

testimonial, for
Confrontation Clause purposes. is determined by
looking at the statemenl's primary pUJpose and
its similarities to traditional testimony. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

.,. Out-Of.Court Statements and Hearsay in
General

Cases that cite this headnote

The Confrontation Clause only applies to
statements that are testimonial. U.S.C.A.

[14J

Const.Amend. 6.

"Testimony" is defined as a solemn declaration
or affinnation made for the p1,1rpgse _of
establishing or proving some fact.

Criminal Law
+.at Out-Of-Court Statements
General

Criminal Law
~ Out-Of-Court Statements and Hearsay in
General

Cases that cite this headnote

[10]

Criminal Law
..,. Out-Of-Coun Statements and Hearsay in
General
Whether a statement is

Cases that cite this headnote
[9)

Criminal Law

..., Hearsay in General

The right to confrontation is fundamental and
applies equally to state prosecutions. ·U.S.C.A.
C~Amend.6.

[8)

Criminal Law
.._. Availability ofDeclarant

and Hearsay in
Cases that cite this headnote
[15]

CJiminal Law
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~

Out-Of..Court Statements and Hearsay in

The introduction of reports· by non-testifying
analysts violates the defendant's right of
confrontation when tliey are for the purpose of
establishing or proving some :met at trial, or are
affirmations made for the purpose ofestnbl ishing
or proving some fact in a criminal proceeding.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.

General

A statement is testimonial~ for Confrontation
CJause

purposes~ when· the · circumstances

objectively indicate that the primary purposeis ~o establish .or prove past events pC>tenti_ally _
relevant to later criminal prosecution; when no
such primmy purpose exists. the statement is
nontestimonial and its admissibility is governed
by state and federal rules of evidence. not the

Confrontation Clause, U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.

Cases tbat cite this headnote

[19]

6.

Criminal Law
..,. Out-Of-Court Statements and Hearsay in
General

Cases that cite this headnote
[lo.)

In order for a statement, forensic or otherwise, lo
be deemed testimonial, for Confrontation Clause
purposes, it must have been made with a pdmruy
objective of creating an evidentiary record· to

Criminal Law
~ Out-Of-Court Statements and Hearsay in
General

establish or prove a fact at trial. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

Criminal Law
~ Use ofDocwnentary Evidence

Cases that cite this headnote

Cri:ndnal Law

·.,. -Testim~ny at Preliminary Examination,

Former Trial, or Other Proceeding

[20]

While a statement does not have to be written
or made under oath to be testimonial, for
Confrontation Clause plllJ)oses, the formality
of the statement .itself and the foIIllality of
the circmnstances in which the statement is
made are relevant to determine whether it was
intended to establish some fact at trial. U.S.C.A
Const.Amend. 6.

Cases that cite this headnote
[17]

A defendant's right to confrontation is violated

when an expert acts mer.ely as a ·wellcredentia!ed conduit, and does not provide
·any independent expert opinion. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.
Cases that cite this headnote

[21]

Criminal Law

Criminal Law
'lh- Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses

When an expert independently evaluates
objective raw data obtained from an analyst.
and exercises his or her own judgment in
reaching a conclusion, the expert is not a conduit

o,,. Out-Of-Court Statements and Hearsay in
General

In essence, a statement is testimonial, for
Confrontation Clause pmposes, when it is
intended to be a weaker substitute for live
testimony at trial U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

for the analyst's conclusion, for Confrontation
Clause purposes, rather, the testifying expert's
opinion is ~ original product that can be readily

tested through cross-examination. U.S.C.A
Const.Amend. 6.

Cases that cite this headnote

(18]

Criminal Law
~ Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses

Cases that cite this headnote

Criminal Law
e Use ofDocumentary Evidence

[,22]

Criminal Law
~ Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses

V'lasttswNexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

3

458

page 14

,pr 09 2015 11:09AM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 8274

State v. Stanfield, - P.3d -(2015)
2015WL 1452930

her field in drawing such condusions. Rules of

The triaJ court's' admission of testimony from
neuropathologist, who op:ined that child died
from non-accidental head trauma after reviewing

Evid., Ruic 602, '703.

CaBeB that cite this headnote

:ilidi;s prepared by technician, who did not
testify at murder tria1, did not viol ate defendant's
Coa:front.ation Clause rights; technician did not
·make the slides with the primary obji;ictive
of creating an cvidmtiazy record to establish
· or prove a fact at trial, neuropathologist had
personal knowledge that the slides were stained
correctly based on her comparison of the slides
with the control slide, and technician's act of
labeling the slides did not require him· or her
to make any conclusions or fac~l fmdings as
to any issue to be decided at trial. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

[26]

The exception to the hearsay rule that allowed an
expert to state art opinion based on inadmissible
evidence and to indicate the general nature of
the sources on which the expert has relied,
but not to disclose, directly or indirectly, the
contents of the sources on direct examination
unless they ,vere otherwise admissible applied to
warrant admission. ofneuropathologist's opinion
testimony that: child died from non-accidental
head trauma. which opinion was funned after
reviewing child's brain tissue slides, which
were labeled by technician, in prosecution
for murder; neuropathologist testified that the
slides she examined contained the brain tissue
of v1ctitii and that those .slides were stained
properly, the teclmician did not make any

Cases that cite this headnote

[23]

Criminal Law.
• R.lght of Accused to Confront Witnesses
The rightto confrontation does :not mandate that
the prosecution call every person involved :in the
chain of custody. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

factual findmgs that neuropatbologist relied
up1>.n, and new:opatbologist examined the tissue,

Cases that cite this headnote
[24]

prosecution for murder; the testimony provided
facts that were specific· to the case. Rules of
Evid., Ru1es 801(c), 802.

Cases that cite this headnote
[25]

documented herfactual fmdings, and formed her
own opinion. Rules ofEvid., Rule 703.

Criminal Law
,&,,, Particular Determinat:iom, Hearsay
InadmiSS1'ble

Neuropathologist's
testimony
that
her
laboratory's routine procedures were foll~wed
and that the slides she viewed contained
the victim's brain tissue was hearsay, during

Criminal Law
+., Sources of Data

An expert witness is allowed to base an opinion
on: (1) facts within her personal knowledge;
(2) facts presented to her at trial;. or (3) facts
presented to her outside of court, but not
perceived by her personally; if those facts are the
type offacts reasonably relied upon by experts in

Criminal Law.
.,.. Sources ofData

Cases that cite this headnote

[27)

Constitutional Law
..,.. :Particular Issues and Applications

Homicide
~ First Degree, Capital, or Aggravated
Murder ·
The trial court's jury instruction on the elements
offirst degree murder did nol violate defendant's
due process rights, even though defendant
argued that the jury should have been required
to find that defendant specifically intended to

cause great bodily harm to the victim; the court
instructed the jmy
to.the elemel'lts of the

as

offense and stated that defendant would be
guilty of first degree murder if she committed·-· ·· ·
a battery upon the child which resulted in great
bodilyhann,fromvvbicbthechilddied. U.S.C.A.
·Const.Amend. 14.
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Cases that cite this headnote

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth.Judicial District
of the ·State of Idaho; Ada County; Hon. Ronald J. Wilper,
District Judge.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Attorneys ftlld Law Finns
· Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for
appellantBrian R. Dickson argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, fur
respondent.Russell J. Spencer argued.

Opinion
HORTON, Justice.
,..1 Katherine Lea Stanfield appeals :from her judgment
of conviction, entered· following a ·jury trial, for the· :first;
degree murder of two year-old W.F. by aggra"ated battery
on a child under twelve years.· Stanfield raises tvvo primary
challenges on appeal. First, she alleges that the di~ct
court erred in admitting certain expert testimony, clafming
that its admission violated her Sixth koendment right to·
confrontation and that the evidenee was inadmissible hearsay.
Secon~ she contends that the district court deprived her of
her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and right to
a jury trial by failing to properly instruct the jwy. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December . 11, 2009, at 3:35 p.m., Ada County
Sheriff's dispatch received an emergency call from Stanfield
requesting medical assistance for W .F ., the son of her
daughter's boyfriend. At the time, Stanfield operated a
daycare primarily for her two grandsons and W.F., and
she had been watching W.F. most weekdays during the
previous four months; Stanfiel~ !nlcJ dispat:che(! th.It W.F ...

was unrespomlve after:fu.lling and hitting his head. A medical
unit arrived at the scene at 3:40 p.m. and transported W.F. to
·· · -St. Luke's Regioriai Medical Center.
W.F. was treated by several doctors and underwent a number
of tests, including two CT scans, which indicated severe
head trauma. W :.F. did not regain consciousness and died

on December 13, 2009. An autopsy '>VOS pcrformod on W.F.
which revealed axonal injury to his brain. According to
Dr. Charles Gllirison, 1he pathologist who performed W .F.'s
autopsy, this iajury could have been caused by either hypoxia
or trauma. Dr. Gmrison requested that a neuropathologi:Jt
become involved in· order to ascertain the cause of the
axonal injury. Dr. Garrison preserv-ed W.F.'s brain for this·' - : ·
examination. Based on Dr. Garrison's evaluation of all of the
~1her evidence, but prior to receiving the neuropathologist's
report, he concluded that W.F.'s death was· caused by nonaccidental trauma.
Police questioned Stanfield and her two grandsons, C.D. ( age
8) and J.I?. (age 5), about the incident immediately aftor W.F.
was transported to the hospital and several times in the months
following W J!.'s death. On September 21, 2010, Stanfield
was charged with first-degree murder by aggravated battery
on a child under twelve. Stanfield maintained that W.F. was
not pushed or shaken, but had fallen down while she was
in the kitchen and he was alone in the living room. The
intenriews ofC.D. and J.D. corroborated Stanfield's version
ofevent.s,butmultiple medieal experts-eonciµdedtbatW .F:'s
injuries were inconsistent with this scenario. After charging
Stanfield, in order to help resolve the conflicting theories,
the S~. hired Dr. Lucy Rorke-Adams, a neuropathologist,
to examine W.F.'s brain tisSUl'I to determine the cause. of his
death.

·The trial began on May 2, 2012, with the jui:y returning its
verdict on June 4, 2012. The primaxy issue at trial was what
-or whe>-eaused the injuries that resulted in W.F.'s death.
The State contended that W .F. died from non-accidental bead
trauma resulting from Stanfield abusing him. Stanfield dcrued
that W.F. was abused and asserted that he hit his head after
falling and his injuries were caused by a combination of 1he
fall and other medical conditions, including hypox.ia caused
by 'the emergency responders.

*2 At tJ.ia1, seven medical experts testified for the
prosecution and three testified for the defense. 1n addition
to these experts, Dr. Rorke-Adams testified for the State
regarding her examination of W.F . 's brain tissue and· the

from

coriclusfons she drew
that ·examination. Dr. ilru=k,;_
Adams ·testified that, while she personally conducted the
examination and wrote the_ report, she did not participate in
preparing the slides that she examined; rather, her technician
prepared the slides. 1 After verifying the technician's work
by reference to a control slide, Dr. Rorke-Adams evaluated

'WasttawNexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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and wrote

the slides
conclusions.

a report detailing her finding., and

Stanfield objected. arguing that because Dr. Rorke-Adams
lacked personal knowledge of the technician's actions, Dr.
Rorke-Adams' testimony violated her right to confrontation
. . and was impermissible hearsay; The district courtovenuled
Stanfield's objection:, and permitted Dr. Rorke-Adams to
testify that the slides she examined contained W.F.'s brain
tissue and that,. based on her examination of the slide~, she
believed that W.F. died from non-acciden1al head trauma
resulting from abuse.
Without objection, the district court instructed the jurors that

to find Stanfield guilty of first-degree murder, 1hey must
find that she commi_tted aggravated battery on W .F., which
resulted in his death, but that they were not required 10 find
that she intended to kill. After deliberating for thirteen hours.
the jury found- Stanfield guilty of first-degree murder. Toe
district court sentenced Stanfield to life in prison, with ten
years fixed.·

·stmrfield appeals the

district court's decision to pernrit Dr.
Rorke-Adams to testify as to the results ofher examination
and the ca~e of W.F.'s axonal injuries. Stanfield also
challenges the district court's jury instruction, alleging that it
constitutes fundamental error in violation of her Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process and her right tQ a jury trial.

(5]
[6] The trial court has broad discretion in deciding
whether to admit hearsay evidence tmder one of the
exception~ and this Co-urt will not. overturn an exercise of
that discretion ab.sent a. clear showing of abuse. State Dep't
of Health & Welfare, a rel Osborn 11. Altman, 122 Idaho
1004, 1007, 842 P.2d 683, 686 (1992). Wh~ther th~ di~i~~- .. ,~- ___. __
court has abused its disctetioll is det~im-hi~d by·ex~ing: '"
"(1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the
applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason."Slate v. Shackelford,
150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 5&2, 590 (2010). Even if
evidence was admitted in enor, this court will not grant relief.
ifwe find the error to be harmless. ld.;·.ne alsol.C.R. 52.

I1I. ANALYSIS
*3 We first consider whether the district court erred by
· permitting the introduction of Dr. Ro.rice-Adams' testimony.
.. This requires a determination whether the -intrciducfion of_
her testimony abrjdged Stanfield's Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation. We then separately consider whether Dr_
. ,~ork@-Adams' testimony included inadmissible hearsay.
· .. Finally, ·we address Stanfield's challenge to the jury
instruction.

A. The ·district court did not err by admitting Dr.
Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rorke-Adams' testimony.

[2 I [3] (4) When a violation of a constitutional riehtl. Tl,e ~ o n ofthe tl!Ytimo1ty did not violate
a..i-.,1
,.__ al fimd.mgs ~-stanfield.r
ass.,,.........,
we will defier t o the tri'al coUit' s li:11,;tu
·
. Sixth.A.mendme11t
, · .right ofconfrontalio1r.
..
ly
er
u
As
prev10usly
noted,
the
district
court overruled Stanfield's
u nl ess tb ose fim d mgs are c 1ear erroneous. ~rate v. .nooper.
• .
.
145 Idaho 139 142 176 P.3d 911 914 (2007) Thi Court
objection and permitted Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify that
·
"fr
'
•
th
.....
al•
urt' d t · . 51.
the slides she examined contained W.F.'s brain tissue and
exercises
ee review over e u~ co s e emuna 10n as
to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in
as to the findings and conclusions she reached based
light of the facts found. "Id. Whether admission of evidence
upon her examination of those slides. Dr. Rorke-Adams
did not personally prepare the slides that she examined;
{IJ

•

lS

violates a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses
under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is a .

question of law aver which this Court exercises :free review.
Likewise; "It]he issue of whether a particillar jiirj,.
instruction is necessary and whether the jury bas been ·
pmperly instructed is a matter of law over which this Court
exercises free review."State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,472,
272 P.3d 417,444 (2012).

id.

rather, a technician in her Jab purportedly prepared the
slides in accordance with instru_ctions ftom Dr. Rork(}Adams.-Stanfield contends 1hat·thnechrucian-;-oy laoeliiif-the slides, asserted that they contained W.F.'s. tissue, and
that, by retuming1he slides to Dr. Rorke-Aclanisvrithout any
notations, asserted that the proper chemicals bad been applied
to the tissue samples in accordance with her instructions.
Stanfield argues that these assertions are testimonial and
that Dr. .Rorke-Adams introduced them for their truth.. Thus,
Stanfield contends that the Confrontation Clause required

~ © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to orlglnal U.S. Government Works.
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that the State produce the testimony of the laboratory
technician in addition to that of Dr. Rorke-Adams. Absent
this testimony, Stanfield argues, Dr. Rorke-Adams' opinions
and conclusions were not relevant or reliable and should not
have been presented to the jury.
_:_ ~,._ . . . -,.· ·- "'". r·

- -~~ C~ent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
[7]
The Confrontation Clause provides · 1hat "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall- eajoy the right ...
1:o be confronted with witnesses against him."U.S. Const
amend. VI; see «lsoldaho Const. Art. I § 13. The right to
confrontation is fundamental and applies equally to state
prosecutions.Poinler v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct.
1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). Our state constitution docs not
contain a confrontation clause ·similar to that found in the·
United States Constitution; therefore. this issue is analyzro
solely under the United States Constitution. Stat.e v. Sharp,
IOI Idaho 498,502, 616 P.2d 1034, I038 (1980).

instructions had not been followed constitute statements for
Confrontation Clause purposes. However, these statements
must be testimonial for the Confrontation Clause to apply.
[13)
[14]
rl5] The Supreme Court bas not provided a
comprehensive definition of"testimonial," but ~me ~i~fng_ _
principles
be
from that Court's recent decisions.
Whether a statement is testimonial is- determined by looking
at the statement's primacy purpose and its similarities to
traditional testimony. Davt.s, 547 U.S.. at 822, Testimony is
defined as "[a] solemn declaration· or affmnation made for
the pwpose of establishing or proving some feet "Crawford,
541 U.S. at 51 (alteration in original~ citation omitted).
Therefore, a statement is testimonial.when "the circumstances
objectively .indicate that --· the primary pwpose ... js to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution."Davts, 547 U.S. at 822. When no such
primazy purpose exists, the statement is nontestimonial and
its admissibility is governed by state and fed~ral rules of

may gleaned

evidence not the Confrontation Clause. 2.Michigan v. Bryant,
(9]
[10]
[11]
The Confrontation Clause only562
344 _
131 S_Ct. l 143r 1155, 179 L.Ed.2d 93
"appli~~ to 'w~~:sses'/:gain~-~~-~ccu~eli-:::!11 o:tfter ~s~
(2 0ll).
'
'
- -- - ·- ····
those who 'bear testimony.
Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).
[16l [17] Furth.er, while a statement does not have to be
The United States Supreme Court has determined that this
written or made under oath to be testimonial, the formality
language restric1:s the Confrontation Cl§:use to· testim-ofiml
of the statement itself and the formality of the circumstances
. hearsay. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-24, 126
in which the statement is made are relevant to determine
S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006); Cra}'lrford. 541 U.S~
whether it was intended to establish-some fact at trial. Da,,t,s,
at 51. The Confrontation Clause only applies to statements·
547 U.S. at 826, 827-28; see, e.g., Shackelford, 150 Idaho
. that EW"testimonial" Davis, 547 U.S. at 823; Crawford, 541
at 373, 247 P.3d at 600 (the totality of the cirownstances
U.S. at 51. The Clause does not bar statements not offered
analysis considers "the fbrmality of questioning and lhe
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S.
extent to which 1he interview was similar to live testimony").
at 59 n. 9 {citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414,
In essence. a statement is testimonial when it is intended
105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985)). If 1he statement
to be "a weaker substitute for live t.estimony at trial."Daris,
is testimonial, then its admission is permitted only if the
547 U.S. at 828 (internal quotation, citation omitted). While
declurant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior
this def'mition has been easily applied to traditional testimony
opportunity to cross-examine the declanmt. Crawford, 541
presented by lay witnesses. its application ta forensic
U.S ..at59;Hooper, 145Idahoat 143, 176P.3dat915.
evidence and expert testimony has proved to be problematic.

u.s.'

[8)

*4 [12]
Any declaration, affinnation, omission, or
nonverbal conduct made for the purpose of establishing
some fact,, qualifies as a statement. The Supreme Court has
recognizet!Jhat a.ff'.u:mp.tions.made_by. way.of.omissions-may----c~n~e statements. Bullcoming l'. New Mexico, U.S.
- - 131 S.Ct 2705, 2714, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011)(""H;furtll~i ~esented, by leaving the '[r]emarks' section
of the report blank, that DQ 'circumstance or condition ··affect[ed] the integrity of the sample or ... the validity
of the analysis.' "). In this case, the technician's labeling
and the omission of any indication that Dr. Rorke-Adams'

Three Supreme Court cases have addressed the subject
presented in this case-whether the statements contamed in,
or relied on in cr~g,_foren~~r_ep_orts_are~':testimonial"----- --but these decisions arc difficult to distill into controlling
principles oflaw. Melendez-Di~l'_: MCI!sachusetts, 557 U.S.
3-05, 129 S.Cf2527, 174 L.Ed2d 314 (2009); Bullcommg,

-

U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. Z7DS, 180 L.Ed.2d 610; Williams
v. Dlinois, U.S.--, 132 S.Ct 2221, 183 L.Ed-2d 89
{2012). It is clear that a statement-forensic or otherw.ise
-is testimonial if it is made primarily with an evidentiary

"'11\i.i!!sttawtiM © 2015 Thomson ReU1ers. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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pmpose, regardless of its formality or any other particular
criteria.· Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1155; see al,10 Melender;Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324. Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Stevens,
and Souter, (and eventually Justices Sotomayor and Kagan)
have consis_tently voted together, opining that this is 1he
only requirement for ·a statement ·to be testimonial, See
e.g. · Melendez-Diazt 55? U;S. at 310; :Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, Alita, and Chief Justice Roberts. also consistently
voting together, have considered whether tlie statement has
an accusatory aspect. Justice Thomas has focused on the
formality of the statement. See, e.g., id at-343-44 (Kennedy,
J.,, dissenting); Id. at 329-30 (Thomas, J., conC1lII'ing). Given
tlie present evolution of the Supreme Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, it is appropriate to more carefully
elC81lline these decisions.

•s

The United States Supreme Cowt :fmrt: took up the
issue of whether analysts' statements contained in forensic
reports are testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes in

Id at 311 n. l (emphasis in original). Justice Thomas
concurred, resulting in a 5-4 holding that the Confrontation
Clause was violated by admissisn of the certificates.
Justice Thomas reasoned that, becaUlle the certifiCl3.tes
-m:rc "formalized testimonial materials" and ..quite plainly
· affidavits;" they we,re governed by the Confrontatit:m Clause,
Id at 329-30 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Kemedy,
joined by Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Ali1o, dissented,
arguing 1hat the Sixth Amendment's uire of the phrase
"witnesses against" requires that the witness perceive "an
event that gives him personal know]e.dge ofsome aspect ofthe
defendant's guilt."Id. at 343-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
dissent reasoned that ••[t]he analyst's distance from the crime
and the defendant. in both space and time, suggests the analyst
is not a witness against the defendant in the conventional
sense."Id. at 345.

--- · ·-·- · ·

Two years later, the Court again addressed the issue in
BuJlcQmfng 11. New Mexico. -U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. 2705,

Melendez-Diaz v. Massar:h11.Set1s, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct..
ISO L,Ed.2d 610. In Bui/coming, the State introduced the
2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, There, the trial court admitted three
~c~t:ates _c>!_ ~alysis~ .!AA~ CQ,<JIU!le _~prei~nt._in. bags of__ re~ults_llf El blC!o.d alcohol test Ji~ _the_ principal .evidence. in .
the defendant's prosecution for driving while intoxicated.
powder seized from the defendant. ld. at 308. The· certificates
were sworn to before a notary by the analysts who conducted
the testing. Id. The plurality held that the certificates were
testimonial' because they were ~soleinn: declrrition{s] or
affumation[s-J made. for the pwpose ofestablishing or proving
some fact" and were "quite plainly affidavits." Id. at 31 O
(quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). The Court noted that
1he governing statute provided that "the sole purpose of
the affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the
composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed
substance,"id. at 311 (emphasis in original, :internal quotation
and citation omitted), and that the certificates provided. "the
precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide

if at trial. "lei 3
Despite this holding, the plurality explained that:

[WJe do not hold, and it is not the
case, that W1yone whose testimony
may be relevant in establishing the
___ _ _ ________ . --- - . chain of custody,-authenticity-of the
sample, or accuracy of the testing
device, must appear in person as part-··
of the prosecution's case ... but, what
· testimony is introduced must (if the
defendant objects) be introduced Jive.

Id. at 2709-10. The "certificate of analyst" was signed by
the testing analyst and reported that the defendant's blood
alcohol-concentration was .21. ld, at 2710.Additionally~ the
analyst affirm~ that he had "received Bullcoming's blood
sample intact with the seal unbroken, that he checked to make
sure that the forensic report number and the sample number
'corresponded,' and that ho penonned on Bullcoming's
sample a particular test, adhering to a precise protocol."Id at
2714. The trial court allowed the certificate to be admitted
as a business record during the testimony of another analyst
who was employed by the same laboratory. Id. at 2712.
Although the testifying analyst was familiar with the Jab's
routine procedures, he had neither observed nor reviewed the
certifying analyst's findings. Id. ·
*6 On appe~ the majority concluded that the report was
indistinguishable from the report admitted in MelendezDiaz, despite not being sworn to under oath, and was thus
testimonial. Id. at ?,717. They explained that "[a] document
- -- -created soleJy-for-an~-identiary-purpose;;'-:::.nadi:dtnud _ _ __

of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial."Id. (citing
M_e'/ftlJdez-:-Diaz, 129 S.Ct .at 2532): In addition tci affirming
Melendez-Diaz, the Bullcomi,ig majority further explained
that the Confrontation Clause required that tile staiemenf.s
not only bad to be admitted through live testimony, but that
the testimony had to be that of the specific analyst who·
conducted the scientific test at issue. Id. at 2715. Toe Court
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rejected the notion that "surrogate testimony" could satisfy
the requirements of the Confrontation Clause because only
the analystresponsible forthe testing could -convey what [he]
knew or observed about the events his certification concerned,
i,e., the particular test and testing process he cmployed."ld
The Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not permit
.a:··person··to•testify. to the·observations made by another,
regurdless of whether they were reoorded, simply because the
person testifying is fiuniliarwith the technology the observing
witness usedJd. at27J4-15.
Of particular significance to our decision today. Justice
Sotomayor's concurrence discussed the limited scope of the
holding, emphasizing tha~ the decision did not extend· to
situations, such as the one presently before this Court. in
which the "expert witness was asked for his independent
opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not
the~lves admitted into evidence."Jd at 2722 (Sotomayor.
J., concurring):

2227. The testifying expert was not involved in obtaining
or testing the DNA obtained from the victim; rather, her
opinion was based on notatioos ~vilhin documents admitted
as business records. Id. The expen did not tcatify to how tile
testing laboratory (CelJmark) handled or tested the sample or
to the accwacy of the profile created fr~m th,e SaIIIJlll:,. ~~~: ____ ....

Yeporfifself was not aclm.itted·i~to evfci~ncito;-shown to the
jury Jd. at 2227, 2230. However, the expert testified that the

DNA profile recovered from the defendant's blood matched
"the male DNA profile fowrd iii semen from th,e vaginal
swabr.... "Id. at 2236 (emphasis in original). The defense
asserted that the Confrontation Clause prohibited the expert
from testifying regarding testing performed by Cellmark. Id.
at 2231. 4

The case was again detennined by Justice Thomas' fifth
vote, however, this time Justice Thomas. concurred with
the previously dissenting Justices-Chief Justice Roberts.
and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito-finding no
Confrontation Clause violation. Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J.,
(181 The oyerriding principle that we glean from Melendez- concurring). The plurality held that even if the· Cellmark
Diaz and Bullcoming is .~twi! i.i_itrod,tW:tion of reports
.repon had been· admitted ·into ·evidence: there wowd have·
by noU:tcstifying analysts violates the defendant's right
been no violation of the Confrontation Clause for several
of· confrontation when they arc "for the purpose of
reasons: (1) "The Cellmark report is vezy different :from
establishing or proving some fact at trial,"Melendez-Diaz,
the sort of extrajudicial state.men-is, such as affid&.:vits, .
557 U.S .. at· 324, Dr' are : ''aff'm:ilation[sF'i:nade for the
depositions, prior testimony, · and confessfons, that the
purpose of establishing or proving some fa.ct in a criminal
Confrontation Clause was originally understood to reach";
proceeding."Bulfcoming,-U.S. at--, Bl S.Ct. at2716
(2) "[tJhe report was produced before any suspect was
{alteration in eriginal; internal quotation omitted). In the
identified"; (3) the report was not sought "for the purpose
present case, the challenged evidence served as foundation . of obtaining evidence to be used against [the defendant].
for the introduction of Dr. R-0rke-Adams' testimony rather
who was not even under suspicion at1he time"~ and, (4) the
than direct evidence of a fact pointing toward S1anfield's guilt.
DNA pmfi.le produced "was not inherently inculpatory." Id.
Thus, we do not view these decisions as dictating the result
at 2228.
of this appeal.
Most recently, in Wt/ltams v. Illinois, the Court examined
application of the Confrontation Oause· to forensic reports
which are relied on by a testifying expert, but which are
not admitted into evidence. U.S. at - - - - - , 132
S.Ct at 2227-28. Williams addressed •• 'the constitutionality
of allowing an expert witness to discuss others' testimonfal
statements if the testimonial statements were not themselves

......... ---~-admitted..as.ev:idence~Jd.-at--22-33-(quoting-Bzcllcoming, U.S. at--, 131 S.Ct. at2722 {Sotomayor, J., concurring in
--part)).
*7

[n

William~. two DNA profiles were produced. One

profile was obtained from a vaginal swab :from a rape victim
and 1he other from a sample oftbe defendant's blood. Id. at

The plurality determined that;, unlike the forensic reports in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the DNA profile generated
in Williams was not created in order to be used as evidence
against a particular defendant. Id. at 2243. At the time the
report was produced, the defendant was neither in custody nor
under suspicion, and the teclmicians who prepared the profile
didn't know whether the results would be incriminating. Id at
2243-44. Therefore, th~plurality reasoned thai.th.e._primacy________________ _
purpose of the technician's report was not to create evidence
against the defenda.m, but was "to perform bis or her task in
··accordance with accepted F~~ect~shd. at 2244.
Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, agreed that the profile
was not testimonial but solely because it Jacked the requisite
formality and solemnity. Id. at2255 (Thomas, J .• concurring).
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He rejected the plurality's new requirement that a statement
rnwt target a particular individual to be testimonial because
"[t]here is no textual justification ... for limiting the
confrontation right to statements made after the accused's
identity bc:came known."Jd. at2262 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Likewise, Justice Kagan. writing for the four dissenting
. · , .. , .··justices;- rejected· the-plurality's accusatory requiremerit,""i.s '
well as Justice Thomas' formality requirement, adhering to
1he view that forensic reports are testimonial based entirely
on the primary pUipOse test Id. at 2273-74 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer concurred with the plurality but
wrote separately to address what he believed was the true
question raised: "How does the Confrontation Clause apply
to tl:te panoply of crime laboratory reports and 1n1derlying
technical statements written by (or otherwise made. by)
laboratory technicians?"'Jd. at 2244 (Breyer. J., concurring).
It is this precise question that this Court faces.

*8 In his concurrence, Justice Breyer discussed the practical
problems resulting from ll requirement that eve.ry analyst
involved in forensic testing must testify at trial. He concluded
that
an
analyst's statements
"lie outside
th~ p~in}et~r ofthe
... . __ ··-- . ·:··.··. ·__ .. ·.
..
Clause" for both historical and practical reasons. Id. at 2251.
Justice Breyer reasoned that, based on the historic purpose of
the Clause, these types of statements would not be subject to
confrontation becaus1nhey do not :impf1cate the-core concerns
at :issue--the use of ex parte examinations as evidence. Id.
at 2249-51, He expressed concern that costs resulting from a
rule requiring the live testimony of every analyst involved in
the testing process would cause prosecutors to forego DNA
testimony and return to a reliance on eyewilness testimony.
In Justice Breyets view, m "interpretation of the Clause that
risks greater prosecution reliance upon Jess reliable evidence
cannot be sound."Jd. at 2251. For these reasons, Justice
Breyer concluded that reports of this nature fall outside
app]ication of the Confrontation Clause. Id.
-

._,_

-

,

{2nd Cir.2013)~ Jen/ans v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 176
(D.C.2013) ("Williams ... creates no new rule of law that we
can apply in this case.").

C.

The facts presented by this appeal differ from bothMe/endezDiar, which involved a certified report that V.'aS admitted
w1'thoi.lt live testimony, 'ruiif Bulfco~iiig-;""wfuch"Tmoiv~. ~
signed report that was admitted through surrogate testimony
of another analyst who had no connection to the report and
offered no independent expertise. Melendez-Diaz, 551 U.S.
305, 129 S.Ct 2527, 174 L.Ed2d 314; Bullcomtng, U.S. - - . 131 S.Ct 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610. Indeed, the
facts appear to fall within one of the .scenarios identified by
Justice Sotomayor as being outside the "'limited reach" of the
majority opinion inBullcaming. - U.S. at--,--. Bl
S.Ct. at 2719,2722 {Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
Circuit courts and state courts have disagreed as to the proper
application of current Supreme Court Confrontation Clauso
jurisprudence. See, e.g., James. 712 F.3d at 96 (interpreting
pre-Williams precedent as establishing that a statement is
testimonial ifits primary purpose isto create a-record for later
use at trial); United States v. .Durol'f-Ca/dera, 737 F3d 988,
994-96 (5th Cir.2013) (declining to adopt requirement that
statement be accusatory). United States v. Turner,.}09 F.3d
H87, 1192-93 (7th Cir.2013) (considering whetn~(Jury
have considered statement as offered for its truth and whether
:it was accusatory); Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 73 A.3d 254,
270-71 (Md.2013) (requiring a statement to be sufficiently
formalized to be testimonial).

may

*9 [19] The only consistent requirement that can be
distilled from these decisions is that in order for a statementforensic or otherwise-to be deemed testimonial, it must have
been made with a primruy objective of creating an evidentiary
record to establish or prove a fact at trial. Michigan 11.
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 131 S.Ct 1143, 1155, 179 L.Ed.2d
When considering an opinion like Wtlliams, in which no
93 (2011); see auo Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324. This
single rationale commands the support of a majority, "the
CDlJlt bas previously addressed the definition of testimonial.
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
statements only in the context of statements made by lay
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
witnesses. where we likewise applied the primary puipose
test to determine whether a statement is testimonial. State v.
narrowest grounds."'Markr v. United States. 430 U.S. 188,
________J9.3~.9.1_S.C1.. .. 9-90,-5l--L.Bd2il~-6Q-(l91-1}·{-quoting-Gregg--1foopet;·-i4:5-rdiilio1J"9~-144=14fi:-T76P.3d 911, 916- l 84
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49
(2007)(videotape of child victim's mteJYiewwith police was
L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). Because no position received support
testimonial because it
admitted as a substitute for her live
from a majority of the j.ustices, Williams does not provide
testimony); State v. Shackelford, 150 Idal10 355, 372-73, 247
us a governing legal principle and this Court views the
P.3d 582, 599-<iOO (2010) (statements of ex-wife were not
decision as limited to the unique set of facts presented in
testimonial because they were offered to evaluate-defendant's

was

that case. 5 See e.g., United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95

.

demeanor and not ofrered for thek truth).

~festt~ © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

10

465

--~--· ..

~pr 09 2015 11 :13AM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 8274

State v. Stanfield, 2015 WL 1452930

page 21

--

..

P.3d -(2015)

trial. Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 854-55 {Ind.2013).
In these cases, the underlying statements did not have an
Although this Court has not previously addressed the recent
evidentiru:y pm-pose, and were thus not testimonial, because
developments in Conftontation Clause jurisprudence in the
only the expert's independent cooolusion served as evidence.
context of forensic evidence, our Court of Appeals has
Lui, 315 P.3d at 510; Speers, 999 N.E.2d at 855.
attempted to navigate these scarcely-charted wateis in State v.
Kramer. 1.'.i3 Idaho 29, 278 P.3d 431 (Ct.App.2012). During
'Kramer's triill fo.t drivlilg under the influence: ofaltolioI/ .. .i.ii) [20] . ti1j . A defendant's right to confto11tation is
the prosecution inlroduced calibration certificates for the
violated when "an expert acts merely as a well-credentialed
Intoxilyzer 5000 instrument used to determine the alcohol · conduit," and does not provide any independent expert
concentration in Kramer's breath. Id. at 30, 32, 278 P.3d
opinion United Slates v. Ranws-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, S-

at 432, 434. Kramer nrgued that the Confrontation Clause
required the State to produce not just the certificates but
the live testimony of the people involved in certifying the
machine.Id at 32,278 P.3d at 434. In a th.ought:ful and wellresearched opinion, the Court of Appeals conc]uded that the
certificates were not testimonial as they were not admitted as
direct evidence of an element of the crime. Id. at 35-36, 278
P.3d at 437-38 {"The certificates here 'support one fact (the
accuracy of the machine) that, in tum, supports another fact
that can establish guilt (the blood alcohol level).' ") (quoting
CommonwealJlr v. Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 947 N.E.2d

6 (1st Cir.2011) {testimony violated Confrontation Clause
because expert simply recounted results of another expert's
testing). These courts finding statemen~ to be testimonial
have done so when the expert has relayed another analyst'~
conclusion that was not reached· independently by the
testifying expert. See, e.g., State 11. Navarette, 294 P .3d 435
(RM.2013). In Navarette, the testifying expert relied on the
findings of another analyst-who concluded that there was
gunpowder residue on the victim-to determine how close
the shooter was to the victim. Id. at 436-37. The court held
that the analyst's findings were testimonial becausethere were
1060, 1069. (Mass.2011)). As-did fue,Court ofAppeals;· · no"objective·matlcerstliarariy third party can·e:xiimfue
we conclude that our inquiry should focus on whether the
order to express an independent opinion"Jti at 438-439.
However, when an expert independently evaluates objective
technician's· statements were made with a primary objective
of creating an evidentiruy re90f."d to establish or prove a fact
raw data obtained from an analyst, an~ exen~ises hiw ~r
·
her own judgment in reaching a conclusion, the expert is
at triaL
· ·
·
· -··_:.

m

not a conduit for the analysts conclusion. United States v.

A number of courts, presented with facts similar to those
in Kramer, have likewise held that the testimony of an
expert witness who 21Irives at an independent conclusion
is pennissible llilder the Confrontation Clause even where
other non-testifying analysts have provided underlying
data or conducted portions of the testing. 6 In Washington
v. Lui, the Washington Supreme Court held that the
Confrontation Clause was not violated even though the

Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 201-202 (4th Cir.2011). Rather,
the testifying expert's opinion is a.11 "original product" that
can be readily "tested through cross-examination." Id at
202 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We join the
majority of jurisdictions considering this subject and focus
our attention on the question whether the primary pID])Ose of
the lab technician's act of labeling the slides and the implicit
assertion that the proper stain was applied was intended to
establish some fact at trial and whether Dr.. Rorke-Adams
served as a mere conduit.

testifying expert "did not personally observe the lab tests
that underlaid her analysis"' because the output ofthe testing,
an eleclrdpherogram, would have no meaning for the jury .
)>. Application of the Confrontation Clause analysis· to
without the testifying expert's evaluation of its significance.
Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony
179 Wash.2d 457. 315 P.3d 493, 507-09 (Wash.2014).
Rather, the preliminary steps in an analysis are essentially
· f ustod __ ,i ••:.l
-~ .i. _ ...
[22) Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that the slides..she.examined__ _ _ _ _
art of th·e cham
---~Po __c___ Y,.J1111.Le_\uuence. ..w...u1es.......L:eps-.
. .
. .
··- to thcontained
merely goes
e we1"ght and no t the aelm.1ss1.b1.11·ty o f the
. the bram tissue of W.F., and that this tissue had
result. Id. Similarly, the Indim.ia Supreme Court_h~ld that the
been ~~~~~th the ~yloid anti.gen. Stanfield co~tends that
· who .....:.:..~..,.
.
f gl ass
Dr. Rorke-Adams'
testimony relied
on two assemons. made
. hnic1an
tee
uau.:i.1.erre d the bl ood fro m pieces
o
. .
.
.
.
..,.
lat
t
~
__
,i
by
the
technician:
(J)
that
the
slides
were labeled with the
to s wab s .1.or er esung w.J.U ana1yms was Just one person
correct case number, and thus contained W.F.'s brain tissue;
in the chain of custody, and es such, the defendant's right
and (2) .that the technician applied the proper stain to the
to confrontation was not violated becaui;e the expert who
conducted the analysis and prepared the report testified at
samples in accordance with the Jaboratory protocol, thereby
permitting an accurate interpretation of the samples.

~'d\mxf © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Dr. Rork~Adams testified that she received W.F.'s brain
from Dr. Gaqison after he had conducted the autopsy, that
the brain tiss11ewa.s labeled when she received it,, and that the
tissue slices were sent to the technician with the same label.
The slides that Dr. Rork~Adams received back :from the
.. ___.technician were also labeled. At trial, the following exchange
occurred:
[The prosecutor]. When the tissues arrived in your office,
are tb.ey marked with who the tissues belong to?
Dr. Rorke-Adams. Yes, of course. They're labeled.

•u

[The prosecutor]. And when you go 1o do your
examination of these tissues, are they still .labeled?
Dr. Rorke-Adams. Yes.

(The prosecutor]. And the technician that put the stain on
the tissues. does she write any reports?

Dr. Ror~Adams. No. She-we write the report. She has
. clocumentation"tO .the fact-thatshe received the-tissue, the·
s1ain that we requ~ted her to do, and she notes when she
cud it, and then when she handed it back to us. Those
are the only pieces of documentation. This is the standard
proceourc rnithe lab~ri.tory for every case.
And so the label of the material is attached to the material.
It remains with the material. Then the slides are prepared
b)• the technician 1111d the slides are labeled with the same
number that was attached to that specimen so we know that
Specimen 500 came :from John Smith. And so we evaluate
-we evaluate it,. write a report, and that report goes into

the permanent .record.

Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that she did not observe the
technician prepare the slides, however. she explained that she
was able to detennine if tile correct stain had been applied:

[The prosecutor]. Are you able to tell when your technician
places the stain on these tissues whether the stain has been
properly applied or not?

tm

out a request sheet. We ask specifically for that·
antibody to be applied to the tissue. It's given to the
technician along with the specimen. Toe lechnician Chen
knows which antibody to use. Those technical procedures
are done in that special laboratory.
- -·--- -·- --~~--" ..-······
And then that prepared slide is given to the pathologist
along '\(ith the sheet, lhe request sheet that we made out
asking for that antibody, plus a control slide, which means
that anotber piece of tissue that was known to contain this
particular antigen that we're interested in has been used ~
to c~rrobo·rate the validity of the stain from the unknown

We

slide.
So. we look at the oontrol slide tirs.t to make certain that 1he
technique was working so that we can rely then upon what
we're looking at in the unknown slide.
So these are all standard procedures in the laboratory, and.
this is the· way it is done every day for all of tbe cases that
come through.
Dr. Rorke-Adams testified this procedure was followed in
this case..
Thus, Dr,. Rorke-Adams had personal·kliciwledge-fuat theslides were stained correctly based on her comparison of
the slides with the control slide. Based upon this testimony,
Dr. Rorke-Adams did not rely upon an implied assertion
by the technician that the slide had been properly prepared.
Therefore, the only remaining implied assertion is that the
labeling of the slides represented that slides contained W .F.'s

tissue.
[23]
As in Lui and Speers, the labeling occurred
during preliminary steps for Dr. Rorke-Adams' forensic
examination. The technician did not make any conclusions
or. factual findings as to any issue to be decided at trial
when she labeled the slides and the technician's assertion
had no probative value as· to Stanfield's guilt or innocence.
Rather, the act of labeling was manifestly for a laboratory
-rather than trial-purpose: to identify the samples while

·
---····--·-·--- _______________.ihe}LawaitedDr.,..llork-f>-A:clam.s'-examination:-Ji"ifflh='°"="'el'.~,wfii='=""t=-e- - - - - Dr:-Roflcci=Aoarns-:-Yes~--Because there's always a control
assertions need not be contained in furmaliz.ed affidavits or
slide that goes with it: Control slid_e means that-in this
. a~!D!~!ld at trial to be testimonfal. the fact that the technician
did not prepare a report suggests that her purpose in labeling
particular case, I asked for a spi,cific antibody to be applied
to this tissue.
the slides was not to establish any fact at trial TI1e only
testimony the technician could have supplied would be to
attest lhat she did not alter the integrity or identity of the
tissue samples. This is akin to the type of assertion made

~-Next e 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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by any person whose name appears in a chain of custody.
As the Supreme Court held m Mdendez-Diaz, the right to.
confrontation does not mandate that the prosecution call every
person involved in.the chain of custody. Me!.mdez-Dtaz v.
.MrustWhusetu, 551 U.S. 305,311 n. 1, 129 S.Ct 2527, 174
L.Ed.2d 314 (2009).
'~

-

.

~.

•12 Further, like the calibration certificates in Kramer, the
technician's assertions were not admitted as direct proof of an
element of the crime; rather. they were admitted as foundation
for the introduction of the results of Dr. Ro:rke-Adams'
testimony regarding her examination of the samples and the
conclusions she drew therefrom, Le., that W.F. died from
non-accidenW trauma. These findings and conclusions were
derived from Dr. Rorke-Adams' personal examination and
obsenrations of the slides. Unlike the analyst inNavarette, the
technician in this case made no independent conclusions and
tbe labeling did not prove any fact relevant to Stanfield's guilt
or innocence.
For the.se reasons, we hold that there was no Confrontation
Clause violation because .the technician's assertions -~re
nof m.ade for an - e~dentiary
~d ·
not
testimonial.

purpo~e

thus ~ere

:;£Dr. Ror~}~, teai,,wnyw~ not inadmissible
hearsay.
(24]
Much like her Confrontation Clause objection.
Stanfield argues that Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony regarding
the contents of the slides and her testimony regardlng the
staining and accuracy of the slides constitute inadmissible
hearsay. Stanfield contends that Dr. Rorke-Adams did
not have an «independent basis of knowledge so as to
testify that the assertions of the laboratory technician were
accurate."The State responds that Dr. Rorke-Adams did not
relay impermissible hearsay evidence but rather testified
to the routine practices of her laboratmy and to matters
that were within her personal .knowledge. as pennitted by

I.RE. 406. 7 Initially, we note that while Dr. Rorke-Adams
testified regarding her laboratory's routine procedures, she
also testified that those procedures were followed in this
---case-aml-that-the-shd-es-conrainecI-W:F:soram tissue. 8 This
testimoey provided facts that were specific to this case and
as such, exceeded that allowed underldaho Rule of Evidence

406.
Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement that is offered
••to prove the truth of the matter asserted."1.R.E. 801(c).

Therefore, Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony that procedures were
followed and that the slides contained W.F.'s brain tissue was
hearsay. 9
[25}

(26]

Generally, hearsay evidence is not admissible

at 1rial unless it mils under one of the recc;>gnized hearsay.
I.RE. 802; St~te l'. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418.

·ex~eption;.·

423,224 P.3d. 485,490 {2009). How.ever, an expert witness
is allowed to base an opinion on: "(1) facts within [her]
personal lmowledge; (2) facts presented to [her] at trial; or
{3) facts presented to [her] outside of court, but not perceived .
by [herJ personally, if those fac:t:3 are the type: of facts
reasonably relied upon by experts in [her] field in drawing
· such conclusions."F.R.E. 703, Comment 1 10 ; F.R.E. 602;
I.R.E. 701; I.R.E. 602; see also Walkins, 148 Idaho at 426,
224 P.3d at 493. Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 provides that:

The facts or data in the. particular case
upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived
by or made known to the expert at.
or before the ·hearing. Ifofa· type·······
reascmably relied upon by e>..-perts jn
the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subje~t,.. the
facts or data
not. be acbnissib]e
in evidence in order for the opinion
or inference to be admitted. Facts or
data that are otherwise inadmissible
shall not be disclosed to the jwy
by the proponent of the opinion or
inference unless the court detennines
that their probative value in assisting
1he jwy to evaluate the expert's
opinion substantially outweighs their

need

prejudicial effect.
*13 I.RE. 703. 1bis rule permits an. expert witness "to
state an opinion based on inadmissible imdence and to
indicate the general nature ofthe sources on which the expert
bas relied. but not to disclose, directly or indirectly, the
contents of the sources on direct examination unless they
are-o1herwiscai:lmissible, or the court malces the required
balancing detemtination."Watkin.r, 14-8 Idaho a! 426--27, 224
. P.3d at 493-94. "The i11tent of the rule is just that the opinion ·
does not have to be excluded because part of the basis was
evidence that would not be admissible itself"Jd. at 426, 224
P.3d at 493 (quoting Evidence Rules Advisory Committee
Minutes of Meeting of November 2, 200 l at 3.).
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In 2002, the rule was amended to clarify that I.RE. 703 should
not be used as "a back door for getting this evidence in the
record ...Id. The amendment "serves to prevent an expert
witness. from serving as a conduit for the introduction of
otherwise inadmissible evidence."Id. at 427. 224 P.3d 485,
224 P;3ch.t494. The amendment was riot .intended to change
the ~eiming ofl.RE. 703; rather, it was intended to clarify
its limitations. Thus, expert testimony that does nothing more
than relay otherwise inadmissible hearsay to 1he jury is barred
by I.RE. 703. Id. However, no error occurs if the hearsay
evidence the expert relies upon is referenced but not actually
introduced as evidence at trial. See, e.g., Doty v. Buhara, 123
ldaho 329, 336, 848 P.2d 387~ 394 {1992).

In Doty, this Court upheld the admission of an expert's
opinion testimony as the cause of tire damage even though
his opinion was based,· in part, on photographs and notes
pre pared by another expert who had also examined the tire. Id.
The expert was allowed· to testify "concerning observations
made by" the other expert. Id. at 335-36, 84& P.2d 387, 848
P.2d 393;...94_ Likewise, in Lawton v, City ofP.ocatello, a

at

-case coix:enililg a ~~~~y~j~ a~cident, this Cowt upheld the
admission of the testimQ11y of.an expert who opined that the
accident site was dangerous and did not meet existing design
-standards:' 12.6 Idaho 454, 464, 886 P.2d 330, 340 (1994).
The expert's testimony referred to reports of otheF accidents
that had occurred in the same area, al~ough the reports were
not admitted into evidence. Id. This Court found no .error in
the introduction of this testimony. Id. Although these cases
were decided prior to the 2002 amendment. they reflect the
meaning of the current rule. See Watkins, 148 Idaho at 426,
224 P.3d at 493.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 was most recently interpreted in
State v. Watkins.Id. In that case, this Court held that I.RE.
703 did not allow an expert witness to reveal tI:ie contents of
another expert's notes, even though the testifying expert relied
on those notes and the notes were not themselves admitted
into evidence. Id. at 427, 224 P.3d 485, 224 P.3d at 494. In
that case~ the State's expert, Dr. Finis. testified that
."'14 according 1o t~..pe.rformed at
her private laboratory, Identigenetix,

Watkins' DNA was in the semen on th~ ..-

giri's underwear and inside the condom
and the girl's DNA was on the outside
of the condom. Dr. Finis, however,
was not at Identigenetix to receive the
evidence in person and did not pelform

the DNA testing herself. Instead, Dr.
Finis relied on communications with
her colleague, Kermit Channell. as
well as his notes, in forming her
conclusions- about the tested evidence.
-Id at 420,224 P.3d at-487. Spedfically; Dt. Finis tesfi:ncc!Iliili:.-,'-".-- -"-c·'-

sbe did not do the testing and was not prescat fur Channcll's

testing but, according the Channell's notes:
Channell used an oral swab taken
girl to establish
a reference DNA sample for her; that
Channell used both penile and oral

:from the six-year-old

swabs taken from Watkins to establish
a reference DNA sample for him~ and
that Channell extracted DNA from
both the inside and outside of the
used condom and tested it to see
whether it matched either Watkins'
or the six-year-old girl's DNA. Dr.
Finis testified that the DNA C::hann~~l __
tb.e--inside of the condom

tested-on

matched Watkins' DNA and that tbe
DNA Channell tested on the outside
of the c911dom was a mbdure -of both
Watkin':, [sic]DNA and the six-yearold girl's DNA.
Id. at 423-24~ 224 P.3d at 490-91. This Court explained that
the testimony was not admissible !Illder I.RE. 703 because
it was evident that Channell's statements were not admitted
fur the limited pmpose of evaluating Dr. Finis' testimony.
Id. at 427, 224 P.3d 485, 224 P 3d at 494. Rather, they
were relayed "for the pwpose of demonstrating the chain of
CU5tody, Channell's testing methodology, and to identif}' the
locations on the condom and panties on which Watkins' and
the victim's DNA were found."ld. We further observed that
no evidence, aside that contained in Channell's notes, was
introduce to establish these facts. Id.
In 1his case, Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that the slides she
examined contained the brain tissue of W.F. and thaUbosei_ _ _ _ __
slides were stained properly. As was the case with the expert
in Doty, who relied on pictures and n~tes created by anoth(?r
expert~- Dr. Rorke-Adams' conclusions were based in small
part on the labeling created by the 1echnician. However, Dr.
Rorke-Adams relied far less on the technician's actions than
did the CA'J)ertwhose testimony we upheld in Doty.Dr. RorkeAdams did not testify "concerning observations made by"
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another expert but rather explained why she could conclude
that the slides belonged to W.F. and why she could observe
the amyloid antigens in W.F.'s tissue.

crime. Thus, Stanfield contends that the jury was required to

find that she specifically intended to cause great bodily harm
to W.F ., as opposed to finding that she committed battery, and
in doing so, unintentionally caused great bodily hann. She
lL!.....
th ...__1._: , ,
,
th
thereforearguesthatthedistriat counviolatedherrighttodue
Unlike Wia.tn.1":;,
e 1a.iuuc1ans asscruons were no1 e
. .
.
.
only evidence ~M es~Jµme~!J!e chain of cuslo4.Yc:0rJhe. ".- ~:,~~s ~c11 }!_ llllitr\u;tcd the''? that tlu:;y d1CJ
hn".c t~ -- : ~L :d- l ----· --- - - ycd- rn· th'
D R k
nod.that she. mtended to commit murder or 'to inflict great
tesbng melJ..lO o ogy emp1o
.
lS case, r. or ·e· d th ·
rt'all
d th ...:
by
bodily harm m order to find her guilty offirst degree murder.
Ad ams receive
e tissue. pa 1 y prepare
e ussue

-~~t

slicing _it, sent the tissue to the laboratory and received the
tissue back from that laboratory.

Stanfield advanced this argument priorto this Court's decision
in State v. Carver, 155 Idaho 489,314 P.3d 171 (2013). In
Carver, this Court addressed ati identical claim and held that
"tbe district court correctly instructed the jmy that Defendant
would be guilty of first degree murder if he committed a
battery upon the child which resulted in great bodily harm,
from which the child died."Jr.l. at 494, 314 P.3d at 176. In this
case, the district court gave the same instruction as we upheld

Further, unlike the situation in Wat.kins, where the testifying
expert relayed factual findings and conclusions reached by
another, the technician here did _not make any factual findings.
Dr. Rorke-Adams did not relay any conclusions that were .
drawn by the technician. Rather, it was Dr. Rorke-Adams
who conducted 'the examination of the tissue, documented
in Carver. 11 The district court did not err in instructing the
her factual findings, and formed her own opinion. Thu.5,
jury as to·tbe eltlillents of the offense. Thus, Stanfield has not
we find that Dr. Rorke-Adams did not act as a conduit
shown that the district court violated her due process rights.
for inadmissible hearsay, but rather indicated the "general
nature of the sources" she relied on in forming her opinion
as pennitted by I.R.E. 703:Watkins; 148 Idaho-aPt2~21;
224 P.3d at 493-94. Even though the district cow1 did not
· IV. CONCLUSION
explicitly. apply the balancing test required by I.RE. 703, we
.~iwlude that the district court did not err by permitting Dr. - For the foreg~ing reasons., :we-.-afflnn the judgment of the

' Ro~~Adams' testimony. ·

district court.
CbiefJustice BURDICK, Justice EISMANN and Justice Pro

B. The dutrict court properly instructed the jury as to
the elements of fir.st degree murder.
*15 [27] Stanfield contends that first degree murder by

Tero WALTERS concur.

aggravated battexy on a child Wlder twelve is a-specific intent

Footnotes

1

As-part of her examination, Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that she cut "slices" ofW.F.'s bra.in. She gave those slices to a tecbnician,
who transferred the tissue to slides, labeled the slides, applied the stuin that Dr. Rorko-AdlllDS specified, and returned the slides to
Dr. Rorke-Adams for her examination.
The rules of evidence may assist in determining the purpose of a statement For example, "'[b]UBiness and public records are generally
2
admissjble absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearuy rules, but because-having been created
for the _administration· of an entity's affairs and not foe the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial-they are not
testimonial."Melendez-Diaz v. MaMachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed2d 314 (2009}.
The plurality also looked to the rules of evidence to determine if the statements served an evidenti . purpose. Melendez.-.Dwz,. _ _ _ _ __
3
----------<rS-7-U:S::-1!:t321~-:-A1ffiou
e
ca1cs of enalysi s were records created in the ordinary course of the Jaboratory's business,
their purpose was not for !he administration of the laboratory's affairs but rather to establish or proye some fact at trial. lei at 324.
Therefore, al though falling within the well~established business records elC~epl.ion, because their primary purpose was
the analysts were subject to confrontation. Id.
The expert did not have personal knowledge of the testing conducted on the defendant's blood, however, the analyst who developed
4
lhe profi1e from the blood sample extracted from lhe defendant testified at trial, as did the analyst who conf'mned that semen was
found 011 'lhe vaginal swabs taken from the victim. Williams. -U.S. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2229.

evxdi:atiary.
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5

6

8
9·

10
11

"'!be :five Justices who contr0l the outcome of today's case ilgree on very little ... they have left signilic1111t confusion in their wake.
What comes out of four Justices' desire to limit Melendez-Dia: and .Bu/lcomingin whatever wny possible, combined with on-.= Justice's
one-justice view of those.holdings. is-to be frank-who knows what Those decisions apparently no longer mean all that they
say. Yet no one can tell in what way or to what extent they are altered because no proposed limitation commands the support of 11
majority."Willi'am.r, - U.S. at--, 1.32 S.Ct. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting).· ·
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Yolie, 621 Pa. 527, 79 A.3d·S20, 541 (Pa,2013) (The right lo confrontation :iatisfied when testifying
expertwas':involvei:1-in a sufficient degree,m fue:analysis and-is-not simp1y_pa.rro1ing another analyst but mtlier·revteweffravNestmg
data, evaluated the results, verified the test, and wrote the report); Stale v. Joseph. 230 Ariz. 296,283 P.3d 27, 29-30 (Ariz.2012)
(the le$tifying e,q,ert relying on autopsy reponprepared by non-testifying doctor did not act as an.impermissible conduit because he
testified'to his own conclusions regarding the victim's injuries); State v. Medfctne Eagle, 835 N.W.2d 886, 898-902 (S .D2013) (right
tn confrontation was not violated despite the fact that analysts that performed some steps of the testing did not testify at trial because·
the testifying expert "perfonned various steps of the [testing]; independently reviewed, analyzed, and compared the data obtained
from the te.sting; and reached her own conclusions regarding the results of the testing"); State 1'. Ortiz-Zape, 367 N.C. I, 743 S.E.2d
J S6, 163 (N.C.2013) ("when an expert gives an opinion, the opinion is the substantive evidence and the expert is the witness whom
the defendant has the right to confront''); Morshall v. People, 309 P ,3d 943, 947 (Colo.2013) ("'We join these courts in concluding
that when a lab S1Jpervisor ... independentjy re.view!I scientific data, dr~ws the conclusion 1hat the data_indicales. the positive presence
ofmelhamphetamine, and signs a report t,o that e:trectthat is admitted at trial, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied if she testifies
and is available for cross-examination."); Smith l'. F1orirla, 2.S So.3d 838, 854-55 (Fla.2009) (no Confrontation Clause violation in
admission of DNA tests because supervisor evaluated raw te:it results, compllfCd samples, made conclusions, and testified at 1rial);
Grim v. Missi,rsippf. 102 So.3d 1073, 1081 (M:iss.2012) {holding that "a supervisor, reviewer, or other analyst involved may testify
in place of the primary analyst where that person was actively involved in the production of the report and had intima.te knowledge of
analyses even though [he or] she did not perform the t.ests first hand.") (alternation in originaI; internal quotatfon and citation omitted).
We acknowledge that the decisions ofour sister states have not beenjn !J!!UO[Ill ai!l11:m1eJ:!t.See, e.g., State l'. Jf.<IV~tte, 294P .3d
435. 43g.:...39 (N.M2013j (autopsy r~~g& ~e t~mo~al because when there are no "objective markers that any third party
can examine in order to express an independent opinion"); Martin l'. State., 60 A.3d 1100; 1107 (Del.2013) (the testing analyst's
rcp.n,sentations and test results were testimonial because the statements were conclusions that the testifying CJ<pert relayed and
did notmake independently).
---- · "Evidcnc11 of a habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the
presence of eyewitnesses, is reh:vantto prove that the conduct of the penon or organization on a particular occasion was in confonnity
wilh the habit or routine practice."I.R.E. 406.
As explained previously, we find that Dr. Rorke-Adams had independent knowledge rega.tding the administration of the proper stain
to the slides based upon her comparison of the slides to a control slide.
The claim that the slides contained W.F.'s tissue is of particular importance; if this assertion were not true, then Dr. Rorke-Adams'
testimony would have been irrelevant
The ldaho Rules of Evidence were modeled on the Federal- Rules of Evidence "in order to ob$ain uniformity in the trial practice in
both the state and federal courts."C1iacon v. Sperry Corp., 11.l ldaho 270,275, 723 P.2d 814, 8[9 (1986). Thus, we seek to interpret
identical rules ''in conform= with the interpretation placed upon the same rules by the federal courts.ftid.
The :in.struc1ion at issue in Carver said that, 'in order for the defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder in the perpetration of
an aggravated battery upon a cnild under twelve ( 12) years of age .•. the state does not have to prove that the defendant intended
to kill [the child]. but the state must prove that during the perpetration of llll aggravated battery on a cb:ild under twelve ( 12) years
of age, the defendant killed [the child]."155 Idaho at 492, 314 P.3d at 174. At Stanfield's trial. the district court instructed the jury:
"In order for the defendant to be guilty of first degree lllllrder ... the state does not bave to prove that the defendant intended to kill
[W.F .]. but tb.e state must prove that during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate an aggravated battery on a child under 12 years
of age, the defendant.killed [W.F.)."
·
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
-

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STACEY GROVE,

)
)

Petitioner,

)

vs.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

CASE NO. CV 2012-01798
MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)
Respondent.

)

--------------)
ARGUMENT
Grove Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reconsideration Of This Court's
Summary Dismissal Of His Claims Related To An Alleged Violation Of His
Confrontation Rights

A

Introduction
Grove requests reconsideration of this Court's· dismissal of his claims

regarding an alleged violation of his confrontation rights. Specifically, he asserts

1
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this Court erred by holdfng: (1) That the defense in the criminal trial waived a
confrontation objection, and therefore petitioner may not assert that objection in

post-conviction; (2) That there was no "testimonial" evidence presented at trial
subject -to a confrontation- objection;--and (3}--Counsel was not ineffectiy,e_-fof,,_
electing to not object on confrontation grounds. (Memorandum in Support of
Second Motion for Reconsideration).

He has presented no new argument or

information in support _of his claims regarding issues (1) and (3), above. He asks
for reconsideration of issue (2), above, in light of the recent decis-ion in State v.
Stanfield, _

Idaho _ , _

P.3d _ , 2015 WL 1452930 (2015). Review of all

three issues shows no grounds for reconsideration.

B.

·The Confrontation Objection Was Walved ln The Criminal Proceedings
Contrary to Grove's contentions, there are specific statutes that bar his

ability to raise his confrontation clause claim· in post-conviction. Post-conviction
"is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings

in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence of conviction.'' J.C. § 194901 (b). Likewise, any ground "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in
the proceeding that resulted in the conviction . . . may not be the basis for a

subsequent application.'' LC. § 19-4908. Grove had an available remedy for any
alleged violation· of his confrontation rights in the original criminal case but
counsel tactically waived that objection.

----------

-

The 11right to confrontation may, of

course, be waived, jr1cluding by failure to object to the offending ev;dence."

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314 n.3 (2009) (emphasis
added). Because Grove, through counsel, waived any confrontation objection in
2
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the criminal case, he may not directly assert that objection in post-conviction. 1
· He is barred from trying to use these proceedings for the prohibited purpo_se of
asserting an objection he could have made, but instead waived, in the criminal
:...:-:·.;.··.-'." =_:;- -· .. ·--:.~.'.- .. ¥-~i--:

-- ------ ·---·- ··-

---"·---·-·· --.

---

._,_ ...._.. _.

.,_.,-- .-.:--_' -,

....,

Under sections 19-4901(b) and 19-4908 Grove's waiver of his claim or
right in the criminal proceedings bars his post-conviction claim. Were this not so,
every posr conviction petitioner who entered a guilty plea could challenge the
lack of a jury trial; could claim that every choice by counsel to not call a witness
violated his right to present evidence; and, closer to this case, could claim every
waiver of cross examination or failure to object to arguably testimonial evidence
violated his confrontation rights. Grove's claim that the waiver of confrontation in
the criminal proceedings does not bar his claim in post-conviction is meritless.
This Court properly dismissed the claim of a Confrontation Clause violation on
the basis that this objection should have been raised in the criminal case and the
choice to not make the objection constituted a waiver.

c.

Grove Has Failed To Show That The Portion Of The Doctors' Testimom
Based On The Neuropathology Report Offends The Confrontation Clause
This Court also ruled, in the alternative, that there was no Confrontation

Clause violation because the neuropathology report was not ·"testimonial.!'
(Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition, pp. 22-24.) This Court

These statutes do not prevent Grove from asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel for his choice to not object-only a direct assertion of the waived
objection. That counsel's waiver was not the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel is addressed below.

1

3
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noted that there is a split in authority regarding whether an autopsy report is
"testimonial," the touchstone for application of the Confrontation Clause.

(Id.)

This Court found more persuasive and applicable to the facts of this case

-- -..opinions holding -that- an aut.opsy-.process conducted independenLof a .. police _;: -- ·c----.·-investigation does not serve the primary function of creating evidence for a
criminal prosecution. (Id.; see also pp. 8-20.) Grove contends that this holding
is contrary to the recent decision in State v. Stanfield, 2015 WL 1452930 (Idaho,
2015). Grove's claim that Stanfield shows any error in this Court's alternative
ruling is w4thout merit.
First, the opinion in Stanfield is of marginal utility in this case. In that case
- the witness in question was an expert hired spe9ifically by the prosecution to
prepare trial evidence. 2015 WL at "'1.

The confrontation chaUenge was to

evidence of actions by others in the expert's lab who processed evidence
intended for trial.' kl_ at *2. Thus, Stanfield does not address the testimonial
nature of evidence prepared outside the scope of a police investigation or
prosecution.

Many jurisdictions have held that autopsy reports were not

testimonial, and therefore not subject to confrontation, precisely -because they
were prepared for purposes other than police investigation or prosecution. See,
§A, State v.

Snelling, 236 P.3d 409, 413-14 (Ariz. 2010) (expert offering opinion

based facts and data set forth in autopsy report did not violate confrontation
rights); People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 449-50 (Cal. 2012) (testimony of expert
regarding description of injuries in autopsy report as one basis for medical
. conclusions d~d not grant right to confrontation of doctor who prepared report);

4
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People v. Hensley, 22 N.E.3d ·1175, 1193·.94 (Ill. App., 1st dist., 2014) (autopsy
report prepared in normal course of business of medical examiner's office not
testimonial); People v. Portes, 125 A.D.3d 794, 2015 WL 542337, *1 (App.,
<. <·--·

, - ---

2nd

--Dept.r20"t5} (admission-of autopsy.report did .noLviolate. confrontation rights).:-,_---<·'······ i~-- ---- - . -

Because Stanfield does not address the basis for this Court's determination that
the neuropathology report was not testimonial, it does not provide grounds for
reconsideration of the ruling that reliance on the report by other experts did not
violate the Confrontation Clause.
Second, even though the Stanfield opinion does not address the question
of whether autopsy reports prepared outside the course of any criminal
investigation are_ testimonial, it does cite with approvalState v. Joseph, 283 P.3d
27 (Ariz. 2012), for the proposition that ''the testimony of an expert witness who
arrives · at an independent conclusion· is· permissible · under the Confrontation
Clause even where other non-testifying analysts have ptovided underlying data

or conducted portions of the testing." Stanfield, 2015 WL at *9 & n.6.
Jn Joseph the trial court allowed the prosecution's medical expert to testify
based on an autopsy report prepared by another doctor. 283 P.3d at 29. He did

not testify about the other doctor's "conclusions" but did testify about the
"opinions he formed after reviewing the facts and photographs contained in the
report." Id. The Court stated that "a testifying medical examiner may offer an
opinion based on an autopsy performed by a non-testifying expert without
violating the Confrontation Clause."

19.:.
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As did the expert ·in Joseph, the doctors in this case offered opinions

Grove had the opportunity to cross-

based, in part, on an autopsy report.
examine these doctors.

.-"'.'~~--·--' ·

He also had the opportunity to present evidence

·······attempting-to uoclermine--the-expert~opinions by-cha:f:leng~ng the facts they:~reHed,--,,.,-----·- ..
on in reaching those opinions.

Because the experts arrived at their own

independent conclusions about the cause of death and the timing of the inflictlon

of the injuries, such was "permissible under the Confrontation Clause even
where other n·on-testifying analysts have provided underlying data or conducted
some portions of the testing.'' Stanfield, 2015 WL at *9.

Grove has failed to

show a basis for reconsideration of this Court's dismissal of the counts related to

his confrontation claim.

D.

Counsel's Choice To Not Assert The Confrontation Issue Was Not
· Ineffective Assistance Of Ctfurisel This Court held that because an objection on confrontation grounds wouid

not have succeeded, counsel's performance by not objecting was not deficient
and Grove suffered no prejudice.

(Opinion, p. 32.) As set forth above, the

Stanfield decision does not alter that analysis.

Even if the Stanfield opinion had resolved the question of whether autopsy
reports done in the regular course of business (as opposed to being part of the
police investigation) were subject to a confrontation objection, that case was not

available to counsel at any relevant time. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in
Stanfield, binding precedent on this general topic did not exist 2015 WL at *6.
In the absence of settled law, counsel's performance can hardly be labelled as

6
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deficient. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630, 226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (2010)
(''this Court will generally not find deficient performance where counsel fails to
argue a novel 'legal theory in an undeveloped area of Jaw"); Piro v. State, 146

---,_,~•-.-,, ---·- - · · · -,ddahoz8~r,9-1-; -190 .J>,Sd---905;--9-'.IQ (Ct.-App-.,"2"10&l~-{,'failure to advance:--a"'noveJ.. _
theory'' is not ineffective assistance of counsel).
Finally, even if a confrontation objection may have had merit, such is not
alone enough to show deficient performance or prejudice_ It is well established
that "lack of objection to testimony fall{s] within the area of tactical, or strategic,
decisions."

Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (Ct. App.

1994). The right to confrontation may be waived by counsel. See Melendez-

Diaz,

557 U.S .. at 314 n.3.

"A co_urtgonsidering

a claim of ine:ffective assistance

must apply a 'strong presumption' that counsel's representation was within the

'wide range' of :reas-0nable professional assistance." Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86. 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984)). "When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court
does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions
cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to
have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or
other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,

561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008).
n State v. Dunlarr,-io51dahoS-4o,384--;-3U--P-=3a--t-;-zt.-O--C2llt3).1he p.ostconvlction petitioner alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to object to reports
by doctors admitted at a capital sentencing because admission of those reports

7
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allegedly violated the petitioner's Fifth Amendment and confrontation rights. The
Idaho Supreme Court did not address the merits of such an objection at all;

rather, it held that "[i]n the absence of evidence suggesting that the introduction
'-''-"~'"·0

~:---fof t-he--allegedly excludable-evidence],was.::t-he---product of inadequate,preparation
or ignorance of the relevant law, we hold that the district court did not err by
summarily dismissing this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."

!fL.

Just as in Dunlap, there is in this case an absence of evidence that
counsel was ignorant of the relevant law or unprepared. Grove has presented
no evidence rebutting the strong ~resumption that counsel's conduct fell within
the range of reasonable representation. The same result as in Dunlap, summary
dismissal, is thus appropriate.

CONCLUSION
Grove is barred from asserting a violation of his confrontation rights in this
post~conviction case because counsel waived that right by not objecting in the
criminal proceedings.

The Stanfield opinion provides no basis for finding a

confrontation violation or ineffective assistance of counsel because it did not
address the preparation of autopsy reports in the regular course of business, but
instead addressed only testing done at the specific request of the prosecution
for trial. Finally, Grove has presented no evidence of any objective shortcoming
of counsel, such as ignorance of the law or inadequate preparation, to rebut the

8
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Because it lacks merit, the motion for

reconsideration should be denied.
DATED this 16th day of Ap

K NNETH K. JOR
Deputy Attorney G ne
Special Prosecutor for Nez Perce County
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-12-01798

PETITIONER'S
CLOSING ARGUMENT

I. INTRODUCTION
COMES NOW, Petitioner Stacey Grove, through counsel Dennis Benjamin and Deborah
Whipple, and offers this Closing Argument following the evidentiary hearing held March 24-25,
2015.
Per this Court's Order of July 11, 2013, four claims were addressed at the evidentiary
hearing: A) whether trial counsel was ineffective in the direct and cross-examination of Mr.
Grove; B) whether trial counsel was ineffective during the direct and cross-examination of Dr.

·Arden;· C)whetl:i:et trial counsel was ineffective in addressing the matter of sleeping jurors;-and · -- ----- · ·..
D) whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to multiple instances of prosecutorial
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misconduct during closing arguments. To prevail on these claims, Mr. Grove is required to
prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. ICR 57(c); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho
65, 67, 794 P.2d 654,656 (Ct. App. 1990). Mr. Grove carried this burden through the exhibits
and testimony of multiple witnesses to jurors sleeping during trial, trial counsel Scott Chapman,
Dr. Jonathan Arden, and Andrew Parnes, Ph.D., J.D.

II. WHY RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED

A. Ineffective Assistance in the Direct and Cross-Examination of Mr. Grove
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932}~ Idaho law alsoguarantees a criminal
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; I. C.c § 19-852. In general, a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed
under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466_U.S. 668 (1984), standard. In order to prevail
under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it
fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; and 2) that this deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. The prejudice
prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have
been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id.

1. Evidence regarding Mr. Grove's relationship with his son and child suwort
--·1

.... ~-~ ........ -

·--.

Mr. Grove alleged in his Amended Verified Petition that defense counsel's performance
was deficient because he introduced evidence in the direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding

2- PETITIONER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
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the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son Alex. The trial transcripts establish that
defense did elicit such evidence. Exhibit B, p. 1074, ln. 1-24. Specifically, Mr. Grove testified
that he had a troubled relationship with his biological son.

It was a complicated situation with Alex. He's ten years old. He's a great boy. It
-- --- ------- ----~- ·-- -- · started off rougli wftli llie very fiist.Me-anahis motlier, she bas1ca1Iy was gone-.---When she was pregnant with
(sic), she started seeing some other guy. And
come to find out, she moved in with him. And, you know, it was a real rocky
relationship the whole way through.
And at the latter -- the latter time when I was seeing him, there was a pull with
him. I could tell that they were telling him things, and he would ask me questions
that I didn't think -- and it was a hard situation. And at the time, it was my
decision that I didn't want to stress him out with it, so I felt it would be best if I
removed myself from the situation until he was old enough to be able to -- I could
talk with him aqout what was going on. And he wouldn't -- he wouldn't have
these feelings, because I could tell he was being tom, and I didn't want to see him
go through that. And I thought the best would be for what I did, and that was the
choice that I made.
Id;·

At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that he could not recall why he
elicited the evidence from Mr. Grove on direct examination. Defense counsel also admitted that
the evidence was unfavorable to Mr. Grove. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript ("EH Tr.") p. 187,

ln. 14-24. That is plainly true as it_portrays him as an uninvolved dad in a case where he is being
accused of harming a child. The Tenth Circuit has held that where an attorney accidentally
brings out damaging testimony due to a failure to prepare, his conduct cannot be called a strategic
choice. Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1296 (10th Cir. 2002). The prosecutor took advantage
of the opening in his cross-examination by asking Mr. Grove if he currently maintained a
relationship with Alex. Mr. Grove had to admit that he did not. Exhibit B, p. 1115, ln. 6-10.

Mr. Grove also alleged that defense counsel's performance was deficient because he
3- PETITIONER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
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failed to object to the prosecutor questioning him about the fact he was not currently paying child
support. The trial transcript proves the prosecutor asked that question and that trial counsel failed
to object. Exhibit B, p. 1 i 15, ln. 21-24. 1 Plainly, this question was not relevant to any issue at
the trial and an objection to it would have been sustained. I.R.E. 402; 403.
Regarding the child support question, defense counsel testified that ''the decision, I guess,
that I made at the time, best as I can recollect is, don't make it - don't make it any bigger than it
is by objection." Evidentiary Hearing ("EH'') Tr. p. 189, ln. 3-5. This is not evidence of a
strategic decision on defense counsel's part since he qualifies his answer with ''I guess" and "best
as I can recollect." At the same time, defense counsel admitted that he could have moved pretrial
to exclude such evidence as he was aware that Mr. Grove was behind on child support payment
prior to trial. EH Tr. p. 189, ln. 9-15.

'In fact, defense counsel filed a Supplemental Motion in Limine-on July 14, 2008, shortly
before trial, to prohibit "any mention of the relationship that Stacey Grove has with his son, Alex
Light, and/or child support obligations." Exhibit A, Vol. lB, p. 174. (The criminal trial record
does not show that defense counsel ever sought or obtained a ruling on this motion.) Thus,
defense counsel actually elicited from Mr. Grove evidence whi~h he sought to exclude pretrial.

In addition, defense counsel knew the state was aware there was a problem with the child support
payment as the Supplemental Motion in Limine put the state on notice.
Andrew Parnes testified that there was no valid strategic purpose for defense counsel to
elicit from Mr. Grove the evidence of his relationship with his son. The evidence undermined

1

Q. Do you pay child support? A. At the time?
Q. No. As of now. A. No, sir.
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the defense case which ''was based on Mr. Grove's credibility'' and "the scientific evidence." In
his view, defense counsel's actions fell below reasonable professional norms for a criminal
defense lawyer especially "because there was a motion in limine ... that was filed to keep that
information out." EH T. p. 250, In. 6-18. Mr. Parnes noted that the record did not show that
- - ·-----·---------------------------------·-----

defense counsel had sought a ruling on his Supplemental Motion in Limine. EH Tr. p. 250, In.
22. The failure to obtain a ruling was itself below reasonable professional standards. EH Tr. p.
251, In. 5-13.

Mr. Parnes was a highly credible witness. He was awarded a doctorate from Stanford and
a law degree from UC-Berkeley, both world class universities. He been an attorney for 37 years
practicing criminal defense and has practicing in Idaho since 1990. EH Tr. p. 245, In. 20 -p.
246, In. 25 ... He served as the President ofthe Palo Alto Bar Association and of the Idaho
·\-Association'of Criminal Defense Lawyers. EH Tr. p. 247, In. 3-19. Mr. Parnes had onlytestified-as an expert on one prior occasion "[a]nd that was actually for the prosecution in a case where
[he] believed that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance [of] counsel." EH Tr. p.
278, In. 22-25.

Mr. Parnes also testified that the prosecutor's question regarding child support was
objectionable because it was not relevant, it was the subject of the motion in limine and that "it
would certainly be more prejudicial than probative if there was any relevance to it at all."
Further, there was no valid reason to let that evidence in. EH T. p. 251, In. 22 - p. 252, In. 5.
85. Defense counsel's failure to object to inadmissible evidence has been found to be deficient
performance under Strickland. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 689 S.E.2d 629,633 (S.C. 2010) ("The
presumption of adequate representation based on a valid trial strategy disappears when trial
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counsel acknowledged there was no trial strategy in mind when he failed to object to the
improper hearsay and bolstering testimony.") (emphasis in original).

In addition, the prosecutor committed misconduct when he raised the child support issue.
"An accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to a trial upon competent, relevant evidence;
evidence which at least tends to establish his guilt or innocence; and evidence which has no such
tendency, but which, if effective at all, could only serve to excite the minds and inflame the
passions of the jury should not be admitted." State v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 194, 196-98, 457 P.2d
433, 435-37 (1969), quoting State v. Fleming, 154 N.W.2d 65, 66 (Neb. 1967). This is so
because "[a] fundamental principle of criminal law is that where the offense charged 'is of itself
sufficient to inflame the minds of the average person, it is required that there be rigorous
insistence upon observance of the rules of the admission of evidence'." Id., quoting People v.

-Jones;-42 CaL2d 219,266 P.2d 38 (1954). ' 1However, reception at trial of irrelevant-and -- · .-:____
immaterial evidence, which serves no probative function, but serves only to inflame the minds
and passions of the jury to the prejudice of the defendant is reversible error." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Wilson held that evidence of "[t]he degree on pain suffered
by a young virgin upon being raped, as opposed to the feelings of a bride when first experiencing
intercourse with her husband," was patently inadmissible and reminded the prosecutor that he
was only "entitled to hit as hard as he can above, but not below, the belt." Id, quoting State v.

Rollo, 351 P.2d 422, 426-427 (Or. 1960). It went on to list several other "examples of irrelevant,
immaterial and inflammatory material, the admission of which into evidence was held to be
reversible error," including:
Evidence that defendant, accused of Mann Act Violation, failed to file income tax
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returns; evidence that defendant, accused of murder, was a deserter from the army;
evidence that defendant, accused of arson, had been treated for venereal disease;
evidence that defendant, accused of murder, while in the army offered a friend
$500.00 to shoot him in the foot in order to avoid :frontline duty; evidence, in
prosecution for 'Malicious shooting at and wounding another with intent to kill,'
of victim's prognosis for recovery and future ability to perform manual labor;
evidence, in rape prosecution, that victim was pregnant as a result of the rape;
evidence, in murder prosecution, that victim was married and a parent; evioence- ------------ ---------

------------ ---

that married defendant, accused of murdering wife's friend, had been seen with
other women[.]
93 Idaho at 198,457 P.2d at 437.
The evidence about Mr. Grove's child support arrears fits squarely into the Idaho
Supreme Court's list of examples of "irrelevant, immaterial and inflammatory material,"and it
was misconduct for the prosecutor to elicit such testimony because it had no such tendency to
prove the charge and "could only serve to excite the minds and inflame the passions of the
jury[.]" Id. Consequently, it was deficient performance for defense counsel to let the
prosecutor's misconduct go unchallenged.
2. Prosecutor's comments about "the story you need the jury to believe"

Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to
move to strike the prosecutor's comments after his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during
cross-examination was sustained. Verified Amended Petition, p. 32. The trial record shows that
the prosecutor characterized Mr. Grove's sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is "the
story you need the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make
sense." Exhibit B, p. 1113, ln. 8-13. While defense counsel's objection was sustained, he did
·not ask that the comments be stricken or that the jury be instructed to disregard the comments.

Id.
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At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel said that he did not recall why he did not ask
the court to strike that comment. He also could not think of a reason why he did not ask the court
to reprimand the prosecutor for that statement. EH Tr. p. 192, ln. 5.:. 15. Mr. Parnes, however,
testified that defense counsel should have asked the Court to strike the comment, "as was done in
other parts of trial." He continued: "I would also add that, in this particular situation, that kind of

L

a statement is so, I think, beyond the bounds that I would have probably have asked for a
mistrial." EH Tr. p. 252, ln. 18 - p. 253, ln. 5.
There is no doubt that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his characterization of Mr.
Grove's sworn testimony. Counsel should not interject his personal opinion and beliefs about the
credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82,
86, 156 P.3d583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007); citing State v. Sheahan,

139 Idaho 267,280, 77 P,3d956,

969 (2003); State ·v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11, 594 P .2d 146, 148-49 (1979); State v.

Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 169,983 P.2d 233,242 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61,
69, 951 P.2d 1288, 1296 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct.
App. 1995); State v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373,376, 707 P.2d 484,487 (Ct. App. 1985). The

I

prosecutor's characterization of Mr. Grove's testimony as a "story you need the jury to believe"

1

and that "some things ... just don't really make sense" are mere assertions of his personal
opinions and belief in Mr. Grove's guilt and to the lack of credibility of Mr. Grove's testimony,
and thus was misconduct. The failure to object to improper statements by the prosecutor have
been found to be deficient performance under Strickland. People v. Bodden, 82 A.D.3d 781,
784, 918 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (2011) (Counsel failed to object to prosecutor's comments which
implied that the defendant's character increased the likelihood that he was guilty.). That was also
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the case here. The failure to object was deficient performance.
3. Prosecutor's question about Mr. Grove's emotional state

Mr. Grove also alleged in his Amended Verified Petition that defense counsel's
performance was deficient when he failed to object to the prosecutor asking Mr. Grove when he
had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription ''was a result of [his] emotional state
Friday[.]" Amended Verified Petition, pg. 32. The criminal trial record proves the questions
were asked and that defense counsel failed to object.

Q. [By Mr. Spickler] Let's go -- let's go to the morning of July 10th. Actually, let
me ask you, are you currently on any medications?
A. Ativan.

Q. And when was that prescribed for you?
A. Friday.
.

. .,------·--

.··:- _- ·-

Q. And that was a result of your emotional state Friday?
A. Just -- yeah. I mean, it's -- it's just lack of sleep. It's just the whole thing. I
mean, you know, this is pretty...
Exhibit B, p. 1120, ln. 9-12. Defense counsel explained that the phrase "emotional state Friday''

was a reference to the previous Friday when he wanted Mr. Grove to testify. Mr. Grove told
counsel that morning that "he was unable to do so because oflack of sleep, and he just wasn't
ready to do it." EH T. p. 197, ln. 25 - p. 198, ln. 1.
At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that "at the time, or even looking at it
now, I'm not sure, under the circumstances of the way all this came down, whether it was
objectionable." EH T. p. 193, ln. 5-10. Mr. Parnes disagreed stating that the evidence was
irrelevant. Further it was highly prejudicial when understood in its proper context. When the

9- PETITIONER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

489

\.

trial was continued on that Friday, ''the jury was told that there had been a medical issue, but they
were not told what the details of that were." EH T. p. 253, ln. 14-21. See also, Exhibit B, p.
1067, ln. 3-5. (Wherein the Court informs the jury that "an unforeseen medical situation has
. arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today'' and does not mention Mr. Grove or
.. ·-·· .

--·

the nature of the medical situation.) Defense counsel's failure to object to improper crossexamination has been held to be deficient performance under Strickland. See, e.g., United States

v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1099 (Jh Cir. 1986) (Deficient performance found where prosecutor used
cross-examination to bring in extraneous and at times unfounded charges in order to blacken the
defendant's character.)

In addition, the prosecutor used the "emotional state" testimony to great effect during his
rebuttal argument. First, defense counsel brings up in his closing argument the questioning about
"Stace having a breakdown last Friday" and argues that the evidence is simply an ad hominem

>---

attack: "[I]f you can't get at the testimony, get at the man. What does that have to do with
anything?" Exhibit B, p. 1445, ln. 2-4. The prosecutor then springs his trap during rebuttal:
So, [defense counsel] talked about, well, why bring up the emotional breakdown
of the defendant? Trying to attack the defendant. No, there's a reason for it. The
reason for it is the State believes that he had an emotional breakdown, an
instantaneous fit of anger, that morning that resulted in these injuries to the kids -to the kid, to
Exhibit B, p. 1458, ln. 13-19. Defense counsel did not object to this line of argument nor did he
have the chance to respond because the prosecutor held it back until rebuttal. But had defense
counsel properly objected, the evidence never would have come in at all.
The introduction of all this evidence was prejudicial under Strickland because Mr.
Grove's credibility was of paramount importance to the defense case. His testimony about what
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happened after Lisa Nash left for work and he was alone with

was one half of the defense

case, the other half being Dr. Arden's medical testimony. Thus, the evidence showing Mr. Grove
had a bad relationship with his biological son and that he was not even paying child support
painted him as a bad person and bad care giver, i.e., the kind of person who would beat an infant.
The prosecutor's comments that Mr. Grove needed the jury to believe his story but that parts of it
just don't really make sense, implied to the jury that Mr. Grove would lie to them because he had

to, irrespective of the logical soundness of his testimony. And the prosecutor's argument that

Mr. Grove had an emotional breakdown with

similar to the one he had in court,

established what the state's evidence could not - an explanation for why Mr. Grove would
brutally beat an infant. None of this would have been brought to the attention of the jury had
defense counsel's performance not been deficient. Without it, there is a reasonable probability
that state would not have obtained-a-conviction';----

B. Ineffective Assistance in the Direct and Cross-Examination ofDr. Arden
Mr. Grove alleged in his Amended Verified Petition that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to object to the prosecutor impeaching Dr. Arden with alleged "gross mismanagement"
when he was the Medical Examiner in the District of Columbia; in failing to attempt to
rehabilitate Dr. Arden on redirect; and in failing to provide iron stain slides to Dr. Arden prior to
his trial testimony. Amended Verified Petition, pp. 32-33; 35-37.
The state's theory of this case was that Mr. Grove "brutally beat"

Martin to death,

Ex. B, p. 691, In. 14-22, between 7:54 a.m. and approximately 8:30 a.m., on July 10, 2006. Ex.
B, p. 745, ln. 7-p. 747, ln. 7.
The defense theory was that the injuries happened prior to the 35 minutes when Mr.
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Grove was alone with

Ex. B, p. 696, ln. 18-p. 708, ln. 24. As stated in defense counsel's

opening at trial, the defense case for acquittal rested on two things: Mr. Grove's credibility when
he testified under oath that he did not beat

and Dr. Arden's testimony that the injuries

resulting in Kyler's death happened prior to 7:45 a.m. on July 10, 2006. Ex. B, p. 708, ln. 9-24.
To make that case, the defense was relying on the jury to "take your intelligence and common
sense and listen to Dr. Arden, listen to the testimony of the causation and the timing of these
things." Ex. B, p. 708, ln. 13-15. As trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing, ''the
nudge" of the case was the timing of the injuries and Dr. Arden was the sole medical witness to
support the theory. EH Tr. p. 212, ln. 10-22.
When Dr. Arden testified at trial, he placed the time of the injuries at three or more days
before. a point between brain death and the cross-clamp. done for organ harvest. Ex. B, p. 1267,
· ln.-11-15;p.1302,ln. l-p.1303,ln. 8. Hefurthertestifiedthatinjuries·tothepancreaswereat
least a week old. Ex. B, p. 1302, ln. 1- 1303, ln. 8. Given that brain death occurred on July 11,
2006, Ex. B, p. 934, ln. 11-13, and the cross-clamping occurred on July 12, 2006, Ex. B, p. 935,
ln. 8-10, the injuries were, according to Dr. Arden's testimony, inflicted prior to the morning of
July 10. By contrast, Dr. Ross testified for the state, based in part upon his review of Dr.
Reichard's report, that the injuries occurred one to two days prior to the cross-clamping; in other
words sometime between July 10 and July 11. Ex. B, p. 933, ln. 14-17; p. 934, ln. 24-p. 935, ln.
16.2

Jn·addition, Dr. Arden testified that there was no tear in the corpus callosum. Rather,
the appearance of a tear was an artifact created during the preparation of the microscopic slides.
Ex. B, p. 1291, ln. 11-15. Dr. Ross testified that there was a tear, but that it could have been
caused either by trauma or by brain swelling instead of blunt force. Ex. B, p. 940, ln. 23-p. 942,
ln. 23.

- "·· --· · --.- --,,::, · ·

- 2·
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Dr. Hunter, a state's medical witness, testified that he believed that

would have

been somewhere between headachy and unconscious immediately following the injury that led to
death. Ex B, p. 875, In. 8-22. Dr. Harper, another medical witness for the state, testified that
would have been obviously critically ill, unconscious or semi-

upon receiving the injuries,
.···----
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conscious. Ex. B, p. 1033, In. 16-21. She also testified that she did not need to consider
microscopic evidence to conclude the time of injury - that sort of evidence was "all well and
good" but "it doesn't make any difference." Ex. B, p. 1041, In. 18-24. She believed that
was injured the morning of July 10. Ex. B, p. 1059, In. 8-17. Dr. Arden testified to the contrary,
specifically that

could have been alert and active after being injured. Ex. B, p. 1306, In.

15-p. 1310, In. 25. His testimony was supported both by testimony about the nature of head
injuries and by the factthat injuries to the pancreas were over a week old showing that

was

clearly active after being seriously injured. ·.:,-~,,- ·
Dr. Arden came before the jury with very strong credentials. He testified to, among other
qualifications, an impressive education, board certifications in both anatomic pathology and
forensic pathology, licenses to practice medicine in five states and the District of Columbia,
membership and a director's position in the National Association of Medical Examiners, and
multiple academic appointments at several medical schools, including N.Y.U. and George
Washington University Medical School. He had given lectures and published multiple articles
in medical journals. He had been a medical examiner for 20 years, including positions as the first
deputy chief medical examiner for New York City and for Washington, D.C. And, at the time of
-- - ·- ...'.".... - - - -~-

Mr. Grove's trial, he had both a private consulting practice and served as a forensic pathologist
for the state of West Virginia Ex. B, p. 1235, In. 19-p. 1245, In. 14.
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In contrast, the jury was given no real information about the state's expert pathologist, Dr.
Reichard. In fact, Dr. Reichard himself never came and testified so that the jury could hear a
non-hearsay account of his determination about the timing of the injuries to

Ex. B. Dr.

Marco Ross, who did testify at trial, presented a much shorter and le~s extensive educational,
academic, and professional resume to the jury. He testified to coming to pathology later in his
career and provided no evidence of board certifications or publications or academic
appointments. Further, he had worked as a medical examiner for just over eight years. And, the
fact that he did not examine the brain himself indicated his own judgment of his lack of expertise
as to pediatric brain injury diagnosis.· Ex B, p. 892, ln. 22-p. 893, ln. 13.
While Dr. Hunter and Dr. Harper offered their opinions regarding the age ofKyler's
injuries, neither had any expertise in the dating of injuries, Each testified based upon their
anecdotal experience as physicians treating injuries;-:riot as pathologist/physicians diagnosing
time of injury. Yet, as Dr. Hunter himself testified, "'In my experience' are the three most
dangerous words in medicine, because each - any one of us has a limited experience compared
with, say, large studies ..." Ex. B, p. 888, ln. 9-14.

In a strict balancing of known expertise, Dr. Arden was by far the best qualified expert at
trial to date the injuries and had the jury accepted his expert opinion, Mr. Grove would have been
acquitted.
However, the state seriously undermined Dr. Arden's testimony with a three-pronged
attack. First, the prosecutor improperly put before the jury the theory that Dr. Arden was on a
.

-

--

~

.- - .

special mission to help Mr. Grove instead of the state. Exhibit B, p. 1321, ln. 18-p. 1323, ln. 4.
Then the prosecutor extensively questioned Dr. Arden about the iron stain slides Dr. Reichard
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had reviewed which Dr. Arden had not reviewed. Ex. B, p. 1353, In. 8-p. 1364, In. 2. And
finally, the prosecutor closed his cross examination by extensively questioning Dr. Arden about
his departure from the Washington, D.C. medical examiner's office under pressure. Ex B, p.
1382, In. 6-p. 1388, ln. 12. That questioning_ is attached as an appendix to this argument for the
court's convenience. In summary, the questioning brought out that Dr. Arden had been accused
of gross mismanagement, had failed to attend meetings of the DC Child Fatality Review Board,
had presided over the office with a backlog of 1300 autopsy reports and an accumulation of 189
bodies, and had been accused of sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, unlawful retaliation,
and racial discrimination. Following these allegations, Dr. Arden resigned.
Dr. Arden's admission to having been accused of all of these things and then resigning
under pressure was the last thing the jury heard in the trial except for this redirect:

Q. We've been out here a long time, and I'in goingto be-very;"Yery-brief, okay?·
Is there anything that the Prosecutor asked you or answers that you've given that
in any way changes the opinions you provided to this jury under direct
examination?
A. No, sir.
Ex. B, p. 1388, ln. 20-25.

Mr. Grove produced evidence that proves by a preponderance that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective in failing to get Dr. Arden the iron stain slides prior to trial and in
failing to prevent the prosecutor's impeachment of Dr. Arden both with the notion that he was on
a special mission to help the defense but not the state and with the irrelevant and unfairly and
hlglilypfejudicfalinformation about his employment with and resignation from the D. C. ·Medical
Examiner.
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At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Arden testified that he had asked Mr. Chapman to send

him all the microscopic slides that had been made by the medical examiner who performed the
autopsy. EH Tr. p. 134, ln. 8-11. These slides included the iron stain slides. EH Tr. p. 136, ln.
8-1 O; p. 13 8, In. 6-10. Mr. Chapman, for his part, testified that he was aware prior to trial of the
existence of the iron stain slides but that in the letter he sent to the prosecutor requesting recuts
for Dr. Arden's review prior to trial he did not ask for the iron stain slides. EH Tr. p. 201, In. 13p. 204, In. 1. Mr. Parnes, testifying as a Strickland expert, stated that the failure of trial counsel
to obtain the iron stain slides for Dr. Arden prior to trial violated reasonable professional norms
because provision of all relevant information to an expert is critical to the expert's ability to
review the matter fully and to have credibility before the jury. EH Tr. p. 254, ln. 20-p. 255, In.
15.3
-··~-.-..:.·-~

The state presented nothing whatsoeverto rebut any ofthis evidence~ ·The state did not
0

dispute that Dr. Arden asked for Mr. Chapman for all slides or that Mr. Chapman did not ask for
or send the iron stain slides to Dr. Arden. Nor did the state present its own expert testimony to
contravert Mr. Parnes' testimony that failure to provide a defense expert with all relevant
information is contrary to reasonable professional norms of practice. In fact, the state did not
even ask Mr. Parnes anything in cross examination about the failure of trial counsel to provide

Mr. Parnes' testimony is consistent with State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 385, 247
P.3d 582, 612 (2010), which recognized that failure to properly prepare an expert may be
deficient performance, but found that Shackelford had failed to demonstrate prejudice. See also,
·Murp1iyv:'Sfiite, 143Idaho 139, 146-47;t.39'2-P.3d,41, 748-49 (Ct. App. 2006),·holdtn.gtltat --:-,,,_- ,
failure to ask for a continuance to consult with an expert medical witness was deficient
performance. Also see, Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2466 (2005),
holding that defense counsel must obtain information that the State has and will use against the
defendant.
3
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the iron stain slides to Dr. Arden other than to ask him whether he had made averments about the
iron stain slides in his affidavit earlier filed in this case. EH Tr. p. 282, In. 23-p. 283, In. 9.
The evidence before this Court is clear that trial counsel acted contrary to reasonable professional
norms in failing to provide Dr. Arden the iron stain slides prior to trial.
With regard to the impeachment of Dr. Arden as being on a special mission, Mr.
Chapman testified that he did not believe it was proper for the prosecutor to impugn the motives
of Dr. Arden without evidentiary support and that he could not now recall why he did not object
to the line of questioning, but that he was certain that Dr. Arden was not going to tell the jury that
he was on a special mission for the defense. EH Tr. p. 21, In. 11-p. 215, In. 18. Mr. Parnes
testified that the special mission questioning was improper and should have been objected to.
EH Tr. 260, In. 10-22.. The state did not present any evidence that such questionirlg by the
:prmmcution was appropriate or that counsel acted in conformity witlrreasonable professional
norms in not objecting to the questioning.
With regard to the other impeachment, Dr. Arden testified that he had alerted Mr.
Chapman prior to trial to the circumstances of his departure from the Washington, D. C. office.

EH Tr. p. 128, In. 3-p. 130, In. 12. Dr. Arden further testified that the allegations did not in any
way relate to his medical expertise or his honesty. EH Tr. p. 131, In. 6-14. Mr. Chapman

testified that he was aware pretrial of the allegations both from discussions with Dr. Arden and
from his own internet research. EH Tr. p. 205, In. 14-p. 206, In. 4. Mr. Chapman further
testified that he assumes the prosecutor was also aware of the allegations against Dr. Arden; that
. - . .

: _-.

-

- ·-

........,.. ·-· - .-- -~---· ·_.:.. .. ·:..

he (Mr. Chapman) did not believe that evidence about the accusations against Dr. Arden and his
departure from the D.C. office was relevant; that he viewed the evidence as prejudicial; that he
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could have made a pretrial motion in limine to exclude the evidence or made a contemporaneous
objection to it at trial; but that he did not attempt to keep the evidence out. EH Tr. p. 204, In. 2p. 207, In. 1.
The state did not dispute any of this evidence. The state's only question to Mr. Chapman
on this topic was whether he could have taken advantage of the prosecutor's questioning of Dr.
Arden regarding the circumstances in Washington, D.C. by arguing to the jury that the state had
nothing to do at trial but attack Dr. Arden because it could not attack his opinions. EH Tr. p.
237, In. 8-17.

Mr. Parnes testified that Mr. Chapman should have objected to the impeachment of Dr.
Arden because the impeachment was irrelevant. Mr. Parnes testified that Mr. Chapman should
have filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence or, in the alternative, to preserve error in

,'.---admittingthe evidence. 4 Mr. Parnes·also testified that the timing of the impeachment; coming at
the very end of Dr. Arden's testimony and the very end of the trial made it particularly
prejudicial. ER Tr. p. 259, In. 4-15. This prejudicial effect was compounded by the failure of
counsel to do anything to rehabilitate Dr. Arden. EH Tr. p. 256, In. 19-p. 260, In. 2. The state
presented no expert testimony to contradict Mr. Parnes' conclusion that counsel was deficient in
failing to keep this evidence out .of trial or at least preserving a record for appeal if the evidence
was erroneously admitted over objection. Mr. Parnes ultimately testified that trial counsel's
performance as a whole during the preparation for Dr. Arden's testimony and in the direct and

·w.-Pames' testimony is consistent with·IRE-401

and 402 because the evidence did not-·
impeach Dr. Arden's medical testimony. Moreover, the evidence's unfair prejudice outweighed .
any probative value and was inadmissible under IRE 403. Lastly, the evidence was not
admissible under IRE 404, nor did the state give any notice of its intent to use the evidence as
required by IRE 404(b).
-4
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cross-examination of Dr. Arden did not meet reasonable professional standards for criminal
defense attorneys. EH Tr. p. 260, ln. 23-p. 261, ln. 3. The state presented no expert or other
evidence to the contrary. Thus, Mr. Grove has proven deficient performance as required by

Strickland
The second question is whether the deficient performance was prejudicial. Mr. Grove has
also proven this.

Dr. Arden testified at the evidentiary hearing that the slides he had pretrial and Dr.
Reichard's report of the iron staining were sufficient, as he testified at trial, for him to conclude
that

s injuries occurred at least 48-72 hours prior to death. But, upon seeing the iron stain

slides himself, he could now further conclude that there were injuries in the mesentery and eyes
that were significantly older, some as old as aweek or more prior to death. EH Tr. p. 167, ln. 8p. ·1'69~ ln. 10. Had Dr. Arden been able to give this·testimony at trial, it would'have effectively
countered Dr. Hunter's and Dr. Harper's "in my experience" claims that

could not have

been active after receiving the injuries that resulted in death. If the jury had known that
had been active for over a week with both retinal injuries and mesentery injuries, there is a
reasonable probably that at least one juror would have had a reasonable doubt that death resulted
'

'

from injuries inflicted in the 35 minutes prior to the arrival of the ambulance.

In addition, had counsel objected to the improper impeachment of Dr. Arden, one of two
things would have happened: the improper evidence would have been excluded or if it was
admitted, there was a reasonable probability that the appellate court would have found reversible
. .,.·, -· -,-.\ :,..·._:=::; ~ -

error.

If the evidence was not admitted, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror
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would have found that the testimony of the most qualified medical pathologist at the trial created
a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Grove's guilt. This is especially evident given the timing of the
impeachment and the failure of trial counsel to rehabilitate Dr. Arden. The last thing that the jury
heard was that Dr. Arden was accused of all sorts of mismanagement and bad acts. Given that
the jury was never instructed to disregard this evidence, the jurors likely used it to determine
what sort of credibility to give to Dr. Arden's expert testimony. Indeed, the prosecutor
recognized the power of this impeachment to discredit Dr. Arden's medical opinions. He
devoted part of his closing argument to discrediting Dr. Arden because Dr, Arden was a paid
expert. He argued:

Dr. Arden, as we presented to you, was a well-paid public servant for many years.
And as he described to you, he resigned his position under pressure. And for the
next five years, 2003. until today - well,. until, excuse me, a month ago or so, he
was not employed as a forensic pathologist, but he was employed as, quote, a paid
consultant
,,-·-a, :
And that's - and he said in criminal cases, what he does is he comes and testifies
for the defense. Now, in fairness to Dr. Arden, he said, if it's clearcut that the
person is just flat wrong, he won't take the case. But on the borderlines on
clearcut, don't you think that it's reasonable, and in your life experience probably,
that his financial situation leads him to decide what cases he can take? Doesn't it
extend out? Doesn't it make sense that it extends out, that realm of reasonable
medical probability? That's for you to decide. When you're deciding on his
credibility, think about that.
Ex. B, p. 1428, In. 20-p. 1429, In. 13.
The prosecutor continued this line of attack in his rebuttal:

~

...... _.,;..

~

::.. ----

He [Mr. Chapman] mentioned putting on evidence just to attack the guy [Dr.
Arden]. Well, when somebody's opinion is so important to you making a
decision, it is necessary to put-arr evidence about-the-kind of:person that's making
the opinion, why he's doing it, to enable you to decide how much weight to give
that opinion, if any. It's not an attack on the person. It's information for you.
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Ex. B, p. 1458, In. 5-12. (It is telling to note that Mr. Spickler acknowledges that Dr. Arden's
testimony was "so important" to the jury's decision and central to the defense case.)
Later, the prosecutor continued:
Dr. Arden certainly has credentials, but he also has a purpose here. When I
commented to you earlier that he was stretching things and I talked about the brain
death and stuff, look at your notes and see if when he admitted that certain of
these things, according to the literature, can appear one to three days after death, if
he didn't always pick three days, you know, the outside limit, not the early part of
it. But look at your notes and see if that isn't true.
Ex. B, Trial Tr. p. 1461, In. 9-17.
These arguments demonstrate that the prosecutor believed that the improper impeachment
evidence was integral to the case against Mr. Grove. Otherwise, he would not have introduced
the evidence nor argued it repeatedly in closing and rebuttal. Reviewing this argument and the
remainder of the evidence presented at trial, there is a reasonable probability that had trial
·:--~.c.. ..

counsel not been deficient in his handling of Dr. Arden's preparation and the improper
impeachment of Dr. Arden that the outcome -of the trial would have been different - there would .
have been an acquittal or a hung jury.
Moreover, had the court allowed the improper evidence even over objection, the error
would have been raised on appeal. And, there is a reasonable probability that relief would have
been granted.
The question of relevancy is subject to free review on appeal, a standard favorable to the
appellant. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713,717,264 P.3d 54, 58 (2011). The evidence regarding

expertise or the validity of the opinions offered at Mr. Grove's trial. Indeed, it did not even have
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any relevance to the doctor's general credibility as the evidence had nothing to do with Dr.
Arden's general reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Therefore, the evidence was
inadmissible under IRE 401 and 402. See, State v. Palin, 106 Idaho 70, 74,675 P.2d 49, 53 (Ct.
App. 1983), noting that prior sexual misconduct alone is not a proper basis to impeach a witness'
general credibility. See also, IRE 403, IRE 404 and IRE 608. Moreover, on appeal, a very
favorable standard of review would have applied. Specifically, the state would have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in the admission of the impeachment evidence did not
contribute to the verdict. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221-22, 245 P.3d 961, 973-74
(2010), citing State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 636, 977 P.2d 890, 898 (1999); State v. Zichko,
129 Idaho 259, 265, 923 P.2d 966, 972 (1996); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 74, 778, 810 P.2d 680,
716 (1991); and State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171,667 P.2d 272,274 (Ct. App. 1983).
Given the evidence presented at trial, there is a reasonable probability that had this Court allowed ·
the evidence over objection, Mr. Grove would have prevailed upon appeal and received a new
trial.
Thus, Mr. Grove has proved both deficient performance and prejudice as required by
Strickland as to counsel's handling of Dr. Arden's preparation and testimony. Post-conviction

relief should therefore be granted.
C. Ineffective Assistance With Regard to Sleeping Jurors

Mr. Grove alleged in his amended verified petition for post-conviction relief that trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial after jurors fell asleep during testimony
:.:::. .-. . . '
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at trial. Amended Veri:fied Petition p. 33. He has now proven this ineffectiveness by a
preponderance of the evidence and post-conviction relief should be granted.
22- PETITIONER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

502

At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Grove presented testimony from witnesses Debbie Grove,
Carol Grove, Lori Stamper, Karen Stamper, Craig Stamper, and Justina Hyder that they had
observed one or more jurors sleeping during the trial. EH p. 13-123. The witnesses testified to
sleeping by Jurors Neiman, Lind, Yates, Barrett, and Loetscher. EH p. 18, ln. 15-p. 21, ln. 19; p.
77, ln. 4-25; p. 86, ln. 7-13; p. 106, ln. 6-7; p. 112, ln. 4-5. He also presented the testimony of

Mr. Chapman that he recalled a side bar during trial about jurors having been sleeping. EH p.
216, ln. 7-10. Mr. Chapman testified that he was aware that some jurors may have been sleeping
during Dr. Ross' testimony but that he did not attempt to make a record with regard to this nor
did he consult with Mr. Grove about whether action should be taken as to the sleeping jurors.
EHp. 218, ln. 3-p. 219, ln. 12. Mr. Chapman's testimony was consistent with the trial record.
During the prosecutor's direct examination of Dr. Ross, the Court interrupted the prosecutor sua
sponte and called for a side--bar. Immediately after the side bar, the Court noted that the
proceedings had been going on for some time and that the Court and counsel had determined that
it would be best to take a break. Ex. B, p. 921, ln. 20-p. 922, ln. 6. During Mr. Chapman's
cross-examination of Dr. Ross, the prosecutor asked for a break in the proceedings. He stated
that it was warm in the courtroom and "I've recently noticed that the jurors might be in need of a
break. They're having a hard time staying awake." Ex B, p. 983, ln. 10-12.5
The state attempted to rebut this evidence through the testimony of seven of the jurors to-

Insofar as the state intends to now argue that no jurors were sleeping, the argument is
contrary to the spirit, if not the letter of, the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel
=-- ·,,4'prec-:tutles"a party from gaining an advantage by taking one-position, and then seeking a second
advantage by taking an incompatible position." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d
597, 600 (2008), quoting McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997).
The underlying policy is the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial
proceedings. It is intended to prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose with the courts. Id.
5
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the effect that they personally did not sleep and that they did not observe others sleeping. EH pp.
305-341. Yet, the state could not present any juror who testified that he or she had watched all
the other jurors throughout the proceedings and no one fell asleep. Id Moreover, the state did
not present testimony from Mr. Yates or Ms. Barrett that they had not been sleeping during the
trial. Id Mr. Grove's evidence as to those two jurors was not impeached by the state.

Mr. Parnes testified that when an attorney becomes aware of a sleeping juror he or she
has a duty to discuss the matter with the client and create a record. Failure to consult potentially
impeded the client's right to a unanimous jury. The right to a unanimous jury is a right that
counsel cannot waive for the client without the client's consent. In this case, Mr. Chapman did
not meet reasonable professional standards in failing to consult with Mr. Grove regarding the
sleeping jurors. EH p. 262, 1n. 4::-p, 264, ln. 6, The state did not present any evidence from an
expert or otherwise that Mr. Chapman's failure to:consult with Mr. Grove to controvert Mr.--' ,
Parnes' testimony.

Mr. Parnes' testimony is consistent with State v. Umphenour, S.Ct. No. 41497, -Idaho
- , -P.3d-, 2015 WL 1423789 (Ct. App. March 30, 2015). Umphenour, relying on State v.

Swan, 108 Idaho 963,966, 703 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1985), holds that Article I,§ 7 of the
Idaho Constitution requires that waiver of the right to a jury trial requires the defendant's
personal waiver. Id, at *3. See also, ICR 23 (a) which states that issues of fact must be tried by
a jury in felony cases unless a trial by jury is waived by a written waiver executed by the
defendant in open court with the consent of the prosecutor expressed in open court and entered in
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Umphenour further holds that a constitutionally invalid waiver of a jury trial is a
structural defect which requires reversal without a showing of an actual effect on the outcome of
the trial. The Court of Appeals relied upon Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Duncan

v. State ofLouisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993); State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222-23, 245 P.3d 961, 974-75 (2010); and Swan, supra, to conclude that
the error in not obtaining a personal wavier by the defendant of the right to have his/her case
determined by the jury affects the framework within which the trial proceeds and thus is not
subject to a harmless error review. Umphenour, at *6-9.

In Mr. Grove's case, the fact that one or more jurors slept though part or parts of the trial
denied Mr. Grove the right to a trial before a jury of 12 as required by Article I, § 7. Counsel did
· ·not meet reasonable professional norms··inwaiving,that right without consulting Mr. Grove.

Umphenour, supra; Swan, supra.
Moreover, as counsel's deficiency created a structural error in the trial, the deficiency
should be evaluated under the standards of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039
(1984). Under Cronic, there is a presumption of prejudice when a deficiency results in an actual
breakdown of the adversarial process. A deficiency which results in structural error is a
deficiency which is entitled to the presumption of prejudice under Cronic.
But, even if Strickland's prejudice prong must be proven, Mr. Grove has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that post-conviction relief must be granted. This case turned on

As Umphenour was resolved on state constitutional grounds, the Court of Appeals did
not address whether the Sixth Amendment likewise requires a personal waiver. Mr. Grove
asserts that it does. See State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 102, 753 P.2d 833, 838 (Ct App. 1988).
6
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expert medical testimony which, absent prosecutorial misconduct, would have weighed in favor
of Mr. Grove. There is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
different, whether through a hung jury or an acquittal, had all twelve jurors heard all the expert
testimony.

D. Ineffective Assistance With Regard to Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing

Mr. Grove alleged in his petition that "[d]efense counsel's performance during the state's
closing and rebuttal arguments was deficient because he failed to object to multiple instances of
misconduct by the prosecutor" and that "[d]efense counsel's performance was deficient because
he failed to move for a mistrial after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments." Amended
Verified Petition, p. 34-35. He also alleged multiple instances of such misconduct. Id., p. 15-17.
Ec:1.ch of these allegations and the evidence presented at the hearing are discussed below:
1. The prosecutor misstated the defense position,regarding preexisting head injury,
saying that the defense was that there was "some long-term brain injury." Exhibit B, pg.
1419, ln. 6-10.
Defense counsel testified that the defense theory of the case was not that there was a longterm brain injury. "It was a defense theory that there was some injury prior to the time that the
child was with Stace... I wouldn't define it as long term, no." He also agreed that it is improper
for the prosecutor to misrepresent the defense's theory of the case, but could not say why he
failed to object to that misrepresentation.

EH Tr. p. 224, ln. 5 - pg. 225, ln. 4.

Mr. Parnes testified that defense counsel should object when the state misstates the
defens~ theory of the case. EH Tr. p. 269, ln. 23. Indeed, the case law is clear that it is improper
for a prosecutor to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence. State v. Raudebaugh, 124
Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166, 610 P.2d 522,
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525 (1980); State v. Tupis, 112 Idaho 767, 771-72, 735 P.2d 1078, 1082-83 (Ct. App. 1987);
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). Further, the prosecutor's

statement about a long term injury implied a period of time longer than a few days or a week
"[a]nd that was clearly not the defense in this particular case." EH Tr. p. 270, In. 1-8. The
prosecutor's mischaracterization of the defense theory was intended to make the theory appear
improbable because it would be unlikely that the brain injuries could go unnoticed by care givers
for a long period of time, while the true theory was much more plausible and supported by Dr.
Arden's testimony.
2. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[c]are takers kill little
babies all the time." Exhibit B, p. 1460, In. 5-6.
3. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[p]arents kill babies all
the time." . . Exhibit B, p. J 460, In. 6-7.

· · - 4. The prosecutor told the jury without strpporting evidence that ''there areliterally
thousands of [similar] incidents in any given span of time[.]" Exhibit B, p. 1460. In. 8~

5. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that he believed that "our
local paper has probably shown ... probably six more of these cases since- since this
one started." Exhibit B. p. 1460. ln. 11-14.
Defense counsel agreed that it is improper for a prosecutor tostate facts which are not
supported by the evidence. EH Tr. p. 225, In. 17-19. Our appellate courts agrees:. "It is plainly
improper for a party to present closing argument that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the
evidence." State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904,911,231 P.3d 549,556 (Ct. App. 2010); see also
Griffiths, 101 Idaho at 166, 610 P.2d at 525; State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 525, 37 P.3d 18,

22 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. Defense counsel could
not recall any evidence to support the above statements, but could not say why he failed to object

I

-I
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to them. EH Tr. p. 226, ln. 5 -p. 227, ln. 1.

Mr. Parnes testified that these comments were not supported by evidence and were
highly inflammatory because the state alleged that Mr. Grove was the caretaker at the time of
Kyler's injuries. Consequently, there should have been an objection. EH Tr. p. 271, ln. 4-7.
The case law supports Mr. Parnes' opinion. While both sides in a trial have traditionally
been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury, "[t]his latitude is not
boundless, however, and it is impermissible to appeal to the emotion, passion, or prejudice of the
jury through the use of inflammatory tactics." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 266-67, 233 P.3d
190, 197-98 (Ct. App. 2010), citing State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20-21, 189 P.3d 477, 482-83
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587 ("Considerable latitude,
however, has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those implied."). A prosecutor
.... -:_~·---

exceeds the scope of this considerable latitude if he on:he "attempts to secure a verdict on any
factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during
trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209,227,245 P.3d 961,979 (2010). Thus, "[u]rgingthejuryto render a verdict based on
factors other than the evidence and jury instructions, such
as sympathy
for the victim, has no
.
.. .
.
place in closing arguments." State v. Felder, 150 Idaho 269,275,245 P.3d 1021, 1027 (Ct. App.
2010); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570,576, 181 P.3d 496,502 (Ct. App. 2007). Finally, the ABA
instructs that "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the prejudices
of the jury." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Functions § 3-5.8
(3d. ed.1993).

In fact, our Supreme Court has long held that the limits on permissible closing argument
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apply most stringently to a prosecuting attorney:
A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, "acting in a quasi judicial capacity." It
is his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable, and lawful means to secure the
conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted in the courts of his judicial
circuit. He should see that they have a fair and impartial trial, and avoid
convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt him to appeal to prejudices, to
pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury, which, whether true or not,
have not been proved. The desire for success should never induce him to endeavor
to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in the
case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the
same[.]
It will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do not look with
favor upon the action of prosecutors in going beyond any possible state of facts
which can be material as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a particular
case for which he is upon trial. Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of
the machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position, which
necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and
conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give
to counsel for the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and
ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in
so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accuse&It is the d1ity ofthe
prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent
evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he should guard against
- anything that would prejudice the-minds of-the jurors, and tend to hinder them
from considering only the evidence introduced.
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 609-11 (1903). See also, State v. Babb, 125 Idaho

934,942, 877 P.2d 905,913 (1994); State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253,268, 152 P. 1054, 1058
(1915).
Mr. Spickler's multiple references to matters outside the record were so far afield from

acceptable practice that defense counsel's failure to object to any one of those statements was
deficient performance. In this regard, Mr. Parnes noted that the fact that defense counsel could
not state a reason for failing to object was "important in terms of making a decision about
deficient performance, that it implies that there's no ... tactical or strategic reason thought out
29- PETITIONER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

509

,,· ..

'

'

.

andplannedfor." EHTr.p.271,ln.11-17.
Further, the failure to object was prejudicial. The prosecutor used the argument as an
emotional appeal to the jury to take a stand against (his asserted epidemic of) child abuse. As

Mr. Parnes stated:
It just absolutely is an instance of prosecutorial misconduct. It's inflammatory.
It's not supported by the record. It[] ... has the - the incredible impact of telling
jurors this happens all the time. This is something that you've got to do
something about. And the way that you're going to do something about it is to
convict Mr. Grove who's in front of you. You can't do anything else other than to
convict Mr. Grove in order to stop this problem that -you know, the problem in
the community.
EH Tr. p. 271, In. 23 - p. 272, In. 8.
6. The prosecutor argued that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking Kyler's body
apart piece by piece[.]" Exhibit B, p. 1464, In. 24-25.
Defense counsel testified that he agreed that is is improper for a prosecutor to appeal to
the sympathies of the jury, but could not say why he failed to object to the above comment.

EH

·Tr; p. 225, In. 5-15. -Mr; Parnes testified that the statement was inflammatory and defense
counsel should have been objected. EH Tr. p. 272, In. 13-18. Of course, appeals to emotion,
passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.

Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 769, 864 P.2d at 607; State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d
916, 923 (1990); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844, 655 P.2d 46, 51 (1982); Griffiths, 101
Idaho at 168, 610 P.2d at 527. And that is the only possible purpose behind Mr. Spickler's
comment about ''taking Kyler's body apart piece by piece[.]" Id, pg. 1464, In. 24-25

-7_·-Toe prosecutor argued that "we don't want to let a murderer go free." Exhibit B, p.
1466, In. 9.
Defense counsel stated that he did not know whether the prosecutor's argument was
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objectionable, but agreed that it could be interpreted as diminishing the state's burden of proof
and could not say why he did not object. EH Tr. p. 223, ln. 1-19.

Mr. Parnes testified that the prosecutor's statement was objectionable. First, it was highly
inflammatory because it informed the jury that the prosecutor would not let a murderer go free,
even if the evidence did not support a guilty verdict. "[T]hat' s not the prosecutor's
responsibility. It's to do justice under the law." EH Tr. p. 268, ln. 10-15. Moreover, the burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is, in fact, designed to let some guilty people go free in order
to protect the innocent. Proof beyond reasonable doubt reflects ''fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). That fundamental value applies in allcriminal cases, even - perhaps even more so - in
,~- -~: - murder cases where the consequences are so high. Beyond a reasonable doubt requires the jury
to _deliberate from the starting position of innocence and test the state's ·case to determine whether
it overcame the presumption. "[W]e don't want to let a murderer go free," flips the presumption
on its head and asks the jury to begin its deliberations with the presumption that the defendant is
a murderer and then determine whether the evidence disproves that. fu Mr. Parnes' opinion, the
comment was so improper that an objection and motion for mistrial outside the presence of the
jury would have been appropriate. EH Tr. p. 268, ln. 16 - p. 269, ln. 1.
8. The prosecutor argued without suworting evidence that the emotional breakdown of

Mr_. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a different kind of "emotional breakdown.
an instantaneous fit of anger. that morning that resulted in these injuries[.]" Exhibit B. p.
1458, 111: 16-18. ·
Defense counsel agreed that the only evidence of an "emotional breakdown" by Mr.
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Grove was elicited, without objection, by the prosecutor during the cross-examination of Mr.
Grove. EH Tr. p. 228, In. 7-14. He was not asked by either party whether he had a strategic
reason for failing to object to this comment. However, defense counsel agreed that a defense
attorney's job is to protect his client's right to a fair trial. He also agreed that objecting to
prosecutorial misconduct could have a deterrent effect preventing future misconduct and that
defense attorneys sometime make such objections for that purpose. Finally, he agreed that
making an appellate record is a part of the defense attorney's duties and that making objections to
prosecutorial misconduct is a method to create an appellate record. EH Tr. p. 228, In. 15- p. 229,

ln. 9.
Mr. Parnes agreed with defense counsel that it is part of defense counsel's duty to create
an adequate record for appellate review because "if there's no record made, then the objections
· [Oii appeal] are-reviewed under a very· strict standard, in Idaho fundamental error- standard,--and in

most courts and they are, in essence, deemed to be waived." EH Tr. p. 267, In. 5-7. In addition,
an early objection to misconduct can rein in an overzealous prosecutor. Id., In. 12-17.
As to the emotional breakdown comment, Mr. Parnes stated that there should have been
an objection to Mr. Spickler's questioning about the emotional breakdown. "[T]hat was
irrelevant evidence and should have been excluded." EH Tr. p. 269, ln. 7-11. He also noted that
the reference in closing argument was prejudicial to Mr. Grove because it was "the only evidence
that they have, in essence, that there was some reason why [the alleged event] occurred." EH Tr.
p. 267, ln. 15.
Here, the prosecutor committed multiple instances of misconduct during closing and
\_

rebuttal argument. Yet, with one notable exception, defense counsel did not object to any of it.
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Mr. Parnes' opinion was that counsel's performance during closing and rebuttal arguments when
considered in totality did not meet reasonable professional standards. EH Tr. p. 273, In. 1-3.
That is clearly the case. Indeed, the state did not present any evidence to contradict Mr. Parnes'
opinion on that prong of the Strickland test.
Defense counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial because, had proper objections
been made, the jury would not have been misled by the prosecutor about the defense position
regarding when the brain injury occurred. It would not have heard "evidence" from the
prosecutor about an alleged widespread problem of care givers killing infants or heard argument
about how horrible it was to take Kyler's body apart during the autopsy, arguments which aimed
to appeal to the jury's passions rather than focusing it on the evidence and jury instructions.
With a proper objection, it would not have heard the prosecutor undermine the state's burden of
proofand the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; nor would it have heard the -

- ·-- .

state's insinuation that it acceptable to convict Mr. Grove even if the evidence did not support
such a verdict because "we don't want to let a murderer go free." Finally, had an objection been
made, the jury would not have heard Mr. Grove's testimony about his "emotional breakdown"
during trial and the prosecutor would not have been able to use that testimony to establish an
reason why Mr. Grove would have committed the offense when it had no other explanation.
Had the jury not been exposed to such improper argument, there was a reasonable probability of
a different result.
Consequently, relief should be granted on this basis alone.

E. Cumulative Prejudicial Effect of the Totality of the Deficient Performance
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court need not look to each
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~···~··::example of deficient performance and determine whether it was prejudicial. Instead, the Court
should consider all the deficient performance and then determine whether the cumulative effect
was prejudicial. See, Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P.2d 910, 917 (Ct. App. 1996)
and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198, 206 (Ct. App:1994). As the Ninth Circuit
has explained, "Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to see whether their
cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. They are, in other
words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel." Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003).
As set forth above, there is a reasonable probability of a different result had defense
counsel's performance not been deficient. Highly prejudicial evidence would have been
excluded;additional exculpatory defense evidence would have been presented by Dr. Arden.and
Dr. Arden wotild not have:been impeached with irrelevant matters, Mr. Grove would hav.e had a- - · ---,.-0

jury trial with 12 jurors who had heard all the evidence presented (or a mistrial), and egregious
prosecutorial misconduct would have been prevented or resulted in a mistrial. This is more than
a sufficient showing of prejudice under Strickland.

III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons above, this Court should grant the petition, vacate the judgment and
sentence in the criminal case, release Mr. Grove on his own recognizance pending further
proceedings, and order that a new trial be held within a reasonable amount of time.
d

this~l
bw& ~-

~--=-~,__..Alff-·__,
Deborah Whipple
Attorneys for Stacey Grove

of April, 2015.

Dennis Benjamin

34- PETITIONER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

514

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on ApriC2$, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be:

Kmailed
hand delivered

faxed
to:

Jessica Lorello
Kenneth Jorgensen
Deputy Attorneys General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

35- PETITIONER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

515

<~·:;'\

,: . --:--~--.

·::~i:·

1382

1

somebody who stayed that way for a week.

2

in the literature if there's an example of somebody who

3

stayed in that condition for a long,

4

you know, depending upon what you mean by long time,

5

several days at a time, yes,
Q.

6

7

long time.

But,

I've seen that many times.

Doctor, why did you resign your position in

Washington DC?
A.

8

9

I don't know

DC,

I was under pressure because I came to Washington

you said yourself,

from the fat into the -- or the

10

frying pan into the fire, which was true.

11

place that was horribly dysfunctional.

12

known not only in the forensic community, but actually

13

more broadly, that that agency was pretty much in chao.s:,

14

had been for close to 20 years.

15

revitalize it.

16

I came to a

It was very well

And I came in to try to

I was very tough in enforcing standards,

17

enforcing ruies, trying to create an agency that worked

18

much better.

19

unhappy, and they got together and decided to make all

20

kinds of allegations about me and said that I did all

21

kinds of terrible things and harassed them and so on and

22

so forth.

23

Along the way, I made a bunch of people

In the course of that, my position to leave that

24

agency became untenable.

25

mayorts office really wasn't going to back me at that

There was publicity.

EXHIBIT_A_

The
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1

point, and so it was clear I couldn't possibly lead this

2

agency with people making all kinds of wild allegations.

3

At that point, and under pressure from the government,

4

resigned my position.

5

Q.

Now, you're familiar,

obviously, with the

6

report -- the Final Report of Inspection of the Office

7

of the Chief Medical Examiner conducted by the District

8

of Columbia Office of the Inspector General?

9

A.

Yes,

10

Q.

And without going into a ton of detail on that,

sir.

11

that report aacused you of gross mismanagement.

12

I'm going to as fair as I

13

government-€mployee-myself,

14

enough money to do what needs to be done,

15

easy to sit on the outside and tak~ potshots wi~hout

16

looking at the fiscal realities or the political

17

realities.

18

I

Now,

can to you, because being a
I

know that there's never
and it's very

-

And I'm going to grant you that.

But I'm just going to ask you,

this report had

19

approximately 84 recommendations for changes, and you

20

agreed with about 80 of them -- or 80 percent of them in

21

your -- when you were given an opportunity to respond.

22

One of the things~- and the reason I bring this up is

23

in y~ur discussion with the jury this morning about your

24

involvement in various child abuse things,

25

the DC Child Fatality Review Board.

you mentioned

That was one of the
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1

things that they were critical of you about, was it not,

2

not attending those meetings?
A.

3

At some point late in my tenure,

I could not

4

possibly attend as many of those meetings as I wanted

5

to.

6

that I brought in had moved on to other jobs in other

7

places.

8

lot of bad times with me,

and they chose to move on to

9

other opportunities.

I was short probably the two

I had at that point -- most of the hand-picked team

They had withstood a lot of tough service and a

So,

10

most important positions in my administrative team, my

11

executive team.

12

Other than all the other generalities you were

13

-talking about ;:---·what's .c__fiscal reality, what's political

14

reality,

15

the agency.

16

very important critical positions of the people who were

17

closest to me on the executive team.

18

more things happening.and more demands,

19

of fact,

20

stop supporting that Fatality Review Committee.

21

didn't stop supplying them with records and information

22

and data.

23

i t had become more and more difficult to manage
1nd I wasn't able to backfill some of those

And as a result of
yes, as a matter

I missed a number of those meetings.

As a matter of fact,

I didn't
We

I think one of the other

24

recommendations or accusations in that report has to do

25

with not providing them with adequate facilities, which
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1

is really nonsense.

We took them into the Medical

2

Examiner's Office.

3

regulatory change to make them a part of the office

4

because they had no home; they had no agency that

5

actually sponsored them for a period of time.

6

them space.

7

with, you know, the place to work and the materials with

8

which to work.

9

wanted and not everything worked perfectly, which is

We tried to make statutory change or

We gave them computers.

We gave

We provided them

And they didn't get everything they

10

true in general of what happened in government when I

11

was there.

12

Not everything worked perfectly.

And so, under the -- under the strains of not

13

being able to· be i-n three,i,)laces at on.ce,

14

number of meetings,

15

in the report.

16

said things about not providing them with support, which

17

I really don't ag~ee with.

18

Q.

and they correctly identified that

No denying that.

Certainly.

I missed a

And I think they also

I understand there's always two sides

19

to every story.

20

though, a backlog of over 1300 autopsy reports, an

21

accumulation of 189 bodies, some of which went back to

22

2000.

23

correct?

24

A.

25

There were some statistical problems,

There was just not a good situation;

Well,

is that

it depends upon how you want to define not

a good situation.

There were clearly some serious
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1

problems that were still ongoing at the time that I

2

left.

3

said, I'm the agency director.

4

responsibility.

5

And I said -- when I responded to that report, I
I take ultimate

Now, in reality, there are other forces at work,

6

both within the agency and within the government in

7

general, so that I mean, I couldn't possibly do every

8

single thing myself.

9

former chief of the agency for the problems.

But I take responsible as the
Some of

10

those were problems that were very serious, and I wish I

11

could say that I fixed them.

12

run trying to fix an agency that had been in the toilet

· - 13

for 20 years.

I had about a five-year

Th·ey hadn't had a real chi-ef medical

14

examiner who did the job and understood the job for

15

about 20 years.

16

In fact,

somebody else in my organization,

in the

17

National Association of Medical Examiners, publicly

18

posted after they

19

tenure of a chief medical examiner in the District of

20

Columbia for the past 20 some odd years had been

21

3.75 years.

22

percent over average.

23

after I went that the average

And I made five-and-a-half,

so I'm 149

But yes, there are some serious problems, and

24

those are things that I can't deny and that I wouldn't

25

try to deny.

But we were in the midst of -- we had made
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1

and were in the midst of making substantial improvements

2

in the agency, and I'm proud of the improvements that I

3

did make.

4

Q.

Now, you made mention, Doctor, of some wild

5

accusations and so forth.

And, again, without getting

6

into a huge amount of detail, unless you wish to, those

7

included allegations of sex~al harassment, sexual

8

discrimination, and unlawful retaliation by five medical

9

examiners, all women, and allegations of racial

10

discrimination in the training of black students and

11

residents.

12

investigated?

Now, those.are allegations.

Were they

13

A.

Yes, sir.

14

Q.

And were they investigated by the Office of

15

Corporation Counsel

16

A.

Yes, sir.

17

Q.

-- for Washington DC --

18

A.

Yes, sir.

19

Q.

-- for the District of DC?

20
21
22
- : . - ~-:-:,..:_··4- :

And were they

sustained?
A.

Well, there was some talk in the investigation

that the investigator may ~ave believed that some of
- ·-. - - - ... ---- ....

·-- ... -----~~"!" --: ·.. .:.:->--~·:-·:--.:::~.--""~!

• ; _ --~·-·;· . . _.:..::.,:.. .. _·::.~:--.:~-- : .:...
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23

these things happened.

24

sustained in the sense that the deciding official never

25

made a decision.

They were never actually

This was not a process that played
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There was no due process hearing.

I never had a

1

out.

2

chance to present a defense.

3

adjudicated by any body, deciding official or otherwise.

4

I was never sanctioned.

None of these was ever

I was never disciplined.

I did resign under pressure.

5

I wasn't fired.

I

6

resigned under pressure.

And they probably would have

7

moved to remove me had I not resigned.

8

also were motivated enough to pay me about a $70,000

9

settlement after I left to avoid me suing them over this
So, I don't think it's fair to say that

10

whole issue.

11

any of them were sustained.

12

Q.

14

Fair enough.
MR. SPICKLER:

13

That's all I have, Your

Honor.

15

THE COURT:

16

Mr. Chapman, redirect?

17

MR. CHAPMAN:

20

Thank you, Mr. Spickler.

Thank you, Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

18

19

By the way, they

BY MR. CHAPMAN:
Q.

We've been out here a long time, and I'm going to

21

be very, very brief, okay?

22

Prosecutor asked you or answers that you've given that

23

in any way changes the opinions you provided to this

24

jury under direct examination?

25

A.

Is there anything that the

No, sir.
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CASE NO. CV 2012-01798
RESPONDENT'S POSTEVIDENTIARY HEARING
CLOSING ARGUMENT

The State of Idaho, by and through Jessica M. Lorello and Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
Attorneys General and Special Prosecuting Attorneys for Nez Perce County, hereby submit the
state's post-evidentiary hearing closing argument.
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BACKGROUND
In January 2007, a grand jury indicted Petitioner Stacey Grove on one count of firstdegree murder for the death ofK.M. (Exhibit A (#36211 R., p.13).) Following a seven-day trial,
a jury convicted Grove of that offense. (Exhibit A (#36211 R., p.210).) Grovewas.-repres.ente.cL .,,.
at trial by Scott Chapman. (E.H. Tr., p.186, Ls.22-24.) Grove unsuccessfully challenged his
conviction on appeal. Grove v. State, 151 Idaho 483,259 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2011).
On September 7, 2012, Grove, with the assistance of coun~el, filed a post-conviction
petition raising several claims. (Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.) Grove filed an
amended petition on January 2, 2013. (Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
("Amended Petition").) Both Grove and the state filed motions for summary dismissal 1; the
Court denied Grove's motion and granted the state's motion, in part, and denied it in part.
(Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition ("Summary Dismissal Order"), filed
July 11, 2013.) Grove filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court decied, and sought an
interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted, but which the Idaho Supreme Court denied. The
Court thereafter scheduled Grove's non-dismissed claims for an evidentiary hearing.

In its

Summary Dismissal Order, the Court identified the following claims that would be considered at
the evidentiary hearing, which was held March 24-25, 2015:

(1)

"Whether counsel's

performance was deficient during direct and cross-examination of [Grove]"; (2) "Whether
counsel was deficient during the direct and cross-examination of Dr. Arden" with respect to the
microscopic slides of tissue taken from K.M. and with respect to the prosecutor's impeachment
of Dr. Arden; (3) "Whether counsel was deficient for failing to move for a mistrial because
jurors may have been sleeping during the presentation of testimony"; and (4) "Whether defense

1 Undersigned

counsel were not appointed until after summary dismissal proceedings.
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counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient." (Summary Dismissal Order,
pp.38-39.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the Court set a briefing schedule for closing
arguments .
..;,_.;~-· .,·.,.-_,,..,._.-:_.:.,._--~ ,_ ----

I.
Grove Has Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice In Relation To Trial
Counsel's Performance Regarding Grove's Testimony
A.

Introduction
In his Amended Petition, Grove raised three claims relating to counsel's performance

during Grove's direct examination and cross examination.

First, Grove alleged "[d]efense

counsel's performance was deficient when he failed to object to the prosecutor asking Mr. Grove
when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription 'was a result of [his] emotional
state Friday.'" (Amended Petition, p.32, 86.)
Second, Grove alleged "counsel was deficient because he introduced evidence in the
direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son
Alex" and claimed "[t]his evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine as it is
both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence." (Amended Petition, p.33 ,, 91-91.1.)
Third, Grove alleged "counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to
the prosecutor questioning Mr. Grove about the fact that he was behind on child support" and
claimed "[t]his evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine as it is both
irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence." (Amended Petition, pp.33-34,

~

92, 92.1.)

Grove failed to meet his burden of proof in relation to any of these allegations.
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B.

Grove Failed To- Meet His Burden Of Proving Counsel Was Ineffective During The
Direct Or Cross-Examination Of Grove
Grove's first claim relating to counsel's performance during Grove's cross-examination

is based on a situation that arose at trial where Grove was unable to testify on the date counsel
originally planned to have him testify. Following an in-chambers discussion, the Court invited
defense counsel to explain the situation on the record, which he did, stating:
... [A]s we discussed in chambers, based upon my observations and interactions
with my client this morning, it became apparent to me that, for whatever reason,
he was going to be unable to proceed today.
We had originally anticipated his testimony this morning. And based
upon what I would -- for lack of a better term, and I'm not a physician or anything
of that nature, but an unraveling due to a culmination of stress and the pressures
involved with this, he would be -- was to such a state that he would have been
unable to testify. And, in my opinion, was unable -- or at least borderline unable,
or would have been in that state, to assist me in the defense.
We had a full schedule for today, and we had fully anticipated proceeding
on that basis. But based upon lengthy discussions with him, and without waving
[sic] any attorney/client privilege, I'll give the Court one example. In an effort to
see where we were going to go with this, I started asking him fairly simple
straightforward questions, as we would on the stand, like his name and date of
birth. And when I asked him his address, he could not tell me his address.
I've been at this for 23-plus years. I've never run into this before. It's
with reluctance that I do this, but I've asked the Court for -- to continue the trial
until Monday morning to enable us to seek medical help and get things put back
together so that we could proceed.
. . . And on that basis, would ask the Court to continue this matter until
Monday morning.
(Trial Tr.2, Vol. II, p.1061, L.18-p.1062, L.25.)
The state objected to.the request for a continuance, explaining:

2

The trial transcripts from the underlying criminal case were admitted as Exhibit B at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. (E.H. Tr., p.6, Ls.23-24.) For ease of reference, the state will
refer to those transcripts as "Trial Tr." and by volume number.
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Number one, despite Counsel's fears of the defendant being borderline unable to
assist in his defense, there's been no adjudication of such a condition. However,
having said that, I accept Mr. Chapman's explanation to the Court in its entirety
as being true.
Secondly, a trial is an organic process. It flows from the beginning to the
end in a predictable manner .. And it is predictable that after a defendant heariuiay
after day of incriminating evidence, that the defendant would feel some stress and
some emotional reaction.
But in this case, it's particularly important because it's the State's
position, as it has been all along, that this defendant had an emotional meltdown
on the morning that the injuries were inflicted on this child. And I believe the
jury should be entitled to observe his demeanor as an additional factor to be
weighed in deciding the facts of this case.
While I understand that Defense Counsel, as well as the Prosecution,
designs their case in such a way as to have witnesses come in in a certain order, it
-- it appears to me if your lead witness is unavailable, he could at least sit here and
observe the other testimony.
And lastly, as a final alternative to granting this condition, the defendant
could be called to the stand; and if the fears that Mr. Chapman had expressed, in
fact, tum out to become reality, the Court could then grant the continuance.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1063, L.7-p.1064, L.10.)
The Court granted defense counsel's request for a continuance and informed the parties
that it was "simply going to tell the jurors that an unforeseen medical situation has arisen
affecting our ability to proceed today" and that the trial would ''resume Monday morning" (Trial
Tr., Vol. II, p.1064, L.18 - p.1066, L.6.) The Court so advised the jury. (Trial Tr., Vol. II,
p.1066, L.20-p.1067, L.7.)
When the trial resumed on Monday, defense counsel's first witness was Grove. (Trial
Tr., Vol. II, p.1069, Ls.22-25.) During direct examination, Grove discussed his background and
how he met K.M.'s mother, Lisa, and his relationship with Lisa, K.M., and Lisa's daug];lt~r(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1070, L.18 - p.1073, L.22.) Grove also explained his relationship with his
biological son, Alex. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1073, L.23-p.1074, L.24.) Grove then testified about

RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING CLOSING ARGUMENT - 5
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the days and events leading up to K.M. 's death, and events after K.M. 's death. (Trial Tr., Vol. II,
pp.1074-1112.)
Near the end of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Grove, the prosecutor inquired
-- ~-:c-whether Grove was ~:currently on any medications.:' (Tri.alTr.,Vol. II.., p,.ll2Q,_J.,~.6~7.)_GrovX:,.:.~, ,~-answered that he was taking Ativan, and then the following exchange occurred:
Q. And when was that prescribed for you?
A. Friday.
Q. And that was the result of your emotional state Friday?
A. Just -- yeah. I mean, it's -- it's just lack of sleep. It's just the whole thing. I
mean, you know, this is pretty ...

Q. Now, is this -- what effect does this Ativan have on your ability to testify?
A. I don't believe anything. It just helped me get some sleep. Like I said,· 1 was
exhausted.

Q. So, you're okay -- you're okaytoday, and your -A. I feel perfectly fine.

Q. -- your memory is not affected by any -A. No, sir.
Q. -- medications?
A. No, sir.

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1120, Ls.9-25.)
"To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that
the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency." Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, _ , 344 P.3d 919, 925 (Ct. App. 2015). It is
well-established that an attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
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below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110
Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243,

"requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable.". Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "Unless a
defendant makes both showings, [deficient performance and prejudice], it cannot be said that the
conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
unreliable." Id. Other bedrock principles governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Stricklang, are worth repeating:
In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be
whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.
Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards
and the like ... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only
guides. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily
talce account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range
of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence
of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical
decisions. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could
distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the
defendant's cause. Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of
the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation,
although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The
purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is
all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular
act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects
of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct,
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of
the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING CLOSING ARGUMENT - 7
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professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound
trial strategy. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any
given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a
particular client the same way.
,.:·-< -_ The availability ef-intru.sive-p0st-trial inquiry into attorney performanc~:.or ..
of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of
ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant
would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's
unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could
be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for
acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of
defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the
trust between attorney and client.

.·-.,;.

---·--, --·-- .

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (citations and quotations omitted).
Application of the correct legal standards shows Grove has failed to establish deficient
performance, much less prejudice, in relation to defense counsel's failure to object to the
prosecutor's inquiry into Grove's medication use at the time Grove testified. In support of his
claim that counsel's lack of an· objection was deficient, Grove relies on Andrew Parnes' 3 opinion

that "the evidence was irrelevant." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.9.) Mr. Parnes' opinion
on the subject falls far short of establishing the testimony was irrelevant as a matter of law.
Indeed, it is unclear why a witness's ability to perceive and recall events would not be relevant
The testimony could also be relevant in relation to Grove's demeanor at the time he testified, and

Grove attempts to bolster Mr. Parnes' testimony by describing him as a "highly credible
witness" and noting Mr. Parnes has "been an attorney for 37 years practicing criminal defense"
and "was awarded a doctorate from Stanford and a law degree from UC-Berkeley, both world
class universities." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.5.) While Mr. Parnes may be a fine
attorney with degrees from well-known educational institutions, this does not mean that the
· decisions Mr; Parnes thinks he would have made based on his limited review C?f th<? record are
the only constitutionally permissible decisions. Indeed, such a conclusion would be contrary to
the Strickland standard. Mr. Chapman, having been an attorney for 30 years, during which time
he handled an estimated 500 plus criminal cases, with approximately 20 jury trials, is certainly
well-qualified, knowledgeable regarding the law, capable of making strategic and tactical
decisions, and a highly credible witness as well. (E.H. Tr., p.229, L.19-p.230, L.17.)
3
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his emotional state, as compared to what his demeanor may have been in relation to K.M. when
Grove was alone with him before he became unresponsive, was hospitalized, and died. As the
prosecutor noted in objecting to the continuance that was required due to Grove's condition
· ·-·--·c--.· ·--- ··-·

when~tfral·-counsel requested-the--eontinuance, the-,state~s,.theory was. that_,µrQY-~-:-~~h!Ml_an_ -·-- ______ .....~ _
emotional meltdown on the morning that the injuries were inflicted on this child," and the jury
was "entitled to observe his demeanor as an additional factor to be weighed in deciding the facts
of this case."
Even if the relevance of the testimony was debatable, Grove did not prove that trial
counsel's decision not to object was constitutionally deficient. As the Idaho Supreme Court
recently explained, "In our view, counsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination,
and lack of objection.to testimonyfalL within the area of ta9tic~l, or stra.,tegic, decisions .... "
State v. Abdullah, _Idaho_, _P.3d_, 2015 WL 856787, *112 (2015). Such tactical or
strategic decisions "wilr not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief
under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted
from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or some other shortcomings capable
of objective review." Id. That Mr. Parnes believes he would have objected does not mean Mr.
Chapman was deficient for making a different decision. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("There
are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.").
Grove has also failed to prove that Mr. Chapman's failure to object to the prosecutor's
inquiry about Grove's use of Ativan was an error "so serious as to deprive [Grove] of a fair
trial." Strickland, 668 U.S. at 687. This case did not turn on whether Grove started taking
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Ativan three days-before he testified in order to help him sleep. The jury's knowledge of that fact does not render its guilty verdict unreliable.

C.
Grove Failed To Meet His Burden Of Proving Counsel Was Ineffective In Relation To
··· - ---- -~--=,~~~ec:,--,-'The-Testimony-About Gr-eve's Relationshli:?c-Witb: His BiologicaLSon,Jncluding_ That _
Grove Had Not Been Paying Child Support
On direct examination, Grove testified that he had a "great" relationship with K.M. and
K.M.'s sister. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1073, Ls.1-2.) Following that, trial counsel inquired about
Grove's relationship with his biological son. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1073, L.23 - p.1074, L.4.)
Grove explained that it was a "complicated situation," but described his son as a "great boy."
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1074, Ls.5-6.) Grove, however, had a "rocky relationship" with his son's
mother. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1074, Ls.7-11.) Grove believed the strained relationship with his
-

-

--

-·

.

---

son's mother made the situation with his son "bard" and he thought it caused his son "stress"
when Grove was seeing him. (Trial Tr.,_Vol. II, p.1074, Ls.12-17.) As a result, Grove thought it
"would be best if [he] removed [himself] from the situation until [his son] was old enough to be
able to ... talk with him about what was going on." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1074, Ls.16-24.)
Grove characterizes this testimony as the presentation of a "bad relationship" between
Grove and his son. (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.3.) To the contrary, the testimony was
simply that Grove did not have an active relationship with his biological son, not that he had a
"bad" one. It was not deficient for counsel to inquire into this area given that the defense clearly
wanted to portray Grove as a caring father-figure to K.M. and his sister - a reasonable strategy
under the circumstances of this case. The state's obvious response to that would have been to
ask about Grove's relationship with his biological son. It is not an unreasonable tactical decision
for the defense to ask the question first. Grove has failed to articulate any basis for this Court to
conclude that the line of questioning was based on a lack of preparation, ignorance of the law, or
RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING CLOSING ARGUMENT- 10
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some -other objective shortcoming. Rather, Grove implies that the line of questioning was an
"accident," but offers no evidence to support such a claim. (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.3.)
Because Mr. Chapman was not deficient for inquiring into Grove's relationship with his
,-;_,;o.c~·--:-s._c---,·biofogica-l: son;-there was no-basis-forcounsel:.te-ohject-tothe prosec.utor-'s,inqµicy __onthe.sam.e _______ .. _
subject.

As for counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's specific question on cross-

examination regarding Grove not paying child support, a topic not directly addressed on direct,
Grove claims ''this question was not relevant to any issue at trial and an objection to it would
have been sustained." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.4.) Whether an objection would have
been sustained does not, however, resolve whether Grove has met his burden of proving
constitutional deficiency. Grove has not. Just because Mr. Chapman did not object does not
mean the decision was not strategic or :tactical, based on _igngrance of the law, _ or lack of
preparation. As noted, "counsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack of
objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions." Abdullah, 2015
WL 856787, *112. Mr. Chapman's testimony regarding the child support question illustrates
this point. Mr. Chapman indicated that, to the best of his recollection, he would not object in
order to avoid ''mak[ing] it any bigger than it is." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.4 (quoting
E.H. Tr., p.189, Ls.3-5).) Nevertheless, Grove contends "[t]his is not evidence of a strategic
decision on defense counsel's part" because he "qualifie[d] his answer with 'I guess' and- 'best as
I can recollect."'

(Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.4.)

Grove's contention reveals a

misunderstanding of the applicable presumption and his burden. The presumption is that the
decision was strategic or tactical and it is Grove's burden to overcome that presumption. That
Mr. Chapman had to speculate about his thought process behind not objecting to a question
asked during a trial that took place nearly seven years ago does not overcome the presumption

RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING CLOSING ARGUMENT - 11

533

and neither the state nor Mr. Chapman were required to prove the underlying reasons for every
single choice trial counsel made during trial.
In addition to his failure to meet his burden of proving deficient performance with respect
0-:~,<:---~·'., .. ,,,;,io ·the ··testimony· elicited

about ,Gt.'eve?-eS: -relationship with hi&:son-and his .failure-to pay. .child -...
0

support, Grove has failed to prove resulting prejudice. In fact, Grove's prejudice argument on
this issue is unclear. It appears Grove may be contending that it was prejudicial because it
"undermine[d] the defense case which 'was based on Mr. Grove's credibility' and the 'scientific
evidence. "'4 (Petitioner's Closing Argument, pp.4-5.) Grove, however, does not explain how
this is so. The fact that Grove made the decision not to have an active relationship with his
biological son because he thought that decision was in his son's best interest has no bearing on
his credibility and has absolutely nothingto do with the "scientific evid~nce." The same is true
regarding his lack of child support payments. There is no reasonable probability that the jury
.. .

~

'

would have reached a different result in this case if it had never heard evidence that· Grove was · ·
not actively paying child support and did not maintain a relationship with his biological son.
Grove failed to meet his burden of proving otherwise.

II.
Grove Has Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice For Not Supplying The
Iron-Stained Slides To Dr. Arden
A.

Introduction
Grove claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to supply iron-stained slides to

Dr. Arden prior to trial. (Amended Petition, pp.35-37,, 97.) Specifically, he alleged Dr. Arden
"requested ... all existing microscopic slides for examination prior to trial" (Amended Petition,

4

Grove also complains that the prosecutor committed misconduct ''when he raised the child
support issue."
(Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.6.) Any independent prosecutorial
misconduct claim is not properly before the Court. (See Summary Dismissal Order, pp.38-39.)
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p:3s,-,r 97.1), but Mr. Chapman "did not comply with that request" (id. at p.35,-~ 97.l(a)), and
had the slides been supplied, Dr. Arden "could have testified that

had been injured at some

much earlier time or times" (id at p.37, ,r 97.1(1)).
--.. --- ---Counsel ·must conduct-a·-~'-reasonabls--investigation'..''-'-for- ·potential exculpatory _evidence,
but failure to discover additional exculpatory evidence is not unreasonable unless "the known
evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further." Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho
396, 412-13, 327 P.3d 372, 388-89 (Ct. App. 2013).
Grove's claim fails because Dr. Arden testified at trial that he had been supplied with all
the information he needed to form opinions about the case and that Mr. Chapman and the
prosecution had provided everything he had requested.

The evidence establishes that Mr.

-- Chapman in fact conducted an adequatefactual investigation by providing his expert with all_Jh~
information his expert requested, and thus did not render deficient performance. Furthermore,
there was no prejudice because the post-conviction examination of the iron slides produced
evidence with no actual exculpatory value.

B.

Grove Has Failed To Prove Deficient Performance Because The Evidence Shows That
Mr. Chapman In Fact Provided Dr. Arden With All The Materials Dr. Arden Needed Or
Requested For Review Of This Case
At the trial Dr. Arden testified as follows:
Q. Did you feel like there was any information that you needed in order to form
opinions about this that was not provided to you?
A. No, sir. And, in fact, I will tell you that along the course of reviewing
materials, one of the things that I felt I needed was the recuts of the slides. They
didn't come initially. And so, at that point, I requested them of you, and you and
the state arranged for them to be.provided. _So, what I requested I was given.
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- (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1252, 1.25 - p.1253, L.9 (emphasis added).) Dr. Arden's trial testimony
conclusively establishes that he was provided all of the materials he "needed to form opinions"
about the case and that "what [he] requested [he] was given."
···---· ---- · ·· At-the evidentiary- ··kea:ring-Dr,··:Arden · stat,ed,.,.tb.atA1e,requested ''.alLof the
slides that were done pursuant to this autopsy." (E.H. Tr., p.133, 1.24 - p.134, L.11.) When
asked about "when he testified at the criminal trial" that he had "received all the information [he]
needed to form opinions about that case," Dr. Arden answered that his trial testimony was only
"correct insofar as I had received everything I needed to support the opinions that I was prepared
to render, that I was prepared to give under oath." (E.H. Tr., p.138, Ls.14-23.)
Dr. Arden's attempt to qualify the testimony he gave at trial is unpersuasive. When
~asked if''there was any:information that [he.]_ne.eded in order toform QPinions about this [case]___
that was not provided to [him]" he unqualifiedly answered, "No." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1252,
L.25 - p.1253, L.3.) Dr. Arden further testified that, ''what [he] requested, [he] was given."
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1253, Ls.8-9.) He did not testify at trial that he "received everything [he]
needed to support the opinions that [he] was prepared to render" but did not receive enough
information to make a thorough review of the case and that he had requested additional materials
that had not been supplied. Any finding that Dr. Arden requested additional information he felt
was necessary to thoroughly review the case and it was not provided to him would require a
conclusion that Dr. Arden was deliberately deceptive in his trial testimony.
The evidence in this case shows that Mr. Chapman arranged for Dr. Arden to be supplied
with all of the materials Dr. Arden requested and felt he needed. He was not required to conduct
further investigation into whether supplying additional, unrequested materials might help the
defense. Grove has therefore failed to prove deficient performance.
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Grove Has Failed To Prove Prejudice Because Dr. Arden'-s Testimony About Prior.
Healed Injuries Has Little. If Any. Probative Value .
Grove has also failed to prove prejudice. Dr. Arden's discovery of prior, healed injuries

through his examination of the iron-stained slides is not exculpatory evidence.
Dr. Arden testified that when he examined the iron-stained slides for the post-conviction
action he discovered evidence of healed injuries in one of K.M.' s eyes, his back, and the
mesentery in his abdomen that were "substantially older" than the injuries that killed K.M.

CE:&

E.H. Tr., p.162, L.19 - p.164, L.7; p.166, Ls.12-19; p.166, L.21 - p.169, L.10; p.173, L.20 p.177, L.13.) He also testified that he could detect those injuries in the standard "H and E"
stained slides, which he had examined prior to trial. (E.H. Tr., p.135, Ls.14-21; p.165, Ls.5-11;
p.174, L.14 - p.175, L.2.) Dr. Arden testified in post-conviction that seeing the iron-stained
-·
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slides did not "change[] any of the opinions [Dr. Arden] expressed;' at trial, but did cause him to
"exp~d[] [his] opinion to include some injuries of greater age." (E.H. Tr., P·!_72, Ls.5-12; see
also p.177, Ls.4-13.)
The trial transcript, however, reveals that Dr. Arden testified that he had observed injuries
of more than a week old and used those observations to form his opinions. (Trial Tr., Vol. II,
p.1302, L.15 - p.1304, L.1 (discussing older, healed injuries); p.1308, L.16 - p.1309, L.11
(discussing older injuries in context of whether

would have shown severe symptoms);

p.1340, Ls.16-24 (acknowledging that his findings of prior injuries were disclosed in pre-trial
discovery); p.1363, Ls.2-20 (discussing older injuries with scarring).) The record does not
establish that Dr. Arden made any truly new findings based on his review of the iron-stained
slides.
Moreover, the existence of older injuries does not call the verdict into question. Grove
contends this testimony "would have effectively countered Dr. Hunter's and Dr. Harper's 'in my
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experience' claims that [K.M.] could not have been active after receiving the injuries that
resulted in his death." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p. 19 (internal quote original).) The
evidence does not support this argument.
Dr. Hunter testified that . K.M.'s,abdominaUnjuries (exclusive of brain injuries),W,Q11Jd..._,,_._ ..have produced "absolute agony ... an incredible amount of pain." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.872, Ls.115.) He further testified that, to his knowledge and in his experience, the severe brain injuries
suffered by K.M. would have ."produc[ed] immediate symptoms" from "severe headache and
confusion to unconsciousness," with unconsciousness being more likely. (Trial Tr., Vol. II,
p.875, Ls.2-22.) Dr. Hunter testified that it was "virtually impossible" that K.M. engaged in
activities such as playing, laughing, climbing, and getting himself pudding after being injured.

- - _(Trial TL, \foLII,_p.8}_6,_Ls,7-20.)_ Dr. Rarp~r testified that K.M.'sabdominal and brain injuries ~·· ~
would have caused K.M. to be "immediately" and "obviously critically ill," including being
· "unconscious or semi-conscious," and were inconsistent with K.M. 's described activities prior to
being left with Grove. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1033, L.12-p.1037, L.24.)
Grove does not explain how Dr. Arden's testimony about previously undetected older
injuries would have countered these medical opinions. Grove has presented no evidence that the
prior, healed injuries were significant in scope or severity. By definition they were less severe

than the fatal injuries Dr. Hunter and Dr. Harper testified were inconsistent with K.M.'s
described activities before being left in Grove's care. Moreover, there is no evidence that K.M.
was not symptomatic of having suffered some form of injury in the weeks or months prior to his
death. Finally, because Dr. Arden detected no additional brain injuries the testimony related to
the physical effects of that ultimately fatal injury are completely unimpeached, even under
Grove's theory.
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Evidence that K.M. suffered previous injuries of unknown severity in his back, eye, and
mesentery in no way impeaches the testimony about the pain and other physical manifestations
that would have been caused by infliction of the ultimately fatal injuries to his abdomen and
brain~ ··-6mve -:-has-· failed- to establish-,that--fuis-t0stimony -is .. even .relevant,.-much ,l~$_-J:p.atjts., _.,... ,
presentation at trial would probably have produced a different result. He has therefore failed to
prove prejudice.

III.
Grove Has Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Regarding The Impeachment Of
Dr. Arden
A.

Introduction
Grove alleged that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to

·--·-··----

--

-----·---··--·--·--·

-----

--·

---·-·

-

··-

------ -----

·- ·-

··-

object to the prosecutor attempting to impeach Dr. Arden with alleged 'gross mismanagement'
when he was the Medical Examiner in the District court Columbia" and "failing to attempt to
rehabilitate Dr. Arden on re-direct examination."

(Amended Petition, pp.32-33, ~~ 87-88. 5)

Grove has failed to prove his claims under the applicable legal standards.
B.

Grove Has Failed To Prove Deficient Performance
During direct examination, Dr. Arden described a "20-year career of government

employment for public service working for four different medical examiner offices" after
completing his education. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1242, Ls.14-22.) He "first worked in the Office

5

In his closing argument Grove also claims counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to
object "to the impeachment of Dr. Arden as being on a special mission." (Petitioner's Closing
Argument, p. 17.) Grove did not allege this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his
Amended Petition. (See generally Amended Petition; see also Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.
11 (listing claims made in Amended Petition and not including claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel for not objecting to "special mission" impeachment). Because it was not pled, this claim
is not properly before this Court. Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765,777,331 P.3d 507,519 (2014)
(" An unpleaded issue not tried by either express or implied consent cannot be the basis for a
court's decision.").
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of the Medical Examiner for Suffolk County," New York. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1240, Ls.22-25.)
After two years in Suffolk County he "then went to Delaware, where [he] was an assistant
medical examiner for the state of Delaware for a three-years [sic] period." (Trial Tr., Vol. II,
-- -"-, '~-124-3;<Ls.3.-.5 .} He then-,work-ed -nine-years-in-the-Office of Chief Mediqal:Ex~mer.b:i New .
York City, first as a medical examiner, then as a deputy chief medical examiner supervising the
office covering one of the five burrows, and finally as First Deputy Chief Medical Examiner.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1243, L.5 - p.1244, L.4.) He then became the Chief Medical Examiner of
Washington, D.C., a position he left in October, 2003. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1244, Ls.5-10.)
After leaving government service he opened a private consulting practice "in the field of forensic
pathology and medicine." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1244, Ls.11-17.)
____ . ___ In~cross~examinatiOil the_prosecutor eJilllored _D.r. Arden's transition from government
employ to private consulting work. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1375 L.8 - p.1378, L.8.) The topics
included how fast he was able to grow his consulting business, why there is an apparent gap in
his work history, and why he had recently taken part-time work for a medical examiner's office.
(Id.) The prosecutor then asked, ''Doctor, why did you resign your position in Washington,
DC?" (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1382, Ls.6-7.) Dr. Arden testified that he took over a "dysfunctional"
office, tried to "revitalize it" by being "very tough in enforcing standards" which made "a bunch
of people unhappy" so they made "all kinds of allegations" and "said that [he] did all kinds of
terrible things and harassed them," so "under pressure from the government, [he] resigned [his]
position." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1382, L.8-p.1383, L.4.) The prosecutor then asked Dr. Arden a
series of questions based on the "Final Report of Inspection of the Office of the Chief Medical
.

-

Examiner conducted by the District of Columbia Office of the Inspector General" and an
investigation by the Office of Corporate Counsel for Washington DC. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1383,
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L.5 - p.1388, L.11.) Dr. Arden acknowledged that he resigned under pressure, but was not fired
and was paid $70,000 so that he would not sue. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1388, Ls.5-11.) Mr.
Chapman on re-direct asked if anything in cross examination had "chang[ed] the opinions [he]

.. - ,,._., ,·.·;{'Jo¥i4ed.to this jury und.er,.direcLexaminatio~ towhich Dr. Arden respo:p.~~.40:~~Q., liit,'', (Trjal ·_;:-~·- ·;,.- . c
Tr., Vol. II, p.1388, Ls.20-25.)
In closing arguments the prosecutor told the jury the evidence shows that Dr. Arden ''was
a well-paid public servant for many years" but "resigned his position under pressure." (Trial Tr.,
Vol. II, p.1428, Ls.20-23.) This resignation led to him making his living for the previous five
years as a "paid consultant." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1428, L.23 - p.1429, L.1.) The prosecutor
encouraged the jury, when deciding credibility, to consider whether the circumstances under
_whic11 ]2r, .Argeg left Qµblic. em__pl9yment and entered consultancy might have created a_ financial .. _
incentive to take less than clear-cut cases and provide testimony ultimately beneficial to the
defendants who hired him. (Trial Tr., Vol. U, p.1429, Ls.2-13.)
In closing arguments Mr. Chapman argued, "Don't let the Prosecutor fool you" with
argument about how Dr. Arden is a paid consultant, because the evidence established he was an
accomplished medical examiner. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1441, L.19 -p.1444, L.3.) He also argued
that although the circumstances under which Dr. Arden left the Washington, DC, medical
examiner's office were "less-than-ideal," they "were administrative things at best and have
nothing at all to do with his qualifications to render an opinion or the opinion he has rendered."
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1444, Ls.4-12.) He asserted the prosecutor's approach was "if you can't get
at the man's testimony, get at the man." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1444, Ls.13-16.) He asserted the
prosecutor wanted to "harp on" the resignation, which was political in nature, because he had
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nothing to-undercut Dr. Arden's integrity or his skills· and qualifications. (Trial Tr., Vol. II,
p.1444, Ls.16-24.)
The record from the underlying criminal case thus establishes that the prosecutor
-- -, .-,~. -"i,,-,--,attempted to impeach- -Dr. Arden-:with-evidence ...thaLhe had left ,hisjo;b

.a~iJ:P,~ heact rne9J9sfil.s .. -.,. . ;.. ._ ,,.

examiner in Washington, DC, involuntarily to start a consulting business, and that lead to a
reasonable inference of a financial motive to take consulting jobs in questionable cases and
testify favorably to defendants.

Counsel chose to respond to that tactic by arguing that the

circumstances of leaving the DC job and becoming a consultant did not affect Dr. Arden's
opinion in any way, and even suggested that the prosecutor's tactic was a sign of weakness in the
ability to attack the substance of that opinion.
__ ___ _ _ _ ___ Groye mesented noevidence that_ coUU§_el' s tactical choice to addressthe circumstances ___ _ __
of Dr. Arden leaving the DC job through argument was the result of objective shortcomings. In
fact, the evidence presented shows quite the opposite. When asked, Mr. Chapman testified that
he was aware of both the facts and the law6 related to the issue and tactically handled it the way
he did because he concluded the evidence related to Dr. Arden leaving the DC office did. not
undermine "Dr. Arden's opinion or his medical abilities and that the jurors would see that."
(E.H. Tr., p.204, L.8 - p.207, L.6.) He did testify in retrospect that presenting the evidence
himself to "pull the thorn" might have been a better tactical choice (E.H. Tr., p.207, L.7 -p.208,
L.13), but such "second guessing" does not show deficient performance, Abdull!:!h, 2015 WL
856787 at *112.

6

Mr. Chapman testified that evidence regarding Dr. Arden's forced departure from the DC
examiner job was not "relevant to his credibility as to his medical opinions" or the "credibility of
his medical testimony," and that it "could be" prejudicial. (E.H. Tr., p.205, Ls.1-13.) This
testimony was consistent with his closing argument to the jury. Mr. Chapman did not testify he
thought the evidence was irrelevant to all issues in the case, was unfairly prejudicial, or that it
was inadmissible.
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· While the trial transcript and Mr. Chapman's testimony support the presumption of
effective performance, the only evidence that actually supports a claim that trial counsel's
tactical decisions were objectively unreasonable is the testimony of Mr. Parnes. (Petitioner's

carrying Grove's burden of proof. Mr. Parnes opined that counsel should have objected because
he might have gotten a favorable ruling 7 and would have preserved the issue for appeal. (E.H.
Tr., p.256, L.19 - p.258, L.14.) While Mr. Parnes is entitled to make tactical choices in cases
where he is counsel, what tactical choices he would have made in this case is of little, if any,
relevance to whether Mr. Chapman's choices were based on an objective shortcoming such as
ignorance of the law or inadequate preparation.
_______ .. The. decisiQJl!LOf _whether. to ob~ctto admission _of evidence of the circumstances_ Dr.
Arden left the DC examiner's job; whether to present it in direct examination; whether to
rehabilitate in re-direct examination; or address it in closing argument (which is what counsel
ultimately elected to do), are all tactical decisions. Such decisions are second-guessed only if
based on an objective shortcoming such as ignorance of the law or inadequate preparation.
Because Grove presented no evidence of any objective shortcoming, he has failed to prove
deficient performance.

C.

Grove Has Failed To Prove Prejudice
To prove prejudice the petitioner must "establish by a preponderance of the evidence that

there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different." Abdullah, 2015 WL
856787, -*89. · Grove has failed to prove prejudice because the evidence in _ question was

7

The state does not believe Mr. Parnes' motion would have succeeded. The admissibility of the
cross-examination is addressed in the prejudice argument, below.
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admissible and, even if inadmissible would not have created a reasonable probability that the
result would have been different.
"Relevant evidence is generally admissible." State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 527, 532, 129

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Harvey, 142 Idaho
at 532, 129 P.3d at 1281 (citing I.R.E. 401). Evidence impeaching or corroborating a witness's
testimony i~ always relevant. See State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 540, 285 P.3d 348, 355 (Ct.
App. 2012) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)) ("Generally, 'Proof of bias is
almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has
might bear on the accuracy
and truth of a
. _historically been entitled to . assess.all evidence which'-·------- --··- - · - - · --..

. ..

'.

---·---·.·.

.·.·. -,--·--

..

-

~

-~--

witness' testimony."').
Dr. Arden's career path changed-rather dramatically a few years before trial, when he
went from an upwardly mobile career track working for government medical examiner offices to
running his own consulting business. The prosecutor explored that change from several angles,
including the change in practice of writing reports in every case as a medical examiner to writing
reports only if requested by a defense attorney (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1318, L.11 -p.1320, L.19);
whether Dr. Arden had effectively switched from testifying for one side to testifying for the other
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1376, L.2 - p.1377, L.8); and whether he had given different opinions in
similar cases when he was a medical examiner (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1323, L.19 - p.1328, L.3).
The prosecutor explored evidence of a gap between the medical examiner job and establishing
the consulting business and the speed at which the consulting business grew. (Trial Tr., Vol. II,
p.1375, L.14 - p.1376, L.1; p.1377, L.9 - p.1378, L.8.) Only part of the exploration of this
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subject of the change in-career path and why-that Dr. Arden was forced out of his career path
upon accusations of mismanagement, including sexual harassment (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1382, L.6
- p.1388, L.11)--does Grove believe his counsel should have objected to. All of it, however,
w.as.,relevantAo- explore- potential-bias.--ThatD.r,o--Nd&n, ..:was:forced from hi~::..&.h9.s.~g,.ca.r,eer _path
because of allegations of mismanagement and therefore had a gap in employment and had to
build a business was all relevant to show bias in taking this case and reaching conclusions
helpful to the defense. Grove has not shown the evidence to be irrelevant.
Nor has he shown it to be inadmissible because it was unfairly prejudicial. "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
__

_ of undJ1e_ delay, waste_ of time, or_needless presentation of cumulative evideI1ce." State v. Ruiz, _ _
150 Idaho 469,471,248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010) (quoting I.RE. 403). "To exclude evidence under
Rule 403, the trial court must address whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by one of the considerations listed in the Rule." Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722. This
balancing test is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Id. Although there is arguably
some potential for unfair prejudice from the evidence in question, the prosecutor focused on the
effect those accusations had on Dr. Arden's career path and his ultimate choice to abandon (or
mostly abandon) working as a government medical examiner and instead become a consultant
hired by criminal defendants. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1428, L.20-p.1429, L.13.) Grove has failed
'

to establish that this evidence was inadmissible.
More importantly, even if inadmissible it is unlikely that this evidence played any
significant role in the verdict.

As noted above, Mr. Chapman vigorously argued that this
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evidence did not -ultimately undercut Dr. Arden's medical opinion.

This argument likely

reduced, if not eliminated, any unfair prejudice.
Moreover, it is exceedingly unlikely that the jury resolved differences in the medical
__,,.,.,,<,_ testimony. based-. on evidence of a forced resi~u_o:Yer.allegations o,f.o:ffic_e:.mi,~m~agen:i~_nt. . _

I
Ii

Dr. Ross and Dr. Arden agreed the fatal injuries were inflicted about three days before death, but
Dr. Ross marked death at cross-clamping (stopping the heart and therefore the flow of blood
carrying the cells involved in healing), which meant the injuries were inflicted on the day K.M.
was admitted to the hospital (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.933, L.3 - p.936, L.1; p.968, Ls.6-23), while
Dr. Arden measured the time of death as some amorphous time between brain death and crossclarnping, meaning the injuries were inflicted before K.M. was in Grove's exclusive physical
_

~

___ custod)'. (lrial Tr., Vol.

l1 p.126~ L.2] =-P.J~67~ L)~~ Far more likely than differences in the

medical evidence being resolved on whether Dr. Arden was guilty of mismanagement is the
probability that

the medical evidence-was resolved because Dr. Arden failed to articulate why he

thought brain death would have stopped the biological healing processes by which the doctors
aged the injuries, as opposed to cross-clamping, which stopped the heart.
Even more likely, the jury concluded that K.M. would have immediately shown
symptoms of his fatal injuries. As set forth above, the doctors who testified for the state were of
the opinion that the infliction of the fatal injuries would have resulted in immediate severe
symptoms that would have excluded the activities K.M. was seen engaged in between returning
home and being left in Grove's custody. Dr. Arden's opinion that the symptoms would not have
coincided with the injury (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1306, L.15 - p.1310, L.25) was ultimately
unpersuasive.
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Grove has failed to prove prejudice. First, the evidence that Dr. Arden was forced to
change career paths because of accusations of mismanagement was admissible to show bias and
was not excludable as unfairly prejudicial. More importantly, however, there is little reason to
·' -- -,---- 0 -

·-" ---

--believe that-the evidence of mismanagement-p.l-3¥eciany significant-role.as cq_mpared toJ::vidence_ _
that the biological healing process did not stop upon brain death (but instead stopped upon heart
death) and that K.M. would have been immediately and obviously symptomatic upon being so
severely injured.

III.
Grove Has Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice For Not Moving For A
Mistrial Because Jurors Were Allegedly Sleeping
Introduction

A.
---

--

-----
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· - ---·· -
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Grove alleged that his trial counsel's performance was "deficient because he failed to
move for a mistrial after many jurors fell asleep during the testimony." (Amended Petition, p.33,
',•

, 90.)

-

Grove has failed to prove this claim. First, Grove has failed to show that a mistrial

motion by counsel based on a claim of sleeping jurors would have been granted. Second, even if
a juror or two were having trouble staying awake for part of the trial, Grove has failed to show
that Mr. Chapman's tactical choice to not move for a mistrial was based on any objective
shortcoming. Finally, he has established no prejudice.

B.

Grove Has Failed To Show That A Mistrial Motion Would Have Been Granted
"To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that

the attorney's performance was deficient and that the ·petitioner was prejudiced by the
deficiency."

Keserovic v. State, 158 Idaho 234, 345 P.3d 1024 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). Where a claim of ineffective assistance
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of counsel is based on a failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion "would not have
been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of the Strickland test." Abdullah, 2015
WL 856787, *96 (brackets omitted); see also Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 715, 274 P.3d 11,
-16 (Ct: App. 2012).

Grove-faile4t~-c&h@wthata mistriaLmotion, ifmade by counsel,would

have been granted. Thus, he has failed to prove either prong of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
A mistrial is appropriate where there has been conduct, inside or outside of the
courtroom, that is "prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R.
29. l(a). A mistrial should be granted where "the event which precipitated the motion for a
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the record." State v.

trial because of a juror's inattentiveness, the defendant must demonstrate the misconduct by clear
and convincing evidence and also prove "the identity and duration of the specific testimony,
argument or instructions the juror missed." State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686, 689, 214 P.3d 672,
675 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 549, 944 P.2d 143, 146 (Ct.
App. 1997).
Where a juror has been inattentive, remedies include "admonishment of any inattentive
juror, replacement of a juror with an alternate or, in appropriate circumstances, declaration of a
mistrial." State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437,441, 146 P.3d 703, 707 (Ct. App. 2006).
Grove has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that juror misconduct due to
inattentiveness occurred at trial. He has also failed to show prejudice because the evidence does
not establish the identity and duration of any testimony allegedly missed. Finally, he has failed
to show that remedies short of mistrial were inadequate.
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Grove's claim of juror misconduct relies almost entirely upon the testimony of friends
and family who assert they saw one or more jurors apparently sleeping. This testimony is not
credible. Furthermore, it is rebutted by credible evidence.
·.·,,. ········-· ··· ·:··-- ···-···-Grove presented-the tsstiffloay-.--ef--fivewitnesses,_asserting .juror.misconduct during the...
testimony of Dr. Ross. Debbie Grove, Grove's mother, testified that five jurors-Neiman, Lind,
Yates, Barrett, and Loetscher-were "sleeping and nodding off." (E.H. Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.14,
L.5; p.15, Ls.21-25; p.17, L.20-p.19, L.3.) Carol Grove, Grove's grandmother, testified she saw
three jurors, Loetscher, Barrett, and ''the gentleman ... that had a mustache," "sleeping" during
Dr. Ross's testimony. (E.H. Tr., p.75, L.11 - p.78, L.4.) Karen Stamper, a friend of the Grove
family, saw two male jurors "sleeping." (E.H. Tr., p.93, L.15 - p.95, L.25.) Craig Stamper, a
- - ---- ~personaLfriend...oLGrov..e,Jestified~thatJID.e..j!ll'or, Loetscher._"ap_p~ed to be sleeQ_ing." (E.H_._____
Tr., p.104, L.13 - p.106, L.17.) Justina Hyder, a close friend of Grove, testified that jurors
· Loetscher arid Yates were "obviously sleeping" and other, unidentified, -jurors were· '~kind of
nodding off." (E.H. Tr., p.110, L.10 - p.113, L.20.)
All of the witnesses testified that these observations were made shortly before the

.

prosecutor asked for a recess because the jurors were having a hard time staying awake. (E.H.
Tr., p.23, L.8 -p.24, L.17; p.78, Ls.19-22; p.96, Ls.1-8; p.107, Ls.12-15; p.113, L.14 -p.114,
L.3; see Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.983, Ls.9-16.)
The evidence is insufficient to show that had Mr. Chapman made a motion for a mistrial
at this time the motion would have succeeded. First, the evidence in support of the motion is
unconvincing. Groves' friends and family gave wildly different accounts of who appeared to be
sleeping. One said it was five jurors, one said three, two said two, and one said it was only one.
Second, the jurors available to testify in post-conviction denied sleeping or seeing any of the
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other jurors sleeping. (See generally E.H. Tr., pp.305-342.) Grove has-not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that any juror actually fell asleep. At best he has demonstrated that at least
one juror appeared to be asleep. 8 Moreover, the alleged sleeping happened shortly before a
· -~- ----re-cess requested by· the,;_pn,seeutor-;--- ~iven ,alL'c.these-,.·ciroumstancesv-it-is likely .that had Mr__
Chapman made a motion for a mistrial it would have been denied because the recess was
sufficient cure for any issue of staying awake. Even if Mr. Chapman could have demonstrated
that a juror had fallen asleep the best remedy he could have hoped for would have been excusing
that juror in favor of one of the two alternates. For these reasons Grove has failed to prove that a
motion for mistrial made at this time would have been granted.
The second episode of alleged juror sleeping occurred during Dr. Harper's testimony.
- ----- --Gr-<JveS-mother,J).ebbie,_claims_she__saw__tw_o_jJJIQrs. Neiman and Lind, "nodd4!g_off' during Dr.- - - - - Harper's testimony. (E.H. Tr., p.26, Ls.1-10.) No other person saw this. (See generally E.H.
Tr.) Nor did -anyone call this alleged episode to Mr. Chapman;s (of anyone else's) attention.
Finally, no evidence indicating what testimony was covered or how long the jurors were
allegedly inattentive was presented. This evidence fails to establish any basis for moving for or
declaring a mistrial.
Finally, Grove's mother also testified that three jurors, Yates, Loetscher and Barrett,
"dozed off' during Dr. Arden's testimony. (E.H. Tr., p.26, L.11 - p.27, L.2.) Lori Stamper, a
friend of Grove's, claimed to have seen either juror Keller or Loetscher apparently asleep at
some point during Dr. Arden's testimony as well. (E.H. Tr., p.86, L.3 - p.87, L.11.) Grove's
other friends and family in attendance did not report seeing any issue with the jury at this time.

8 It

is noteworthy that the only juror identified as appearing to sleep by all of Grove's friends and
family was Kendall Loetscher. Mr. Loetscher testified that he did not fall asleep. (E.H. Tr.,
p.315, L.9 - p.316, L.12.) In addition, juror Loetscher was not identified as having been asleep
in documents prepared by Grove's witnesses prior to trial.
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(See generally E.H. Tr.) Again, this evidence is insufficient because it is contradicted by the
jurors' testimony and fails to identify what evidence would have been compromised.
The evidence presented by Grove does not show that a mistrial would have been granted.

because of the bias of the witnesses, the remarkable inconsistency in what they claim they saw,
and the contrary evidence.

Moreover, even if there were an issue with jurors becoming

inattentive, Grove failed to establish that the issue was not properly addressed through taking a
recess, much less that other remedies short of declaring a mistrial, including juror admonishment .
and using alternates, were inadequate. Having failed to show that a motion for mistrial would
have been granted, Grove fails on both prongs of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
~-----fornotmmdng_foLa.mi£trial._~---·--... -..-. ____ ~-----

C.

Grove Has Failed To Show That The Tactical Decision To Not Seek A Mistrial Was The
Result Of An Objective Shortcoming By Counsel
To establish deficient performance, Grove had the burden of showing that Mr.

Chapman's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

"In order to

prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must prove the allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence." Popoca-Garcia v. State, 157 Idaho 150, _ , 334 P.3d 824, 825
(Ct. App. 2014). That proof must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631,
634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, .775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.
App. 1989).
"[T]he decision to request or consent to a mistrial involves tactical choices appropriately
made by the defendant's counsel." State v. Nab, 113 Idaho 168, 172-73, 742 P.2d 423, 427-28
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(Ct. App. 1987). "[T]actical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or some
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, _ , 344

presented any evidence tending to show any shortcoming of counsel capable of objective
evaluation, such as deficient observation of the level of attentiveness of the jury or ignorance of
the law.
Grove contends his trial counsel's performance was deficient for not consulting him
about whether to request a mistrial. (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.24.) Grove did not plead
failure to consult with him as a cause of action, however. Rather, his amended petition alleged
"---- ------~hat-~efense-counsel~s-:l)erformance-was-deficienLhe_cause he_failed to move for a mistrial after
many jurors fell asleep during the testimony." (Amended Petition, p.33,

,r 90.)

~

Because Grove

a

never alleged that failure to consult with him about seeking mistrial was deficient performance,
that claim is not before this Court.
Even if the claim had been pled, it fails both factually and legally. It fails factually
because Grove presented no evidence that he was not consulted or that, had he been consulted at
the time, he would have wanted a mistrial. It fails legally because, with respect to Mr. Parnes, no
court has ever said that electing not to ask for a mistrial because of a sleeping juror is the legal
equivalent of waiving the jury and proceeding with a court trial. As set forth above, there are
many cases addressing the legal significance of a claim of a sleeping juror. Grove has elected to
address none of them, and none of them support his legal theories. It is generally not deficient
performance to fail to advance a "novel legal theory." Abdull~ 2015 WL 856787, *96.
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Grove has not articulated, much less proven, a claim of deficient performance for failing
to seek a mistrial, as alleged in his pleadings. He instead argues it was deficient performance to
not consult with him about whether to seek a mistrial, a theory neither pleaded nor supported by

D.

Grove Has Failed To Prove Prejudice
"To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the

attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different."
'

Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, _ , 344 P.3d 919, 925 (Ct. App. 2015). Here the outcome
would have been different if the court granted a mistrial. As set forth above, however, a motion
for a mistrial would not have been granted. To be entitled to a mistrial Grove would have had to
----------·-··-----

...

-

-

-

·--.

-

-~--~~

-

----------------------~ -

------- -------~-~

establish that more than two jurors (because there were two alternates) were sleeping to a degree
that disqualified them from continued jury service. The evidence failed to prove that jurors were
sleeping, much less sleeping to a degree requiring the remedy of a mistrial.
Grove's argument is apparently that if a juror nods off the jury trial is rendered equivalent
to a court trial. This is not a cognizable theory of prejudice because it relies on no cases actually
addressing the legal standards by which a mistrial should be granted because of an inattentive
juror. In order to prevail under the relevant standards Grove would have had to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that a juror was inattentive, as well as ''the identity and duration of the
specific testimony, argument or instructions the juror missed." State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686,
689, 214 P.3d 672, 675 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 549, 944
P.2d 143, 146 (Ct. App. 1997). He would also have had to prove that alternate remedies would ..
have been inadequate, State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437, 441, 146 P.3d 703, 707 (Ct. App. 2006).
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Because Grove's claims of prejudice ate not based on the legal standards actually relevant to his
claim, they should be rejected.
Grove's claim that his prejudice is automatic is not grounded in law. Under the relevant
,----·--: -}egi:tl: -standar.ds -Grove has..::failed-to-prove--that too .outcome of the trial wol!ld-lla-Y;-~e_en.i!Jfferent.
0

had be made a motion for a mistrial because he has failed to prove a mistrial would have been
granted.
IV.
Grove Has Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice In Relation To Closing
Arguments
A.

Introduction
The final claim the Court identified as subject to consideration at the evidentiary hearing

misconduct by the prosecuting attorney" and failing to "move for a mistrial or curative
instruction following the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments." (Summary Dismissal
Order, p.39.) In particular, in his Amended Petition, Grove alleged the prosecutor committed
misconduct during closing argument by (1) twice misstating the "defense position regarding
preexisting head injury," (3) using the phrase "smoke and mirrors to get you confused" in
relation to Dr. Arden's testimony, (4) "suggest[ing] without supporting evidence that Dr.
Arden's 'financial position' leads him to decide what cases he can talce," (5) commenting that "a
'colleague' said that Dr. Arden's answers during cross-examination were slippery as an ice cube"
and "opin[ing]" that Dr. Arden "was stretching things," (6) telling the jury "without supporting
evidence that '[p]arents kill babies all the time,"' (7) telling the jury "without supporting
evidence that 'there are literally thousands of [similar] incidents in any given span of time," (8)
telling the jury ''without supporting evidence that he believed that 'our local paper has probably
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shown . . . probably six or more of these cases since - since this one started,"' (9) saying that
"Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking [K.M.'s] body apart piece by piece," (10) implying
that "he had evidence not presented at trial that Mr. Grove had previously been 'violent with

K.M.'s biological father as a witness because the state's "medical experts unanimously, to no
exception, said he could not have done it," and (13) arguing "without supporting evidence that
the emotional breakdown of Mr. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a different kind of
'emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that morning that resulted in these injuries."
(Amended Petition, pp.16-17.)
Grove failed to prove deficient performance or prejudice related to counsel's failure to
~--------objec-t--t-e-an-y:f)om-en-0f-the-pr-osecutor~losing-.argument_ahont which he complains. ___________ _

B.

Grove Failed To Meet His Burden Of Proving He Is Entitled To Relief On His Claim
That Counsel Was Ineffective In Relation To The Prosecutor's Closing Argument
"From a strategic perspective ... , many trial lawyers refrain from objecting during

closing argument to all but the most egregious misstatements by opposing counsel on the theory
that the jury may construe their objections to be a sign of desperation or hyper-technicality."
United States v. Molin~ 934 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991). A defense attorney may also
decide not object because he believes the prosecutor's argument is helpful to his case or believes
he can capitalize on the prosecutor's statements during his own closing argument. Id.; see also
Lambert v. McBride, 365 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Under Strickland, we must note that
there may very well be strategic reasons for counsel not to object during closing arguments.
Counsel may have been trying to avoid calling attention to the statements and thus giving them
more force."); United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (counsel's decision not
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to object to the prosecutor's closing argument "falls within the range of permissible conduct of
trial counsel"). "Whatever the actual explanation, Strickland requires [the Court] to 'indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
·: ··-·:o~~:::-_.';:-··-~--asststan:ce."'· Mo-liria,-934F.zd at 1448- (-quoting-Strickland,466 US-.cat-689) ... :'This presumpti.QIL,~ .... ,,, .... ___ ·
especially applies to silence in the face of allegedly improper arguments." Vicory v. State, 81
S.W.3d 725, 731 (Mo. App. 2002) (citation omitted).

In addition to the Strickland standards applicable to Grove's claim that counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to several portions of the prosecutor's closing argument, the
Court should also consider the overriding legal standard applicable to closing arguments:
"Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and
---~ -·· ~-disGRssing-~€-ev-i.denceandlnferenceS-to-be_made.ther.efrom~ State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694L
720,215 P.3d 414,440 (2009) (citations omitted).
In an effort to meet his burden, Grove ignores most of the applicable legal standards. As
the foregoing authority indicates, it is well-within counsel's strategic decision-making authority
to not object during closing argument, even if he could technically do so. At the evidentiary
hearing, Grove, usually without providing any context, asked trial counsel why he did not object
to several of the statements the prosecutor made during closing that Grove believes were
improper. (See generally E.H. Tr., pp.220-228; p.230, L.18 - p.231, L.3.) Frequently Mr.
Chapman could not provide a reason he did not object. (Id.) That does not, however, mean that
the decision, at the time, was not strategic or tactical, based on ignorance of the law, or based on
some other shortcoming capable of objective evaluation. In fact, on cross-examination, Mr.
Chapman agreed there are a variety of considerations relevant to the courtroom dynamics during
closing argument, including tone, "circumstances and the context," and tactical concerns related
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to juror perceptions.

(E.H. Tr.~ p.231, L.16 - p.233, L.3, p.238, L.18 - p.239, L.3.) Mr.

Chapman also explained the difficulty with providing specific reasons for failing to object in
t
t

relation to a trial that occurred almost seven years ago. (E.H. Tr., p.241, L.23 -p.243, L.5.)
· ··· · ·· ·-- ·· ''Ftir1het;·c:1:,·defense attorney--is ,undoubtedly-not--Qens:titutionally- obligated.-tQ~l;?jecLtq,;
statements that are not improper. For example, in this case Grove contends an objection should
have been made to the prosecutor's use of the phrase "long-term" because it is different than the
defense theory that the brain injury occurred prior to the time K.M. was alone with Grove.
(Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.26.)

However, as defense counsel acknowledged at the

evidentiary hearing in response to the question whether the defense theory was that "there was
some long-term brain injury," "it depends on how you define long term." (Trial Tr., p.224,
----- --Ls ..l-3,J..6..}-Disagr.eemellLoY..eu:ucl:L1erminoJ.o.~does not demonstrate objectionable misconduct

in terms of "misrepresenting" the defense's theory of the case, much less show that counsel's
failure to object was deficient under Strickland.
Even if this Court could find that Grove met his burden of establishing that counsel was
deficient for failing to object to one or more of the statements the prosecutor made during closing
argument, Grove failed to prove prejudice. There is no reasonable probability that the result of
the trial would have been different if counsel had objected. Any objection, even if sustained,
would have only resulted in reiterating instructions the jury received anyway.

(Exhibit A

(#36211 R.; pp.225 (Instruction No. 3 - instructing jury it could only consider evidence and
defining evidence), 228 (Instruction No. 4 - again defining evidence and specifically instructing
that arguments of counsel are not evidence and that if facts as remembered by jurors were
different than what was stated by the lawyers, jurors should follow their own memories)).) In
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addition, given the weight of the evidence presented, Grove was not prejudiced by any
deficiency in counsel's failure to object to any portion of the prosecutor's closing argument.
Nor is Grove entitled to relief based on any cumulative alleged deficiencies by counsel.
· - · ··(Pefitiot'ler~-s Closing· Argument; p;34}·Because -Grove.':fai:led-to Jffove counse-Lwas--de:ficient--in ..
any manner, there is no alleged deficiency to accumulate. Even if this Court finds one or more
deficiencies, Grove has failed to show any sufficient prejudice entitling him to relief.

CONCLUSION
Grove failed to meet his burden of proving he is entitled to relief on any of the claims that
were properly before the Court at the evidentiary hearing. The Court should, therefore, dismiss
the remaining claims from Grove's Amended Petition and enter judgment denying Grove's
request for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 8th day of May 2015.

JE ICA M. LORELLO
D
ty Attorney General
Nez Perce County Special Prosecutor

eputy Attorney General
Nez Perce County Special Prosecutor
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
CV-12-01798
)
-~------,-------pETJTIONER"'SXEBUTTALTO
)
RESPONDENT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
)
)
)

I. INTRODUCTION
COMES NOW, Petitioner Stacey Grove, through counsel Dennis Benjamin and Deborah
Whipple, and offers this Rebuttal to Respondent's Closing Argument.

A. Ineffective Assistance in the Direct and Cross-Examination ofMr. Grove
1. Evidence regarding Mr. Grove's relationship with his. son and child SUIWOrt
The Respondent argues that "[i]t was not deficient for counsel to inquire into this area
[Mr. Grove's relationship with his son] given that the defense clearly wanted to portray [Mr.]
Grove as a caring father-figure to K.M. and his sister - a reasonable strategy under the
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circumstances of this case." Respondent's Argument, pg. 10. This argument is flawed because it
ignores the fact that it was not a strategic decision to bring that evidence out. Defense counsel
testified that he could not recall why he elicited the evidence from Mr. Grove on direct
examination; He also-testified that the evidence was-unfavorable to Mr. Grove:-·-EvideRtiary . ---- -···- ...
Hearing Transcript ("EH Tr.") p. 187, ln. 14-24. In addition, the Respondent's suggestion that it
was a tactical choice to bring out the evidence is incorrect. In fact, defense counsel filed a
motion in limine to exclude "any mention of the relationship that Stacey Grove has with his son,
Alex Light, and/or child support obligations." Exhibit A, Vol. lB, p. 174.
The Respondent also argues that "[i]t was not an unreasonable tactical decision for the
defense to ask the question" because the state would have inquired about Mr. Grove's
~-'-"-'~'~---retatlonship-withms·so1n)n~c1'oss--=exarninatton----:-"Responaent's-mgIDllent,·pg. -i-o-:---llutthistactic-·-~---~--~~did not further the Respondent's supposed defense strategy. Mr. Grove's relationship with his
son does not show either that he was or was not a caring father figure to

and had defense

counsel not raised the issue on direct examination the state could not have cross-examined upon
it. Defense counsel knew the evidence was prejudicial and excludable and the fact that he
unnecessarily presented the evidence to the jury is a "shortcoming0 capable of objective review''
which need not be deferred to by this Court. State v. Abdullah, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2015
WL 856787, *112 (2015).
Not only was defense counsel's performance deficient when he unnecessarily raised the
topic of Mr. Grove's relationship with his son, his failure to exclude the evidence that Mr. Grove
was behind on his child support payments was also deficient. Whether Mr. Grove was current or
delinquent with his obligations has nothing to do with whether he was a caring caretaker to
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And the fact that defense counsel sought to exclude that evidence and did not raise i-t
himself during the direct examination of Mr. Grove shows that he did not intend to bring that fact
to the jury's attention. Thus, as previously argued, the failure to obtain a pre-trial decision on his
.,:c.·_-,, ·._·c- -,

mo.ti-0n in limine was objectively unreasooahle.--The.same is -true for:.cdefense counsel's failure to · - .
object to the state's cross-examination on the topic. Defense counsel could not state a reason for
failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination on that topic and it could not have been in
furtherance of the defense strategy. Evidentiary Hearing ("EH") Tr. p. 189, ln. 3-5. Thus, it was
deficient performance for defense counsel to let the prosecutor's misconduct go unchallenged.
2. Prosecutor's comments about ''the story you need the jury to believe"
The Respondent does not address Mr. Grove's argument that defense counsel's

-· - · ~·~'--performance-wa:s-deficientbecause-he-failedto-move·to ·-s1Jike-the-pro-se-cutCYr'-s-c1>:rnments-afte-r~---·---·-- ·
his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination was sustained. Verified
Amended Petition, p. 32; Petitioner's Closing Argument, pg. 7-9. 1 Thus, no reply is needed.
3. Prosecutor's question about Mr. Grove's emotional state
The Respondent seeks to justify the prosecutor's line of questioning about Mr. Grove's
use of Ativan by commenting that "it is unclear why a witnesses's ability to perceive and recall
events would not be relevant." Respondent's Argument, pg. 8. It is clear, however, that Mr.

previously noted, the trial record shows that the prosecutor characterized Mr. Grove's
sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is ''the story you need the jury to believe" and then
opined that "some things ... just don't really make sense." Exhibit B, p. 1113, ln. 8-13. While
defense counsel's objection was sustained, he did not ask tliat the comments be stricken or that
the jury be instructed to disregard the comments. Id The comments should have been stricken
because a prosecutor should not interject his personal opinion and beliefs about the credibility of
a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P .3d
583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007)
1As
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· Grove's ability to perceive events occurring at the time of the charged incident in July -2006 could
not have been affected by his three-day-long use of Ativin during the trial in July of 2008.
Further, it is a far-stretch for the Respondent to even claim it could have affected Mr. Grove's
,.=- -· · - · ... ,

-ability te-aeeurately recall the events~he:;previouslyper-ceived sinceAtiviThls not a nm:cotic,:- . - .
intoxicant or hallucinogen.2 In this regard, it is worth noting that Mr. Spickler never presented
any evidence that Ativan might affect Mr. Grove's ability to accurately recall the events of July
2006. Likewise, Mr. Stickler never asked if the Ativan affected Mr. Grove's demeanor or made
any attempt to prove that it could.
More importantly, the Respondent's argument misses the purpose of the questioning. Mr.
Spickler was not interested in the effect of the Ativan on Mr. Grove's demeanor or ability to

·----·----i:estiry.!'Iewantoo tooring·ounherrretevant andiligbiy-prejudidatfactofMr:-6:rove-'s--------·-----"emotional breakdown" before the jury. As the Respondent frankly admits, "the state's theory
was that [Mr.] Grove had an emotional breakdown on the morning that the injuries were inflicted
on [the] child[.]" Respondent's Argument, pg. 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, the
state had a problem with its theory. It had no evidence to support it. There was no evidence
presented at trial that Mr. Grove was in a homicidal emotional state before, during or after the
time he was alone with

So, the state had to resort to improper questioning about Mr.

Grove's medical condition during trial to show this imagined emotional breakdown. That
evidence was irrelevant because "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a
·-

·--

..

-·---· ---.

Ativan, the trade name for Benzodiazepine, "has a tranquilizing action" on the Central
Nervous System ''with no appreciable effect on the respiratory or cardiovascular systems."
www.pdr.net/drug-summary/ativan-tablets?druglabe1id=2135&id=l869 (last visited 5/12/2015).
2
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particular occasion" except in limited situations not applicable here. 1.R.E. 404(a).
Even if such evidence was admissible character evidence, the fact that Mr. Grove was
overcome during trial with the effect of loss of sleep does not tend to prove he had a totally
-·, ...,,; ·····- . difrenmttypeof emotionalbreakdown-ID.2-006,abreak-down:-,which,the-stateimagined.to be "an ....
instantaneous fit of anger, that morning that resulted in these injuries to the kids -- to the kid, to
Exhibit B, p. 1458, 1n. 13-19. There was no evidence that Mr. Grove's medical
condition during the trial was an expression of some long-standing underlying character defect
which could manifest itself in a homicidal rage. Thus, it was irrelevant under I.R.E. 401 because
it did not have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and was
--~ot--atlmissibte-1mderi--:R.-:E-:-4-()2-.- ~ - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - Trial counsel did not strategically fail to object to the above. He testified that he did not
believe it was objectionable. EH T. p. 193, ln. 5-10. Thus, Mr. Grove has shown that defense
counsel's failure to object "resulted from ... ignorance of the relevant law'' and thus is "a basis
for post-conviction relief for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel[.]" State v. Abdullah, supra.
4. Prejudice
The Respondent argues that the jury learning that Mr. Grove's use of Ativan did not
render the jury's verdict unreliable, Respondent's Argument, pg. 10, but that argument misses the
point. It was the evidence about the "emotional breakdown" which the state used to establish its
theory that :Mr. Grove had a previous emotional breakdown and brutally beat

to death;

Next, the Respondent argues that it is "unclear" how the improper evidence affected Mr.
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- Grove's credibility, Respondent's Argument, pg. 12, but Mr. Grove has already explained that
the evidence showing Mr. Grove had a bad relationship with his biological son and that he was
not even paying child support painted him as a bad person and bad care giver and the
· c"-

-pmsecutor's comments~that--M:r;·Gro-v.e-neededthe,juey~ro:-believe-his story suggested-that Mr; Grove would lie to them because had to. That all goes to the believability of Mr. Grove's
testimony.
Finally, while the Respondent argues that each individual instance of deficient
performance was not prejudicial under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), it does
not address Mr. Grove's cumulative error argument.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Direct and Cross-Examination ofDr.
Arden
Mr. Grove has, as set out in his Closing Argument, established by a preponderance of the

evidence that trial counsel was ineffective in the preparation for and presentation of Dr; Arden's
testimony at trial. The Respondent argues that the failure to supply Dr. Arden with the iron
slides was not deficient performance because Dr. Arden could form an opinion without them and
that there was no prejudice because the slides were not exculpatory. Respondent's Closing p. 13.
This argument misses the central point - that it was counsel's duty to supply the expert with all
the available materials, including the iron slides, which were used to impeach Dr. Arden's
opinion at trial, and that the slides not only were actually exculpatory, but even if they had not
been exculpatory, the impeachment with them was prejudicial to Mr. Grove's defense and would
not have occurred had counsel properly fulfilled his obligation to secure all the evidence that
would be used by the state against Mr. Grove and to properly get it to his expert prior to trial.
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Mr. Grove has also demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was
ineffective in the presentation of Dr. Arden's testimony at trial. Specifically, counsel was
ineffective in failing to stop the improper impeachment of Dr. Arden and in failing to rehabilitate
· ·· ··-·· ·· ······ · · ·-him.·following the,impfoper·impeachmenL ·. 'Fhe'R:espondent-argues fu.atcounselwas simply
making a tactical choice to not stop the improper impeachment and in not rehabilitating Dr.
Arden on redirect. Thus, the Respondent argues, the decision to not act could not be deficient
performance. Respondent's Closing p. 20-21. However, this argument is contrary to the record.
1. Deficient Performance in Failing to Provide the Iron Slides to Dr. Arden
With regard to the iron slides, Dr. Arden testified that he had asked Mr. Chapman to send
him all the microscopic slides that had been made by the medical examiner who performed the

Chapman testified that he was aware prior to trial of the existence of the iron slides, but did not
~

-~ - -,

ask for the slides in his letter to the prosecutor seeking materials for Dr. Arden's review. EH Tr.
p. 201, ln. 13-p. 204, ln. 1. Mr. Parnes testified that failure of trial counsel to obtain the iron
slides violated reasonable professional norms because provision of all relevant information to an
expert is critical to an expert's ability to review the matter fully and to have credibility before the
jury. EH Tr. p. 254, ln. 20-p. 255, ln. 15.

In his closing argument, Mr. Grove cited this Court to State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho
355,385,247 P.3d 582, 612 (2010); Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146-47, 139 P.3d 741,
748-49 (Ct. App. 2006); and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2466 (2005),
each of which supports the conclusion that failure to properly prepare Dr. Arden by providing

him with all the slides, including the iron stains, which the state intended to use against Mr.
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Grove, was deficient performance.
The Respondent has not addressed the case law at all in its closing. Rather, the
Respondent argues, contrary to the evidence presented, that Dr. Arden never requested all the

Chapman arranged for Dr. Arden to be supplied with all of the materials Dr Arden requested and
felt he needed." From this, the Respondent asks this Court to conclude that counsel's
performance was not deficient.
This argument is directly contrary to Dr. Arden's unrebutted testimony that he had asked
for all the microscopic slides prior to trial, including the iron stains. EH Tr. p. 134, In. 8-11; p.
136, ln. 8-10; p. 138, In. 6-10. The Respondent certainly had the opportunity to rebut this
evidence by asJ.oiigMLCliapm.an whetlier DKArclen asked:fiim forlesstlian all'llie slia.es prior

------

to trial, but the Respondent chose not to ask this question. The validity of the Respondent's
argument that Dr. Arden never asked for all the slides must be measured against the actual record
and, of course, common sense. The Respondent's argument that Dr. Arden never asked for all
the materials relied upon by the state's experts is not only contrary to Dr. Arden's testimony at
the evidentiary hearing, but also contrary to common sense. There is no logical reason for Dr.
Arden to have requested all the microscopic slides, except that he wished Mr. Chapman to
withhold the iron stains.
While the Respondent's argument is contrary to the record and common sense, what is
even more important is that the Respondent's argument is beside the point. It is not the expert's
·- jobt-o obtain-the materials needed forthe expert's review. That is the job of counsel. As--"··.
discussed in Rompilla,supra, it is counsel's duty to obtain and review the evidence the state will
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be using against the client.
The notion that defense counsel must obtain information that the State has and
will use against the defendant is not simply a matter of common sense. As the
District Court points out, the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice in circulation at the time ofRompilla's trial describes the obligation in
,- ·~: :t-enns'no·ohe-could misundetstanttirr-circum:stances-ofa-case like this one~-~,

0----~~-"-0 '

,

'It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of
the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to
facts relevant to the merits of the case and penalty in the event of
conviction. The investigation should always include efforts to
secure the information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless
of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts
constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty. 1
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.).

Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387, 125 S.Ct. at 2465 (footnote omitted).
Tneiron stains were information 1n. ffie ·possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement. It was incumbent upon defense counsel, not Dr. Arden, to obtain the slides. It was
further incumbent upon defense counsel, not Dr. Arden, to send those slides to Dr. Arden. See,

Murphy v. State, supra. In failing to obtain the slides and forward them to Dr. Arden for his
review, defense counsel provided deficient performance.
The Respondent attempts to persuade this Court not to reach the conclusion that counsel
was deficient by arguing that "Any finding that Dr. Arden requested additional information he
felt was necessary to thoroughly review the case and it was not provided to him would require a
conclusion that Dr. Arden was deliberatively deceptive in his trial testimony." Respondent's
Closing p. 14. However, as noted above, whether Dr. Arden requested the slides or not is beside
· the point Counsel had adutytctprovide the slides. Counsel failed in that duty. And,further, the - --... ------ -.. ·.
Respondent's logic is flawed. Dr. Arden testified at trial that he had the information needed to
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form opinions about the case. Ex. B, p. 1252, ln. 25;.p. 1253, ln. 3. As explained in the
Evidentiary Hearing, that is a different question than the question of whether he received all the
slides that existed in the case and that would be used by the state against Mr. Grove. EH p. 138,

· · - · - -- · --hL ,1.g.:ap: 139,· ln: 10. · Dr. Ar.Jenwas··honest-with1:he-jury when hetesti:fied that.he;;had~ficient
information to form opinions about the case. There was nothing deceptive about his testimony.
Even if Dr. Arden's forthrightness was at issue in this post-conviction case, he was forthright in
his trial testimony. But, in any event, a finding of deficient performance is not dependent upon a
finding that Dr. Arden was not forthright.
Contrary to the Respondent's arguments, counsel was deficient in failing to provide Dr.
Arden with the iron slides.
- -~-~.--~-------~-:-PreniwceFromlheUefic1ency inFailmgto'"ProviaethelronSl1desto'Dr.
Arden
The Respondent argues that the failure to provide Dr. Arden with the iron slides was not
prejudicial because the record did not establish that Dr. Arden made any truly new findings based
upon this review of the slides. Respondent's Closing p. 15. In fact, Dr. Arden did testify in the
Evidentiary Hearing that in viewing the iron stains he was able to date the injury to the mesentery
as weeks rather than days prior to death. EH p. 159, ln. 8-p. 168, ln. 11. Dr. Arden testified that
"[T]hat's what different from simply reading in the report, there is positive iron staining. This
tells me that something else has gone on that is substantially older than whatever is happening in
the fresher appearing hemorrhage. And this was not available to me by interpreting the written
report without personally examining the iron stains." EH p. 164, 1n. 1-7. He further testified that
because he could see iron stains in the connective tissue separate from the area where he could
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still see hemorrhage, he can conclude that the mesentery injuries were weeks rather than a week
old. EH p. 168, ln. 8-11. This contrasts with his trial testimony that the injuries to the mesentery
appeared to be days and "possibly" a week or more old. Ex. B, p. 1317, ln. 12-13. Likewise, in

part of the hemorrhage in the optic nerve was older than the age of three plus days that was
presented at the trial. EH p. 168, ln. 19-p. 169, ln. 10; Ex. B, p. 1294, ln. 6-9. This was
especially significant because Dr. Ross testified that the hemorrhage in the optic nerve was
possibly the result of the hemorrhages in the brain. Ex. B, p. 927, ln. 10-20. Dr. Ross's
testimony combined with Dr. Arden's dating the optic nerve injures as older than a few days goes
to prove that the fatal head injuries were not inflicted during the time Mr. Grove was alone with

In oilier words, oyseemgthe rronstruns, Dr. Amen was ablelo effectively reburtlie------~--state's evidence that

sustained the head injuries in the few minutes prior to the 911 call.

But, even if Dr. Arden had not found anything new in the iron stains, the failure to
provide him the stains was prejudicial because the state used that failure to undermine the
credibility of Dr. Arden's trial testimony. The prosecutor questioned Dr. Arden extensively
about the iron stains at trial. Ex. B, p. 1355, ln. 9-p. 1364, ln. 25: And, all Dr. Arden could do
was to respond that he could only rely upon the autopsy report because he had never seen the iron
stains. Ex. B~ p. 1355, ln. 9-19. This cross-examination undermined Dr. Arden's credibility with
the jury because the jury would conclude that Dr. Arden had not seen all the evidence the state's
experts had seen and therefore his opinion could not be as accurate as their opinions.
The Respondent further argues that the existence-of older injuries does not call the-jury's -verdict into question. Respondent's Closing p. 15-16. In other words, the Respondent appears to
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argue that the older injuries were not exculpatory. However, as Mr. Grove explained in his
Closing Argument at page 19, had the jury lmown that

I

had been active for over a week

with retinal, mesentery, and pancreas injuries, there is a reasonable probability that at least one
' ,>-_:,.a,,-

-juror-would have-::eoncludedtb.aH{yler·remained active for-some·time--a:fter-reeeiv-ing the- fatal"'·'.<, - -.,>
injuries. In this, the evidence from the iron stain slides was exculpatory.
The Respondent also argues that Mr. Grove did not present any evidence of the earlier
injuries being significant in scope or severity. Respondent's Closing p. 16. However, the record
is contrary to this argument. Dr. Hunter testified that the autopsy showed "extensive injuries to
the intestines." Ex. B, p. 871, ln. 3-21. He further opined that

would have been in

"absolute agony" from the muscle injuries. Ex. B, p. 872, ln. 5-15. Dr. Ross testified that the
abaomll1fil ·111Junes were veryaebrnratmg mJillies which woulanave oeen very pain:ful:-:Ex:B-;-p.
943, ln. 18-22. Dr. Harper described the abdominal injuries as "quite awful" and ''major, major"
trauma Ex. B., p. 1034, ln. 18-p. 1035, ln. 11. Dr. Harper further opined that the injury to the
mesentery would have been fatal if

had not died from the head injury. Ex. B, p. 1058, ln.

1-8.
The older injuries were clearly extremely serious injuries as testified to by the state's own
medical witnesses. Dr. Arden's testimony that the abdominal injuries were older than the few
minutes before 911 was called was vital. It would have created a reasonable doubt that
was fatally injured during the short time he was with Mr. Grove. In addition, had the jury been
aware that some part of the retinal injury was older than a week per Dr. Arden's testimony based
on the iron slides and that the retinal injury was possibly caused by the fatal head injuries-per Dr..
Ross' s testimony, then the jury would have had a reasonable doubt that the fatal head injury was
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inflicted just prior to the 911 ·calL Further, the Respondent's argument that "because Dr. Arden detected no additional brain
injuries the testimony related to the physical effects of that ultimately fatal injury are completely
-~~c...-,--- ' " '' --,,-

-umntpeached~"- Respondent's Closing p:-16, is;" like-its ·earHer argument, is not on point.~Br, ···. ·

.,,,

Arden testified at trial extensively as to the head injuries. The fact that he did not find any
additional brain injuries as a result of his inspection of the brain slides does not mean that there
was no evidence produced at trial to challenge the state's medical witnesses' testimony as to the
timing of the head injuries. In fact, as discussed above, inspection of the iron slides allowed Dr.
Arden to provide exculpatory evidence that the head injuries did not occur when Mr. Grove was
alone with

Nor, does the fact that no additional head injuries were observed change the

·----fact that colJllsel was deficient in failing to get D!.L\ro.en the rron stams~ Nor, does 1t cliange that
fact that the failure to get the iron stains was prejudicial because as noted above, the state
extensively questioned Dr. Arden about not having reviewed the iron stain slides which cast a
doubt upon all of his testimony including his testimony about the head injuries. The state
certainly never attempted at trial to cast doubt only upon Dr. Arden's opinions as to the
abdominal injuries. Rather, the state attacked Dr. Arden's preparation and credibility in its
entirety. Ex B, p. 1425, ln. 3-p. 1430, ln. 14; p. 1461, ln. 9-p. 1466, ln. 1.
The Respondent's last argument against a finding of prejudice is that the testimony about
the iron stains was not even relevant. Respondent's Closing p. 17. The testimony was, as
discussed above, relevant because it undermined the testimony of the state's medical witnesses'
· testimony about the timing of

s injuries which was the central issue at trial; And,

moreover, the Respondent is judicially estopped from arguing that evidence of the iron stains was
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- irrelevant as it relied upon that evidence to obtain its conviction. Ex. B, p. 1355, ln. 6-p. 1364, ln.
2. McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (2013), stating, "Judicial

estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position and then subsequently
-~-.

-'

-~-. - -

-- - seeldng-a.-seconcfpo-sition tb:atis-incompatibkwithihefusf;''-· ---~: In sum, Mr. Grove has proven by a preponderance of the evidence both deficient

performance and prejudice in the failure of trial counsel to supply Dr. Arden with the ir~n stain
slides prior to trial.
3. Deficient Performance in The Presentation of Dr. Arden's Testimony
As set out in Mr. Grove's Closing, Mr. Grove has established by a preponderance of the

evidence that trial counsel was deficient in not objecting to the prosecutor's impeachment of Dr.
Arden with the theory iliat Dr. Araen was cm a mission for the defense or wi-nfllie irrelevant
evidence regarding Dr. Arden's departure from the Washington, D.C. medical examiner's office.
The Respondent responds to this proof and argument by asserting that trial counsel made the
tactical choice to allow the improper impeachment and to not rehabilitate Dr. Arden and
therefore the decision cannot be deficient performance. Respondent's Closing p. 17-21.
The Respondent also argues that Mr. Grove did not demonstrate prejudice because the
impeachment was proper and because there was "little reason to believe that the evidence of
mismanagement played any significant role" in the jury's deliberations. Respondent's Closing p.
17-21.3 However, the Respondent's argument is contrary to the record and contrary to the law.

The Respondent also argues in a footnote that this Court should not consider deficient
-· ----_,._ performance in the failure to object to questioning and ar-gumentto the effect-that Dr.-Arden was
on a paid mission for the defense because the claim was not made in the petition. Respondent's
Closing, p. 17, footnote 5. In making this argument, the Respondent has confused allegations
supporting claims with claims. The claim that Mr. Grove was denied effective assistance of
3
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As the Respondent notes, Mr. Chapman testified that the improper impeachment was not relevant
to Dr. Arden's medical opinions or his credibility and that it could be prejudicial. EH Tr. p. 205,

ln. 1-13, cited in Respondent's Closing, p. 20, footnote 6. While the Respondent appears to argue
'ihatthere·c'ould be a strategic reason·fornot-objectingto-J)Ot-entially prejudiciate-videnc®',that is .
not relevant, it does not cite this Court to any support for that argument. This is likely because
there is no such support. Likewise, the Respondent does not cite this Court to any place in the
record where Mr. Chapman testified that it was his strategic choice to allow this evidence
without objection. There can be no possible strategic reason for allowing in irrelevant evidence
that is harmful to the client, especially when, as in this case, the evidence could have been kept
out by a motion in limine thus eliminating any possible negative consequences to an attempt to
eliminate the evidence.
As Mr. Parnes testified, the failure to object to this evidence was deficient performance.
EH p. 256, 1n. 19-p. 261, 1n. 3. The evidence was inadmissible under IRE 401, 402, 403, and
404. Moreover, a great part of it was evidence of other bad acts which could not be admitted
without prior notice from the state under IRE 404(b), a notice which the state failed to give. The
failure to object to the improper impeachment was objectively unreasonable. 4

counsel at trial in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Amended Verified Petition p.
24. While the allegations in support of the petition did not include that counsel was deficient in
failing to object to the "on a mission" inappropriate questioning and argument, the claim of
ineffective assistance was clearly before the Court. See, Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493,
95 P.3d 642,644 (Ct.App. 2004), noting the difference between claims and allegations
supporting the claims.
4 The Respondent tries to characterize Mr. Parnes' testimonyas,testimony only that he
personally would have conducted the defense according to a different strategy than Mr. Chapman
chose. Respondent's Closing p. 21. However, this argument misconstrues Mr. Parnes'
testimony. Mr. Parnes specifically testified that counsel's failure to object to the inadmissible
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Mr. Parnes' testimony is consistent with the case law. fu McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,
571,225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010), the Supreme Court held that counsel's performance was deficient
when there was no conceivable tactical justification for the failure to object to inadequate jury
·,z_:;.' ·_,

,~-instructions:·· Likewise here, there was-nu-conceivable-tactical justification for the failure to file a

-.

motion in limine or object at trial to the improper impeachment.

Mr. Grove has proven deficient performance by a preponderance of the evidence.
4. Prejudice From the Deficient Performance in Presenting Dr. Arden's Testimony
The Respondent has argued that Mr. Grove did not prove prejudice by a preponderance of
the evidence because the improper impeachment evidence was admissible and therefore there
was no prejudice in not objecting. At the same time, the Respondent argues that even if the
evidence was inadmissible there was no prejuaice oecause 1t was unlilcely that the evidence
played any role in the verdict because it "did not ultimately undercut Dr. Arden's medical
opinion." Respondent's Closing p. 23-25.
The Respondent argues that the evidence was properly admissible with this reasoning:
"That Dr. Arden was forced from his chosen career path because of allegations of
mismanagement and therefore had a gap in employment and had to build a business was all
relevant to show bias in taking this case and reaching conclusions helpful to the defense."
Respondent's Closing p. 23. This argument might carry the day if in fact the state had presented
impeachment showing that Dr. Arden was unemployable, was desperate for money, and thus lied
to the jury in order to collect his expert fees. But, that is not the evidence the state presented.

testimony was deficient performance - not because it was a different strategy from that which Mr.
Parnes would have chosen if he had been trial counsel, but because the failure was not the result
of a strategic decision and was objectively unreasonable. EH p. 260, In. 23-p. 261, In. 3.
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There was no indication that Dr. Arden was unemployable, that his income was precarious, or
that he was desperate for money and work. Moreover, there was no evidence that he was the sort
of man who, even if he was in such a situation, would lie to a jury in order to obtain the fees the
,..;/ , · - •: >

•

'defense could· pay for his expert testimony; -Nof'Wa.S·there· any evidence that,Mr;· Chapman-was -the sort of attorney who would seek out an indigent desperate unemployable doctor so that he
could put medically questionable "expert" testimony before the jury. In short, there is absolutely
no evidence that Dr. Arden is dishonest. Nor is there any evidence that Mr. Chapman would
seek out a dishonest expert and knowingly put dishonest testimony before the jury. The
Respondent's relevancy argument fails because the evidence before the jury did not go to prove
bias or dishonesty.
At tlie same time, ffie Respondent argues that even

utne eviclence was inadmissible ana.

did, as it concedes "arguably [have] some potential for unfair prejudice," Respondent's Closing
p. 23, the evidence did not play a role in the verdict. Why in the world would the state have
sought out and presented this evidence if it did not believe that the evidence would play a role in
the verdict? Why would the prosecutor question Dr. Arden so extensively about his departure
from the Washington, D.C. medical examiner's office at the end of his cross-examination at trial,

if the evidence would not play a role in the jury's verdict? Ex. B, p. 1372, ln. 8-p. 1378, ln. 9; p.
1382, ln. 6-p. 1388, ln. 12. Why would the prosecutor make the arguments in closing and
rebuttal set out in Mr. Grove's Closing at pages 20-21 focusing on the exit from the Washington,
D.C. office if the state did not believe that the evidence was going to play a role in the verdict?
The Respondent's argument in its Closing in this case is contrary to its position at trial
and is not sensible in light of the record the state itself created at trial. It should be rejected both
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on the -grounds of judicial estoppel, McAllister, supra, and because it is inconsistent with the trial
record.

Mr. Grove has proven prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. 5

·---.- c.

IneffectiveAssistaiice'W'itlfRegard·tt1 Sleeping'ffitrors· ·,, ···--

Mr. Grove presented unrebutted evidence in the hearing on the petition that one or more
jurors had slept at various points in the trial. He has also argued that the failure of counsel to
consult with Mr. Grove and alert the Court through a motion for a mistrial was deficient
performance. Closing Argument p. 23-26. Mr. Grove presented expert testimony, EH p. 261, ln.
19-p. 263, ln. 14, and case law, State v. Umphenour, S.Ct. No. 41497, _Idaho__, _P.3d
_ , 2015 WL 1423789 (Ct. App. March 30, 2105), relying on State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963,
966, 703 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1985), which confirms that tneTdalio Constitution requrresllie
defendant's personal waiver of the right to a jury trial. Mr. Grove has set out how the failure of
counsel to consult him regarding action to be taken regarding the sleeping jurors potentially
impeded his right to a unanimous jury and amounted to a waiver which counsel cannot make
without the client's consent. Closing Argument p. 24. Mr. Grove has thus carried his burden of
proof on this matter.
The Respondent has responded by arguing that Mr. Grove failed to show that a mistrial

Mr. Grove also proved by a preponderance of the evidence that had counsel objected to
the improper impeachment at trial and the evidence was nonetheless admitted the matter would
have been reviewed on appeal under the standard of free review with the burden on the state to
prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. EH p. 258, ln. 1-14. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho
713,717,264 P.3d 54; 58 (2011-);Btate V; Perry, 15-0ldaho209; 22-1'-22, 245 P.3d 961, 973-74 -·
(2010). Closing p. 21-22. The Respondent has not disputed this statement of the law nor argued
that Mr. Grove did not show a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on appeal had
the error been preserved. On this basis also, Mr. Grove has carried his burden of proof.
5
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would have been granted and that the tactical choice to not move for a mistrial was based on any
objective shortcoming. The Respondent further denies any prejudice. Respondent's Closing p.

25.
,. JL .- •

Tne Respondent's argam:ent'l'egardingwhether'~a1n.istrial•would have been granted is - --beside the point. The question is not whether a mistrial would have been granted. The question
is whether counsel was deficient in waiving the right to a unanimous jury without consulting the
client. This is not a tactical decision that counsel may make. Umphenour, supra; Swan, supra;
ICR23(a). See also, State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 102, 753 P.3d 833,838 (Ct. App. 1988).
The Respondent attempts to evade the conclusion that counsel was deficient by arguing
that Mr. Grove did not plead that the failure to consult him was deficient performance. Again,
the Respondent has confused claims with allegations m support oftlie c l ~ ; · Grove c1early
claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Amended Petition p. 33. This Court clearly articulated
that the issue before it was whether counsel was deficient in not alerting the Court to the sleeping
jurors. Opinion and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment p. 39. If the Respondent believed
that this claim of ineffective assistance was not properly before the Court, the Respondent should
have moved to reconsider the Court's order granting an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
Having failed to do so, the Respondent consented to the matter being tried before the Court.
IRCP 15(b) stating that when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.
Toe-Respondent also argues thatMr:-Grove did not present any evidence that he was not
0

consulted by counsel. Respondent's Closing p. 30. However, Mr. Chapman specifically testified
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that he carinot recall consulting with Mr. ·Grove about the sleeping jurors and that he did not
obtain a written waiver from Mr. Grove. EH p. 219, 1n. 3-12.
The Respondent further argues that counsel did not have a duty to move for a mistrial
· -·

"--· ·because to request otiewbula·hlive-advanced a~1mvel""legal'1:heory:" However, it is not a novel

-.-~..:: . ,-----~,-'., ,·

theory that the waiver of a jury trial is an action that requires the personal waiver of the
defendant. ICR 23(a) and Swan, supra. See also, State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686,689,214 P.3d
672, 675 (Ct. App. 2008), noting that sleeping during trial may constitute juror misconduct.
There is nothing novel about the idea that if one or more jurors are sleeping and thus not present
for the trial that the right to the jury trial has been impeded.
The Respondent lastly argues that Mr. Grove's argument that counsel's deficiency in
failing to consult him about waiving his right to a jury tnal amounted to structural errons 'not
grounded in the law." Respondent's Closing p. 32. However, the Respondent does not elaborate
on or explain its position and so Mr. Grove cannot respond to it. Mr. Grove stands on his
argument that the deficiency created a structural error that is to be treated as presumptively
prejudicial per United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984). Closing Argument
p. 25.
The Respondent also argues that Mr. Grove has not shown prejudice per Strickland.
Respondent's Closing p. 32. However, Mr. Grove has shown prejudice. He has shown that the
case turned on the medical evidence, which absent the improper impeachment of Dr. Arden,
provided greater support for the defense than for the state. Had the jurors all been awake for all
of the ex.pert testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have

···-···= ·

been different. Moreover, had counsel not been deficient in failing to consult with Mr. Grove,
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there is a reasonable probability that he would have declined to waive his right to a jury trial - as
evidenced by his election to proceed to a jury trial in the first place. This would have resulted in
some sort of remedy - whether a mistrial or, if possible, the dismissal of the sleeping jurors as
· - · ·· · · ·· alternates. In 'either event, there is a reasoit:tbie-probability; given the evidence presented, that,-',.:~. ,

Mr. Grove would not have been convicted in this trial by this jury.
D. Ineffective Assistance With Regard to Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing

Mr. Grove alleged in his petition that defense counsel's performance was deficient
because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the prosecutor and failed to
move for a mistrial after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. Amended Verified
Petition, p. 34-35. In his Closing Argument, he set forth each of those examples and
demonstrated why an objection wascalloo for andsliowedtliat defense counsel"'coula not account
for why he did not object.
The Respondent does not address these instances individually, but instead resorts to
generalities about how there might be legitimate reasons for not objecting. Respondent's
Arguments, pg. 33-34. In doing so, it ignores the evidence presented at the hearing where
defense counsel could not account for the failure to object. Defense counsel did not testify that
he feared the jury might see an objection ''to be a sign of desperation or hyepertecnicality." He
did not testify that he thought any of the prosecutorial misconduct was "helpful to his case" or
that he believed that he could "capitalize on the prosecutor's statement during his own closing
argument." (And, in the case of the emotional breakdown evidence discussed in Part A, defense
"counsel's attempt to address thatissue·ii:rclosing only opened the door to a devastating rebuttal ·
argument.) Nor did defense counsel testify that the failure to object was based upon a decision
21 • PETIDONER'S REBUTTAL TO RESPONDENT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
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· ''to avoid calling attention to the statements and thus giving them more force." Thus, this Court
need not "indulge in a strong presumption" that counsel's failure to testify falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. See Respondent's Argument, pg. 33 (quoting cases).

· ···--····· · · · · ·· ·:rv.tr: Grove-presented: evidence that theffa:ilure-ta-0bjectwas-below the standards o:f reasoaable---,-. "'' ,- .-,.,. --·· - , . ~
assistance and defense counsel could not state any reason why he failed to object. Thus, Mr.
Grove has overcome the presumption with evidence.
The fact that defense counsel could not state a reason for failing to object was "important

in terms of making a decision about deficient performance, that it implies that there's no ...
tactical or strategic reason thought out and planned for." EH Tr. p. 271, ln. 11-17. The
Respondent belatedly complains, however, that Mr. Grove ''usually'' did not give defense counsel
any context wlien aslan~ about mdiVIdual instances· ofaefic1ent performance. Respondent's
Argument, pg. 34. Mr. Grove disagrees with the blanket statement, but even if it were true, the
Respondent ignores the instances where, in its opinion, context was given. It also ignores that it
had a full and fair opportunity to cross examine defense counsel about each of the instances and
give the matter all the context it felt appropriate, but failed to do so. The Respondent knew well
in advance that defense counsel would be questioned on the specific instances raised at the
hearing. It attended the deposition of defense counsel, had a copy of the transcript of that
deposition and knew from pages 16-18 of the Verified Amended Petition precisely where Mr.
Grove believed objections should have been made. 6 One can only presume that the Respondent
made no effort to ask defense counsel if there were possible explanations for the failure to make

Paragraph 50 of the Amended Petition alleged: "Defense counsel did not object to any
of the misconduct alleged in paragraphs 47-49." Thus, the Respondent had ample advance notice
of what would be asked and would have provided its own "context" had it thought it was needed.
6
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specific objections because it knew there were none. Mr. Grove has shown that a reasonable professional defense attorney would not have let

the prosecutor: 1) misrepresent the defense's theory of the case; 2) argue facts not in evidence; 3)

tactics; 4) diminish the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 7 and 5) argue
conclusions not supported by the evidence. While both sides in a trial have traditionally been
afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury, a prosecutor exceeds the scope of
this considerable latitude if he or she "attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the
law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,

227, 245~ag--61--:-979-(2010J. That was the case here ando.efense counselslioulclnave done
something to stop it.
Finally, the Respondent argues that there could be no prejudicial effect because "[a]ny
objection, even if sustained, would have only resulted in reiterating instructions the jury received
anyway." Respondent's Argument, pg. 35. But that is not the case. Had proper objections been
made, the prosecutor's misstatement of the defense theory of the case would have been stricken
and the jury would have been instructed to disregard. The same is true regarding the prosecutor's
comment about how horrible it was to perform the autopsy. While the jury might have heard one
of the assertions about the widespread problem of care givers killing infants that comment would
Defense counsel testified that he did not know whether the prosecutor's argument that
thejury didn't wanttolet-amurderer go free was objectionable. EHTr .. p. 223, ln.l-19 .. So, the_----·-failure to object would not have been a matter of tactics as theorized by the Respondent. Rather,
the failure to object must have been based upon ignorance of the law as the comment was clearly
improper.
7
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have been stricken and the rest of the comments never would have been made at all. And if the
jury heard the state's argument that it acceptable to convict Mr. Grove even if the evidence did
not support such a verdict because "we don't want to let a murderer go free," it also would have

examination question about Mr. Grove's "emotional breakdown" been made, the jury would not
have heard the prosecutor's closing argument that incident proved that Mr. Grove had another
breakdown when he was alone with

Had the jury not been exposed to such improper

argument, there was a reasonable probability of a different result and relief should be granted. 8

E. Cumulative Prejudicial Effect of the Totality of the Deficient Performance
The Respondent does not dispute that the Court should consider all the deficient
-performance andllien aetermme wliellier llie cum.mauve effect was prejilltic1al. See, Boman v.

State, 129 Idaho 520,527,927 P.2d 910,917 (Ct. App. 1996) and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho
24, 32,878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App.1994); Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003).
Here, Mr. Grove was prejudiced by defense counsel's deficient performance during: 1) his own
direct and cross-examinations; 2) the direct and cross-examination of Dr. Arden; 3) the time the
jurors were sleeping while testimony was being presented; and 4) the multiple instances of
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. So, even if each individual instance of deficient
performance was not enough to undermine confidence in the verdict, the Court should find that
totality of the effect was prejudicial under Strickland.

-8 " The

Respondent does not dispute the claim that defense counsel was also ineffective for.
failing to preserve the prosecutorial misconduct claim for appeal by making timely objections.
Given the enormity of the misconduct, it is reasonably probable that Mr. Grove's conviction
would have been reversed had the issue been preserved for appeal.
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III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons above, this Court should grant the petition, vacate the judgment and
sentence in the criminal case, release Mr. Grove on his own recognizance pending further

: ---·~·-,.·.~_-::., "j>rocee1liligs~ and ordet-thata·new·trialbeb.eld-witbin·areasonable amountoftinte,-· .·
Respectfully submitted this

/4~ day of May, 2015.

~hA;tt WM---~~c..-_---

Deborah Whipple
Attorneys for Stacey Grove

Dennis Benjamin
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STACEY LEWIS GROVE,
Petitioner,
V.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2012-1798

)
)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER; ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

This matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine four
remaining issues from the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The Petitioner was
represented by Dennis Benjamin and Deborah Whipple, of the firm Nevin, Benjamin,
McKay & Bartlett. The State was represented by Jessica Lorello and Kenneth Jorgensen,
of the office of the Idaho Attorney General. Evidence was presented to the Court on
March 24, 2015. The parties also presented oral argument on Petitioner's Second Motion
to Reconsider. Following the hearing, the Court allowed the parties additional time to
submit written closing arguments. The Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby
renders its decision.
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-BACKGROUND
Following a trial by jury, Stacey Grove was found guilty of first degree felony
murder by aggravated battery of a child under twelve years old. The victim was twentythree month_old

Martin. Thejury returned the guilty verdict onJuly30,_2008.

--·""-"'"' -----,-- .- "-- ________

Judgment of conviction was entered on January 28, 2009. The Idaho Court of Appeals
considered the Petitioner's appeal of his judgment of conviction. On March 25, 2011, the
Court issued an appellate opinion which affirmed Grove's conviction of first degree
felony murder.
A detailed factual summary of this case is found in the Court of Appeals Opinion,

State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 485-489, 259 P.3d 629, 631-635 (Ct. App. 2011). The
---~~-~---£etitioner initiate.diliis_pr_o~e_ding_for_post-conYictionrelieflw filing~a Verified Petition _______
for Post-Conviction Relief on September 7, 2012. On April 30, 2013, the Court heard
oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary disposition. This Court issued
an Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition on July 11, 2013, wherein
this Court found the Petitioner had raised a material issue of fact with respect to four
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel within the Amended Verified Petition for PostConviction Relief.
Following the Court's order on summary disposition, the Petitioner filed a motion
to reconsider, which was denied on November 11, 2013. Evidence was presented on the
post-conviction claims in open court on March 24, 2015. The Court also heard the
Petitioner's second motion for reconsideration. First this Court will address the motion to
reconsider. Then the Court will review the legal standard for post-conviction relief and
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· ______
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I

set forth findings of fact from the evidence presented, followed by conclusions of law on
these four remaining claims.

SECOND MOTION TO RECONSIDER
----

-

--- -

-

- -

The P.etitioner- has filed a--secondmotion for reconsideration, asking this Courtto-.--. -

0

0

reconsider its order granting the Respondent's motion for summary disposition as to the
confrontation clause issue and the Confrontation Clause aspects of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. The Court has reviewed the motion and finds there still
remains a split of authority on the issue of whether an autopsy is considered "testimonial"
for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis. Therefore, the Court stands by the ruling
set forth in the Opinion and Order on Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, filed
______- _____November.21,2013____________ _

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution
of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
interest of justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint;
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy.
LC. § 19-490l(a).
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A petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-

Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709,
711,905 P.2d 642,644 (Ct. App. 1995). "An application for post-conviction relief
initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,
287,912 P.2d 653,655 (Ct. App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction
-~~ -~-~--reliefc')llustbe~v--erified-With..respectio

i

l

facts_withirLthe..personalJmowledge_ofih~-·~--

1

applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be

!

attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with
the petition. I.C. § 19-4903." Id.

In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of
pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim
for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844,846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994).
Under I.C. § 19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However,
"[s]ummary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no
genuine issue of material fact which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
petitioner to the requested relief." Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287, 912 P.2d at 655. "If
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the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, at 711,
905 P.2d at 644. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any
~ "'

' · --- --fact,- is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to--art evidentiary hearing.'\.Baruth v. Bardner, .
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986).

FINDINGS OF FACT ON REMAINING ISSUES FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF
There are four issues which were addressed at the evidentiary hearing.
Accordingly, findings of fact will be presented as they apply to each issue, following
these general facts of the case:
1. Grove hired attorney Scott Chapman to represent him during the criminal
-·~~---·

.

.

--

..

·---··~---~~---------- .----------

proceedings.

Chapman filed motions in advance of the trial, and represented

Grove throughout the entire proceedings. Sarah Geis assisted Chapman during

. _.

the trial as a paralegal.
2. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, Chapman had been an attorney for almost
thirty years. Chapman's area of practice has become more focused on criminal
defense over his years of practice. Chapman estimated he has handled over 500
criminal cases and represented clients in over twenty jury trials, typically
averaging one to two criminal trials per year.
3. Chapman presented Grove's case following the legal theory that the injuries that
led to the victim's death occurred prior to the early morning hours of July 10,
2006. The State presented evidence that the injuries occurred on the morning of
July 10, 2006, while the victim was alone with Grove.
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Whether counsel's performance was deficient during direct and cross-examination of the Petitioner.
4. Grove claims Chapman's performance was deficient when he questioned Grove
on direct and cross-examination. First, Grove claims Chapman should have
objected when the prosecutor questioned Grove regarding his relationship with his
biological son. When asked why he failed to object to the prosecutor's question
regarding child support, Chapman stated that he thought about objecting but chose
not to in order to not draw the jury's attention to the issue more than it already
had been.
5. During the trial, the prosecutor made the statement, "Mr. Grove, I understand the
story you've told this morning is the story you need the jury to believe, but there
-~-~

--------·-------- -------------------~----·

are some things I am curious about. They just don't really seem to make sense."
Cha,pman objected to the statement and the objection was sustained by the Court.

I

Chapman did not recall why he did not ask the statement to be stricken.
6. When asked about the prosecutor's questions to Grove regarding the Ativan
prescription and his inability to testify as scheduled at trial, Chapman stated that
he was not sure that under the circumstances the testimony was objectionable.
7.

Grove presented Attorney Andrew Parnes as an expert regarding his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Parnes has been a member of the California
State Bar since 1978, the Idaho State Bar since 1990 and various federal district
courts and the United States Supreme Court, and also courts of appeal, Ninth and
Tenth Circuit. His practice includes representation-in,capital litigation, habeas
corpus cases and appellate practice.
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8. -Parnes opined trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's cross- examination regarding Grove's biological son, trial counsel should have asked the
prosecutor's statements regarding ''the story you need the jury to believe" to be
- stricken, and that trial counsel-should-have objected-when the prosecutor
questioned Grove regarding his Ativan prescription and the delay of the trial.

Whether counsel was deficient during the direct and cross-examination of Dr.
Arden.
9. Grove asserts that Chapman's performance was deficient for failing to provide the
expert witness, Dr. Arden, with copies of iron stained slides the medical examiner
reviewed during the autopsy. Chapman sent a letter to the prosecutor seeking
recuts of slides made during the autopsy. He could not recall if he followed up
with Dr. Arden to see if Dr. Arden had received all the slides he wanted.
However,_itwas his practice to facilitate getting information to an expert if it was
requested of him.
10. Grove also asserts Chapman was deficient in his handling of information
available for purposes of impeaching Dr. Arden's testimony. Chapman was
aware of potential impeachment issues regarding Dr. Arden's employment as
Chief Medical Examiner in Washington, D.C. Chapman explained he did not
object to the prosecutor's attempt to impeach because none of the issues went to
Dr. Arden's opinion or his medical abilities, and the jurors would see that. He did
not feel an objection would make a difference to the opinions presented. In
hindsight;· Chapman thought it may have been better to present the issue in direct
testimony, or "pull the thorn," by presenting it to the jury first so it doesn't look
like you are trying to hide the information.
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11. Dr. Jonathan Arden testified in the criminal trial as an expert witness on behalf of
the defendant. Dr. Arden is a forensic pathologist who has held his medical
license since 1981. He currently conducts a consulting practice in forensic
pathology and medicinec,:-and..alsohasapart.,.time,appointment as a medical
examiner in the state of West Virginia.
12. Dr. Arden was called as the last defense witness in the criminal trial. During
cross-examination he was questioned by the prosecutor regarding the issue of his
departure from his employment as Chief Medical Examiner in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Arden confirmed he had discussed this matter with defense attorney Scott
Chapman when Chapman contacted him to potentially be a witness in the case.
_____. . ______
. Dr~~en_explainedJ:hatJ:heissue.s_of_his__depar:tur_eJtom___emplo}'lllenLasthe~ .

________

Chief Medical Examiner in Washington, D.C. did not relate to his medical
expertise, credibility, or honesty as a witness.
13. In preparing for the criminal case, Dr. Arden requested a set of all the microscopic
slides that were done pursuant to this autopsy, both the general autopsy and the
brain examination, including slides that utilized special stains. At the time of
trial, Dr. Arden had copies of all slides, except iron stain slides that were
reviewed by the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy on the body, Dr.
Marco Ross. Dr. Arden did review the iron stain slides of the abdomen in
preparation for the evidentiary hearing on post-conviction relief.
14. Dr. Arden felt that in preparation for the criminal trial he had received everything
he needed to support the opinions he was prepared to render regarding the timing
of the injuries to the victim. However, recently, when reviewing the iron stain
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slides from the abdomen, he learned additional information to support his
determinations regarding the timing of the injuries to the victim's abdomen,
including pancreas and mesentery.
15. -At the criminattrial;,withoutthe benefitoi,r€-viewing the iron stain slides from the- abdomen, Dr. Arden opined that there were injuries in this area that were 48 to 72
hours of age. By reviewing the iron stain slides, he found evidence of injuries
that were substantially older, on the order of a week or more. Similar evidence
was also noted from review of iron stain slides from the eyes and optic nerves.
There were no iron stain slides made of the brain, thus, Dr. Arden did not review
any such slides to prepare for this evidentiary hearing. Ultimately, Dr. Arden
--c-0pineS-hechas-11ow---expandedhis-0riginal-Opinion_at-1riaLas.__a_re.sult~of_the_reyiew_ _ _ _ __
of the iron stain slides. However, Dr. Arden confirmed that his opinion regarding
the age of the most recent injuries, which were the injuries that led to the victim's
death, were the same as his opinion presented at trial.

Whether counsel was deficient for failing to move for a mistrial because jurors may
have been sleeping during the presentation of testimony.
16. Debbie Grove, Carol Grove, Lori Stamper, Karen Stamper, Craig Stamper, and
Justina Hyder were all present in the gallery during various dates of the trial, to
support Stacey Grove. From their vantage point in the gallery, each witness
described what they viewed to be jurors sleeping during the presentation of
evidence in this case.
17. The State presented testimony from the following individuals who presided as
jurors in the criminal trial: Kim Behler, Casey Neiman, Kendall Loetscher,
Michael Keller, Sharon Taylor, Gregory Lind, and Nanda Lamb. Each juror
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testified that they did not sleep during the presentation of evidence, nor did they
notice any of the other jurors sleeping.
18. While the observers in the gallery were credible in their testimony, the jurors
· · themselves~were .inthe,,bestposition.t&I'6COgnize.whether-they personally were.

_. ,.:c-~~- ,··,..

~:,,- ·;-: _ .

sleeping, or whether a fellow juror on the panel fell asleep during the proceedings.
The jurors all testified consistently that they did not sleep, nor did they notice
· anyone sleeping.
19. Chapman testified that during the trial it came to his attention that someone
thought a juror was sleeping. He could not recall if he was told the juror was
sleepy or that the juror was sleeping. After Chapman was advised of the concern,
·-·--the-Coui:t.called~for.aJunchrecess.~hapman_didnoHake_an~ac.tions_r.e~ar.ding________
the issue.

Whether defense counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient.

20. Grove asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to object to several statements
made by the prosecutor during closing argument and rebuttal argument. Further,
Grove claims counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial based upon
the prosecutor's misconduct.
21. Chapman confirmed that he did not make objections to the statements set forth in
the Amended Petition. Chapman did object once to statements made by the
prosecutor during the closing statement. When Chapman made his closing
statement,' he responded to the:State' s theory of the case and explained where the
State failed to meet its burden of proving the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
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22. Parnes testified that in his opinion Chapman should have objected to the
statements made by the prosecuting attorney. He opined that because Chapman
did not have an explanation of why he did not object to the statements, there was
no -ta€ticalor-strategic reasoning-employed-during the closing arguments. . --·-:-:·

,-.,~~c,;::_ ..,_,. ~-s-.' ,··:, ,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are judged under the standards set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 674 (1984).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a postconviction petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was
deficient and, in most cases, must also show that prejudice resulted from
the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,693 (1984); Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517,
520,960 P.2d 738,741 (1998); Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900
. __g,2d-22l,-224-.{Ct.App...l.995};.Jlussellll....8tate,J.l&_Idaho-65~.fJ1,..J.9A.P.2cL___ __
654, 656 (Ct.App.1990). Deficient performance is established if the
applicant shows that the attorney's representation fell below an objective
standard ofreasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064,
80 L.Ed.2d at 693; Berg, 131 Idaho at 520,960 P.2d at 741; Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell, 118 Idaho
at 67, 794 P .2d at 656. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance
the outcome of the criminal case would have been different. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697; Berg, 131 Idaho at
520, 960 P.2d at 741; Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell,
118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656.
Mintitn v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 658-659, 168 P.3d 40, 42-43 (Ct. App. 2007). It is well
established that an attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that
counsel's performance is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Gibson V;Btate, 110 Idaho 631,634; 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986).

When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court
does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions
cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is
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shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance·ofthe
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Pratt v.
State, 134 Idaho 581,584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000). "There is a strong
presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of
professional assistance." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d
1170, 1185 (1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aragon v. State,
----,,, ,_,4:::J:-¥Ida.ho :758; 760,96Q:.P~d-l114rl-l-'l6-(198-8)}.-- -. -~,-~_:::,,_,"- ..,..,,,--, _ _

State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). 1

1 Idaho

appellate courts look to the bedrock principles governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims as
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland. Recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals in
Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 327 P.3d 372 (Ct App. 2013) stated:
This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of
counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on
inadequate preparation, ignorance ofrelevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective evaluation. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168,172,254 P.3d 69, 73
(Ct.App.2011). There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the
·--:---wicle-range-ofprofessional-assistance:-S1ate.r.--S-hackelford;-i-50--I-daho-3-55,-383,--14-1-P-;3d
582,610 (2010); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999).
Because it proves important in this case, we note that in Strickland, the United States
Supreme Court elaborated regarding the considerations applicable when a court is
determining whether counsel rendered deficient performance:
- ·
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all
too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction
or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense
after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of
counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,
the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." There are countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of
detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of
ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant
would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's
unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could
be adversely affected Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for
acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of
defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the
trust between attorney and client.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95 (citations
omitted).
Id. at 409-10, 327 P.3d at 385-86.
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The Petitioner sets forth several claims that trial counsel was ineffective. Material
issues of fact were raised with respect to four issues, each will be addressed below.
1. Whether counsel's performance was deficient during direct and crossexamination of the Petitioner.
The Petitioner asserts counsel's performance was deficient during the direct and
cross-examination of the Petitioner during the criminal trial. Specifically, the Petitioner
claims counsel was deficient because he introduced evidence regarding the Petitioner's
relationship with his son, Alex, and then failed to object when the prosecuting attorney
asked whether the Petitioner was behind on child support payments. The Petitioner
asserts counsel's performance was deficient for failing to move to strike the prosecutor's
comments after an objection to a statement, ''the story you need the jury to believe," was
·-··~---·-··------·---~

made. Finally, the Petitioner asserts defense counsel was deficient for failing to object
when the prosecutor questioned Grove about his emotional state which led to a delay of
the trial.
The Petitioner has not met his burden of showing counsel was ineffective with
regard to direct and cross-examination of Grove. The testimony in question falls into the
category of strategic and tactical decision making which occurs during the trial process.
The decisions made by counsel are within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. None of the issues raised by the Petitioner are matters which resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law or other shortcomings capable of objective
review. See Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 824 (2000).
a. Testimony regarding Grove's relationship with his biologicalson.
The Petitioner asserts that counsel questioned Grove about the bad relationship
between Grove and his biological son. Exhibit B, p. 1074, 1n. 1-24. At the evidentiary
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hearing counsel stated he could not recall why he elicited this testimony and agreed when
asked if the evidence was unfavorable to Grove. Evidentiary hearing transcript, p. 187,

In. 14-24. The Petitioner asserts counsel was deficient by failing to object when the
·-----·- prosecutor questionedGrove aboutfailingt-0 pay child support, which wa$-n0-t,relevantto- .. -:-,..:'-''",c-·--..,-c,
the issues of the case. Ultimately, the Petitioner claims that counsel's actions portrayed
Grove as an uninvolved dad in a case where he was accused of harming a child. The
Petitioner relies on a case from the Tenth Circuit, Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283 (10th
Cir. 2002) to argue that where an attorney accidentally brings out damaging testimony
due to a failure to prepare, his conduct cannot be called a strategic choice. See Fisher,
282 F.3d at 1296.
------'.I'h~-F-i-she,-Gase-iS-distinguishable-:fr.om-the..case..at-hancLin.-Eisha,-trial counsel~------ ~ ____
strategy was very poor: counsel admitted to attempting to conduct his investigation at
--

trial. Id. at

1294. 2

--.

In the case before this Court, Petitioner cannot establish that trial

2The Fisher Court reviewed an objectively unreasonable

failure to investigate. In Fisher, there was no
virtually no pretrial preparation or investigation. The same cannot be said in the case before this Court.
The lack of preparation revealed by these illustrative exchanges indicates an
objectively unreasonable failure to investigate. Counsel has a duty to investigate all
reasonable lines of defense, or make reasonable determinations that such investigation is
not necessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A decision not to investigate
cannot be deemed reasonable if it is uninformed. Id. Mr. Porter's decision not to
undertake substantial pretrial investigation and instead to "investigate" the case during
the trial was not only uninformed, it was patently unreasonable.
Nor can the actions described above be considered part of a general trial strategy
of pointing to holes in the state's evidence to create a reasonable doubt. Mr. Porter could
have pursued such a strategy: he elicited testimony about certain physical aspects of the
crime and his client that the state itself never introduced or used to link his client to the
crime. Mr. Porter could have argued to the jury it should infer from these circumstances
that the state had no physical evidence against Mr. Fisher, or even that its evidence
exonerated him. However, ''the mere incantation of 'strategy' does not insulate attorney
behavior from review." Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343; 1369 (10th Cid994)
(internal quotation omitted). Here it is evident that counsel did not have a strategy of
pointing to holes in the evidence or trying to create a reasonable doubt in jurors' minds.
To the contrary, it is obvious that during his direct and cross examinations Mr.
Porter had no idea he might elicit information that could be useful to such a strategy.
Furthermore, he made no attempt whatsoever to draw the jury's attention to any gaps in
the state's evidence, and never otherwise articulated a reasonable doubt theory to the jury.
14
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counsel had not prepared for trial; he relies instead on pointing to one instance in the trial
where he contends evidence was not favorable to his case.
The Petitioner presented evidence from Attorney Andrew Parnes wherein Mr.
-··c:·,','e.°'.:~'."c·-.,--;c.h-P,amesfound~thaHherewas-no-valid-s-trategicpurpose.fordefenseoounsel.to-eli~it-fi:om. -:-:::::·-·.:. :·---~--2,.- •...
Grove the evidence of his relationship with his son. Parnes also testified that counsel's
failure to object to the prosecutor's question regarding child support was also below
reasonable professional standards. Ultimately, the Petitioner contends that this portion of
the case resulted in no strategy on the part of trial counsel.
To satisfy the requirements of Strickland, the Petitioner must show that the
attorney's performance was deficient and, that prejudice resulted from the deficiency.

-----Str-iekland--v.--Washingt<Jn,466..U..-S..668,-687,l..04-S. Ct.2052,.2064,...80L.Ed.2d.6J..4,1i93
(1984). The Court does not find that counsel's representation fell below reasonable
professional standards with respect to the testimony regarding Grove and his son.
Further, even if the Petitioner were to establish the first prong of Strickland, there is no
evidence in this record that prejudice resulted from this deficiency. In other words, there
is no evidence the outcome of the trial would have been different but for this avenue of
testimony. While in hindsight it may have appeared that Grove had a bad relationship
with his biological son, this has minimal bearing on whether Grove committed a battery

Consequently, the accidentally elicited damaging testimony remained just that, damaging,
rather than part of a strategy designed to benefit his client. Where an attorney
accidentally brings out testimony that is damaging because he has failed to prepare, his
conduct cannot be called a strategic choice: an event produced by the happenstance of
·.. ···coi.uisel's uninformed and reckless cross-examination cannot be called- a "choice" at all.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (counsel's failure to investigate must be
the product of a reasonable decision that the particular investigation is unnecessary or it is
deficient). We conclude counsel's uncontroverted failure to investigate some of the most
obvious aspects of the case was unreasonable and deficient.
Fisher, 282 F.3d at 1296.
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Martin. Therefore, the Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

is denied.

b. Failure to move to strike statement of prosecutor "the story you need the
jury to believe."
-- --··-----------------..
.

-···

···-··

----~--

The Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike the
prosecutor's comments. The trial record shows that the prosecutor characterized Grove's
sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is the 'the story you need the jury to
believe' and then the prosecutor opined that "some things ... just don't really make
sense." Exhibit B, p. 1113, ln. 8-13. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, but
counsel failed to ask the comments be stricken, or that the jury be instructed to disregard
the comments.
------

The Petitioner relies on cases which held that the failure to object to improper
statements by the prosecutor have been found to be deficient performance under

Strickland. See People v. Bodden, 82 A.D.3d 781, 784, 918 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (2011).
In the case at hand, there was an objection to the statement. The Petitioner fails to
establish that counsel's failure to ask for a motion to strike rises to the level of deficient
performance. Further, there is nothing in the record of this case to establish, that but for
the failure to request the Court strike the testimony, the outcome of the case would have
been different. Therefore, the Petitioner fails to meet his burden on this claim.

c. Prosecutor's questions about Grove's emotional state.
In the criminal trial, Grove was scheduled to testify on Friday; however, the case
--wa~rdelayed until Monday because Grove was unable to testify, nor aid in his defense, due to his emotional state on that day. The jury was informed that an unforeseen medical
situation had arisen which affected the court's ability to proceed that day. During the
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State's cross-examination of Grove, the prosecutor asked if Grove was currently taking
any medications, when the medication was prescribed, and whether it was prescribed due
to Grove's emotional state on Friday. Exhibit B, p. 1120, In. 9-1.2. At the evidentiary
hearin'.g' Attorney Parnes testified that in his opinion-defense counsel should hav@oojeeted ,, -·- - - . -. ·.--- ------,-+
to the testimony as irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
The Petitioner relies on United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1099 (7th Cir. 1986)
to support his argument that performance is deficient where a prosecutor used crossexamination to bring in extraneous and at times unfounded charges to blacken the
defendant's character. In the Wolf case, the court found defense counsel was deficient,
because the attorney's strategy of the case was to not object to any line of questioning by
-- ------t-h.epr-oseeut-er-.----- - .-··-.-

-

·----~-------------

Any doubt about the prejudicial effect of the improper cross-examination
. . is erased when we consider Wolfs last challenge to his conviction, which ..
is that his trial counsel was totally incompetent. Counsel made no
objection to any of the improper cross-examination. The government
argues that this was a tactical decision: a tactic of no objections. It is true
that lawyers will frequently not object to objectionable questions,
believing either that the witness will give an answer helpful to the defense
(or at least not harmful to it) or that too-frequent objecting will irritate the
jury or make it think the defendant is trying to hide the truth. But to have a
policy of never objecting to improper questions is forensic suicide. It shifts
the main responsibility for the defense from defense counsel to the judge.
It would make no sense in a case like this where the prosecutor was intent
on bringing in extraneous and at times unfounded charges in order to
blacken the defendant's character. The failure to object to any of the
improper cross-examination discussed above is incomprehensible, as is the
failure to object to the instruction on intent or to offer a "dominant
purpose" instruction.
United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d at 1099. Wolf is clearly distinguishable from the case at

hand. In this matter, there is no evidence in the record that defense counsel was operating
in a manner similar to the defense attorney in Wolf
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The Petitioner has not established that counsel was deficient for failing to object
to the questions regarding Ativan at the trial. This issue falls into tactical and strategic
decision making, and thus, does not establish counsel was ineffective. 3 Further, the
P-etitioner has not shown-that had-the tes-timony not4Jee!l--€.licited, the outcome:o£the case--- --- --,---

~ : "1

would have been different. Therefore, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
dismissed.

2. Whether counsel was deficient during the direct and cross-examination of
Dr.Arden.

The Petitioner has presented a question of material fact regarding whether counsel
rendered deficient performance in the presentation of the expert testimony of Dr. Arden.
~- -· - - · -.'.f-he--P--et-itioner-asserts-that-Df.Aroon-Was-not-suppli-ed-Wi.th-all-existingmicmscopic-_slicies_ _ _ _ __
for examination prior to trial. Further, the Petitioner asserts counsel was deficient for
failing to object when the Prosecutor elicited testimony for purposes of impeaching Dr.
Arden.
a. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to provide the iron stain slides.

At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Arden testified that he had asked defense counsel
to send him all the microscopic slides that had been made by the medical examiner who
performed the autopsy, which included iron stain slides. Attorney Chapman testified that
the letter he sent to the prosecutor requested recuts for Dr. Arden's review, but not
specifically iron stain slides. Attorney Parnes opined that failing to obtain the iron slides
3 The Petitioner presented the testimony of Attorney Parnes to establish that defense counsel should have
objected to the cross-examination regarding Grove's use of Ativan, and emotional state. While Attorney
Parnes testified that he would have objected, this does not establish that defense counsel was ineffective
when he made a different decision. "There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
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for Dr. Arden prior to trial violated reasonable professional norms because providing all·
relevant information to an expert is critical to the expert's ability to review the matter
fully.
- -·-:---··· ·- .· .

.:.

.. ··

.·, ..

information he needed in order to form opinions about the case. Dr. Arden responded
that he requested recuts, and those were provided. 4 During the evidentiary hearing Dr.
Arden testified he had received all the information he needed to form opinions about the
case. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 133-138. Because Dr. Arden had sufficient
evidence to support the opinions he presented in the case, the Petitioner fails to establish
counsel was deficient.
- - - - - - - ---~Fmther-,th€-l!et.iti0n€r-eannot-establish-that.butfor.counsel:sJailure10_.proYideJhe _ _._.__ ... .
iron stain slides; the outcome of the case would have been different. At the evidentiary
hearing, Dr. Arden testified that examination of the iron stains led to the discovery of
evidence of healed injuries in one of the victim's eyes, his back, and the mesentery in his
abdomen. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 162-177. However, during the trial Dr.
Arden testified regarding his observations of injuries that were more than a week old
based upon his examination of the evidence provided to him at that time. 5 The existence
of injuries older than those which caused the victim's death does not call the verdict into

4

At the trial Dr. Arden testified as follows:
Q. Did you feel like there was any information that you needed in order to form opinions about
this that was not provided to you?
A No sir. And, in fact, I will tell you that along the course of reviewing materials, one of the
things that I felt I needed was the recuts of the slides. They didn't come initially. And so, at that
point, I requested thetn of you; and you and the state arranged for them to be provided. So, what I
requested I was given.
Trial Transcript, Volume II, p. 1252, ln. 25-p. 1253, ln.9.
5 Trial transcript, Volume II, p. 1302 (discussing older, healed injuries); p. 1308(discussing older injuries in
context of whether the victim would have shown severe symptoms); p. 1340 (acknowledging that his
findings of prior injuries were disclosed in pre-trial discovery); p. 1363 (discussing older injuries with
scarring).
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question. -While the iron stains may have helped Dr. Arden discuss older injuries to the
eye, back and mesentery, there is no evidence regarding the significant injuries to the
victim's brain. Therefore, because the Petitioner fails to establish that Dr. Arden's
• - :< --·<•- - · 1• -

·presentation from the-iron stains would-have-ehanged the outoome--ofthe trial-, this claim- - --- -·---

H

is dismissed.
b. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to object when the Prosecutor
elicited testimony for purposes of impeaching Dr. Arden.

The Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor's attempt to impeach Dr. Arden regarding alleged gross mismanagement when
he was the Medical Examiner in the District of Columbia and failing to attempt to
rehabilitate Dr. Arden on re-direct examination. At the evidentiary hearing, Attorney
- - - - - - - - "·-·----~----

--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Chapman testified that he was aware of the impeachment issues from discussions with
Dr. Arden and from his own internet research; he assumed the prosecutor would also. be _
aware of this· information; that he did not believe the accusation evidence was relevant,
and could be prejudicial; and that he could have made a pretrial motion in limine to
exclude the evidence. 6 Attorney Parnes opined counsel's failure to object and failure to
file a motion in limine were prejudicial and deficient performance.
The Petitioner's claim that trial counsel did not adequately address crossexamination and impeachment of Dr. Arden falls within the area of tactical or strategic
decision making.
"[C]ounsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack
of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic,
decisions, as- does counsel's·presentation of medical evidence." Giles, 125
Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368. "[S]trategic and tactical decisions will not
be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to
Evidentiary hearing transcript, at 128, 131, 204-207.
20
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have resulted from inadequate preparation; ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review." Pratt, 134 Idaho at
584, 6 P.3d at 834.
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1, 116 (2015). In the case at hand, there is no

- - -evidence to support counsel 1s -de£isiens.,resulted from inadequate preparation or..._._____ ._
ignorance of the relevant law. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot establish counsel was
ineffective based upon the strategies he employed regarding the prosecutor's attempts to
impeach Dr. Arden.
Further, the Petitioner has not shown that but for the impeachment of Dr. Arden,
the outcome of the case would have been different. The evidence that Dr. Arden was
forced to change career paths due to mismanagement was admissible for purposes of
- - - -impeaGhment-in:-t:his-ease,-it-callsinto question..the.witne.ss.es. credibility._ Second, the _____________ _
impeachment evidence was a small portion of the case compared to the significant
amount of medical evidence presented in the case. The Petitioner has not established that
had the prosecutor not attempted to impeach Dr. Arden, the outcome of the case would
have been different.
3. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to move for a mistrial because
jurors may have been sleeping during the presentation of testimony.

The Petitioner raised a material issue of fact regarding whether defense counsel
was deficient for failing to bring to the Court's attention that jurors may be sleeping.
During the evidentiary hearing, several individuals from the gallery testified regarding
their observations of what appeared to be jurors sleeping during the presentation of
testimony. However, several of the jurors also-testified, and each stated they did not
sleep during the trial. The Court found the testimony of the jurors to be credible, and
thus, found no evidence that jurors were sleeping during the presentation of evidence.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
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The Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a mistrial when
the jurors were inattentive. "Where a claim of ineffective assistance is predicated on
counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion would not have been
~- ~~"""--·-·· -- . -

---- -successful generally prec1ud-es-a-finding·ofpr-ejudi£ec}},c:;;:Zepeda v.-State, 15 2.Idaho 710,....
715,274 P.3d 11, 16 (Ct. App. 2012). The Petitioner cannot establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the motion for a mistrial would have been granted, had it been
made.
In State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686,214 P.3d 672 (Ct. App. 2008) the Idaho Court
of Appeals considered whether a juror's inability to hear testimony constituted juror
misconduct.

------ -----~-----~iliilii~~=:~:::y~!::::~:J!;~~:~:':~~!j~r~OI~~---- .----- - --inattentiveness, through sleeping or drawing during witness testimony,
may constitute misconduct. See Bolen, 143 Idaho at 440-41, 146 P.3d at
706-07. Here, Strange has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the juror's difficulty with hearing constitutes misconduct. The
complaints from the jurors dealt with what they considered bad acoustics
and a poor sound system. Aware of the problem during trial, the court
instructed defense counsel on separate occasions to speak louder. One
juror needed the use of a listening enhancement device, which was
provided. Post trial, the jurors, upon questioning, indicated that they were
able to hear the questions presented to the witnesses at trial as well as the
answers. The difficulty in hearing was not attributed to the jurors.
Therefore, the district court did not err in determining no juror misconduct
occurred.
Even if we assume the difficulty with hearing amounted to
misconduct, Strange failed to show he was prejudiced thereby. To
establish prejudice, a defendant must show the identity and duration of the
specific testimony, argument or instructions the juror missed. See, e.g.,
Chubb v. State, 640 N.E.2d 44, 48 (Ind.1994); Ratliff v. Commonwealth,
194 S.W.3d 258, 276 (Ky.2006); State v. Chestnut, 643 S.W.2d 343, 34647 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982); seeal-so.Statev. Hayes, 270 Kan. 535, 17 P.3d
317, 319-21 (2001) (reversing trial court's denial of motion for mistrial
based on juror's complete inability to hear defendant's testimony, which
violated defendant's rights to an impartial jury and due process). In this
case, the jurors who had difficulty hearing during the trial testified that
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
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their greatest difficulty was with hearing defense counsel when he was
sitting down at the defense table. Strange failed to identify any specific
portion of the trial that the jurors missed because they were having a hard
time hearing defense counsel. The general complaint expressed by the
jurors is insufficient to show prejudice. See, e.g., People v. King, 121 P.3d
234, 241-42 (Colo.Ct.App.2005); Durham v. State, 867 A.2d 176, 181
. (Del.2005).· The·-districtctmrtdid-noterrin"determining that-there was no
basis to determine that the jurors were unable to receive and consider fully
the evidence presented at trial.

Id. at 689, 214 P.3d at 675.
In the case at hand, the Petitioner fails to show by clear and convincing evidence
that jurors were sleeping, which rose to the level of juror misconduct. 7 Based upon the
evidence presented, the preponderance of the evidence supports a determination that the
jurors did not sleep during the presentation of evidence. Trial counsel was informed a

· ·-·· --· - - ·--jurormight be ,sleepy,or-sleeping'°After this r-eport, the-Gourt £ailed foF-a-lunch-reGess-.-----~ 0

The record does not indicate whether the recess was taken because jurors were not paying
attention, or because it was a reasonable time for a break based upon the flow of the
proceedings. Based upon the evidence presented, Grove's attorney acted in a manner that
fell within an objective standard of reasonableness.
Further, the Petitioner has failed to meet his burden to establish he was prejudiced
as a result of the alleged misconduct. Finally, there is no evidence in the record that had
defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial, that it would have been successful. Thus,
this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is dismissed.

The Petitioner relies on State v. Umphenour, S.Ct. No. 41497, 2015 WL 1423789 (Ct App. March 30,
2015) for the proposition that the Idaho Constitution requires that waiver of the right to a jury trial requires
the defendant's personal waiver. In the case at hand, because the Petitioner fails to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that jurors were sleeping, he cannot establish that his right to jury trial was
waived. Therefore, the case at hand is distinguishable from the waiver issue discussed in Umphenour.
7
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4. Whether defense counsel's performance during closing argument was
deficient.
Lastly, the Petitioner asserts that counsel's performance was deficient during
closing statements because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the
prosecuting attorney. 8 Further, defense counsel failed to mov~ for a mistrial or c~ative instruction following the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments.
The right to effective assistance extends to closing arguments. See Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 701-02 (2002); Herringv. New York, 422 U.S. 853,
865 [95 S.Ct. 2550, 2556--57, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 602] (1975). Nonetheless,
counsel has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client, and
deference to counsel's tactical decisions in his closing presentation is
particularly important because of the broad range of legitimate defense
strategy at that stage. Closing arguments should "sharpen and clarify the
issues for resolution by the trier of fact," Herring, 422 U.S. at 862 [95
S.Ct. at 2555, 45 L.Ed.2d at 600], but which issues to sharpen and how
-- -·- - .- ------ -bestt-0-elarifythemare-(!uestions-With.many.r.easonable-answers.-Indeed,..- - - --··---- ---~- ·--·
it might sometimes make sense to forgo closing argument altogether. See
Bell, 535 U.S. at 701-02 [122 S.Ct. at 1863-54, 152 L.Ed.2d at 931].
Judicial review of a defense attorney's summation is therefore highly
deferential. ...
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6, 124 S.Ct. 1, 4, 157 L.Ed.2d 1, 7-8
(2003).
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,348 P.3d 1, 123 (2015). In the case at hand, the
decision to not repeatedly object during closing arguments is a strategic decision.
Decision made by trial counsel during the presentation of closing arguments fell within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. From a strategic perspective, it is
The alleged instances of misconduct include:
1. The prosecutor misstating the defense position regarding pre-existing head injury as "some longterm brain injury"
2. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "caretakers kill little babies all the
time," that ''parents kill babies all the time," that "there are literally thousands of similar incidents
in any given span of time," and that "our local paper has shown ... probably sic more of these
cases since - since this one started." ·
3. The prosecutor argued that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking Kyler's body apart piece
by piece."
4. The prosecutor argued that ''we don't want to let a murderer go free."
5. The prosecutor argued without supporting evidence that the emotional breakdown of Grove at trial
showed that Grove had a different kind of emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that
morning, that resulted in these injuries."
24
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reasonable for a trial lawyer to refrain from objecting during closing arguments to all but
the most egregious misstatements made by opposing counsel. During closing argument,
Chapman presented a strategic and tactical argument based upon his theory of the case, as
· well as explained how the State faire·d-tomeeHhe·burdenof proof. Therefore, the.-, - .--.T~_,;:• .:., .....,,_

0 .",

.. ~-

Petitioner has not established the counsel's performance was deficient based on this
claim.
I

I

Further, even if counsel were deficient for failing to repeatedly object during the

11

l
l

closing statements, the Petitioner fails to prove prejudice. There is no reasonable

i1

probability that the outcome of the case would have been different if counsel had

il

objected. Therefore, the petitioner's claim is dismissed.

!

·-·-- -.·---- c-- - -

--5-.-. W-heth-er-cth-e.P-etitioner-cest-abli-sh-ed-ther-e wa~-cumulatbr..e.pr..ejudiciaLeffecL ___ _ ------- I
,l
of the totality of the deficient performance.
1:
1!
i!

The Petitioner asserts that separate errors by .counsel should be analyzed together

fl

. 1:l

to determine whether the cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to

lij

effective assistance of counsel. Having reviewed each claim separately and finding the

II

Petitioner has not met his burden of proof, there is no support for a claim of cumulative

i
I:
I·

1:

prejudicial effect. Therefore, the petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.

1:

CONCLUSION
The Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to present evidence on four separate

IIll

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the foregoing determinations, the

llI,,
,.

Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving he is entitled to relief on any of the claims.
Therefore, the Petitioner's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is dismissed.in

I

its entirety.

ij

Ii

11

11
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER; ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

!I

25

610

i1

!·l

!I

IJ

---':.._--:...::...::_:_~----_:.....::-...:..--,_-~

-

r-··-----~-~---~--=-·-~-------

- - - - - - - - - - - - ----------- -

----------,---------

ORDER
The Petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is hereby DISMISSED.

·IT ,IS =SO GRDERED.
0

DATED this

Q.5

·TL
day of August 2015.

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of
_the_FINDINGS_OF.FACT.., CONCLUSIONS OF ___ ~~- _____ ~·· ___ _
LAW AND ORDER; ORDER.RF~
MOTION TO RECONSIDER Wim1led,
postage prepaid, by the un ersigned at
Lewiston, Idaho, this
day of
August, 2015, to:
Dennis Benjamin
Deborah Whipple
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay and Barlett LLP
PO Box 2772
Boise ID 83701
Attorney General's Office
Jessica Lorello
Kenneth Jorgensen
Deputy Attorneys General
Criminal Law Division
PO Box 83720
Boise ID 83720-0010

PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)
)

STACEY LEWIS GROVE,

)

_ CASE Nfl._ _C_y_2_Ql2-l128 ______________
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)

)
)
)
)
)

V.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

FINAL JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: All claims contained within the
Petition for Post-Conviction relief are hereby DISMISSED.

,

DATED this

J.s

jl..

day of August 2015.

Carl B. Kerrick - District Judge
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
-··--··--·----------------

------···

)
)
)
--)

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV-12-01798
-~-

_-_.

.

.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, State ofldaho, AND ITS ATTORNEY,
the Ada County Prosecutor, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named Appellant, Stacey Grove, appeals against the above named
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment dismissing his petition for postconviction relief filed on the 25th day of August, 2015, the Honorable Carl Kerrick, presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l)
I.A.R.
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3. A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal is listed below which the Appellant
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent
the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: Did the Court err in failing to grant
Petitioner's Petition for Post Conviction Relief?
4. No order sealing any portion of the record has been issued.

5. Transcript:
(a) A reporter's transcript is requested.
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript in both hard copy and electronic format:
• 12/18/2012 Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
• 02/12/2013 Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
• 04/30/2013 Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: NIA
~•l"fl/28/26l3Hearing-"-eourtReporter:-Nancy-'fowler~--~--~"~ --- ~ --- - --- --- - - - Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
• 03/24/2015 and 03/25/2015 Evidentiary Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 325 PAGES
• 05/29/2015 Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included Rule 28, LA.R:
• 09/07/2012 Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Stevie Grove in Support of Verified Petition for Post
Conviction Relief
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Lori Stamper in Support of Verified Petition for Post
Conviction Relief
•09/07/2012 Affidavit of Carol Grove in Support Verified Petition for Post Conviction
Relief
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Lynette Walton in Support Verified Petition for Post
Conviction Relief
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Deborah Grove in Support Verified Petition for Post
Conviction Relief
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Jack Grove in Support Verified Petition for post Conviction
Relief
• 09/19/2012 Request for Judicial Notice
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• 10/01/2012 Affidavit of Karen Stamper in Support of Verified Petition for Post
Conviction Relief
• 10/01/2012 Affidavit of Craig Stamper in Support of Verified Petition for Post
Conviction Relief
• 10/05/2012 Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal and to Set for Hearing
• 10/10/2012 Objection to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and Motion for a
-More Definite Statement - , • 10/15/2012 Order Granting Request for Judicial Notice
• 10/15/2012 Order Granting Motion to Declare Petitioner a Needy Person
• 10/15/2012 Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition
• 11/28/2012 Affidavit of Eric Fredericksen
• 11/28/2012 Affidavit of Diane Walker
• 12/10/2012 Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin
• 12/13/2012 Affidavit of Jonathan L. Arden MD
• 12/18/2012 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition---State
• 01/02/2013 Amended Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief
• 02/06/2013 Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal
and to set for hearing
• 02/11/2013 Petitioner's Renewed Motion or Summary Disposition
• 03/15/2013 Petitioner's Brief Filed in Response to State's Motion for Summary

·-· - --, ...,,~ ~ - · --- fiispo-sition-andin-.. Support-of-Petitioner's-Motion.·-- --- --- -- -- ··--- -· ·- -·------·-· --- . __________ -- - - "'--- ---- -- --• 04/01/2013 Reply Brief in Support of State's Motion for Summary Disposition and
Response to Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary disposition
• 04/12/2013 Affidavit of Andrew Parnes
• 04/12/2013 Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Disposition
• 04/12/2013 2nd Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin
• 05/03/2013 Affidavit of Stacey Grove in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary
Disposition
• 05/08/2013 Motion to Strike---State
• 05/08/2013 Objection to State's Motion to Strike--Petitioner
• 07/11/2013 Opinion & Order on Motions for Summary Disposition
• 08/09/2013 Motion for Reconsideration---Petitioner
• 08/09/2013 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration---Petitioner
• 09/03/2013 Petitioner's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
• 11/21/2013 Opinion & Order on Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration---DENIED
• 04/09/2015 2nd Motion for Reconsideration
• 04/09/2015 Memorandum in Support of 2nd Motion for Reconsideration
• 04/16/2015 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration---Respondent
• 04/24/2015 Petitioner's Closing Argument
• 05/14/2015 Respondent's Post Evidentiary Hearing Closing Argument (original) .
• 05/15/2015 Petitioner's Rebuttal to Respondent's Closing Argument
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• 08/25/2015 Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law and Order; Order Denying
Motion to Reconsider
• 08/25/2015 Final Judgment
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:
• All Exhibits offered or admitted at evidentiary hearing.
8. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
• Nancy Towler, Nez Perce County Courthouse, P.O. Box 896, Lewiston, ID
83501

(b) That the Appellant has been found to be indigent and is exempted from paying the
estimated cost for the preparation of the transcript on appeal.
--c -,-,----------

---

-{c:J -rhaftheAppellanthas oeenfouncl tobe indigentand is exe:rnpted-from-p-ayin-g- the

----- --· - - ·-- -

estimated fee for the preparation of the record on appeal.
(d) That Appellant is exempt from paying the· appellate filing fee because there is no
filing fee for post-conviction petitions.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20
(and the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code).
Dated t h i ~ day of August, 2015.

~~...._~

~,~
Dennis Benjamin

.

Attorneys for Stacey Grove
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on Augu~ , 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be: mailed to:
• Nancy Towler, Official Court Reporter, Nez Perce County,Courthouse, P .0, Box.:896,- ----- -- ,
Lewiston, ID 83501
• Jessica Lorello and Kenneth Jorgensen, Deputy Attorneys General, Criminal Law
Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010
• Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0101
"".)L~

.

.

.

.

Dated thi~_ day of August, 2015.
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Fl LED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STACEY GROVE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

- - · ·-···- -

CASE NO. CV-12-01798
ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

c-'fhe-eourt;imvingumsideretl-Petitioner~·moti-on-forarrorder appointin-g-1heiJffice-uf-

~

- · - -- -

the State Appellate Public Defender to represent him on appeal and good cause appearing,

,,
HEREBY ORDERS that DennisiB~njamin and Deborah Whipple of Nevin, Benjamin, McKay &
l

:

¥·

'

Bartlett LLP are withdrawn as attorneys of record and hereby appoints the State Appellate Public

'

Defender to represent Mr. Grove from the final order and judgment entered in this case on
;f
;,
August 25, 2015.

sr

<~.L /-BC

DATED this-1..:.:__ day of~z015.

Qp;JL__<=)_
Hon. Carl Kerrick
District Judge

1 • ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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TO:

ClerkoftheCourt :·.: ·· •.
Idaho Supreme Court .. ·. ·. . . . : . .
P.O. Box 83720 .· ·
.. · , .........,_. .
Boise, ID 8374.0~0~?:.:~/:/·.
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( State of Idaho .

.NOTICE OF:'T.RANSCRIPT LODGED
~

Notice is ~ereb_~. giventhat
'

I

,•

I,•_.,,:•

.•:'

----·------·--··----·--·-------.

'

-~ ;

'

'

..

QJ Se~~¢:ajber 28, 2015, I, Nancy_K. Towler;

',''

•

'.• •

---···.·
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•
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.

-

•

--------·------ - -

~

-----------······

C.S.R., lodge4· rui ~lectroruftranscript.of434 pages in length for the above-referenced
;

appeal with

. :.

~

:.

,; t - • .

'

'

. •

.

. .•

·.

the Distrlti C6tirt~'Gl~rk. ciffu.~ County ()fNez Perce in

the Second Judicial District. ·
Included therein:

:

.,.

·,.', ••

..
...
..• ._,.. .

·--··

·,·:
•

:

..

l

He~g~ D.ecehl.ber 'ts, 2oi2;

: H~~g; Febrt1arfi2, 2013;'·· ... -

Oral Argument;April 30, 2013;.
'oral Argument, 'October 28, 2013;
.. Evidentiacy1Iearing,. March 24-25, 2015; and
'0riu_Argu:nien( :M:ay 29, 2ois. ·
···, . .

I also filed an electronic c~py wi:th the. Supreme Court of the State of Idaho on the
same date.

'·

::·'::-,'::.::·:::.~·i\/r}t-:'.:··~·~tlj_:.;~:(.;-. .'.:
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_N~cy K. Towler_ _ _ __

.' .

. :< /'.\.:~f i,it;:): .//{~:~ (.\.',,,;, _-. .Nancy K.Towler, C.S.R. #623
:.: .\ ..
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STACEY GROVE,

)
)

)
Petitioner-Appellant,··

SUPREME COURT NO. 43537

)

)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)

v.

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Respondent.

)

I, Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Nez Perce
County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the
exhibits offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the
Supreme Court or.,r~tai~ed as indicated.

IN WITNESS WHEREQF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of the .Court this

day of

t~o\}£,~

2015.

""

PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIB1TS
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Date: 11/4/2015

User:

Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County

Time: 11 :29 AM

BDAVENPORT

Exhibit Summary

Page 1 of 1

Case: CV-2012-0001798
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs· State Of Idaho, Defendant
Sorted by Exhibit Number
Storage Location

Number
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Description

Result

Property Item Number

State's exhibit #1
CD---sentencing exhibits
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY
HEARING 3-24-15
Petitioner's exhibit A, B & C
CD---contains all 3 exhibits and is ·
attached to the Petition for Post
Conviction Relief filed in
CV12-1798 can not be returned
because of being attached to
petition.
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY
HEARING 3-24-15
<. . ,,-.,; ,;3.,:.?
Petitioner's exhibit D
juror seating chart
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY
. _.:
HEARING 3-24-15
Petitioner's exhibitE · ·
newspaper clipping St Joseph
Recognizes Excellence-Ken
Loetscher
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY
HEARING 3-24-15
Petitioner's exhibit F
Reichard Autopsy Report
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY
HEARING 3-24-15
Petitioner's exhibit G ...
CD---Dr. Arden powerpoint : .·..
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY
HEARING 3-24-15
Petitioner's exhibit H
letter to Judge Kerrick dated
August2008
··
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY
HEARING 3-24-15 ....

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Lorello, Jessica M

Admitted

IN FILE

Assigned to:

Benjamin, Dennis

Petitioner's exhibit I
letter to Dan Spickler from Scott
Chapman dated 4-23~08. ..
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY
HEARING 3-25-15

iX<Admitted ,·•
,· As~igned

to:

· .: ·Admitted
Assigned to:

..... Admitted
.:•' .,'

.,:,·:··

Exhibit Vault

Co fJL\

~ssigned to:

Benjamin, Dennis

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Benjamin, Dennis

ct> c\ i6C-: ~nt

-- Proto c.cp---(
\f\dw:ta.J Or\ df5C:.,

-

D~!biDCop~.

1nd1..1t"ud on di 'c:>C

!=xhibit Vault
Benjamin, i;:>ennis

- Phoiv cop~ ·, r1 ct,.Jdlc1
an df5e:,,

'·-':. · ...

:>,·. ,'.,
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~n+

. ExhibitVault .

Exhibit Vault

,

\j

Benjamin, Dennis

~9rnitte~

~·,'

Coy'-\ ci disc

Benjamin, Dennis

Benjamin, Dennis

Assigned
to:.
.•
·.. .,.

Destroy or
Return Date

·· ·ExhibifVault-Large Chai

Assigpe9 to:

· Admitted

Destroy
Notification
Date

~.·

.

,,__

_J -

~- :_. '·;.:...::_.:_.:>

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE .STATE OF IDAHO
STACEY GROVE,
SUPREME COURT NO. 43537
Petitioner-Appellant,
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District0;f,t.h~.,:--St.ate of.Idaho, in and for .the County of
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound by me and
contains true and. correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and
papers designated to be included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate
Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and
additional documents that were requested.
I further certify:
1.

That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures
offered or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled
.
'
cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of
,

.

the Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and
the Clerk's Record. The above exhibits will be retained

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

623

in the possession of the undersigned, as required by
Rule 31 of the I.daho Appellate Rules.
2.

That the following will be submitted as confidential

exhibits to the record:
Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin-Exhibits Bl, B2, B3, B4,
B5, B6 filed December 10, 2012

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said.court this

\tJf\

day of

~1't~vi7ctl

2015.

By

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
;

'

)

STACEY GROVE,

)

)

SUPREME COURT NO. 43537

)

Petitioner-Appellant,

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)

)

v.

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Respondent.

1.

I, Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
.

.

.,

'

Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of

I
l

Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the Clerk's Record

I

and Reporter's Transcript were placed in the United States mail
and addressed to

·~'1.wf$Rq~ G..· Wai:ict'en; Attorney General, P. O.

Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 and Sara B. Thomas, SAPD, PO
Box 2816, Boise, ID

83701 this

/):!Jfllday oft/a~

2015.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of the said Court· this.

J5'fh day of ~hlltm~ 2015.
PATTY 0. WEEKS
CLERK

> :;~:_:}.~ ~ .·

B
~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVI

.. ~-,:. :.

.

cf'....

j

1
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